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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: J.M. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.M. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 849 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered May 15, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s):
2022 04414
BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: MARCH 5, 2024
J.M. appeals from the order entered by the Luzerne County Court of
Common Pleas (“trial court”), denying his petition to expunge the record of
his involuntary commitment under the Mental Health Procedures Act
(“MHPA”).1 J.M. argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his 302
commitment, and there was a violation of his due process rights provided by
the MHPA because he was not examined by a physician within two hours of
his arrival at the facility as required by 50 P.S. § 7302(b). Finding J.M.’s
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1 50 P.S. §§ 7101-7503, Act of Jul. 9, 1976, P.L. 817, as amended. The
legislature enacted the MHPA to establish procedures “to assure the
availability of adequate treatment to persons who are mentally ill.” 50 P.S.
§ 7102. Relevant herein, the MHPA governs involuntary emergency
examination and treatment, also known as a “302 commitment.” Id. § 7302.
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contentions to be unsupported by the record and/or the applicable law, we
affirm.
In the months leading up to November 2020, J.M. engaged in various
arguments with his neighbors. According to J.M., his neighbors threatened to
burn down his home. On November 30, 2020, J.M. called his sister, A.J., to
seek her help with his neighbors. During the call, J.M. told his sister that his
neighbors were going to kill him; their father was racist and was helping the
neighbors cover up their threats; and the police were in on the neighbors’
plan. J.M. told A.J. that if she called the police or sent anyone else to his
home, he would shoot them “on sight” with one of his guns.
A.J. filed an application for involuntary emergency examination and
treatment (“MH–783 Form”),2 indicating that J.M. was severely mentally
disabled and a danger to others. A.J. also requested that “[t]he County
Administrator issue[] a warrant authorizing a policeman or someone
representing the County Administrator to take the patient to a facility for
examination and treatment.” MH–783 Form, 11/30/2020, Part I (Application).
Edward Hayes, a crisis clinician, requested and obtained authorization for
transportation of J.M. to an approved facility for his warrantless examination
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2 The Pennsylvania Department of Human Services issues the MH–783 form
for use in connection with 302 commitments. See 55 Pa. Code § 5100.86(a)
(“Written applications, warrants, and written statements made under section
302 of the [MHPA] (50 P.S. § 7302), shall be made on Form MH–783 issued
by the Department.”).
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because he was an immediate danger. Id., Part II (Authorization for
Transportation to an Approved Facility for Examination Without a Warrant).
In the interim, J.M.’s father came to his house. J.M. asked his father to
leave. Thereafter, J.M. called his father. A police officer answered his father’s
phone, at which point J.M. discovered a large police presence at his home.
After speaking with the officer, J.M. willingly accompanied police to the
emergency room at Wilkes-Barre General Hospital.
J.M. arrived at the hospital at 11:01 p.m. Adharsh Sahadevan, M.D.
(“Dr. Sahadevan”), a physician, examined J.M. at 11:11 p.m. During the
examination, J.M. told Dr. Sahadevan that his neighbors and his father were
members of the Ku Klux Klan, his neighbors were trying to poison him, and
that he would shoot anyone who came onto his property.
Based upon the information available to him, Dr. Sahadevan found that
J.M. had poor insight and judgment and concluded that J.M. was severely
mentally disabled and needed to be admitted into an inpatient psychiatric unit
for treatment for a period not to exceed 120 hours. However, Dr. Sahadevan
did not sign the MH–783 Form immediately because J.M. first requested a
face-to-face meeting with a psychiatrist and one was not available to evaluate
J.M. until the following morning at 9:30 a.m. Dr. Sahadevan ultimately signed
the MH–783 Form at 10:00 a.m. on December 1, 2020, and J.M. was
transferred to First Hospital in Kingston for treatment.
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J.M. stayed at First Hospital for eight days, where he had counseling
sessions every other day. First Hospital discharged J.M. with a diagnosis of
persecutory delusions and unspecified psychosis, prescribing him medication
that he took for two months following his release. Additionally, J.M. met with
a counselor for six to eight months after his release. Thereafter, the counselor
referred J.M. to licensed psychologist, Abby Russin, Ph.D. (“Dr. Russin”), for
a mental health evaluation. On February 20, 2022, Dr. Russin issued a report
in which she noted that J.M. originally thought his neighbors vandalized his
home to harm him, but came to realize that the neighbors were just trying to
annoy him. Dr. Russin further stated that J.M. was cooperative and had good
judgment and insight.
On May 19, 2022, J.M. filed a counseled petition for the expungement
of his 302 commitment and restoration of his firearm rights.3 In the petition,
J.M. sought expungement because the evidence was insufficient to support
his 302 commitment. He further asserted a due process violation based upon
the alleged failure of a physician to evaluate him within two hours of his arrival
at the hospital as the law requires. The trial court held a hearing at which
J.M. testified and the parties entered the MH–783 Form and Dr. Russin’s report
into evidence. The trial court denied J.M.’s request for expungement but
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3 Based upon his 302 commitment J.M. was prohibited from possessing a
firearm. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(4).
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granted his request for restoration of his firearm rights. J.M. filed a timely
notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement.
On appeal, J.M. raises the following questions for our review:
1. Whether insufficient evidence existed to support the
involuntary commitment of J.M.?
2. Whether J.M.’s due process rights were violated, thus requiring
the expungement of his involuntary commitment, when J.M.
was not evaluated by a physician within two hours of his arrival
at the hospital as required by 50 P.S. § 7302(b)?
J.M.’s Brief at 4.
“We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for expunction for an
abuse of its discretion.” In re J.G.F., 295 A.3d 265, 269 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(citation omitted).
In his first claim, J.M. contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support his involuntary commitment. J.M.’s Brief at 11, 15. J.M. argues that
the alleged threats listed in the MH-783 Form did not target a specific person
but were conditional statements to prevent his sister from sending anyone to
his home. Id. at 13-14. J.M. asserts that if his sister had not done anything,
he would not have been a threat to anyone; therefore, he reasons, the alleged
threat was not likely to occur. Id. at 14. J.M. highlights that when provided
the opportunity to carry out his threat to the police, he did not do so, and he
instead voluntarily accompanied them to the hospital without brandishing a
firearm or threatening anyone. Id. at 13, 14, 15. According to J.M., when a
physician is determining whether a person is a danger to others, the law
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requires consideration of what would occur without treatment, which in this
case was nothing. Id. at 14-15.
The trial court found sufficient evidence existed to support J.M.’s 302
commitment. Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/2023, at 22. Specifically, the trial
court observed that J.M. warned A.J. that he would shoot anyone she sent to
his property “on sight.” Id. at 21. Therefore, J.M. made a threat to “others”
on November 30, 2020. Id. The trial court also found that J.M. committed
an act in furtherance of his threat by articulating a specific plan to harm
anyone who came onto his property, including police and neighbors. Id. at
21-22. The trial court gave deference to Dr. Sahadevan’s findings and
conclusion that J.M.’s threat was credible, was severely mentally disabled, and
needed inpatient treatment. Id. at 22.
Pennsylvania law provides an avenue for a person involuntarily
committed pursuant to section 302 of the MHPA to have a court conduct a
limited review of the propriety of the commitment:
A person who is involuntarily committed pursuant to section
302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act may petition the court to
review the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the commitment
was based. If the court determines that the evidence upon which
the involuntary commitment was based was insufficient, the court
shall order that the record of the commitment submitted to the
Pennsylvania State Police be expunged.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2); see also In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 237 (Pa.
2017) (“The plain language of Section 6111.1(g)(2) requires a court of
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common pleas to review only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
302 commitment.”).
[U]nder section 6111.1(g)(2), a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence to support a 302 commitment presents a pure
question of law, and the court’s sole concern is whether, based on
the findings recorded by the physician and the information he or
she relied upon in arriving at those findings, the precise,
legislatively-defined prerequisites for a 302 commitment have
been satisfied and are supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. We emphasize that the trial court’s review is limited to
the findings recorded by the physician and the information he or
she relied upon in arriving at those findings, and requires
deference to the physician, as the original factfinder, as the
physician examined and evaluated the individual in the first
instance, was able to observe his or her demeanor, and has
particularized training, knowledge and experience regarding
whether a 302 commitment is medically necessary.
In re B.W., 250 A.3d 1163, 1167 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). “Section
6111.1(g)(2) does not ... authorize a trial court to ‘redecide the case,’
operating as a ‘substitute’ for the physician who originally decided the 302
commitment was medically necessary.” In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 244 (Pa.
2017) (citations and brackets omitted). To that end, “given that we are
reviewing a Section 6111.1(g)(2) expungement ruling, we are limited to
considering the evidence the physician knew at the time of the 302
commitment.” In re B.W., 250 A.3d at 1170.
Pursuant to section 302 of the MHPA, “[a] person taken to a facility shall
be examined by a physician within two hours of arrival in order to determine
if the person is severely mentally disabled within the meaning of section
301(b) and in need of immediate treatment.” 50 P.S. § 7302(b). If the
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examining physician determines “that the person is severely mentally disabled
and in need of emergency treatment, treatment shall be begun immediately”
and may continue for up to “120 hours.” Id. § 7302(b), (d). An individual is
“severely mentally disabled” if “as a result of mental illness, his capacity to
exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and
social relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he
poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or himself.” Id. § 7301(a).
"[A] clear and present danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by
proof that the person has made threats of harm and has committed acts in
furtherance of the threat to commit harm.” Id. § 7301(b)(1). “[T]he
articulation of a specific plan to harm an identified target that is deemed
credible by medical professionals is sufficient to prove an act in furtherance of
the threat to commit harm.” B.W., 250 A.3d at 1175.
Here, in the MH–783 Form, A.J. stated that J.M. thought his neighbors
were going to kill him and that their father was covering up this plan. MH–
783 Form, Part I. A.J. indicated J.M. was yelling while making these
statements. Id. When A.J. told J.M. to call the police, he refused, stating
that the police were in on the plan with his neighbors. Id. J.M. told A.J. that
if she called the police or sent anyone else to his house, he would “shoot them
on sight.” Id., Part I, Addendum. A.J. noted that J.M. had multiple guns in
his home. Id.
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This information was available and presented to Dr. Sahadevan, the
physician who conducted the emergency examination after J.M. came to the
hospital. As mentioned above, Dr. Sahadevan found that J.M. had “poor
insight and judgment.” Id., Part VI (Physician’s Examination). Dr. Sahadevan
stated that J.M. believed his neighbors and his father were members of the
Ku Klux Klan4 and that his neighbors were trying to “poison his home.” Id.
Dr. Sahadevan noted that J.M. said to him that he would shoot anyone who
came onto his property. Id. Dr. Sahadevan concluded that that J.M. was
“severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment. He should be admitted
to a facility designated by the County Administrator for a period not to exceed
120 hours.” Id.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the
preponderance of the evidence supports Dr. Sahadevan’s determination that
J.M. was severely mentally disabled and in need of involuntary commitment.
See In re B.W., 250 A.3d at 1170. J.M.’s plan was fully formed as it detailed
the targets of the threat (his neighbors and police) and the manner of carrying
out the threat (shooting them on sight if they came onto his property with one
of the guns he had in his possession). See Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/2023, at
22 (giving “deference to Dr. Sahadevan’s conclusion that J.M. was severely
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4 At the hearing on J.M.’s petition for expungement, J.M. testified that his
neighbors had threatened to burn down his house if he brought a “person of
color” into his home. N.T., 9/30/2023, at 8.
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mentally disabled,” and that Dr. Sahadevan found J.M.’s threats to be
credible); see also In re B.W., 250 A.3d at 1176 (concluding that “engaging
in the planning process by conducting research or expressing a detailed plan
constitute acts in furtherance of a threat under the MHPA”).
The evidence in the contemporaneously created record at the time of
the involuntary commitment was sufficient to demonstrate that J.M. was a
clear and present danger to others. See id. at 1176-77 (concluding that an
articulation of a specific plan to harm a coworker that is deemed credible by
medical professionals is sufficient to prove acts in furtherance of threat to
commit harm to another); In re Woodside, 699 A.2d 1293, 1296-97 (Pa.
Super. 1997) (concluding that appellant’s threat that he would get a scope
and rifle and get rid of his estranged wife, combined with the purchase of a
rifle scope from a sporting goods store on the day of his commitment,
constituted an overt act in furtherance of the threat to harm his wife).
J.M. does not include any citation to relevant case law to support his
argument that he had to specifically identify a police officer or any other
person by name to meet the threats and acts formulation. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a) (noting that an argument must be supported by relevant citation to
authority). The plain language of the statute does not require the
identification of a specific person; instead, it clearly states that the person
must pose “a clear and present danger of harm to others.” 50 P.S. § 7301(a)
(emphasis added); see also id. § 7301(b) (stating “a clear and present
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danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by proof that the person has
made threats of harm and has committed acts in furtherance of the threat to
commit harm”).
We further reject J.M.’s argument that his peaceful transfer to the
hospital without shooting or attempting to shoot the police established that
he did not commit acts in furtherance of the threat as required to establish
that he is a “clear and present danger” of harming others. See supra, p.8.
As we have previously recognized, “the plain language of the MHPA does not
require an overt act in furtherance of the threat” to establish a person is a
clear and present danger of harm to others; a plan to commit an act is
sufficient. In re B.W., 250 A.3d at 1177. Since the trial court is required to
defer to Dr. Sahadevan’s findings, and the record supports the doctor’s
conclusion that J.M. was a clear and present danger to others, we find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that the evidence
supported Dr. Sahadevan’s conclusion that J.M. was severely mentally
disabled, requiring immediate inpatient treatment. See 50 P.S. § 7302(b).
In his second claim, J.M. contends that his involuntary commitment
should be expunged based upon a violation of his due process rights under
the MHPA. J.M.’s Brief at 15-19. In particular, J.M. alleges that a physician
failed to evaluate him within two hours of his arrival at the hospital. Id. at
15. J.M. argues that he arrived at the facility at 11:01 p.m. on November 30,
2020, but that a psychiatrist did not evaluate him until 10:00 a.m. on
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December 1, 2020. Id. at 16. According to J.M., a medical doctor checked
his vital signs upon arriving at the hospital and then placed him in a hallway
for twelve hours until the psychiatrist examined him the next morning. Id. at
16-7. J.M. claims that merely checking his vital signs, which any nurse or
nursing assistant could do, fails to satisfy the examination requirement of the
MHPA. Id. at 17. J.M. further asserts that there was no need for immediate
treatment if a physician does not need to see a patient within two hours of
arriving at the facility. Id. at 18. J.M. additionally argues that the trial court’s
consideration of the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to comply with the two-
hour limit was improper and cannot be used to avoid his due process rights.5
Id. at 19.
As our discussion above reflects, section 6111.1(g)(2) provides a
mechanism for a person to petition the common pleas court to review the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a 302 commitment. See 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 6111.1(g)(2); see also In re Vencil, 152 A.3d at 237 (“The plain language
of Section 6111.1(g)(2) requires a court of common pleas to review only the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the 302 commitment.”) (emphasis
added). Section 6111.1(g)(2) does not, however, allow for expungement
based upon purported due process violations or procedural irregularities
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5 This argument is in response to the trial court’s opinion, wherein it stated
that “J.M.’s request to see a psychiatrist in person, during the height of the
COVID-19 pandemic, caused a delay to Dr. Sahadevan signing the Report.”
Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/2023, at 36.
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related to a 302 commitment. See In re P.M., 230 A.3d 454, 458 (Pa. Super.
2020) (rejecting petitioner’s due process claim as a means to expunge his
section 302 commitment). As our Supreme Court observed,
a section 6111.1(g)(2) review is not a direct appeal from a 302
commitment and the interest at stake under 6111.1(g)(2) is not
one’s right to liberty. The infringement upon [a petitioner’s]
liberty occurred when []he was involuntarily committed pursuant
to section 302 of the MHPA. By the time a section 6111.1(g)(2)
petition is filed, the liberty deprivation has ended. A sufficiency
review pursuant to section 6111.1(g)(2) of the Uniform Firearms
Act is merely a mechanism to expunge the [Pennsylvania State
Police] record of an individual’s 302 commitment to remove this
barrier to his or her possession and control of firearms.
In re Vencil, 152 A.3d at 245.
Here, J.M.’s second basis for his expungement request is based upon a
claimed due process violation regarding the alleged failure of a physician to
evaluate him within two hours of arriving at the hospital as required by the
MHPA. See J.M.’s Brief at 15-19. As this is not a means for obtaining
expungement of a 302 commitment, we cannot grant J.M. relief on this claim.
See In re Vencil, 152 A.3d at 245; In re P.M., 230 A.3d at 458.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/05/2024
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