[J-37-2023] [MO: Brobson, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WESTERN DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 41 WAP 2022
:
Appellant : Appeal from the Order of the
: Superior Court entered June 23,
: 2022 at No. 601 WDA 2021,
v. : vacating the Order of the Court of
: Common Pleas of Allegheny County
: entered April 14, 2021 at No. CP-02-
RONNIE LEHMAN, : CR-0003380-2018, and remanding.
:
Appellee : SUBMITTED: June 21, 2023
CONCURRING OPINION
JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: MARCH 21, 2024
I agree with the Majority that Appellee Ronnie Lehman was “committed to”
Renewal Center at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance in violation
of Section 113(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act
(“Controlled Substance Act”), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). As such, I further agree with the
Majority’s conclusion that Lehman was an “inmate” as that term is used and defined in
Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(a.2), (e), at the time of his
offense. The Majority, therefore, correctly concludes that Lehman’s trial and appellate
counsel were not ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction under Section 5123(a.2).
I disagree, however, with the Majority’s conclusion that the language of Sections
5123(a.2) and (e) is plain and unambiguous. Rather, I would find that the language is
ambiguous as it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation. Specifically, while I
do not agree with the Superior Court’s determination that Lehman was not an inmate at
the time of his offense, I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that the lower court’s
interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. Section 5123(a.2) states that “a prisoner or
inmate commits a felony of the second degree if he unlawfully has in his possession or
under his control any controlled substance in violation of” Section 113(a)(16) of the
Controlled Substance Act. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(a.2). Subsection (e) defines an “inmate”
as “[a] male or female offender who is committed to, under sentence to or confined in a
penal or correctional institution.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(e). Unlike the Majority, I find the
phrase “committed to” to be ambiguous and as such the Court must turn to the factors
set forth in Section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c), and
other rules of statutory construction. See Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n., Inc. v. Pub. Sch. Emps.
Ret. Bd., 863 A.2d 432, 436 (Pa. 2004). While the Majority finds the statutory language
at issue unambiguous, it also sets out the statutory construction principles courts take
into account when statutory language is ambiguous. See Maj. Op. at 11-12. Particularly
instructive is the discussion of the legislative intent of Section 5123(a.2), which makes
clear the General Assembly’s goal in enacting the statute was total abstinence of
controlled substances by inmates. See id. That goal is furthered by the Majority’s
conclusion that Lehman was “committed to” Renewal Center and, thus, an “inmate” as
those terms are used in Sections 5123(a.2), (e). As such, I concur with the Majority’s
holding.
Justice Dougherty joins this concurring opinion.
[J-37-2023] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 2