IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 22–1367
Submitted January 23, 2024—Filed March 22, 2024
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
SCOTT RANDOLPH LUKE,
Appellant.
On review from Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Karen
Kaufman Salic, District Associate Judge.
A defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision affirming
his prison sentence for domestic abuse assault second, contending that the
district court abused its discretion and failed to give reasons for consecutive
sentences. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.
Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen,
C.J., and McDonald, Oxley, and May, JJ., joined. McDermott, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Waterman, J., joined.
Karmen R. Anderson of Anderson & Taylor, PLLC, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General for appellee.
2
MANSFIELD, Justice.
Antipholus of Syracuse. Shall I tell you why?
Dromio of Syracuse. Ay, sir, and wherefore, for they say every why
hath a wherefore.
William Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors act 2, sc. 2, ll. 44–46.
I. Introduction.
Iowa law gives district courts the discretion to determine if sentences
should be served concurrently or consecutively. But the law also requires the
court to state its reasons—the whys and wherefores—for doing so.
In this case, the defendant committed domestic abuse assault while on
probation for previously committing two other domestic abuse assaults. After he
pleaded guilty, the district court sentenced him to two years in prison for the
latter offense, revoked his probation and sent him to prison on the earlier
offenses, and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. The defendant
appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to
prison on the current domestic abuse assault charge. He also argued that the
district court failed to adequately state its reasons for running the sentences
consecutively. The court of appeals affirmed. It held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in imposing a prison term for the latest offense. It also
held “by the slimmest of margins” that the district court’s statement of reasons
for consecutive sentences was sufficient.
On further review, we affirm the district court and the court of appeals. At
the sentencing hearing, the district court gave the defendant a detailed and
personalized explanation for why it was sending him to prison. Although the
district court did not specifically discuss reasons for running that sentence
consecutively to the sentence imposed on the probation revocation, it cured that
omission in the written sentencing order, which referenced the reasons “stated
3
on the record” as a ground for consecutive sentences. Additionally, the sentence
imposed was well within the district court’s broad discretion. Accordingly, we
find no error in the defendant’s sentence.
II. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In 2021, Scott Luke pleaded guilty to domestic abuse assault
(strangulation) and domestic abuse assault (second offense), both aggravated
misdemeanors, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.2A(2)(d) (2021) and
708.2A(3)(b). On the strangulation charge, Luke was sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term not to exceed two years. On the second offense charge,
he was sentenced to 365 days in jail. All but thirty days were suspended, and he
was placed on probation for two years.
The following year, Luke violated the terms of his probation by committing
another domestic assault. On the evening of April 6, 2022, at around 9:00 p.m.,
the Mason City Police Department received a call regarding a domestic dispute
between Luke and A.L.
Officer Tiedemann was the first to arrive at the residence, less than ten
minutes later. He knocked on the door multiple times before Luke and A.L.
answered together. According to Officer Tiedemann, A.L. “immediately came out
and started showing [him] red marks around her collar bone area” and “some
scratches on her neck.” A.L. also had visible bruising on her side. A.L. reported
that Luke had choked her to the point where she briefly became unconscious.
Luke had also asked her if she wanted to die. Meanwhile, Luke claimed that he
“never touched her.” He suggested the scratch marks had come from the children
and the bruises from the dog.
Luke was arrested and transported to the Cerro Gordo County jail. He was
booked on one count of domestic abuse assault, strangulation with bodily injury.
4
A.L. went to the hospital that evening. Photographs showed injuries to A.L.’s
elbow, hand, ribcage, neck, and chest.
Luke was later charged by trial information with domestic abuse assault
impeding breathing or circulation of blood causing bodily injury, a class “D”
felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2)(a) (2022), 708.2A(1), and
708.A(5).
In July 2022, the State and Luke entered into a written plea agreement
that was approved by the district court. The current charge against Luke was
reduced to domestic abuse assault second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor.
Iowa Code § 708.2A(3)(b). Luke pleaded guilty to that charge without an
agreement as to disposition.
On August 15, the district court held a combined hearing on Luke’s
probation revocation and his sentencing on the current charge. The State asked
for the original sentence to be imposed on the probation revocation and for a
two-year sentence to be imposed on the current domestic abuse assault second
charge. Luke requested contempt as a sanction for the probation violation and
no more than a suspended sentence. Luke waived his right of allocution.
The district court revoked probation on the earlier charges and imposed
the original prison term; the court also sentenced Luke to two years in prison on
the current domestic abuse assault second charge. Before orally pronouncing
sentence on the current charge, the district court stated that it would consider
Luke’s need for rehabilitation and the need to protect the community. The
district court then commented specifically on Luke’s reaction to the reading of
the victim-impact statement, stating:
Mr. Luke, you know, obviously during the reading of the
Victim Impact Statement, you had difficulty even listening to that
and kind of restraining yourself. I totally get that you don’t agree
with some of the things that she said. I’m unable to attribute any
5
sort of cause for PTSD on your victim’s part or any of those sorts of
things so, I mean, there’s limited things in that that I can consider,
but I certainly can consider your almost inability to contain yourself
despite your attorney’s efforts. You’ve committed at this point at
least with these two cases I have here two assaults against this
woman and you appear to have no remorse for that.
....
You appear to minimize your behavior.1
Regarding Luke’s potential for rehabilitation, the court added,
At some point you have to interact with people differently than
you do. That may be impacted if you aren’t taking your medications
or whatever is going on, I don’t have any clue on those things, but,
you know, that’s something that’s within your control whether you
take your medications as prescribed or not. You obviously need
them, they’re beneficial when you take them, and I don’t know if that
factored into the situation or not. You obviously have a lot of things
going on in your family dynamic. The department is involved; you’ve
lost a child, which is heartbreaking for any parent. You’re obviously
without the coping mechanisms to deal with that in a healthy, law-
abiding way. Those circumstances have been in place for a long time
with the department. I think it’s even something that I was told when
we had your sentencing on your other case, which was I think a year
ago tomorrow, and things are not improving. The idea of continuing
to try to handle this where you do something illegal, you get arrested,
you sit in jail for a while, you get out, it’s just going to keep repeating
itself until you make some significant changes, and I recognize, you
know, . . . all those other things that [your attorney] listed, doing the
[Iowa Domestic Abuse Program], but, you know, none of that was
sufficient to keep us from getting back in here and having the same
thing all over again, and, you know, there’s a point at which the
scale kind of tips on whether we believe we can address your issues
in the community or whether you need to be in prison, and, you
know, Mr. Luke, we’re at that point.
A few moments later, after addressing the no-contact order and some other
matters, the district court also ordered that the probation revocation sentence
and the current sentence be served “consecutively to each other” without further
1Although Luke claimed to have remorse, moments earlier Luke had characterized his
own behavior as merely “yelling at [A.L.] and causing her emotional damage.”
6
explanation. Subsequently, the court entered a written sentencing order that
stated,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that taking into account
Defendant’s age, attitude, criminal history, and employment,
financial and family circumstances, as well as the nature of the
offense, including whether a weapon or force was used in the
commission of the offense, the recommendations of the parties, and
other matters reflected in the Court file and record, for the protection
of society and rehabilitation of Defendant:
Prison. Pursuant to Iowa Code Sections 901.5, 902.3 and
902.9, Defendant is committed to the custody of the director of the
Iowa Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term, not to
exceed two years. The Sheriff shall transport Defendant to the
reception center designated by DOC. Defendant shall be given credit
for time previously served in connection with this offense. For the
reasons set forth above and/or stated on the record, the
sentence shall be served CONSECUTIVELY to the sentence(s)
imposed in [the probation revocation case].
Luke appealed this sentence. He argued that the district court abused its
discretion when it sentenced him to a period of incarceration and that it also
failed to articulate the reasons for running the sentence consecutively to, rather
than concurrent with, his sentence on the probation revocation. We transferred
the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court,
although it did so unenthusiastically with respect to the reasons given for
consecutive sentences. After quoting the written sentencing order, the court
observed,
We find this statement of reasons sufficient—by the slimmest of
margins—to explain the decision to impose consecutive sentences
. . . . The spirit of the requirement of giving reasons for imposing
consecutive sentences would be better met by stating specific
reasons on the record rather than in nonspecific language in the
written sentencing order that follows.
We accepted Luke’s application for further review.
7
III. Standard of Review.
We review challenges to sentences within the statutory limits for an “abuse
of discretion.” State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v.
Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2015)). “A district court abuses its discretion
when it exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent
clearly unreasonable.” State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Iowa 2016). A “ground
or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when
it is based on an erroneous application of the law.” Id. (quoting State v. Putman,
848 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2014)).
IV. Legal Analysis.
As we have noted, Luke appeals his sentence on the April 2022 domestic
abuse assault second on two grounds.2
A. Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion in Imposing a Prison
Sentence? First, Luke argues that the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing him to two years in prison rather than time served. According to him,
the court should have considered “other, less invasive options” like “halfway
houses, work release programs, and intensive probation” and “the amount of
pretrial incarceration” before sending him to prison.
To shape this argument, Luke emphasizes that he “spent more than four
months incarcerated” before being sentenced. According to Luke, this was a
significant punishment and “would have taught him a valuable lesson about
cause and effect and suffering the consequences of your actions.” Further, he
2Generally, Iowa law bars defendants who have pleaded guilty from appealing absent good
cause. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). We have said “that the good-cause requirement is satisfied
in this context when the defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed
to in the plea bargain.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020). As the State concedes,
Luke is appealing his sentence, and his sentence was not mandatory or agreed to in the plea
agreement. Thus, Luke has good cause to appeal.
8
points to potentially mitigating personal facts to argue that no further
imprisonment was warranted. These include his history with bipolar disorder,
lack of access to proper medications, age, education level, criminal history, and
the fact that one of his children had recently passed away. While Luke advances
reasons why he believes a prison sentence was not warranted, Luke does not
claim that the district court considered an improper factor in making its
sentencing decision.
In our judicial system, district court sentencing decisions are given “a
significant amount of latitude because of the ‘discretionary nature of judging and
the source of the respect afforded by the appellate process.’ ” State v. McCalley,
972 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 133
(Iowa 2021)). “Sentencing decisions that fall within the statutory limits are
‘cloaked with a strong presumption in [their] favor.’ ” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Fetner, 959 N.W.2d at 134).
We find that the reasons given orally by the district court at the sentencing
hearing speak for themselves and demonstrate that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing Luke to two years in prison.
B. Did the District Court Fail to Give Adequate Reasons for
Consecutive Sentences? Next, Luke argues that the district court failed to
provide sufficient reasons for ordering his sentence to be served consecutively to
the sentence resulting from his probation revocation.
At the time Luke was sentenced, Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23
provided, “The court shall state on the record its reason for selecting the
particular sentence.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d) (2022).3 This rule has been
3The rule was recently revised as part of the comprehensive review and revision of the
Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consistent with prior caselaw, it now provides, “The court
9
interpreted as requiring district courts to give reasons for imposing consecutive
sentences. See Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 273 (“Rule 2.23(3)(d) applies to the district
court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences.”).
Rule 2.23(3)(d)—now rule 2.23(2)(g)—serves two purposes in our view.
First, it “ensures defendants are well aware of the consequences of their criminal
actions.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa 2014). Second, it
“affords our appellate courts the opportunity to review the discretion of the
sentencing court.” Id.
In State v. Hill, we held that rule 2.23(3)(d) required the district court to
state the reasons for consecutive sentencing even when the underlying statute
set forth a presumption of consecutive sentences. 878 N.W.2d at 273.
The defendant in Hill had been convicted of burglary and assault with
intent to commit sexual abuse and had served time in prison. Id. at 271. While
on parole, he then committed a string of acts that violated the sex offender
registration requirements and was charged accordingly. Id. The defendant
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years in prison to be served
consecutively with his parole revocation. Id. at 272.
The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court “failed to provide
adequate reasons for the consecutive sentence.” Id. On the record, the court had
orally stated, “The reason for the sentence is protection of the community,
seriousness of the crime, and the nature and circumstances of the offense.” Id.
In the sentencing order, the court simply wrote that the sentence was “to run
consecutive to the parole revocation.” Id. We concluded that the district court
did enough to justify the two-year sentence but not enough to explain why that
sentence would be consecutive to the sentence resulting from the parole
shall state on the record the basis for the sentence imposed and shall particularly state the reason
for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g) (2023) (emphasis added).
10
revocation. Id. at 274. Although the same reasons could support both an
underlying sentence and a consecutive-sentencing decision, here “the district
court, when giving reasons for [the defendant’s] sentence, did not explicitly state
the same reasons supported making the sentence consecutive.” Id. at 274.
Again, we stated in Hill that “[s]entencing courts should also explicitly
state the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence, although in doing so the
court may rely on the same reasons for imposing a sentence of incarceration.”
Id. at 275.
Hill did not come out of the blue. Our precedent required district courts to
state reasons for consecutive sentences. See State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679,
690 (Iowa 2000); State v. Harrington, 349 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Iowa 1984),
abrogated on other grounds by Ryan v. Arneson, 422 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1988);
State v. Jason, 779 N.W.2d 66, 77 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009).
Separately, we have held that a “boilerplate” statement of reasons does not
satisfy rule 2.23(3)(d) and that something more specific is required. See State v.
Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001) (en banc). For example, in State v.
Lumadue, the court utilized “a pre-printed ‘Prison Order’ which included the
following statement: ‘The Court has determined that this sentence will provide
reasonable protection of the public. Probation is denied because it is
unwarranted.’ ” Id. We held that this “boilerplate” did not meet the requirements
of the rule. Id.
The outcome in Lumadue makes sense because otherwise courts could
sidestep the requirements of rule 2.23 and avoid making any explanation for the
sentence simply by reusing a one-size-fits-all form. See also State v. Cooper,
403 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (“The present record, far from
articulating the rationale behind the court’s choice of sentence, states only
generalized, vague considerations which we may assume advise every court in
11
making every sentencing decision: the circumstances of the offense and the
defendant’s background.”).
In State v. Thacker, we again condemned a standardized sentencing order.
862 N.W.2d 402, 408–10 (Iowa 2015). There too, the written sentencing order
was the only statement of reasons for the defendant’s sentence. See id. at 404.
The order stated, “The following sentence is based on all of the available
SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS set out in Iowa Code Section 907.5.” Id.
Additionally, the district court had checked a box on the order that said “The
Plea Agreement” was “the most significant [factor] in determining [the] particular
sentence.” Id. (second alteration in original). Nothing else in the record indicated
that the parties’ plea agreement included an agreement as to sentence. Id. at
410. We upheld the defendant’s challenge to her sentence. Id. at 408–10.
Likewise, in State v. Thompson, we held that a check-the-box form for the
sentencing did not meet rule 2.23 standards unless specific boxes were actually
marked. 856 N.W.2d at 921. Again, the written order was the only record of the
sentence. Id. at 917. The order stated that the sentence was “based on all the
available SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS set out in Iowa Code Section 907.5.”
Id. at 918. It then read, “The court finds the following factors the most significant
in determining this particular sentence: . . . .” Id. Underneath, the order listed
fifteen options with checkboxes. Id. It was intended that the district court would
mark the most relevant boxes. See id. The list included items such as “the nature
and circumstances of the crime,” “protection of the public from further offenses,”
and the like. Id.
Yet, the district court had failed to mark any of the options. Id. We held
that under the circumstances, this did not amount to a valid statement of
reasons. See id. at 921. Still we added that if properly filled out, such a
12
check-the-box form would be an acceptable way to express the reasons for a
sentence. Id. As we explained,
In this age of word processing, judges can use forms, such as the
one available in this case, to check the boxes indicating the reasons
why a judge is imposing a certain sentence. . . . If the sentencing
order does not have boxes similar to the ones in this case, the judge
can use his or her word processor to insert the reasons for a
particular sentence.
Id.
Applying these principles here, we conclude that the district court went
significantly beyond what we criticized in Lumadue, Thacker, and Thompson. For
the most part, it did what a sentencing court should do. The court gave an
on-the-record explanation, based on appropriate factors and tailored to the facts
and circumstances of the specific case, for why it was sending Luke to prison.
Its only oversight was that it failed to give any reasons at the hearing for
consecutive sentences. But this omission was cured in the written sentencing
order, where the court said that “[f]or the reasons set forth above and/or stated
on the record, the sentence shall be served CONSECUTIVELY to the sentence(s)
imposed in [the probation revocation case].”
The court was entitled to rely on the same reasons it had previously given
for a prison term as reasons for consecutive sentences. Hill, 878 N.W.2d at
274–75. Furthermore, the oral colloquy and the written sentencing order may be
combined to determine whether sufficient reasons have been given. Lumadue,
622 N.W.2d at 304 (noting that in a prior case “the sentencing colloquy, in
combination with the written judgment entry, formed a sufficient basis for
appellate review of the sentence for abuse of discretion”). Thus, we find the
district court provided sufficient reasons for ordering the domestic assault abuse
second sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed on
revocation of probation.
13
We are not saying that the written order by itself would have been
sufficient. But here, the issue is simply whether a standardized written order
can bridge the only gap that remained when an individualized on-the-record
colloquy set forth the reasons for the sentence and indicated that the sentence
would be consecutive to probation revocation. This situation strikes us as not
materially different from the judge stating as follows at the end of the hearing:
“If I forgot to give reasons for consecutive sentences, those are the same reasons
as I gave for the underlying sentence itself.” Because sentences are “cloaked with
a . . . presumption in [their] favor,” McCalley, 972 N.W.2d at 676 (alteration in
original) (quoting Fetner, 959 N.W.2d at 134), we read the statement “[f]or the
reasons . . . stated on the record, the sentence shall be served CONSECUTIVELY”
as meaning that whatever reasons were stated on the record will be deemed the
reasons for consecutive sentences.
We reiterate our guidance from Hill and “encourage sentencing courts to
give more detailed reasons for a sentence specific to the individual defendant and
crimes and to . . . explicitly state the reasons for imposing a consecutive
sentence.” 878 N.W.2d at 275.
V. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.
Christensen, C.J., and McDonald, Oxley, and May, JJ., join this opinion.
McDermott, J., files a dissenting opinion, in which Waterman, J., joins.
14
#22–1367, State v. Luke
MCDERMOTT, Justice (dissenting).
When a judge decides that sentences for two different crimes will run
consecutively (one after the other) and not concurrently (at the same time), the
judge is required to state the reasons for that decision. The majority finds that
although the judge in this case didn’t provide a reason for ordering consecutive
sentences at the sentencing hearing, the written order filed afterward, when
combined with statements at the hearing, satisfied the requirement.
But the written order didn’t fix the problem. That order—whether by
referring to statements from the hearing or on its own—discloses nothing about
the reasons for the consecutive sentences. We’re left without any explanation, as
our sentencing rules require, for why the sentences must run consecutively. I
thus respectfully dissent.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23 requires that “[t]he court shall state
on the record the basis for the sentence imposed and shall particularly state the
reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g)
(2023) (emphasis added). This requirement existed under prior versions of our
criminal rules as well. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 2016)
(requiring district courts to give reasons for imposing consecutive sentences
under an earlier version of rule 2.23).
As we’ve explained, the requirement primarily serves two important
purposes. The first is obvious: it “ensures defendants are well aware of the
consequences of their criminal actions.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915,
919 (Iowa 2014). The second is perhaps less obvious, but no less important: “to
give appellate courts the opportunity to review the discretionary nature of
sentencing.” State v. Alloway, 707 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Iowa 2006), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 197–98 (Iowa 2010); see also
15
State v. Horton, 231 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Iowa 1975) (en banc) (McCormick, J.,
concurring) (noting increasing the rationality of sentencing, the therapeutic
value of sentencing on the defendant, ensuring meaningful appellate review, and
informing correctional authorities of the reasoning behind the sentence as
reasons for this requirement).
“When a court is given discretion in sentencing, a statement of the reasons
for the sentence is necessary to allow appellate courts to determine if the
discretion in imposing one form of sentence over another form was abused.”
Alloway, 707 N.W.2d at 584. We defer to sentencing judges in part because they
see individual defendants up close and are best positioned to assess credibility
and weigh facts such as the defendant’s criminal history, personal
characteristics, the nature of the offense, and so on. Sentencing judges must
balance an array of factors—prospects for rehabilitation, risks for recidivism,
and the need for deterrence, among others—when determining a defendant’s
sentence. Iowa Code § 901.5 (2024).
Appellate courts are poorly positioned to reassess or rebalance most of
these factors. Jeffrey S. Sutton, An Appellate Perspective on Federal Sentencing
After Booker and Rita, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 79, 84 (2007). We insist on an
explanation from the sentencing court partly because we’re ill-equipped to offer
meaningful review without it. Id. When appellate courts fail to ensure that
sentencing courts disclose the reasons for their sentences, appellate courts lose
the capacity to provide a meaningful check on criminal sentencing. “[B]y
requiring sentencing judges to articulate the facts on which they rely,” it
“encourages judicial candor, transparency, and predictability in exercising the
discretion that inevitably remains.” Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth
Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 775, 784 (2008). The
16
deferential abuse of discretion standard might be thought of as “earned” by a
sentencing court only when the sentencing court shows its work.
The concurrent-or-consecutive decision at the center of this appeal often
stands as the most important component of a judge’s sentencing decision. A
defendant sentenced to ten years, for instance, on each of two separate
convictions will serve only up to ten years total if the sentences are ordered to
run concurrently. But he’ll serve up to double that time—twenty years—if the
sentences are ordered to run consecutively. The potential magnitude of the
concurrent-or-consecutive decision demands adherence to the requirement
imposed on courts to state reasons for the sentences imposed.
Indeed, sentencing courts are required not just to state reasons, but to
“particularly” state them. Iowa Rule Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). To “particularly” state
something means to do so “to a higher degree than is usual or average” or “so as
to give special emphasis to a point; specifically.” Particularly, New Oxford
American Dictionary 1240 (2d ed. 2005).
The State concedes, and the majority agrees, that the sentencing judge did
not provide any reason for ordering consecutive sentences at the sentencing
hearing. The judge simply stated that the sentences would be served
consecutively to each other. The written order filed after the hearing said this
about consecutive sentences: “For the reasons set forth above and/or stated on
the record, the sentence shall be served CONSECUTIVELY to the sentence(s)
imposed in FECR030393 [(the probation revocation case)].” (Emphasis omitted.)
Unpacking this sentence, the reasons, we’re told, are found in potentially three
places: the record transcript of the hearing, the written order, or a combination
of the transcript and written order.
We start with the reasons “stated on the record” for imposing consecutive
sentences. Again, there were none. Although the district court detailed its
17
reasons for the sentence imposed on the assault charge—a two-year prison term
with a protective order—it stated no reasons when it ordered the sentence to run
consecutively with the separate two-year prison sentence imposed in the
probation-revocation case. The court’s statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed on the assault conviction doesn’t satisfy the distinct requirement to
“particularly state the reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” Iowa
R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g) (emphasis added).
The majority reads the written order as saying that the reasons for the
assault sentence will perform double duty; in other words, that the reasons the
court stated for imposing the two-year prison term on the assault conviction also
serve as the reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. But the written order
doesn’t say that. It simply states: “For the reasons set forth above and/or stated
on the record, the sentence shall be served consecutively . . . .” (Emphasis
omitted.) Reference to “the reasons . . . stated on the record” logically refers to
the reasons stated on the record for ordering consecutive sentences. The
majority’s reading adds words to the written order, such that we would read
something like: “For the same reasons stated on the record for the sentence
imposed on the assault conviction, the sentence shall be served consecutively.”
But none of the italicized words appear in the written order. Nor can we assume
them if we are to give meaning to the separate requirement that “[t]he court shall
state on the record the basis for the sentence imposed and shall particularly
state the reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” Iowa R. Crim. P.
2.23(2)(g) (emphasis added).
The majority finds daylight between this case and our reasoning in State
v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 269. I don’t see it. In Hill, we noted that the same reasons
could support both a defendant’s underlying sentence and the consecutive
sentencing decision. Id. at 274. But we vacated the sentence after concluding
18
that “the district court, when giving reasons for Hill’s sentence, did not explicitly
state the same reasons supported making the sentence consecutive.” Id.
(emphasis added). We noted that we were “unsure whether the stated reasons
for the sentence applied to both the decision [on the underlying] sentence and
the decision to make his sentence consecutive.” Id. In closing, we stated that
sentencing judges “should also explicitly state the reasons for imposing a
consecutive sentence,” even if they were “rely[ing] on the same reasons for
imposing” the underlying sentence. Id. at 275. The majority’s reliance on the
written order’s reference to the hearing record as establishing the reasons for
consecutive sentences suffers from the same fatal defects we discussed in Hill.
When a sentencing court states no reason on the record for imposing
consecutive sentences and then enters a written order that simply refers to the
reasons already stated on the record as the basis for the consecutive sentences,
the court hasn’t given any reason for its decision. There are no “reasons” stated
for consecutive sentences to refer to. As the old song goes, “Nothing from nothing
leaves nothing.” Billy Preston, Nothing from Nothing, on The Kids & Me (A&M
1974). It’s notable that the State, for its part, doesn’t even make the argument
that the majority latches onto to affirm the sentences here. Because the reasons
stated on the record do not include reasons for consecutive sentences, the
written order’s reference to the hearing record fails to satisfy the rule.
So we turn to “the reasons set forth above” in the written order to see if
the court provided written reasons for consecutive sentences. The order stated:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that taking into account
Defendant’s age, attitude, criminal history, and employment,
financial and family circumstances, as well as the nature of the
offense, including whether a weapon or force was used in the
commission of the offense, the recommendations of the parties, and
other matters reflected in the Court file and record, for the protection
of society and rehabilitation of Defendant:
19
Prison. Pursuant to Iowa Code Sections 901.5, 902.3 and
902.9, Defendant is committed to the custody of the director of the
Iowa Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term, not to
exceed two years. The Sheriff shall transport Defendant to the
reception center designated by DOC. Defendant shall be given credit
for time previously served in connection with this offense.
The State’s actual argument in its brief is that the above-quoted language in the
written order satisfies rule 2.23—not, as the majority finds, that the statements
on the record were sufficient. The court of appeals declared this written language
sufficient “by the slimmest of margins.”
The lengthy recitation of sentencing considerations in the order reads like
an all-inclusive list. The list nearly mirrors the factors set forth in Iowa Code
§§ 901.3(1) and 901.5. A reader is left wondering: Is there any criminal sentence
for which this all-encompassing list would not apply?
And therein lies the problem with the sentencing court’s blanket recitation.
As C.S. Lewis wrote: “If you see through everything, then everything is
transparent. But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world. To ‘see
through’ all things is the same as not to see.” C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man 81
(HarperCollins 2001) (1944). Similarly, to state every reason is to state no reason.
When the sentencing court provides a list that recites every reason for a criminal
sentence—a list that could apply to every defendant for every crime in every
case—the court has provided no explanation for the sentence imposed in this
case against this defendant.
As the majority notes, we’ve addressed boilerplate language in written
sentencing orders before. In State v. Lumadue, for instance, we held that such
language alone doesn’t satisfy our rules. 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001) (en
banc). To hold otherwise would allow sentencing courts, in the majority’s own
words, to “sidestep the requirements of rule 2.23 and avoid making any
explanation for the sentence simply by reusing a one-size-fits-all form.”
20
In State v. Thacker, the written order recited that the sentence “is based
on all of the available SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS set out in Iowa Code
Section 907.5.” 862 N.W.2d 402, 404 (Iowa 2015). We noted our prior rejection
of “a boilerplate-language approach that does not show why a particular
sentence was imposed in a particular case.” Id. at 408. When considering “what
motivated the district court to enter a particular sentence,” we said that an
appellate court “cannot guess or simply calculate the rough probabilities.” Id. at
410. We held that the court failed to adequately state the reasons for its
sentence, and we thus vacated the sentencing order and remanded for
resentencing. Id.
In State v. Thompson, the district court used a form that similarly recited
that the sentence “is based on all the available SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS
set out in Iowa Code Section 907.5.” 856 N.W.2d at 918 (emphasis omitted). The
form included a check-the-box menu of reasons (“criminal history,” “propensity
for further criminal acts,” and so on) that the court could individually mark. Id.
The court, however, left every box unchecked. Id. We held that this resulted in a
failure to provide reasons for the sentence, and we thus vacated the sentencing
order and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 921.
The majority follows the thread in each of these cases before abruptly
concluding that the sentencing defects in them are distinguishable from this
case. I don’t see how. The order in this case is not a check-the-box form; it is a
precheck-every-box form. Like the forms in Thacker and Thompson, the all-
encompassing list in the written order here fails to particularly disclose the
reasons for imposing consecutive sentences.
The majority begins by proclaiming the need for “whys and wherefores,”
but in the final analysis insists on neither. The written order’s bare reference to
“reasons . . . stated on the record” doesn’t permit the “if I forgot to mention any
21
reasons for consecutive sentences, then I meant all the same ones as I said for
the sentence imposed on the underlying crime” interpretation that the majority
offers up. That sort of purpose aligns more with what the all-encompassing list
in the written order seems intended to accomplish (and, for the reasons
explained, it doesn’t). If the statement in the court’s written order saves this
sentence from violating rule 2.23(2)(g), then the bar for a sentencing court to
clear to “particularly state the reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence”
rests on the floor. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). No reasons were stated, let alone
particularly stated, for running the sentences consecutively. I would vacate the
sentence and remand for resentencing.
Waterman, J., joins this dissent.