United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 18, 2006
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
__________________________ Clerk
No. 05-70005
__________________________
CHRISTOPHER COLEMAN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
No. 4:02-CV-3865
___________________________________________________
Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:
Convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, Christopher Coleman petitions for a
Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) from the district court’s denial of federal habeas corpus relief.
Because we find that reasonable jurists could not debate the propriety of the district court’s decisions
regarding Coleman’s multiple alleged constitutional errors, we deny Coleman’s application for a
COA.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On the night of December 13, 1995, Christopher Coleman and two other men were driving
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together around Houston, Texas. They stopped on a dead-end street and waited. Soon after, another
car arrived and parked behind the car in which Coleman was riding. This second car carried four
people: the driver, Jose Luis Garcia-Castro; his girlfriend, Elsie Prado; Prado’s brother, Heimar
Prado Hurtado; and Prado’s three-year old son, Danny Giraldo. Coleman and the two other men got
out of their car and approached the second vehicle, where one of Coleman’s companions spoke to
Hurtado. Then, standing close to the passenger side of the car, Coleman opened fire on the
occupants of the second vehicle.
When police arrived, they found Hurtado, Garcia-Castro, and Giraldo dead and Prado
seriously injured. Prado survived her injuries and told police that she would never forget the
shooter’s face. She picked Coleman’s picture from a photo spread nine days after the shooting. A
week later, police arrested Coleman in Lawrenceburg, Tennessee.
Two Houston police officers traveled to Tennessee to transport Coleman back to Texas.
Upon arriving at the Lawrenceburg police station, the Houston officers read Coleman the warnings
required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Coleman waived his rights. After roughly
three hours of being interviewed by the officers, Coleman gave a recorded statement in which he
admitted being present when the murders occurred; he did not admit to being the actual shooter.
In June 1997, a Texas state jury convicted Coleman of capital murder and sentenced him to
death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Coleman’s conviction and sentence, Coleman
v. State, No. 72,895 (Tex. Crim. App. May 5, 1999), and denied his initial state application for a writ
of habeas corpus, Ex Parte Coleman, No. 48,523-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2001). A second
state habeas application was dismissed as an abuse of the writ. Ex Parte Coleman, No. 48,523-02
(Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2002). In September 2004, the federal district court denied Coleman’s
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federal habeas application and refused to grant a COA on any of Coleman’s claims.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Coleman filed his federal habeas petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Accordingly, the petition is subject to the requirements
imposed by AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Under AEDPA, Coleman
must obtain a COA before he can appeal the district court’s denial of habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c). See also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (“[U]ntil a COA has been issued
federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits of appeals from habeas petitioners.”).
The district court refused to grant Coleman a COA, so Coleman’s only alternative is to petition this
court directly for a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
“To determine whether a COA should be granted requires an overview of the claims in the
habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits.” Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 870 (5th
Cir. 2005). Coleman must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), such “that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “The
question is the debatability of the underlying constitutional claim, not the resolution of that debate.”
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 342.
“A federal court’s collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the
respect due state courts in our federal system.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. Accordingly, “a federal
court’s review of a claim adjudicated in a state court is deferential.” Summers, 431 F.3d at 868.
Under [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d), a federal court cannot grant habeas corpus relief with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings
unless the adjudication of that claim either (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
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determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision
that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the state court proceeding.
Hughes v. Dretke, 412 F.3d 582, 588–89 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). The statute
permits a federal habeas court to assess only the state court’s decision, not the propriety of its analysis
and reasoning. Pondexter v. Dretke, 346 F.3d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, under AEDPA,
“a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1). A federal habeas petitioner “has the burden of rebutting this presumption with clear
and convincing evidence.” Hughes, 412 F.3d at 589 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). A credibility
determination by the state habeas court also is afforded deference. Guidry v. Dretke, 397 F.3d 306,
326 (5th Cir. 2005).
III. DISCUSSION
Coleman requests a COA on fifteen separate claims. We review the claims in turn.
A. Claim One
Coleman brings a facial challenge to the Texas death penalty system. Specifically, Coleman
points to the fact that Special Issue No. 3 in his case, the mitigation special issue,1 does not contain
a burden of proof and contends that, therefore, jurors could have believed that he was required to
prove mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt. Coleman suggests that the ambiguity prevented the jury
from properly considering his mitigating evidence in violation of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782
1
The third special issue in Coleman’s case provided:
Do you find from the evidence, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including
the circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s character and background, and the
personal moral culpability of the defendant, Christopher Coleman, that there is a
sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warran[t] that a sentence of life
imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed?
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(2001) (“Penry II”).
The district court noted that Coleman raised this claim for the first time on a successive state
habeas that had been dismissed as an abuse of the writ. Accordingly, because the basis of the claim
was reasonably available at the time of his first state habeas application, the district court found that
the claim was procedurally defaulted and that even if Coleman could demonstrate cause for his
default,2 he suffered no prejudice. We agree.
“‘Under the procedural default doctrine, a federal court may not consider a state prisoner’s
federal habeas claim when the state based its rejection of that claim on an adequate and independent
state ground.’” Thacker v. Dretke, 396 F.3d 607, 614 (5th Cir.) (quoting Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d
844, 846 (5th Cir. 1996)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 80 (2005). Texas’s abuse of the writ doctrine is
a valid state procedural bar foreclosing federal habeas review. Kunkle v. Dretke, 352 F.3d 980,
988–89 (5th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, assuming that Coleman could show cause for his default, he
is unable to show any resultant prejudice because his challenge necessarily fails: “[N]o Supreme
Court or Circuit precedent constitutionally requires that Texas’s mitigation special issue be assigned
a burden of proof.” Rowell v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 370, 378 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 103
(2005). Reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s decision to deny habeas relief on this
claim.
B. Claims Two, Three, and Four
For his next three claims, Coleman contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v.
2
Coleman points out that Penry II was decided after his first state habeas application was denied. The
Director argues that the grounds for Coleman’s claim were reasonably available well before Penry
II. The district court found Penry II inapplicable to Coleman’s claim for relief. Further, Penry II did
not announce a “new rule” that would apply retroactively. See Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551,
567–68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 239 (2005).
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Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), implicitly overrules twenty years of Supreme Court death penalty
jurisprudence, including McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), and requires that a hearing be
held to determine if the decision to seek the death penalty and the Texas clemency process are
unconstitutionally infused with racial considerations, in violation of the equal protection clause. The
district court concluded that these claims were procedurally defaulted, since they were first raised on
a successive state habeas that was dismissed as an abuse of the writ. Alternatively, the district court
reasoned that Bush v. Gore did not announce a rule applicable to criminal cases, and if it did, that
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), barred its retroactive application to Coleman’s case.
Reasonable jurists would not find the district court’s resolution of these claims debatable. In
two unpublished decisions, this court previously has discussed Bush v. Gore’s utter lack of
implication in the criminal procedure context. See Wyatt v. Dretke, 165 F. App’x 335 (5th Cir. 2006)
(unpublished); Hughes v. Dretke, 160 F. App’x 431 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). We adopt the
reasoning of those persuasive opinions and, likewise, conclude that the question is beyond debate.
C. Claim Five
Coleman argues that the time limit Texas imposes on filing a habeas petition in a capital case
is unconstitutional. Specifically, Coleman complains that he had only 45 days to file a petition,
whereas had he been convicted of a non-capital crime, he would have had 180 days. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071, § 4(a). Despite the position taken, Coleman never even alleges injury from
the earlier filing deadline. In Ferguson v. Estelle, 718 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1983), this court held
that a habeas petitioner is “without standing to raise the potential problems of others.” The district
court found that Coleman lacked standing to contest the filing deadlines, since he filed his petition
in the applicable timeframe and suffered no injury. Reasonable jurists could not debate the district
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court’s determination.
D. Claims Six, Seven, and Eight
For his next three claims, Coleman contends that his statement to the police should have been
excluded at his trial, claiming the police beat him and denied him requested counsel. The trial court
held a pretrial hearing, during which the police who interviewed Coleman testified that he was read
the Miranda warnings and waived his rights. At this hearing, Coleman never claimed that he had
requested or been denied counsel. Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the trial court
denied Coleman’s motion to suppress. During the state habeas process, Coleman introduced
unsworn, unnotarized statements from three individuals who were not present at the interrogation,
purportedly in support of his newly-alleged claim. The state habeas court determined that the police
who interviewed Coleman were credible, implicitly rejecting the credibility of the statements offered
by Coleman. Noting that the offered statements were internally inconsistent and lacked any indicia
of reliability, the district court found that Coleman had failed to rebut the presumption of correctness
afforded the state habeas court’s factual findings and credibility determinations.
To prove that his confession was coerced and that he was denied requested counsel, Coleman
offers only the same unsworn statements of three individuals who were not present at the time
Coleman made his statement to the police. Not only were these statements not competent evidence
for purposes of defeating the Director’s motion for summary judgment below, see FED. R. CIV. P.
56(e), they also, as the district court noted, contradict one another. Further, the fact that these
statements were not offered to the trial court at the suppression hearing casts doubt on their
reliability. Coleman has not offered clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of
correctness we afford the state habeas court’s factual findings under AEDPA. Reasonable jurists
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would not find the district court’s determination debatable.
E. Claim Nine
Coleman contends that a line-up at which Prado tentatively identified him was impermissibly
suggestive. After hearing testimony at a suppression hearing, the trial court found that the line-up
did not violate Coleman’s constitutional rights. The state habeas court found that the line-up was not
improperly suggestive and that Prado’s in-court identification of Coleman was based on her
observation of Coleman at the time of the murders. The state habeas court also found that the earlier
photo spread from which Prado identified Coleman as the shooter just nine days after the murders
was not improperly suggestive. The district court found that Coleman failed to rebut the
determinations of the state habeas court. Additionally, the district court found that Prado’s
identification of Coleman from the photo spread, standing alone, was sufficient to support the later
in-court identification, regardless of any impropriety in the line-up. Alternatively, the district court
independently found that the line-up and in-court identification were sufficiently reliable. Coleman
did not challenge the photo spread on federal habeas, thereby acceding to its propriety.
“[A] conviction based on an eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification
by photograph will be set aside only if the identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive
as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.” Herrera v. Collins, 904 F.2d 944, 946
(5th Cir. 1990) (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968)). A two-step process governs
the admissibility of identification evidence: First, a court must determine whether the pretrial
identification was impermissibly suggestive; if it was, then second, a court must determine whether,
“under the totality of the circumstances, the suggestiveness leads to a substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification.” Id. Such an analysis is a mixed question of law and fact. Livingston
-8-
v. Johnson, 107 F.3d 297, 309 (5th Cir. 1997). See also Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982)
(“[T]he ultimate question as to the constitutionality of the pretrial identification procedures . . . is a
mixed question of law and fact . . . .”). Accordingly, Coleman cannot prevail in federal habeas unless
he shows that the state court acted contrary to or unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in
finding that the line-up was not impermissibly suggestive and that, even if it were, it did not taint
Prado’s identification of Coleman. The Supreme Court has identified several factors to help
determine the likelihood of misidentification: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal
at the crime scene; (2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior
description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation;
and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
199–200 (1972); Livingston, 107 F.3d at 310–11 (applying Biggers). Prado was inside the car, in
the rear passenger-side seat, when Coleman fired on the car from the passenger side; Prado said she
saw the assailant fire the gun, at one point claimed that she would never forget the shooter’s face, and
described the shooter as having several identifying physical features that Coleman does not dispute
accurately describe him. Furthermore, as the district court noted, nine days after the crime Prado was
shown a photographic array from which she positively identified Coleman, and that array is not
challenged on appeal. Assuming, without deciding, that the line-up was impermissibly suggestive,
Coleman has failed to demonstrate that the state habeas court’s determination that Prado’s in-court
identification was not improperly tainted is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme
Court precedent. Reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s determination.
F. Claim Ten
Coleman argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury that he would be ineligible
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for parole for forty years, in order for them to consider that circumstance in assessing his future
dangerousness. Alternatively, Coleman argues that the equal protection clause is violated by the
discretionary ability of Texas trial judges to inform the jury of a defendant’s parole eligibility. The
district court noted Supreme Court precedent indicating that juries need not be informed if a
defendant will be eligible for parole, see Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 169 (2000),3 and nine
decisions from this circuit explicitly stating that no such requirement exists, see, e.g., Miller v.
Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 290 (5th Cir. 2000). For Coleman’s alternative equal protection argument,
the district court pointed out that Coleman cited no authority on the issue and, therefore, even if his
claim were true, relief would be barred by Teague’s non-retroactivity principles. Given the ample
precedent opposing Coleman’s position, see, e.g., Elizalde v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 323, 333 (5th Cir.
2004), reasonable jurists could not debate whether the district court erred in its determination.
G. Claim Eleven
Coleman argues that his due process rights were violated because two trial witnesses testified
“under duress” because the witnesses and their mother had been held as material witnesses. The state
habeas court found that the witnesses had been properly held pursuant to Texas law to secure their
appearance at trial, not to coerce them into testifying favorably for the prosecution. The district court
found that Coleman offered no evidence to rebut the state habeas court’s factual determination and
that, furthermore, Coleman did not allege, much less prove, that the witnesses testified falsely.
Coleman’s argument is wholly conclusory and in no way rebuts the presumption of
correctness afforded the state court. Furthermore, a review of the trial transcript shows that at least
3
Rather, due process only requires that juries be informed of a defendant’s ineligibility for parole. See
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994).
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one of the witnesses told the jury that he was testifying unwillingly, thereby quelling Coleman’s
credibility concerns.4 Reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s denial of federal habeas
relief on this claim.5
H. Claim Twelve
Coleman argues that the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by refusing to permit
Coleman’s attorney to testify during the guilt phase that Prado’s photo spread identification was only
tentative. As the district court noted, “Coleman’s argument misstates the facts of the case”: Coleman
attempted to call his counsel only during the sentencing phase. Coleman’s attorney proffered
testimony about a conversation he allegedly had with a prosecutor in which the prosecutor indicated
that Prado’s initial photo spread identification was tentative. Coleman’s counsel had no personal
knowledge of the photo spread and did not know if the prosecutor had been at the photo array when
Prado made the identification. The state habeas court found that the prosecutor was not present at
the photo array. The district court found no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the inadmissible
double hearsay testimony should be excluded.
Assuming that the trial court erred in its evidentiary decision to exclude the double hearsay,
“the mere occurrence of an evidentiary violation is not sufficient to establish a [Confrontation Clause]
violation.” Hafdahl v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 528, 539 (2001). Sitting in habeas, the only question a
4
The witness told the jury that he wished to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination but had been told by the judge that his testimony would in no way incriminate him.
5
Coleman also argues that it was error for the trial judge to instruct the witnesses that they had no
Fifth Amendment right not to testify because the witnesses faced no possible criminal charges.
Coleman’s argument is meritless. See Roznovsky v. Estelle, 546 F.2d 1185, 1187 (5th Cir. 1977)
(“[T]he witness may not refrain from responding to questions merely because he asserts the [Fifth
Amendment] privilege. Rather, it is for the court to determine whether his silence is justified under
the doctrine.”).
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federal court must decide is “whether the state trial court’s exclusion of [Coleman]’s statement was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established constitutional law, as
announced by the Supreme Court.” Summers, 431 F.3d at 877. Coleman, of course, cannot point
to any controlling Supreme Court precedent that would permit double hearsay to be introduced at
trial. Because the state court did not unreasonably apply, or rule contrary to, Supreme Court
precedent by excluding inadmissible double hearsay, the district court correctly denied relief.
Reasonable jurists could not disagree over the district court’s resolution of this claim.
I. Claim Thirteen
Coleman argues that the evidence of his future dangerousness was insufficient as a matter of
law for the jury to find against him on Special Issue No. 1.6 Coleman first raised this claim before the
state habeas court, but that court denied the claim because, in Texas, sufficiency of the evidence is
only reviewable on direct appeal. The district court found that Coleman’s federal habeas claim was
procedurally barred because Texas has long held that sufficiency of the evidence claims are not
cognizable in state habeas proceedings. See Renz v. Scott, 28 F.3d 431, 432 (5th Cir. 1994).
Furthermore, Coleman’s alleged cause of and prejudice from the procedural default are wholly
conclusory, and he has failed to demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The district court
correctly held that Texas’s procedural bar precludes federal habeas review of Coleman’s sufficiency
argument. Reasonable jurists could not debate this point.
J. Claim Fourteen
Coleman argues that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective because of the
6
The first special issue provided: “Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
there is a probability that the defendant, Christopher Coleman, would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society?”
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failure to raise on direct appeal the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s
finding of future dangerousness. Coleman did not raise this claim in his petition for federal habeas
relief; rather, Coleman raised it for the first time in a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the
judgment. The district court found that Coleman’s attempt to raise the issue after judgment was
improper and refused to rule on the merits of his claim. See Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group, Inc.,
342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003) (“A motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) . .
. cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment
issued.”) (internal quotations omitted). Since Coleman did not properly raise this claim below, we
do not consider Coleman’s claim in this COA petition. See Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 695
(5th Cir. 2003) (“We generally will not consider a claim raised for the first time in a COA
application.”).
K. Claim Fifteen
For his final claim, Coleman argues that the trial court erred by ordering the jury to keep
deliberating after the foreman alerted the trial judge that it was at an impasse and gave the jury’s
numerical split. The district court found that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury to continue
deliberating did not render Coleman’s trial fundamentally unfair.
The jury began penalty deliberations around midday on June 5, 1997. During the second day
of deliberations, the jury foreman sent the trial judge a note:
Your Honor,
We have deceided [sic] special issues numbers one and two. We are at an
impass [sic] on issue number three. We have solid votes on either side and they do
not feel they can change their minds. We have been delibrating [sic] this issue since
early this morning. Do you have any advice?
After hearing the trial judge read the note, Coleman moved for a directed verdict, which the trial
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judge denied. The judge called the jury in and asked the foreman the numerical split of the jury,
“without telling me who’s for one way or who’s for the other.” The foreman responded: “The
numerical difference is eight and four.” The trial judge addressed the jury:
I’m going to ask the jury to go to lunch and come back this afternoon. Give it at least
another try, and I will certainly consider your note at that time. We just ask you to
continue. See if you can make any headway. If you cannot, just let the Court know
sometime this afternoon. Thank you again for your consideration. We’ll take you to
lunch right away. Thank you.
Later that afternoon, after a total of almost twelve hours of deliberation, the jury foreman sent a
second note to the judge: “Your Honor, At this point we are at an impass [sic]. It does not seem that
it is going to change. The vote at the moment is eleven to one.” Coleman again moved for a directed
verdict, which the trial court denied. After receiving this jury note, the judge did not call in the jury
to talk to them directly, and the record shows only that the judge wrote a reply note to the foreman
as follows: “Members of the Jury: Please continue deliberations.”7
“A judge may encourage jurors who are having difficulty reaching a verdict to deliberate
longer, and to give due consideration and respect to the views of their peers.” United States v.
Straach, 987 F.2d 232, 242 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896)).
7
Before responding to the jury’s second note, the trial judge addressed the parties outside the
presence of the jury:
The Court at this time is going to send back a note, “After about 11 and a half hours
of deliberations, members of the jury, please continue your deliberations. The reason
the Court is doing this is because the last notes, the last conversation with the jury,
it was eight to four, so some progress has been made. The Court is going to ask you
to continue deliberations.”
The state habeas court found that the trial court only sent a written response to the jury asking them
simply to continue their deliberations and made no reference regarding the jury’s “progress.”
Coleman does not challenge the state habeas court’s factual determination regarding the trial court’s
communication with the jury; he merely asserts that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury
to continue deliberating.
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Such a supplemental instruction is permissible even in the death penalty context. Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238–39 (1988). A reviewing court must consider the propriety of the
supplemental jury charge “in its context and under all the circumstances.” Id. at 237 (internal
quotation omitted). The potential for coercion exists when a trial judge inquires as to the “nature or
extent of [the jury’s] division” and then instructs the jury to continue deliberating. Lowenfield, 484
U.S. at 239–40 (citing Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926)). At least in a federal criminal
trial, the better approach is to ask questions regarding the division of jurors that think further
deliberation will be useful. Id. at 240.
AEDPA, though, does not require us to hold the state courts to the same standard as we do
federal district courts. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 9–10 (2002) (finding that the court of
appeals erred in granting habeas relief based on its belief that non-constitutional Supreme Court
precedent in federal criminal trials, based in the Court’s supervisory powers over the lower courts,
was equally applicable to state courts). A state trial judge’s inquiry into the numerical split of the
jury, so long as it is “simply to assess the progress of the jury,” does not render a trial fundamentally
unfair so as to require habeas relief. Thompson v. Cain, 161 F.3d 802, 810 (5th Cir. 1998). See also
Montoya v. Scott, 65 F.3d 405, 412 (5th Cir. 1995).8 When the answer to the question reveals that
the jury is split eleven to one, it is not per se impermissible for the state trial judge to ask the jury to
continue deliberating. Thompson, 161 F.3d 809–10. Furthermore, even on direct review, we have
held that “the unsolicited disclosure of the jury division by the foreman is not by itself a ground for
8
The Supreme Court has, at least implicitly, approved of just such a question in the habeas context.
See Packer, 537 U.S. at 6 (“The judge then asked the foreman what the latest vote count was, but
told him not to reveal which side had which number of votes. The foreman indicated that the last
vote count had been 11 to 1.”).
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a mistrial.” United States v. Warren, 594 F.2d 1046, 1049 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979).
In a pre-AEDPA case, we denied habeas relief to a state prisoner whose trial judge asked the
numerical split of the jury without reference to how many votes were on each side and then asked the
jury to continue deliberating for another thirty minutes; the jury returned a verdict of death after forty
minutes. Montoya, 65 F.3d at 408. As in Montoya, Coleman’s trial judge did not give a traditional
Allen charge to the jury; the judge did not instruct the minority to reconsider its views in light of the
majority’s arguments nor remind the jury of the time and expense of going through another trial.
Rather, the trial judge merely asked the jury to continue deliberating.
The state habeas court found that the trial judge’s supplemental instruction was not coercive.
Instead, that court found that “the jury’s two notes show that the jury had been engaged in active
deliberation.” Coleman has failed to rebut the state habeas court’s factual determination with clear
and convincing evidence. Furthermore, the state habeas court’s decision denying relief is neither
contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law as established by the Supreme Court. It
is not only permissible but proper for a trial judge to ask a jury to continue deliberating if it appears
that further deliberation might be fruitful in helping the jury reach a unanimous verdict. In its
response to the second jury note, the trial court explained to the parties on the record that it was
requesting the jury continue deliberating because the additional deliberations clearly moved some
jurors to reconsider their initial views. When considering the totality of the circumstances, see
Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237, including the trial judge’s initial jury instructions and the response to
both jury notes, it is clear that the trial court did not coerce the jury into rendering a particular
verdict. Nor do we find the point debatable among reasonable jurists.
IV. CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Coleman’s application for a COA.
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Coleman v. Quarterman
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date filed: 2006-07-18
Citations: 456 F.3d 537
Copy Citations