Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:

Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

FILED MARCH 8, 2005

JACQUELYN V. MAGEE,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 126219

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

PER CURIAM

In this case involving the Civil Rights Act, the Court

of Appeals held that plaintiff’s claims of sexual

harassment, sex and age discrimination, and retaliation

were timely filed, because the lawsuit was brought within

three years of the date she resigned her employment with

defendant.1

We conclude that plaintiff’s claims were not filed

within the limitations period because none of the alleged

discriminatory or retaliatory conduct occurred within the

1
Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued March 2, 2004
(Docket No. 243847).
three years that preceded the filing of the complaint. We

therefore reverse that part of the judgment of the Court of

Appeals and remand the matter to the trial court for

reinstatement of the trial court’s grant of summary

disposition to defendant.

Plaintiff Jacquelyn Magee was an hourly production

employee who began work for defendant DaimlerChrysler in

1976. She went on medical leave for emotional distress on

September 12, 1998, and, without first returning to work,

resigned her job on February 2, 1999.

On February 1, 2002, Magee filed a lawsuit under the

Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., claiming that she

had been unlawfully discriminated against and harassed

during most of her twenty-two years at DaimlerChrysler.

Magee’s complaint lists separate counts for sex harassment

based on hostile work environment, sex harassment based on

quid pro quo harassment, retaliation, sex discrimination,

and age discrimination.2

2
Magee’s complaint also includes a separate count
alleging constructive discharge. The trial court dismissed
this count, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s ruling. Magee did not appeal, and the dismissal of
that claim is not before this Court.

In her complaint, Magee alleges that she suffered

harassment from the 1980s until her last day of work on

September 12, 1998, and that her supervisors periodically

retaliated against her during this period as a result of

her resistance to the harassment. Magee alleges that this

constant harassment caused her to leave her job at

DaimlerChrysler on September 12, 1998, and that she decided

to resign on February 2, 1999, because she anticipated that

the harassment would continue if she returned.

DaimlerChrysler moved for summary disposition,

asserting that Magee’s February 1, 2002, complaint failed

to allege any discriminatory acts after September 12, 1998,

and that the complaint was therefore not filed within the

three-year period of limitations applicable to Civil Rights

Act claims, MCL 600.5805(10).

The trial court initially denied DaimlerChrysler’s

motion without prejudice, allowing Magee to amend her

complaint to allege harassment or retaliation occurring up

to her February 2, 1999, resignation. However, because

Magee’s amended complaint continued to allege only

harassment and retaliation through September 12, 1998, her

last day of work, the trial court granted DaimlerChrysler’s

motion and dismissed Magee’s complaint.

Magee appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Court

of Appeals, which relied on this Court’s recent decision in

Collins v Comerica Bank, 468 Mich 628; 664 NW2d 713 (2003),

to reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the harassment,

retaliation, and discrimination claims. The Court of

Appeals concluded that these claims were timely, because

they were filed within three years of the date of Magee’s

resignation.

DaimlerChrysler then sought leave to appeal to this

Court. After hearing oral argument from both parties on

the application, this Court has now determined that the

Court of Appeals misapplied Collins and erroneously

reinstated Magee’s Civil Rights Act claims.

In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of

action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations

is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.

Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich 226, 229-230; 661 NW2d

557 (2003). Likewise, this Court reviews de novo rulings

on summary disposition motions. Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich

661, 664; 685 NW2d 648 (2004).

III

In Collins, supra at 633, this Court held that a cause

of action for discriminatory termination does not accrue

until the date of termination. The plaintiff employee,

Gwendolyn Collins, was suspended pending an investigation;

when the investigation was completed several weeks later,

her employment was terminated. Within three years of her

termination, Collins filed a complaint alleging that her

termination was the result of race and gender

discrimination. The Court of Appeals ruled that Collins’s

suit was not timely under the three-year period of

limitations because her causes of action accrued on the

last day that she actually performed employment duties (as

opposed to her later termination date). This Court

disagreed with the Court of Appeals last-day-worked

analysis and reversed, holding that a claim for

discriminatory discharge cannot arise until a claimant has

actually been discharged. Id.

Relying on Collins, the Court of Appeals in this case

reasoned that Magee’s claim also accrued on her termination

date as opposed to her last day of work. The Court

acknowledged that Magee resigned, and was not terminated.

But it found significant that “her last day of work was

followed by a period in which she was on a medical leave of

absence” and that she was employed by DaimlerChrysler while

on leave. Accordingly, it concluded that her causes of

action, if any, arose on February 2, 1999.

The Court of Appeals reliance on Collins to reinstate

Magee’s claims of sexual harassment, sex and age

discrimination, and retaliation is misplaced. Magee was

never terminated from her employment and does not allege

discriminatory termination. She bases her Civil Rights Act

claims on alleged discriminatory conduct that occurred

before her leave of absence. Indeed, when given a chance

to amend her complaint to plead claims falling within the

period of limitations, Magee was unable to do so. Collins,

a discriminatory termination case, simply does not apply in

this situation.

To determine whether Magee’s claims were timely filed,

we look to MCL 600.5805(10), which establishes that the

applicable period of limitations is three years from the

date of injury. Because Magee alleged no discriminatory

conduct occurring after September 12, 1998, the period of

limitations on Magee’s claims expired, at the latest, three

years from that date, or by September 12, 2001.

Accordingly, as the trial court held, Magee’s February 1,

2002, complaint was not timely filed.

The dissent argues that the defendant violated the

Civil Rights Act within the three years preceding the

filing of plaintiff’s claim by failing to “prevent future

harassment . . . .” Post at 3. This interpretation of the

Civil Rights Act amounts to a continuing violations

doctrine in which an employer is continuously liable from

the time it or its agent violates the act until the time

that violation is remedied by the employer. Thus, in

Justice CAVANAGH’s view, a plaintiff subjected to a hostile

work environment on December 31, 2005, may file a timely

complaint in December 2030 if the employer has failed to

remedy the sexual harassment in the ensuing twenty-five

years. This theory renders nugatory the period of

limitations established by the Legislature in MCL

600.5805(10). It is therefore a theory we must reject.3

For these reasons, we reverse the relevant part of the

judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to

the Macomb Circuit Court for reinstatement of the order

granting DaimlerChrysler’s motion for summary disposition.

Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

3
Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631

NW2d 686 (2001).

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

JACQUELYN V. MAGEE,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 126219

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________

WEAVER, J. (concurring).

I concur in the result of the opinion per curiam that

reverses the Court of Appeals judgment in part and remands

the matter to the trial court for reinstatement of the

trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant.

Under the facts pleaded by plaintiff, the three-year period

of limitations1 began to run when plaintiff went on medical

leave on September 12, 1998, for emotional distress.

Plaintiff’s claims were required to be filed within three

years of September 12, 1998. Because they were not, the

trial court was correct to grant summary disposition to

defendant. Therefore, I concur in the result of the

opinion per curiam.

Elizabeth A. Weaver

1
MCL 600.5805(10).
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

JACQUELYN V. MAGEE,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 126219

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).

I disagree with the majority’s contention that

defendant engaged in no discriminatory conduct during the

three years that preceded the filing of plaintiff’s

complaint. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

Plaintiff began working for defendant in 1976. Over

the years, plaintiff complained of various incidents of

harassment. Plaintiff complained that her foreman was

making sexual advances toward her. When plaintiff was

assigned to a different supervisor, her former foreman

still worked in the same complex and continued to harass

her. Because of the harassment, plaintiff was ordered by

her psychiatrist to take an approximately four-month

medical leave. When plaintiff returned from her medical
leave, her former foreman was still working in the same

complex as plaintiff.

A subsequent foreman of plaintiff’s also made sexual

advances toward her, including intentionally touching

plaintiff’s breast. For an entire year, plaintiff also

complained to defendant about a sign in the men’s restroom

that referred to plaintiff in a derogatory and sexually

suggestive manner. Because of the stress of the harassment

she continued to suffer, plaintiff was ordered to take

another medical leave of absence.

While she was employed by defendant, plaintiff’s union

steward also made sexually suggestive comments about

plaintiff’s “ass” and touched her in an inappropriate

manner. Plaintiff’s coworkers made sexually suggestive

comments about her body and began hitting her with

cardboard sticks. When plaintiff asked her union steward

to intercede, he just laughed and said, “Yea, hit that

ass.” Plaintiff repeatedly complained to defendant, yet

nothing was done. When plaintiff requested a transfer, her

union steward told her that she could transfer if she had

sex with him. Once plaintiff was transferred, the union

steward told her that she “owed” him and he wanted her to

have sex with him. He later stopped plaintiff from

training for another position because she was not having

sex with him. Plaintiff again complained to a foreman, but

he said there was nothing he could do. Because of the

stress plaintiff was suffering as a result of the

harassment, plaintiff was then ordered to take a third

medical leave.

Because defendant took no steps to stop the harassment

while plaintiff was on her third medical leave, she was

forced to decide not to return to the harassing

environment. Defendant’s discriminatory conduct in failing

to take steps to prevent future harassment continued

throughout plaintiff’s medical leave. Requiring plaintiff

to return to the harassing setting to work in the unchanged

environment would be unreasonable and possibly dangerous to

plaintiff’s health, considering that her doctor had ordered

three medical leaves because of the stress of the

harassment. As plaintiff explained, in order to have even

been considered for a possible transfer to another plant

after having been out on her third harassment-related

medical leave, she would have had to return to the plant

she left and hope for a transfer, despite that her multiple

complaints had garnered no response before or during her

medical leave. Thus, for plaintiff to be able to try and

leave the harassing environment, she would have had to

return to work with the same men who harassed her and whose

conduct necessitated that plaintiff take medical leaves in

the first place, without any assurance that defendant would

protect her.

This case presents a unique set of circumstances

because plaintiff’s doctor-ordered medical leave was

directly related to the harassment. Plaintiff’s final

medical leave was actually her third leave related to the

stress of the harassment she suffered. Defendant

maintained a hostile work environment despite plaintiff’s

repeated complaints. Defendant’s failure to stop the

harassment after these complaints is, under the facts of

this case, discriminatory conduct. Because this conduct

occurred during the three years that preceded the filing of

plaintiff’s lawsuit, I find that her complaint was timely

filed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly