Present: All the Justices
MICHAEL HIGGS, ET AL.
v. Record No. 990006
MICHAEL AND DELORES KIRKBRIDE
OPINION BY
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
November 5, 1999
ARLINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF
ZONING APPEALS
v. Record No. 990073
MICHAEL AND DELORES KIRKBRIDE
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
Benjamin N.A. Kendrick, Judge
In these appeals, which we consolidated for argument, the
primary issue we consider is whether the trial court erred in
reversing a decision of a board of zoning appeals that a lot
created by the subdivision of an existing residential lot is
irregularly shaped and, thus, does not have a sufficient average
width for the zone in which the lot is located.
BACKGROUND
The dispositive facts are not in dispute. Michael L.
Kirkbride and Delores A. Kirkbride (the Kirkbrides) are the
owners of Lot 11, commonly known as 6226 North 23rd Street, in
the Fenwick & Lutrell’s Addition of East Falls Church in
Arlington County. Lot 11 is quadrilateral, roughly trapezoidal
in shape, with a 100.09-foot front line on North 23rd Street.
The lot is approximately 200 feet deep. Because the west lot
line is slightly askew from the perpendicular to the front lot
line, the lot narrows to a parallel back lot line of 90.37 feet.
Lot 11 is located in an R-6 zone, in which, pursuant to the
local zoning ordinance, a lot must consist of not less than
6,000 square feet and have an average width of at least 60 feet.
On November 19, 1997, a preliminary plat subdividing Lot 11
was approved by the Arlington County zoning administrator’s
office. That subdivision created two lots: Lot 11-A and Lot 11-
B. Lot 11-A, which is the lot at issue in this appeal, includes
the original residence on former Lot 11 and comprises the
northeast corner of the original lot. To complete the
subdivision, the Kirkbrides would be required to remove a
sunroom porch on the west side of the residence in order to
comply with setback regulations.
Lot 11-A is quadrilateral with no parallel sides and no
congruent angles. It has a northern front line on North 23rd
Street of 60.04 feet. The west lot line of Lot 11-A is parallel
to the original west lot line of former Lot 11 and, thus, is
slightly askew from the perpendicular to the front lot line. As
a result, the lot narrows to less than 60 feet immediately
beyond the front lot line. At a depth of 105.16 feet on the
west lot line, the south lot line is set at approximately a 45-
2
degree angle to the southeast, creating a south lot line of
71.60 feet and an east lot line of 150.94 feet. Lot 11-B
consists of the remainder of the original lot. In these
configurations, each lot consists of more than 6,000 square feet
as required in the R-6 zone.
Michael and Mary Lou Higgs, Hans and Rebecca Salzinger,
Aida Morales, William and Virginia King, and Stephen and Susan
Slye (the neighbors) own properties on North 23rd Street that
adjoin or are near former Lot 11. After the zoning
administrator approved the subdivision plat, the neighbors filed
a petition with the Arlington County Board of Zoning Appeals
(the BZA) challenging the zoning administrator’s determination
that Lot 11-A conformed to the minimum width requirements for
the R-6 zone. 1 The neighbors contended that Lot 11-A is
irregularly shaped and, thus, the zoning administrator had erred
by permitting the south lot line to be used as the rear lot line
in the measurements for determining the average width of the lot
as if Lot 11-A were a regularly shaped lot. The neighbors
further contended that by calculating the average width in the
manner applicable to irregularly shaped lots, Lot 11-A has an
average lot width of only 48.11 feet.
1
No challenge was asserted against Lot 11-B.
3
In defending the appeal before the BZA, the Kirkbrides
relied upon the zoning administrator’s interpretation of the
zoning ordinance. In its definitions section, the ordinance
sets out the method for determining the average width of a lot,
the “rear lot line” being one of the measurements used in that
determination. The ordinance defines the rear lot line as
“[t]hat lot line which is the most distance from, and the most
nearly parallel with, the front lot line. In the case of a
triangular or otherwise irregularly shaped lot, a line at least
ten (10) feet in length entirely within the lot and parallel to
and at a maximum distance from the front lot line.”
The Kirkbrides contended that the south lot line of Lot 11-
A is the rear lot line as defined by the ordinance because the
south lot line is the “line which is the most distance from, and
the most nearly parallel with, the front lot line.” They
further contended that the zoning administrator has consistently
interpreted this definition of a rear lot line in the ordinance
as applying to any quadrilateral lot. Finally, the Kirkbrides
correctly noted that using this interpretation results in a
determination that Lot 11-A satisfies the requirement of having
an average width of at least 60 feet.
The BZA determined that Lot 11-A is “irregularly shaped,”
and consequently, using the 10-foot measurement for the rear lot
line specified in the ordinance, that Lot 11-A fails to meet the
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minimum average lot width required by the ordinance for the R-6
zone. Accordingly, the BZA voted unanimously to reverse the
zoning administrator’s determination.
The Kirkbrides petitioned the Circuit Court of Arlington
County for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the
BZA, which the trial court granted on May 8, 1998. Thereafter,
the trial court granted the neighbors’ petition to intervene.
While the certiorari proceeding was pending, the Arlington
County Attorney, representing the BZA, sought to have a
memorandum placed in the County’s land records voiding the
approved subdivision plat on the ground that the challenge to
the zoning administrator’s preliminary determination that Lot
11-A was not an irregularly shaped lot prohibited finalizing the
approval process for the subdivision. The Kirkbrides sought an
injunction from the trial court prohibiting this action prior to
the resolution of the certiorari proceeding. The County
Attorney and the Kirkbrides reached an agreement that the
proposed memorandum would state that the subdivision “may” be
void, subject to the outcome of the certiorari proceeding. The
trial court memorialized this agreement in an order, and found
that as a result the need for an injunction had been mooted.
On September 3, 1998, the trial court heard argument from
the parties on the merits of the case. Essentially, the parties
took the same positions they had taken before the BZA. The
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Kirkbrides again contended that since Lot 11-A is quadrilateral,
it is not “triangular or otherwise irregularly shaped” as
provided in the zoning ordinance. This is so, they contended,
because the south lot line of the lot is “the most distance
from, and the most nearly parallel with, the front lot line”
and, thus, is the “rear lot line” as defined by the ordinance
for purposes of determining the average width of the lot. The
Kirkbrides also presented exhibits from the zoning appeal
purporting to show that there are other similarly subdivided
lots in Arlington County and that the zoning administrator had
consistently treated any quadrilateral lot as having an
identifiable rear lot line even if the rear lot line was
significantly out of parallel with the front lot line. In
addition, the Kirkbrides noted that the trial court had affirmed
a decision of the BZA in an earlier certiorari proceeding where
the BZA had affirmed the zoning administrator’s determination
that a lot with a similarly angled rear lot line was regular in
shape.
The BZA and the neighbors contended that the BZA was not
bound by prior actions of the zoning administrator. The BZA
further contended that its determination in the present case
could be distinguished from the zoning administrators’ approval
of other quadrilateral lots, including the lot at issue in the
prior certiorari proceeding cited by the Kirkbrides, because in
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each of those instances the side lot lines were parallel and
perpendicular to the front lot lines. The BZA noted that here
the west lot line diverges from the perpendicular and, thus, Lot
11-A is in no way symmetrical.
At the conclusion of the argument, the trial court
indicated that it would reverse the decision of the BZA as
“plainly wrong and I think what’s been going on for the last
decade should continue unless the [C]ounty [B]oard [of
Supervisors] changes it.” Prior to the entry of a final order,
the trial court heard argument on a joint motion to reconsider.
At that hearing, the neighbors contended that the trial court
had applied an improper standard of review in rendering its
decision, asserting that the trial court could not substitute
its own definition of “irregularly shaped” if “reasonable people
can say that’s an irregular lot, which the BZA has found.” The
BZA asserted that the trial court had erred in giving deference
to the determination of the zoning administrator rather than to
the determination of the BZA. The trial court denied the motion
to reconsider.
In the final order, the trial court reversed the decision
of the BZA, stating that the decision was “plainly wrong” and
that the BZA had “applied erroneous principles of law.” The
order goes on to state that because Lot 11-A conforms to the R-6
zone requirements, the subdivision plat “is a valid and legal
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subdivision of the property.” The BZA and the neighbors
recorded lengthy objections on the final order, referencing
their arguments at the original hearing and at the hearing on
the motion to reconsider. The BZA further objected that the
validity of the subdivision plat was not properly before the
trial court. We awarded appeals to the BZA and the neighbors. 2
DISCUSSION
In considering these appeals, we are guided by well-
established principles of law. On review before the trial
court, the decision of a board of zoning appeals “is presumed to
be correct and can be reversed or modified only if the trial
court determines that the BZA applied erroneous principles of
law or was plainly wrong and in violation of the purposes and
intent of the zoning ordinance” and “[t]he party challenging the
BZA’s decision has the burden of proof on these issues.” Foster
v. Geller, 248 Va. 563, 566, 449 S.E.2d 802, 804-05 (1994); see
also Board of Zoning Appeals v. 852 L.L.C, 257 Va. 485, 489, 514
S.E.2d 767, 770 (1999); Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals,
233 Va. 37, 44, 353 S.E.2d 727, 732-33 (1987).
In addition, the principles relevant to the construction of
a zoning ordinance, whether by a court or by a board of zoning
2
Stephen and Susan Slye are not parties to the neighbors’
appeal.
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appeals, are also well-established. In considering the
deference which must be afforded to zoning officials in such
cases, we have said that while “statutes and ordinances
delegating zoning authority may be broadly construed to prevent
zoning officials from becoming unnecessarily hamstrung in their
efforts to enforce zoning ordinances, administrative zoning
actions must be grounded within the statutory framework
provided.” Foster, 248 Va. at 569, 499 S.E.2d 806 (citations
omitted). In doing so, “[t]he words of the ordinance are to be
given their plain and natural meaning. The purpose and intent
of the ordinance should be considered but the ordinance should
not be extended by interpretation or construction beyond its
intended purpose.” Donovan v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 251 Va.
271, 274, 467 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1996) (citations omitted).
The parties agree that the zoning ordinance at issue here
is unambiguous. Accordingly, the efforts of all the parties,
but those of the Kirkbrides particularly, in the hearings before
the BZA, in the trial court, and on appeal, to rely upon or
distinguish prior interpretations of the ordinance and its
legislative history are irrelevant to the issue that was before
the BZA and the trial court, and is now before this Court on
appeal. See Town of Blackstone v. Southside Elec. Cooperative.,
256 Va. 527, 533, 506 S.E.2d 773, 776 (1998) (“When considering
a legislative act, a court may look only to the words of the
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statute to determine its meaning, and when the meaning is plain,
resort to rules of construction, legislative history, and
extrinsic evidence is impermissible”).
Nor do the parties contest the mathematical results of the
two differing methods for determining average lot width under
the ordinance. 3 Rather, the sole issue before the BZA was
whether the zoning administrator erred in not treating Lot 11-A
as an “otherwise irregularly shaped lot.” Similarly, the BZA’s
action in reversing that decision of the zoning administrator
was the sole issue before the trial court, and its review of
that decision was subject to the standard of deference and
presumption of correctness set out above.
The ordinance provides no definition for “otherwise
irregularly shaped lot,” and therefore we must ascribe to the
words their usual meaning. “Irregular” means “failing to accord
with what is usual . . . lacking perfect symmetry of form.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1196 (1993). It is
clear from the definition of a rear lot line as the “line which
is the most distance from, and the most nearly parallel with,
the front lot line,” that a lot need not be perfectly
3
For reasons not made clear in the record, at least three
different plats of the subdivision, with slight discrepancies in
the lengths of the lines of Lot 11-A, were submitted during the
proceedings below. These discrepancies have no effect on our
consideration of the issues in these appeals.
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symmetrical in order to have an identifiable rear lot line.
However, it is equally clear that, by inclusion of a separate
and distinct provision for determining and limiting the length
of the “rear lot line” for a lot “otherwise irregularly shaped,”
the legislative intent of the zoning ordinance is to assure a
minimum average width and consistency among all lots in a
particular zone.
Lot 11-A is 60 feet in width at no point other than at its
front lot line. Only by virtue of the elongated south lot line
being treated as the “rear lot line” can the lot achieve the
necessary minimum width required for a lot in the R-6 zone.
Moreover, in light of Lot 11-A’s patent lack of symmetry, we
hold that the BZA’s determination that it is “irregularly
shaped” was based on a sound reading of the ordinance under
appropriate principles of law, is supported by the record and,
therefore, is not plainly wrong or in violation of the purpose
and intent of the ordinance. The trial court erred in holding
to the contrary. 4
4
The BZA and the neighbors contend that the trial court
erred by holding the BZA had failed to give deference to the
zoning administrator’s determination that under the ordinance
the south lot line of Lot 11-A constituted the rear lot line.
It is not clear that the trial court so held. Accordingly, we
simply note that the power of the BZA to review the decisions of
a zoning administrator is provided for under Code § 15.2-
2309(3). “In exercising its powers the board may reverse or
affirm, wholly or partly, or may modify, an order, requirement,
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Finally, we consider the BZA’s assertion that the trial
court erred in declaring the previously recorded subdivision
plat to be valid. We will assume, without deciding, that this
issue was properly before the trial court as a result of the
agreement between the County Attorney and the Kirkbrides to have
the conditional memorandum recorded in the land records pending
the outcome of the certiorari proceeding. It is self-evident
that our resolution of the main issue presented by this appeal
negates the effect of the trial court’s ruling that the
subdivision plat is valid. Therefore, we will direct the
parties to correct the land records in a manner consistent with
this opinion.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for these reasons, we will reverse the
judgment of the trial court and enter final judgment in favor of
the BZA and the neighbors.
Reversed and final judgment.
decision or determination appealed from.” Code § 15.2-2312. It
is an appropriate function of the board to reverse a decision of
a zoning official where the board determines that the decision
is contrary to the plain meaning of the ordinance and the
legislative intent expressed therein. The board owes no
deference to the zoning official in that circumstance.
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