Willingham v. Gibson

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUN 17 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

JACKIE LEE WILLINGHAM,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v. No. 01-6071

MIKE MULLIN, Warden,
Oklahoma State Penitentiary,

Respondent-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. CIV-98-1379-T)

Fred L. Staggs, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Robert L. Whittaker, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division (W.A. Drew
Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, with him on the brief), Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before SEYMOUR , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and
BRISCOE , Circuit Judge.

BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge.
 Jackie Lee Willingham appeals from an order of the district court denying

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Upon a thorough

review of the record and the arguments presented, we conclude Mr. Willingham is

not entitled to habeas relief.

In 1995, an Oklahoma jury found Mr. Willingham guilty of first degree

malice murder. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.7. At the penalty phase, the jury

rejected the State’s allegation that Mr. Willingham posed a continuing threat to

society, see id. § 701.12(7), but found that the murder was especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel (HAC aggravator), see id. § 701.12(4). After weighing the

HAC aggravator against the evidence presented in mitigation, the jury determined

that Mr. Willingham should be put to death for the crime. The trial court formally

imposed the recommended sentence, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal

Appeals (OCCA) affirmed both conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See

Willingham v. State , 947 P.2d 1074 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). The OCCA also

denied Mr. Willingham’s subsequent application for post-conviction relief. See

Willingham v. State , No. PC-97-389 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 1998) (unpub.).

Mr. Willingham then commenced the instant habeas proceeding, alleging

fifteen grounds for relief. The district court denied the petition in its entirety, and

Mr. Willingham appealed. The district court granted a certificate of appealability

(COA) on ten issues. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Following the case

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management conference, this court issued its standard order directing that, unless

Mr. Willingham submitted a motion to expand the COA within ten days, “[t]he

issues to be raised in the opening brief are those set forth by the district court in

its order granting a [COA].” Case Management Order, April 18, 2001. No such

motion was filed. In accordance with the case management order and § 2253(c),

we limit our consideration to the ten issues properly certified for review: 1

1. Refusal to Instruct on Second Degree Murder;

2. Use of Victim Impact Evidence;

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel;

4. Admission of Willingham’s Post-Arraignment Statements;

5. Prosecutorial Misconduct during Second Stage Closing Argument;

6. Admission of Cumulative Photographs of the Victim;

7. Admission of Willingham’s Videotaped Statement at Crime Scene;

8. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the HAC Aggravator;

9. Use of an Improper Reasonable Doubt Instruction; and

10. Cumulative Error

1
We note Mr. Willingham indiscriminately briefed all of the issues
originally asserted in his habeas petition, appending a summary request for
a COA at the end of his discussion of the five uncertified claims. Appellate
review of these matters has been waived. Romano v. Gibson , 278 F.3d 1145,
1155 (10th Cir. 2002); Cannon v. Gibson , 259 F.3d 1253, 1259 n.3 (10th Cir.
2001), cert. denied , 122 S. Ct. 1966 (2002).

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 FACTS

Most of the pertinent facts were established by Mr. Willingham’s own trial

testimony and his earlier admissions to the police. On the day of the murder,

Mr. Willingham was selling perfume door to door in Lawton, Oklahoma.

Working his way through a downtown building, he came to the office occupied by

Mrs. Jayne Van Wey. Although she told him she did not wish to purchase any

perfume, he continued to press her, adhering to his standard sales procedure of

insisting on three “no” answers from a potential customer. The repeated

rejections that ensued led to an escalation of the situation to what Mr. Willingham

claims was a rude rebuff by Mrs. Van Wey and hostile vulgarity on both sides.

After calling on some other offices in the building, Mr. Willingham noticed

Mrs. Van Wey enter a restroom off the hallway near her office. Still angry over

their earlier confrontation, he eventually followed her into the restroom, pulled

her from a stall, and struck her several times in the face. As she continued to

struggle with him, he slammed her head into the wall and let her fall backward

onto the floor. When she rolled over and began to push herself up onto her hands

and knees, he kicked her in the face with his boot. At that point, all resistance

ceased, and he left. Mrs. Van Wey lost consciousness and died asphyxiating on

the blood from her injuries.

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 Shortly after the murder, the police found a sales brochure left at one of the

other offices Mr. Willingham had visited. Upon contacting the company and

speaking with a supervisor, the police learned that a sales team in Lawton would

be meeting at a local restaurant later that afternoon. The supervisor also indicated

that at least one member of the team, Kevin Longenecker, fit the suspect’s

description. The police proceeded to the restaurant and approached the group of

salesmen. Detective John Whittington asked about Mr. Longenecker and was told

by Mr. Willingham that he was not there. Detective Whittington noticed that

Mr. Willingham was extremely uneasy and had a fresh scratch on his neck. After

Mr. Willingham offered a facially implausible explanation of the scratch,

Detective Whittington asked him to come to the police station. The detective said

the entire group would need to come, and explained that the police were

investigating an attack on a woman (he did not say murder) downtown that day.

At the police station, Mr. Willingham was advised of his Miranda rights, 2

which he waived in writing. He initially denied any involvement in the attack,

but after Detective Whittington pointed out what looked like blood on his boots

and asked him to tell his side of the story, Mr. Willingham admitted he had beaten

Mrs. Van Wey. However, some of the details of his version of the attack did not

fit the physical evidence, and he was asked to return to the scene and clarify his

2
See generally Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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account. After again waiving his Miranda rights, Mr. Willingham walked through

the crime scene describing the attack, somewhat differently, on videotape.

Thereafter, Mr. Willingham learned that Mrs. Van Wey had died. He was

interviewed again to clear up additional questions raised by the physical evidence,

and at this point finally admitted he had forcefully kicked Mrs. Van Wey in the

head before leaving the restroom. Finally, after two of Mrs. Van Wey’s credit

cards were found in the restaurant where Detective Whittington had first spoken

with Mr. Willingham, he was advised of his rights and questioned once more, to

explain this new development. He eventually admitted he had not immediately

followed Mrs. Van Wey into the restroom but had stopped in her office and taken

the cards from her purse first, “to make it look like a robbery.”

Mr. Willingham’s only defense at trial was to challenge the State’s case

on the element of intent. Specifically, he testified that while he had attacked

Mrs. Van Wey out of anger over their prior confrontation, he had not intended to

kill or seriously injure her. Accordingly, the defense requested instructions on the

lesser offenses of heat-of-passion manslaughter and second degree depraved-mind

murder. The trial court granted the first instruction but denied the second. The

jury ultimately rejected Mr. Willingham’s intent defense, finding him guilty of

first degree malice murder.

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 STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Mr. Willingham filed his habeas petition after the effective date of the

Antiterorrism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which therefore

governs the proceeding. See Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 420, 429 (2000). This

court has summarized the significance of AEDPA for habeas review as follows:

Under AEDPA, if a claim was adjudicated on its merits in state court,
a petitioner is entitled to federal habeas relief only if he can establish
that the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1), (2). Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant
a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court reached a conclusion
opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law,
decided the case differently than the Supreme Court has decided a
case with a materially indistinguishable set of facts, or unreasonably
applied the governing legal principle to the facts of the petitioner’s
case. See Williams [ v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)].
“Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause . . ., a
federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court
decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or
incorrectly. Rather that application must also be unreasonable.”
Williams , [529 U.S. at 411]. “In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new
constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state
prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to
claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Williams , [529 U.S.
at 412]. AEDPA also requires federal courts to presume state court
factual findings are correct, and places the burden on the petitioner
to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

“If[, however, a] claim was not heard on the merits by the state
courts, and the federal district court made its own determination in

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 the first instance, we review the district court’s conclusions of law
de novo and its findings of fact, if any, for clear error.” LaFevers v.
Gibson , 182 F.3d 705, 711 (10th Cir. 1999). If the district court’s
factual findings are based only on a review of the state court record,
we conduct an independent review. See Smallwood v. Gibson ,
191 F.3d 1257, 1264 n.1 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied , [531 U.S.
833] (2000).

Walker v. Gibson , 228 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct.

2560 (2001). With this review framework in mind, we turn to the claims raised

by Mr. Willingham, first addressing those related solely to his conviction and then

those implicating sentencing concerns.

I. Refusal to Instruct on Second Degree Murder

Mr. Willingham argues that he was improperly denied an instruction on

second degree depraved-mind murder, citing Beck v. Alabama , 447 U.S. 625

(1980) (invalidating death sentence for first degree murder where jury was not

permitted to consider lesser included offense). In light of radical swings in state

law as to whether depraved-mind murder even qualifies as a lesser included

offense (LIO) of first degree malice murder, this is not simply a straightforward

Eighth Amendment claim under Beck and its progeny. A brief history of the

pertinent Oklahoma case law will indicate why Mr. Willingham has joined ex post

facto and equal protection objections to his Beck claim.

Prior to Mr. Willingham’s direct appeal in 1997, the OCCA considered

second degree murder a LIO of first degree murder. Hooks v. Ward , 184 F.3d

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1206, 1233 n.25 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Boyd v. Ward , 179 F.3d 904, 916

(10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 1167 (2000)). However, his claim that

the trial court had violated Beck by refusing to instruct on second degree murder

prompted the OCCA to take note of a 1976 amendment to the state’s murder

scheme that it had theretofore overlooked. Willingham , 947 P.2d at 1081

(“Apparently, our case law failed to recognize this change in the statutes.”). In

light of that amendment, second degree depraved-mind murder now requires “an

act imminently dangerous to another person,” Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.8(1)–an

element that malice murder, which turns on the intent to kill rather than on any

particular characterization of the means used to carry out that intent, does not

require, see Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.7. Consequently, pursuant to the “statutory

elements” test for identifying LIOs in Oklahoma at the time, the OCCA concluded

that depraved-mind murder was not a LIO of malice murder and, hence, could

not provide a basis for Mr. Willingham’s Beck claim. Willingham , 947 P.2d

at 1081-82.

Two years later, however, in Shrum v. State , 991 P.2d 1032 (Okla. Crim.

App. 1999), the OCCA returned to the view that second degree murder is a LIO

of first degree malice murder–this time notwithstanding the 1976 statutory

change–pursuant to a global reassessment of its approach to LIOs in the murder

context. Abandoning the elements test altogether, the OCCA held as a categorical

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matter “that all lesser forms of homicide are necessarily included and instructions

on lesser forms of homicide should be administered if they are supported by the

evidence.” Gilson v. State , 8 P.3d 883, 917 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000)

(summarizing Shrum ), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 1496 (2001).

This is the legal backdrop against which Mr. Willingham claims Beck

entitled him to a LIO instruction on second degree murder. Should his Beck claim

fail based on the brief break in state law during which second degree murder was

not considered a LIO of malice murder, Mr. Willingham insists he must be

afforded relief under ex post facto and/or equal protection principles.

A. Beck Claim

In fact, the district court did rely on the window of unfavorable state LIO

law to deny Mr. Willingham’s Beck claim. Invoking Hopkins v. Reeves , 524 U.S.

88, 95-100 (1998), for the principle that Beck is not violated if a state court

refuses to instruct on an offense that, under state law, is not a LIO of first degree

murder, the district court held that the OCCA’s construction of the second degree

murder statute on his direct appeal controlled and defeated his Beck claim. We

agree. While Hopkins indicated that state courts may not frustrate the values

embodied in Beck through arbitrary interpretation of hierarchical murder schemes,

see Hopkins , 524 U.S. at 100; see also Bagby v. Sowders , 894 F.2d 792, 794-95

(6th Cir. 1990) (en banc), no such impropriety has been demonstrated here. As

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explained above, the OCCA’s rejection of Mr. Willingham’s Beck claim was

grounded in a reasoned, albeit belated, application of the prevailing LIO standard

to the controlling statutory definitions of the offenses involved.

Before turning to Mr. Willingham’s resultant ex post facto argument, we

briefly consider two other bases for rejecting his Beck claim which would not

implicate any ex post facto problem. First, the state trial court did instruct the

jury on first degree heat of passion manslaughter, which suggests the district

court could have denied the Beck claim because, under Schad v. Arizona , 501 U.S.

624 (1991), “[t]he Beck requirement is satisfied so long as the jury had the option

of at least one lesser included offense, even if there are other lesser included

offenses also supported by the evidence.” James v. Gibson , 211 F.3d 543, 555

(10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 886 (2001). However, Schad ’s

qualification on Beck presumes that the LIO presented to the jury had evidentiary

support in the record, as otherwise it would not have provided a true third option

to obviate the death-or-acquittal dilemma Beck was intended to resolve. Valdez v.

Ward , 219 F.3d 1222, 1242 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 1618 (2001);

see Schad , 501 U.S. at 648 (explaining that, while Beck dilemma can be obviated

by one LIO, “[t]hat is not to suggest that Beck would be satisfied by instructing

the jury on just any [LIO], even one without any support in the evidence”);

cf. Roberts v. Louisiana , 428 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1976) (invalidating, as arbitrary,

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state procedure allowing juries to avoid death penalty through use of LIOs

regardless of supporting evidence). Here, both the OCCA and the district court

held that the evidence did not warrant a heat of passion manslaughter instruction,

and the trial record bears out that determination. The minimal nature of the

alleged provocation, and the length of time between that provocation and the

murder, during which Mr. Willingham made other office calls showing nothing

remarkable in his demeanor, clearly undercut this LIO. Thus, we cannot rely

on Schad to provide an alternative rationale for rejecting Mr. Willingham’s

Beck claim.

A second possibility is that the evidence simply did not warrant the second

degree murder instruction Mr. Willingham insists that he should have received.

The OCCA’s opinion is unclear on this question. At one point the OCCA did

note, as one of three bases upon which Beck “can be distinguished from this

case,” that “ Beck only requires an instruction on lesser included offenses when

the evidence supports such an instruction,” but then went on to discuss the

inadequacy of the evidence solely with respect to the manslaughter instruction.

Willingham , 947 P.2d at 1082-83. The district court, which relied exclusively on

the Hopkins rationale cited above, also did not assess whether the trial evidence

would have warranted a second degree murder instruction in any event.

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 Our own review of the trial record leads us to conclude that, had a second

degree murder instruction otherwise been available under state LIO law, the

evidence was legally sufficient to warrant such a charge. The critical elements of

depraved-mind murder are that the death was “caused by conduct which was

imminently dangerous to another person” and that “the conduct [was] not

done with the intention of taking the life of any particular individual.” Id.

at 1081. The former element is clearly established by the violent nature of

Mr. Willingham’s physical assault on Mrs. Van Wey, and the latter element, while

ultimately rejected by the jury’s verdict, was nevertheless a plausible option on

the evidence–indeed, as the OCCA noted, lack of intent to kill was the “only

theory of defense at trial,” id at 1080.

Thus, the Hopkins analysis discussed above, which rests on the temporary

swing in Oklahoma LIO law conclusively disadvantageous to Mr. Willingham,

appears to be the only rationale available for rejecting the Beck claim on

the merits. As a result, Mr. Willingham’s ex post facto objection cannot be

avoided.

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 B. Ex Post Facto (i.e., Due Process 3
) Claim

It might appear that this claim, which arose only in response to the OCCA’s

new construction of the amended second degree murder statute in its decision on

Mr. Willingham’s direct appeal, has never been exhausted in state court.

However, Mr. Willingham raised it in a petition for rehearing from that decision,

which was denied without explanation by the OCCA. Under Aycox v. Lytle ,

196 F.3d 1174, 1177-78 (1999), the latter disposition could still be entitled to

deference under § 2254(d), even though it would be left to the federal courts to

articulate an appropriate rationale for the OCCA’s summary decision. As it

happens, the OCCA explained in a later case why the change in LIO law effected

by its decision on Mr. Willingham’s appeal did not violate any ex post facto

prohibition. In Phillips v. State , 989 P.2d 1017, 1034 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999),

the OCCA rejected an essentially identical claim for the following reason:

Although Willingham was handed down six (6) months after
the trial in this case, the law upon which the decision that second
degree depraved mind murder is not a lesser included offense of
malice murder was based was the 1976 amendment to the statute.
Therefore, as the statutory language upon which this Court relied for
its authority was in effect at the time of the murder and trial in this
case, it appears that no possible ex post facto violation is present.

3
While “the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause figures prominently in
[Mr. Willingham’s] argument,” strictly speaking the “limitations on ex post facto
judicial decisionmaking” derive from the Due Process Clause, which does not
incorporate wholesale all the restrictions directly imposed on legislative action by
the former provision. Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U.S. 451, 456-61 (2001).

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The problem with this rationale, which might be upheld under § 2254(d) in

the context of a retroactive legislative change as a reasonable application of

Ex Post Facto Clause jurisprudence, is that, as noted in footnote 3 above,

Mr. Willingham’s claim arises, rather, under the Due Process Clause and is

therefore governed by somewhat different principles never considered by the

OCCA.

The Supreme Court recently clarified that “due process limitations on the

retroactive application of judicial interpretations of criminal statutes” apply to

those decisions “that are ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law

which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.’” Rogers , 532 U.S.

at 461 (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia , 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964) (quotation

omitted)). This court employed appropriate due process standards in this context

before Rogers’ clarification/reaffirmation of Bouie . Of particular relevance here

is Fultz v. Embry , 158 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 1998), in which we held that a state

decision, much like Willingham , belatedly interpreting and applying legislative

amendments “a number of years . . . after passage of these new laws” was an

example of the sort of foreseeable decision whose retroactive application was

constitutionally permissible. Id. at 1103-04.

Of course, the question whether the OCCA’s decision in Willingham was

“unexpected and indefensible” also depends on the merit or plausibility of its

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holding in light of the legal principles and statutory language on which it was

based. In that regard, it should be clear from what has been said above that the

OCCA’s application of its statutory elements test to the amended second degree

murder statute cannot be characterized as “indefensible,” even if the OCCA’s

prior failure to acknowledge the statutory change made its sudden attention to the

matter “unexpected.” Further, the OCCA’s later reversal of position in Shrum

reflected a global reassessment of its approach to the LIO question–resulting in

its abandonment of the straightforward but inflexible elements test for a broader

approach permitting instruction on any lesser homicide offense supported by the

trial record–and, thus, Shrum ’s contrary result does not suggest that the OCCA’s

analysis in Willingham was indefensible on its own terms. In sum, we hold that

Mr. Willingham has failed to make out a due process violation under the

Rogers -Bouie standard.

C. Equal Protection Claim

Mr. Willingham argues that when the OCCA “restored the law preceding

Willingham , in Shrum, ” but “left out in the cold those few cases [denying LIO

claims] which had begun with Willingham ,” the OCCA “irrationally denied [him]

the protections mandated by Beck and afforded Oklahoma capital defendants both

before and after him,” thereby violating his right to equal protection under the

law. Aplt. Br. at 25-26. This contention merits little comment. In light of the

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preceding discussion of the OCCA’s reasoning in Willingham and Shrum , the

charge of irrational discrimination is unfounded. Moreover, as Mr. Willingham

concedes, he did not raise this equal protection issue below (nor has he exhausted

it in the state courts).

II. Admission of Post-Arraignment Statements

Immediately upon his arrest, Mr. Willingham waived his Fifth Amendment

rights and confessed to the attack on Mrs. Van Wey. He does not challenge that

confession. Rather, he objects on Sixth Amendment grounds to the admission of

two statements he gave shortly after his arraignment, which he later recanted,

relating to (1) his pre-murder theft of Mrs. Van Wey’s credit cards, from a purse

she had left in her office, to deflect suspicion for the ensuing attack by making it

look like a robbery (but which had the unintended effect of supporting the State’s

case on intent, since such a cover made no sense if he planned to leave her alive

to tell the police about the attack); and (2) an assault on an officer in the Marines

years earlier (relevant to the continuing threat aggravator). At trial, he insisted he

stole the credit cards only after the attack on Mrs. Van Wey (for no plausible

reason he could explain), and simply denied the latter assault.

Mr. Willingham’s right to counsel had certainly attached when he made the

statements in question, i.e., “after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal

proceedings . . . by way of . . . arraignment.” United States v. Baez-Acuna ,

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54 F.3d 634, 637 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). However, he does not

dispute police testimony that repeated Miranda (Fifth Amendment) waivers were

effected at this time. Such waivers can suffice for Sixth Amendment purposes as

well, depending on two further factual considerations: whether the later contact

was initiated by the police or the suspect, and whether the suspect expressly

invoked his right to counsel before that contact. Under Michigan v. Jackson ,

475 U.S. 625 (1986), and Patterson v. Illinois , 487 U.S. 285 (1988), the Sixth

Amendment permits re-initiation of police questioning pursuant to Miranda

procedures if the suspect has not requested the professional representation to

which he is entitled, but, once he has made such a request, subsequent contact is

permitted only if the suspect initiates it himself, even if the police otherwise

adhere to Miranda safeguards.

Thus, the district court properly focused on whether Mr. Willingham

requested counsel during his arraignment. The court noted that the OCCA had

addressed the two “statements made by [Mr. Willingham] after his initial

appearance, but before he filled out and submitted his [formal, post-arraignment]

application for appointed counsel,” and had concluded that “[t]he record indicates

[Mr. Willingham] did not request counsel until [his subsequent written

application].” Willingham , 947 P.2d at 1079. The district court deemed this

a factual finding presumptively correct under § 2254(e)(1), and then considered

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whether Mr. Willingham’s affidavit averring that he asked the judge to appoint

counsel at his arraignment constituted the “clear and convincing evidence”

necessary to rebut the presumption. This is a difficult question, because the

arraignment was not recorded and there is no evidence in the record to counter

Mr. Willingham’s account (the OCCA denied his request for an evidentiary

hearing on post-conviction, when he first submitted his affidavit).

The district court ultimately elected to resolve the matter through harmless

error analysis. 4
With respect to the assault in the Marines, the district court held

it was merely cumulative to other admissions Mr. Willingham had made about

fighting and, thus, was harmless. We agree. Moreover, we note that the primary

focus of this evidence–the continuing threat aggravator–was not found by the jury

in any event.

In contrast, the timing and, by inference, purpose of Mr. Willingham’s theft

of the credit cards was clearly relevant to the crucial element of intent for first

4
The district court used the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
of Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), instead of the “substantial and
injurious effect or influence” habeas standard from Brecht v. Abrahamson ,
507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quotation omitted) which we have held still controls in
post-AEDPA cases where, as here, there is no state court Chapman determination
to defer to under § 2254(d). See Hale v. Gibson , 227 F.3d 1298, 1324-25 (10th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 2608 (2001); see also Herrera v. Lemaster ,
225 F.3d 1176, 1179 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2000), reopened & reh’g granted en banc
(Feb. 28, 2002). However, our conclusion on harmless error does not turn on
which of these standards applies.

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degree murder. However, the district court held that the physical evidence led to

the inescapable conclusion that Mr. Willingham stole the cards before the attack,

so his admission to the same effect was harmless. The court was referring to the

fact that, despite the large quantity of blood in the washroom, and associated

stains on the doorknob, hallway carpet, and Mr. Willingham’s clothes, there was

no blood in Mrs. Van Wey’s office or on her purse. Two additional points

support the district court’s analysis. First, testimony from a witness in the

building independently pointed to the pre-murder theft of the cards, by indicating

that several minutes passed between her seeing Mr. Willingham walk by in the

direction of the washroom and her hearing the noise of the ensuing attack.

Second, regardless of the whole credit card scenario, the sheer brutality of the

attack, especially the forceful kick to the head with which it concluded, weighed

heavily in favor of a finding of intent to kill. Under the circumstances, the

district court’s determination of harmless error was correct.

III. Admission of Videotaped Statement Given at the Crime Scene

Mr. Willingham objects to admission of the videotaped statement he gave at

the crime scene, asserting that this “reenactment of the assault was so prejudicial,

demeaning and cumulative that [he] was denied a fair trial, due process of law

and a reliable sentencing proceeding.” Aplt. Br. at 63. On his direct appeal, the

OCCA held the videotape was merely “a walk through of the crime scene with

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[Mr. Willingham] telling his version of the events,” and, as such, did not involve

any identifiable error. Willingham , 947 P.2d at 1083-84. When Mr. Willingham

resumed his objection on habeas, the district court noted that he did not advance

any specific reasons why the videotape was inadmissible or identify what

particular material contained therein could give rise to actionable prejudice.

Thus, the district court summarily denied relief because Mr. Willingham had

failed, as a threshold matter, to develop an argument sufficient for federal review.

Mr. Willingham’s claim fails for both reasons identified above. On appeal,

he makes no attempt to shore up the basic argumentative deficiencies noted by the

district court. On the contrary, his appellate briefing is essentially a verbatim

copy of the conclusory allegations presented in his habeas petition. In any event,

upon review of the videotaped statement, we agree with the OCCA’s description

of its content; Mr. Willingham’s attempt to characterize it as a provocative

reenactment of the murder is sheer hyperbole.

IV. Admission of Photographs of the Victim

Mr. Willingham claims that the trial court improperly admitted twenty-two

photographs of Mrs. Van Wey’s body, which he contends were unduly prejudicial

to the defense at both stages of trial. Where no particularized constitutional

guarantees are directly implicated, such an evidentiary objection is cognizable on

habeas only if the alleged error was “so grossly prejudicial that it fatally infected

-21-
the trial and denied the fundamental fairness that is the essence of due process.”

Fox v. Ward , 200 F.3d 1286, 1296 (10th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied ,

531 U.S. 938 (2000). With this federal standard in mind, we conclude that

the OCCA’s resolution of this matter was not unreasonable and, therefore,

Mr. Willingham is not entitled to relief under § 2254(d). See Thomas v. Gibson ,

218 F.3d 1213, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000).

On Mr. Willingham’s direct appeal, the OCCA explained that “[t]he test for

admissibility of photographs is not whether they are gruesome or inflammatory,

but whether their probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice,” and held that the victim photographs were properly admitted at

the guilt phase for their relevance to the critical element of intent to kill and at

the penalty phase for their relevance to the serious physical abuse requirement of

the HAC aggravator. Willingham , 947 P.2d at 1083 (also holding photographs

depicted sufficiently different aspects of victim’s injuries to undercut any

challenge on ground they were cumulative). The district court agreed that the

photographs were properly admitted for these important purposes, and held that

Mr. Willingham therefore could not demonstrate a due process violation

warranting habeas relief.

Mr. Willingham’s appellate argument on this issue fails to come to grips

with the primary basis for the rulings of the district court and OCCA. He simply

-22-
repeats his charge that the photographs are gruesome, without addressing their

obvious facial relevance to critical elements of the State’s case at both stages of

trial. We note one additional point, for clarification. When a victim dies or loses

consciousness early on in an assault, photographs of all of her injuries might

involve irrelevant and/or unduly prejudicial material at the penalty phase, since

the HAC aggravator focuses on the conscious suffering of the victim. Cf. Powell

v. State , 906 P.2d 765, 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (holding admission of victim

photographs during penalty phase “came very close” to reversible error for just

this reason). Here, however, there is no such concern; Mr. Willingham’s own

testimony described Mrs. Van Wey as conscious and struggling to defend herself

throughout the fatal beating.

V. Reasonable Doubt Instruction

In Cage v. Louisiana , 498 U.S. 39 (1990), and Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S.

62 (1991), the Supreme Court held that “a jury instruction is unconstitutional if

there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow

conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tyler v. Cain , 121 S. Ct.

2478, 2480 & n.1 (2001). Invoking this body of law, Mr. Willingham objects to

the reasonable doubt instruction given at his trial, which stated in part:

“[I]f you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt under the law
and the evidence herein that the said defendant did commit the
offense of murder in the first degree as charged in the complaint and
information herein, you will find the defendant guilty of said offense

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 and so state by your verdict. However, if you fail to find and believe
the defendant guilty or if you entertain a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt, then in either case you should return a verdict of not guilty.”

Trial Tr. Vol. III at 150-51 (emphasis added). He argues that replacement of the

clearly mandatory “will,” used where the instruction relates the lack of reasonable

doubt to a guilty verdict, with the allegedly more permissive “should,” used where

the instruction relates the presence of reasonable doubt to a not guilty verdict,

allowed the jury some discretion to convict even if they harbored a reasonable

doubt about his guilt.

Rejecting this claim, the OCCA explained “[t]he term ‘should,’ when used

as it was used by the trial court, is defined as expressing an obligation or duty.

‘Should is never placed on the level with ‘may,’ which is clearly permissive.”

Willingham , 947 P.2d at 1082. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never indicated

that the mandatory force inherent in the term “should” is insufficient to properly

guide a jury’s application of the reasonable doubt standard. Moreover, we note

that the trial court referred to reasonable doubt at several other points in its

charge, repeatedly directing that a not guilty verdict “must” follow if the jury

harbored a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s innocence. The OCCA’s

conclusion that the instructions, read as a whole, adequately stated “the jury’s

duty to determine if the State has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt,” id.

at 1083, was neither “contrary to” nor “an unreasonable application of” the clearly

-24-
established law summarized in Tyler . Accordingly, habeas relief on this claim is

foreclosed by § 2254(d)(1).

VI. Evidence Supporting HAC Aggravator

Mr. Willingham challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

HAC aggravator. The controlling constitutional test is whether any rational

trier of fact could have found the aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. Hale ,

227 F.3d at 1334-35. This court has not decided, for AEDPA purposes, whether

such issues of evidentiary sufficiency are legal and hence governed by

§ 2254(d)(1), or factual and hence governed by §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1); in any

event, however, the critical question is “whether the OCCA’s decision [affirming

the HAC finding] was reasonable.” McCracken v. Gibson , 268 F.3d 970, 981

(10th Cir. 2001). In our view, it clearly was.

The OCCA summarized the evidence supporting the HAC aggravator as

follows:

Appellant’s own testimony reveals that he punched Mrs. Van Wey in
the face at least three times, then he slammed her head into the wall
causing her to fall to the ground on her back. Mrs. Van Wey was
still conscious at that point because she was able to roll over and rise
to her hands and knees before being kicked in the face by Appellant.
Circumstantially, it was at that point that she lost consciousness and
aspirated her own blood which caused her death. Certainly this
evidence supports a finding that Mrs. Van Wey was subjected to
serious physical abuse . . . .

Along with Appellant’s testimony, the medical examiner
testified that there were at least four violent blows to the victim’s

-25-
 head. This evidence combined with Appellant’s testimony can lead
one to conclude that some of these blows occurred prior to the loss of
consciousness. Circumstantial evidence and common sense would
lead a reasonable jury to believe that this killing was successfully
designed to inflict a high degree of pain on the victim. Therefore,
there was sufficient evidence to show that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel.

Willingham , 947 P.2d at 1085.

Mr. Willingham does not take issue with the factual accuracy of that

summary, which the trial record clearly bears out. Rather, he contends “Mrs. Van

Wey was beaten to unconsciousness so quickly that she suffered little longer than

had [he] walked in and shot her.” Aplt. Br. at 66. He does not cite any authority,

and we know of none, to support his cavalier equation of the extended, brutal

beating suffered by Mrs. Van Wey with a single, mercifully swift gunshot. The

district court correctly rejected this contention as wholly without merit.

He also insists this case is controlled by Thomas v. Gibson , 218 F.3d 1213,

which invalidated a HAC finding that had been based solely on evidence of

multiple blows and the inference “that a murderer would [not] continue striking

a murder victim if the first landed blow rendered the victim unconscious.” Id. at

1228. Thomas is inapposite. In that case there was “no evidence that a struggle

had taken place, that [the victim] had defensive wounds, or that [the defendant]

had any wounds on his body consistent with a struggle when he was arrested

shortly after the murder.” Id. Moreover, a witness “close enough to observe

-26-
many details . . . did not testify to hearing any noises, voices, or screams.” Id.

Here, in contrast, we have Mr. Willingham’s own description of Mrs. Van Wey’s

conscious struggle until the final violent blow was landed, which is consistent

with the injuries inflicted and further corroborated by the fresh scratch on

Mr. Willingham’s neck at the time of his arrest. We also have testimony from a

witness who heard banging noises and a scream coming from the direction of the

women’s washroom at the time in question. Clearly, the kind of inference

questioned in Thomas was not needed by the OCCA to affirm the HAC finding in

this case.

VII. Victim Impact Evidence

Mr. Willingham claims that victim impact evidence presented at the penalty

phase was unduly emotional, impermissibly contradicted substantive evidence of

the circumstances of the murder, and included improper “opinions about the

crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence.” 5
Hain v. Gibson , 287 F.3d

1224, 1238 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). On direct appeal, the OCCA

5
Mrs. Van Wey’s family described her as a loving wife, caring mother and
generous person, properly indicating the human loss caused by her death. But
some family members injected speculative, inflammatory details about the crime
and the commensurate retribution it demanded–one daughter suggested that Mr.
Willingham be confined in a small area, beaten, and made “to crawl [to] try to get
away,” “beg for his life” and “choke on his own blood.” Some also contradicted
trial evidence regarding the asserted provocation for the crime, denying that Mrs.
Van Wey was capable of the rude vulgarity Mr. Willingham attributed to her. All
three children asked the jury to impose a death sentence.

-27-
(1) summarized the evidence and acknowledged some of it was indeed improper,

see Willingham , 947 P.2d at 1085-86, 1088, (2) noted the absence of a trial

objection, but stated it would consider the matter “under [its] statutorily mandated

sentence review to determine whether the statements caused [Mr. Willingham] to

be sentenced to death for improper reasons,” id. at 1086, and (3) ultimately

concluded that “even absent the improper victim impact evidence, the result

would have been the same,” id. at 1088-89. The district court followed

essentially the same approach, noting the improper testimony but denying relief in

light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt in the first stage and of aggravation in

the penalty phase. We agree with both the OCCA and the district court, though it

is important to clarify the harmless error standard underlying our conclusion that

habeas relief is not warranted here.

While the OCCA appears to have applied a species of harmless error

analysis, denying relief for recognized error due to lack of prejudice, there is no

indication that it employed the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of

Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. at 24. Consequently, we consider the question

of harmless error de novo under the general standard established for habeas cases

in Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619, asking whether the objectionable victim

impact evidence “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s [death penalty] verdict,” id. at 637 (quotation omitted). See Sallahdin

-28-
v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002) ; Hale , 227 F.3d at 1324-25;

Herrera , 225 F.3d at 1179.

Several factors convince us that the victim impact evidence in question had

no such effect or influence. The jury properly found that the brutal, demeaning

attack on Mrs. Van Wey was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel–a finding

effectively compelled by Mr. Willingham’s own description of the crime quite

apart from the few speculative embellishments in the victim impact testimony.

Mr. Willingham was admittedly responsible for the attack, which, moreover, the

jury had already found during the guilt phase was carried out with a fatal intent,

thus rejecting his primary extenuating plea that he never meant to inflict serious

harm. Finally, the “provocation” cited for the attack, that Mrs. Van Wey was rude

to him when he persisted in clearly unwanted sales advances, was so ludicrously

disproportionate, and temporally remote, to his violent response that any indirect

refutation (or substantiation) on the point could hardly have mattered to the jury.

Under the circumstances, we are confident that the improper aspects of the victim

impact evidence did not play any substantial role in the jury’s assessment of the

death penalty in this case. See Hain , 287 F.3d at 1239-40 (holding admission of

comparable victim impact evidence harmless for similar reasons).

-29-
VIII. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Mr. Willingham claims several remarks made by the prosecutor to the jury

were improper and entitle him to relief under the “fundamental fairness” standard

that generally governs such claims on habeas. See Neill v. Gibson , 278 F.3d

1044, 1058 (10th Cir. 2001), petition for cert. filed , (U.S. May 6, 2002) (No. 01-

10121). The OCCA concluded none of the remarks rose to the level of actionable

prosecutorial misconduct. See Willingham , 947 P.2d at 1084. In denying habeas

relief, the district court (1) set out the allegedly objectionable remarks; (2) noted

the conclusory nature of Mr. Willingham’s objection to them, but nevertheless

evaluated their impact in light of the record as a whole, including the strength of

the State’s case on guilt and aggravation; (3) concluded none of the remarks,

individually and/or cumulatively, deprived Mr. Willingham of a fundamentally

fair trial; and (4) upheld the OCCA’s decision denying relief on this claim

pursuant to § 2254(d).

On appeal, Mr. Willingham does not really address the district court’s

opinion, much less attempt to identify specifically any error in its rationale. In

fact, his appellate briefing does little more than restate, essentially verbatim, the

allegations originally set out in his habeas petition. In any event, we have

reviewed the comments and the trial record, which lead us to the same conclusion

reached by the district court.

-30-
 Mr. Willingham objects to the prosecutor’s personal “prayer” for a first

degree murder verdict during closing argument in the guilt phase:

The evidence is overwhelming. There’s only one verdict, and I pray
you’re strong enough, . . . however long it takes, set in there, talk
this case over, discuss this case, but I pray there be only one verdict,
and that’s guilty of murder in the first degree.

Trial Tr. Vol. III at 180. He also objects to the following exhortatory remarks by

the prosecutor during closing argument in the penalty phase:

I’d like to put this, if I may, in perspective. Most of you, if you had
a stray dog that had its head busted up, the dog is dying, the dog is
wallering down trying to get up, most human beings could not kick
that stray dog in the face hard enough to break a nose, shove it back
into the eyelids, knock out teeth, split lips and watch that dog gurgle
and die, or turn around and walk off while it was in the throes of
death. Most people cannot do that. That should tell you something
about a human being that has the ability to do that to an old woman
and walk out.

....

How many of you will ever be able to get this vision of that
bathroom and this woman’s face out of your mind. It’s going to
haunt you for months. It’s going to change every one of you to some
degree that’s been affected with this case. You can’t help it if you’re
a normal human being.

....

I want to get back to this . . . life without parole, make him think
about it day in and day out. I submit to you this man wouldn’t think
about it past the day of his judgment and sentence. Correlate the two
for you, if I may; [Mrs.] Van Wey is not ever going to see another
Christmas. Life without parole, he’s going to see them year after
year after year . . . [Mrs.] Van Wey will never celebrate another
birthday. Life without parole, he’ll celebrate it every year.

-31-
 ....

Every one of you told me that you could give the death penalty. A
number of you told me that you would not take the easy way out.
Now the easy way out is to say I just can’t do this or it’s too great,
I don’t want to have to deal with this. Let’s just do life without
parole and go to the house. That’s the easy way out in this case.

....

[T]he evidence in this case is overwhelming – overwhelming. I pray
you be strong. I pray you members of the jury be strong. There’s
only one verdict. Anything less will be the second travesty in this
case.

Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 116-117, 128-131.

Comparable–indeed, substantially more inflammatory–remarks have not

warranted habeas relief under the fundamental fairness standard in prior cases

before the Supreme Court and this circuit. See, e.g. , Darden v. Wainwright ,

477 U.S. 168, 178-83 (1986); Pickens v. Gibson , 206 F.3d 988, 1000 (2000);

Hopkinson v. Shillinger , 866 F.2d 1185, 1205-11 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled on

other grounds as recognized by Davis v. Maynard , 911 F.2d 415, 417 (10th Cir.

1990). Further, the obvious strength of the State’s evidence at both phases of

trial undercuts Mr. Willingham’s claim that the few remarks noted above played

any significant role in the proceedings. In sum, “we cannot conclude that these

remarks, alone or considered together, rendered [Mr. Willingham’s] trial

fundamentally unfair. The [OCCA’s] decision denying . . . relief on these claims

was, therefore, not unreasonable.” Pickens , 206 F.3d at 1000 (quotation omitted).

-32-
IX. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

None of Mr. Willingham’s allegations of ineffective assistance were raised

on direct appeal. On state post-conviction, the OCCA held those relating to trial

were procedurally defaulted and those relating to appeal failed for lack of facts to

support a finding of deficient performance. Willingham v. State , No. PC-97-389

(Okla. Crim. App. March 19, 1998). The district court approached the matter as

follows. First, it upheld the OCCA’s denial of the appellate ineffectiveness claim

as reasonable under § 2254(d). Second, it held that all of the trial ineffectiveness

allegations, except those relating to counsel’s failure to develop mental health and

related mitigation evidence, could have been pursued on direct appeal by separate

counsel and, thus, were properly barred under English v. Cody , 146 F.3d 1257,

1263 (10th Cir. 1998). Finally, it reviewed the claim relating to the mental health

and mitigation evidence under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984),

and held that (1) the failure to obtain treatment records which counsel had been

told did not exist was not deficient performance, and (2) the failure to call certain

witnesses in mitigation, even if deficient, was not prejudicial.

Despite the significance of the district court’s procedural bar holding, on

appeal Mr. Willingham does not mention, let alone meaningfully challenge, the

court’s analysis in that regard. Rather, his appellate brief simply recites his

numerous complaints about counsel, many in very conclusory fashion, as if there

-33-
had been no procedural bar ruling undercutting most of them. We shall focus on

the primary claim decided on the merits by the district court, regarding the mental

health and mitigation evidence Mr. Willingham insists his counsel should have

developed and presented at trial. For procedural and substantive reasons, none of

his other allegations warrant specific comment. 6

Mr. Willingham cites three types of evidence in this regard: records of his

treatment for depression as a child; potential expert testimony regarding the

psychological consequences of his abusive upbringing; and lay testimony further

describing his troubled childhood. As for the treatment records, the district court

properly held two points undercut Mr. Willingham’s claim. First, he admitted that

his counsel requested such records but were informed they did not exist. Second,

he did not suggest what counsel could have done differently to obtain the records

nor did he indicate what was contained in the records which could have altered

the outcome of his trial. Mr. Willingham’s cursory discussion of the matter on

appeal does not in any way undermine the district court’s analysis.

Mr. Willingham complains about two different categories of potential

expert testimony. The first involves certain experts who did not evaluate

6
Mr. Willingham has also summarily asserted ineffective assistance of
counsel in connection with many of the substantive claims addressed throughout
this opinion. As we have rejected these other matters on the merits, separate
consideration of the associated ineffective assistance claims is unnecessary.

-34-
Mr. Willingham until their recruitment by post-conviction counsel. His

allegations of ineffective assistance in this regard are explicitly derivative of his

complaint about counsel’s failure to obtain his childhood treatment records–i.e.,

he argues that competent counsel would have obtained such evaluations if

“[t]imely edified by” the treatment records. Aplt. Br. at 38. Because, as just

explained, counsel lacked those records through no fault of their own, the district

court reasonably rejected this aspect of Mr. Willingham’s claim on the ground

that he had not suggested any viable basis for concluding that counsel should have

sought out the additional psychological evaluations.

Mr. Willingham also asserts that counsel were ineffective for failing to

call Phillip J. Murphy, Ph.D., to testify. Doctor Murphy had interviewed

Mr. Willingham prior to trial and concluded “he was not typically a continuing

threat to society, especially in prison where there is a typical absence of older

females who are most likely to trigger his unresolved anger with his mother.”

Post-Conviction App. Vol. 3, Psychological Report by Dr. Murphy at 2 (report

prepared for post-conviction proceeding but reciting pre-trial finding). Because

the continuing threat aggravator was ultimately rejected by the jury in any event,

the district court held Mr. Willingham could not show any prejudice in that

respect. As for counsel’s failure to call Dr. Murphy for more general mitigation

purposes, the district court held counsel could reasonably have concluded that his

-35-
testimony would not have been especially significant, or even favorable, to the

defense. We have reviewed Dr. Murphy’s report, and agree with that assessment.

Moreover, as the report indicates, and Mr. Willingham acknowledges in his

appellate brief, Dr. Murphy’s opinions about Mr. Willingham’s post-traumatic

stress disorder and his love-hate relationship with his mother were dependent

upon Dr. Murphy’s review of the same treatment records discussed above, which

were not available to counsel.

Finally, Mr. Willingham argues that counsel should have called additional

lay witnesses to testify about his abusive upbringing by his mother. The district

court disposed of this aspect of his claim on Strickland ’s prejudice prong. The

court noted that Mr. Willingham’s mother testified for the defense regarding the

deplorable conditions under which he was raised, including their poverty and his

exposure to the abusive, drug-dependent men she dated. She also admitted she

was verbally and physically abusive to him, and would neglect him while she

stayed out all night at the bars. Since the other witnesses could have done little to

add to the substance of what Mr. Willingham’s mother had said, the district court

concluded, correctly in our view, that no reasonable probability existed that their

testimony would have changed the outcome of the sentencing proceedings.

See generally Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695.

-36-
X. Cumulative Error

The OCCA rejected a cumulative error claim on Mr. Willingham’s direct

appeal on the basis that “hav[ing] found no single error requiring reversal, we

cannot find that the proceedings, as a whole, were unfair.” Willingham , 947 P.2d

at 1088. This rationale, taken on its face, would render the cumulative error

inquiry meaningless, since it indicates that cumulative error may be predicated

only upon individual error already requiring reversal. Instead, the proper inquiry

“aggregates all the errors that individually might be harmless [and therefore

insufficient to require reversal], and it analyzes whether their cumulative effect

on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be

determined to be harmless.” United States v. Wood , 207 F.3d 1222, 1237

(10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). We therefore consider Mr. Willingham’s

cumulative error claim de novo, applying the controlling federal standard. S ee

Herrera , 225 F.3d at 1179. The crux of our review is “whether the defendant’s

substantial rights were affected.” Wood , 207 F.3d at 1237 (quotation omitted).

As indicated at various points throughout this opinion, the strength of the

State’s case on both guilt and aggravation effectively undercuts Mr. Willingham’s

assertion of actionable prejudice in connection with the few errors which may

have occurred during the proceedings. Now, “[c]onsidering [any such] errors in

the aggregate, we conclude upon review of the entire record that the cumulative

-37-
[effect] is harmless” as well. United States v. Becker , 230 F.3d 1224, 1233

(10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 1666 (2001); see also Moore v. Gibson ,

195 F.3d 1152, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

-38-
No. 01-6071, Willingham v. Gibson

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I write only to address the issue of refusal to instruct on second-degree

murder. I would reach the same conclusion on the issue as the majority, but

would reach that conclusion by a different route.

The state trial court concluded the evidence was insufficient to support the

second-degree murder instruction. This decision by the state trial court is entitled

to deference under the AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Mr. Willingham’s sole defense during the guilt phase of the trial was that,

although he brutally assaulted Mrs. Van Wey with the intent of injuring her, he

did not intend to kill her. That evidence is clearly overborne by the physical

evidence of the severity of Mrs. Van Wey’s injuries. The first police officer to

arrive at the scene testified that although he knew Mrs. Van Wey, he did not

recognize her because of the significant swelling and bruising of her face.

Dr. Chai Choi, who performed the autopsy, gave vivid testimony concerning

the severity of injuries to Mrs. Van Wey’s head and body. 1 The doctor

1
Dr. Choi testified that Mrs. Van Wey sustained the following injuries:
(1) a bruise on the top of her head, which could only have been caused by
“violent, hard contact,” (2) a bruise in the center of her skull above the eye
socket, which again could only have been caused by violent contact, (3) a broken
nose, (4) torn upper and lower lips, (5) a broken upper tooth, (6) bruises on her
upper and lower gums, (7) a bruise and scratch above her left eyebrow, caused
by some “forcible rubbing onto some object,” (8) a bruise on the left eye socket;
(9) a bruise on the lower left side of her cheek, which showed “some pattern of
(continued...)
concluded these injuries were caused by repeated and violent blows.

I would give the trial court’s decision the deference we are to give it

under the AEDPA and conclude in light of that deference that no reasonable jury

could have found that, in light of the severity of Mrs. Van Wey’s injuries,

Mr. Willingham did not intend to kill her.

1
(...continued)
something, doughnut shaped, double things, that kind of forced against, struck
onto such a fashion – object” (i.e., an impression was left on her face from the
object that struck her), (10) pinpoint hemorrhages underneath the skin across the
bridge of her nose and in the eye sockets, indicating some type of compression to
this region of her face (likely caused by placing a hand over her face), (11) at
least four separate injuries to her brain, each of which could have been caused by
some type of violent blow or contact, (12) a bruise on the inner part of her right
thigh and leg, (13) a bruise on the inside of her left arm, (14) bruises on her
mid-chest and breast area, (15) a bruise on the back of her right arm, and
(16) a scratch and a tear with a bruise “just at the margin of the hymen,” likely
caused by some type of strike. Tr. II at 7-27. Dr. Choi concluded that the injuries
would have resulted in Mrs. Van Wey’s “airwell fill[ing] with . . . blood,” in turn
causing her to “drown[] in her own blood.” Id. at 32. The doctor further opined
that had she not drowned in her own blood, the injuries to her head likely would
have been sufficient to kill her. Id. at 33.

-2-