United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-2408
CHARLESBANK EQUITY FUND II, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND
HARVARD PRIVATE CAPITAL HOLDINGS, INC.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
BLINDS TO GO, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya and Howard, Circuit Judges,
and Singal,* District Judge.
John T. Montgomery, with whom Martin J. Newhouse, Lesley F.
Wolf, and Ropes & Gray LLP were on brief, for appellants.
David H. Erichsen, with whom Peter A. Spaeth, Debra Squires-
Lee, Michael R. Dube, and Hale and Dorr LLP were on brief, for
appellee.
June 2, 2004
__________
*Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation.
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal challenges the
district court's denial of a preliminary injunction seeking what
amounts to a freeze order (although its proponents describe the
requested relief as being in the nature of an equitable
attachment). Concluding, as we do, that the lower court correctly
chose to employ the traditional four-part standard for gauging the
propriety of preliminary injunctive relief in this situation and
proceeded to apply that standard faultlessly, we affirm the
decision below.
I. BACKGROUND
Our starting point is the cast of characters. Defendant-
appellee Blinds To Go, Inc. (BTG) operates a slew of retail stores
in North America (a few of which are located in Massachusetts).
Plaintiffs-appellants Charlesbank Equity Fund II, Limited
Partnership (Charlesbank) and Harvard Private Capital Holdings,
Inc. (HPCH) are affiliated entities that make and hold investments
on behalf of the President and Fellows of Harvard College.
The litigation between these protagonists has its roots
in a venture capital transaction. On December 18, 1995, HPCH and
BTG entered into a preferred share purchase agreement (the
Agreement). Pursuant to the Agreement, HPCH made a $15,000,000
capital investment and, in exchange, BTG issued to HPCH the
entirety of a new class of stock, totaling 20,618,556 preferred
shares with conversion privileges. As a prophylactic device, BTG
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insisted that HPCH grant to the holders of BTG's common stock a
right of first refusal. The provision embodying this safeguard, as
amended and restated in a 1997 shareholders' agreement, required
that the holders of BTG's common stock be afforded the opportunity
of first refusal in the event of any transfer of the preferred
shares arising out of a third party's "bona-fide offer to purchase"
the shares (so long as the offeror was "acting at arm's length").
The Agreement contained several other provisions. Of
particular pertinence here, HPCH or its permitted assignee had the
right to "put" all the preferred shares in specific time frames or
upon the occurrence of certain triggering events. Receipt of
notice of the exercise of this option obligated BTG to redeem the
shares within sixty days at a per share price calculated in
accordance with a formula delineated in BTG's corporate charter.
A significant element of this formula was the EBITDA (i.e.,
earnings before interest, income tax, depreciation and amortization
as determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles, consistently applied) for the immediately preceding
twelve months. In order to secure the due performance of this buy-
back obligation, BTG granted to HPCH a security interest in its
existing and after-acquired assets.
The relationship between HPCH and BTG proved uneventful
through the end of the millennium. A precursor to discord surfaced
in November of 2001, when HPCH transferred its preferred shares and
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appurtenant rights and interests under the Agreement (including its
security interest in BTG's assets) to Charlesbank. Although the
1997 shareholders' agreement was still in effect, HPCH consummated
the transfer without first offering the preferred shares to the
holders of BTG's common stock. Charlesbank proceeded to exercise
the "put" option in the first available window of opportunity,
notifying BTG on January 14, 2002, of its desire that the company
redeem the preferred shares. Under the terms of the Agreement, the
EBITDA for the fiscal year ending on February 2, 2002 would apply
to that redemption.
The calculation of the EBITDA did not go smoothly. Over
the next few months, the figure diminished to a point well below
what Charlesbank had anticipated. This shrinkage in turn lowered
the projected purchase price of the preferred shares. As these
estimates slumped, Charlesbank grew increasingly suspicious that
BTG was cooking the books. The buy-back transaction stalled.
On June 21, 2002, Charlesbank took matters into its own
hands. Invoking federal diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a), it sued BTG in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts (BTG is a Canadian corporation that
maintains its principal place of business there and Charlesbank is
a Massachusetts limited partnership). The complaint asserted
claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. HPCH (a Massachusetts charitable
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corporation headquartered in that state) soon joined the fray as an
additional plaintiff. The interests of the two plaintiffs are
congruent and, from this point forward, we refer to them,
collectively, as "C-H."
In October of 2002, BTG and the holders of its common
stock countersued in a Canadian court. They sought a declaration
that BTG did not owe any money to C-H because the transfer of the
preferred shares was unauthorized. BTG posited that the
transaction between Charlesbank and HPCH triggered the right of
first refusal; that HPCH nonetheless disregarded that obligation;
and that, therefore, the shunned right of the holders of BTG's
common stock to purchase the preferred shares vitiated the
purported transfer and trumped Charlesbank's right to exercise the
"put" option. In the alternative, BTG asked for a judicial
determination that it owed only $15,453,548 for the preferred
shares.
The Canadian court of first instance dismissed the suit
on the ground of forum non conveniens. That holding was affirmed
on appeal (i.e., the Canadian appellate tribunal agreed that
Massachusetts was a more convenient forum) but the dismissal was
vacated and the case stayed pending resolution of the first-filed
action. Thus, the battle between the parties shifted back to the
federal district court.
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C-H's primary allegation was — and is — that BTG
manipulated its finances and shrank the EBITDA by posting a series
of spurious year-end reserves after the "put" option had been
exercised. In C-H's view, these machinations artificially deflated
the EBITDA by nearly $5,000,000 (i.e., from $12,900,000 to just
over $8,000,000) and the projected purchase price for the preferred
shares by roughly $8,300,000 (every reduction of $1,000,000 in the
EBITDA translates, under the formula, into a reduction of
approximately $1,700,000 in the aggregate purchase price). BTG
denied C-H's allegations; reiterated its claim that the right of
first refusal should have been honored; and urged that, in all
events, its books fairly and accurately reflected the company's
finances.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a) deals with the issuance of
preliminary injunctions. On July 15, 2003, C-H invoked that rule
and moved for a preliminary injunction "in the nature of an
equitable attachment of the assets of the defendant." In practical
effect, it sought to freeze a substantial amount of BTG's funds in
order to secure eventual payment of the purchase price for the
preferred shares. BTG opposed the motion, and the district court
summarily denied it. The court's decision rested on two
independently sufficient grounds. First, the court concluded that
it lacked the authority to issue such an injunction under the
Supreme Court's landmark opinion in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo,
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S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999). Second, the
court found that C-H had failed to show irreparable harm (and,
thus, had not satisfied a necessary threshold requirement for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction). After moving unsuccessfully
for reconsideration, C-H appealed. We now affirm.
II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Although the parties seem to be content that we have
jurisdiction over this appeal, we are duty-bound to test that
hypothesis. When a colorable question exists, an appellate court
has an unflagging obligation to inquire sua sponte into its own
jurisdiction. See Espinal-Dominguez v. Commonwealth of P.R., 352
F.3d 490, 495 (1st Cir. 2003). That is the situation here.
As a general rule, only final orders are immediately
appealable. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291). Virtually every
general rule admits of exceptions, however, and a statutory
exception to this finality principle authorizes interlocutory
review of orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify
injunctions." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Consequently, if the remedy
that C-H seeks is in the nature of an injunction, we have
jurisdiction here and now to review an order denying that relief.
This question comes to the forefront because C-H appears
at times to argue that it is not seeking an injunction at all, but,
rather, an equitable attachment. See, e.g., Appellants' Br. at 1,
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4. For jurisdictional purposes, it matters whether the relief
requested is more appropriately classified as an injunction or an
attachment. While orders granting or denying injunctions are
immediately appealable, the status of attachment orders is more
problematic.
It is common ground that — at least in the absence of
special circumstances — federal appellate courts lack jurisdiction
to undertake interlocutory review of orders granting prejudgment
attachments. See Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, 45-
47 (1st Cir. 1986); see also 16 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3922 (2d ed. 1995). By
like token, orders denying prejudgment attachments are not per se
appealable when issued. See 11 Wright & Miller, supra § 2936, at
24-25. But such orders may be immediately appealable if they
satisfy the requirements of the so-called collateral order
doctrine.1 Id.
The taxonomic problem is complicated here because C-H's
original request for interim relief is not a model of clarity.
1
The collateral order doctrine is a judge-made exception to
the finality principle. See Espinal-Dominguez, 352 F.3d at 495.
To satisfy this doctrine — and thus furnish a valid basis for an
interlocutory appeal — the order appealed from must satisfy four
basic criteria. Id. at 496. First, it must involve an issue
unrelated to the merits of the main dispute, which is capable of
review without disrupting the main litigation. Second, the appeal
must be capable of finally resolving the issue. Third, the order
must implicate a right incapable of vindication upon review after
final judgment. And finally, the order must embody an important
and unsettled question of controlling law. Id.
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While that request at times employs the vocabulary of injunctive
relief, it at times suggests that what C-H actually wants is an
attachment (albeit an attachment derived from the district court's
authority under Rule 65). Given this internal inconsistency, we
must cut through the tangle of words and determine whether,
functionally, C-H is seeking an injunction or an attachment.
Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 303 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002)
(explaining that a court must look "to the practical effect of the
order rather than its verbiage" to determine if it is appealable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)); accord Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d
1128, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
This court has noted several factors that should be
considered in deciding whether a requested order is more akin to an
injunction or an attachment. These factors include "the present
and future consequences of the constraint involved; whether the
order directs or restrains conduct of one of the parties; [and] how
the order was treated below by the district court and the parties."
Teradyne, 797 F.2d at 47.
Viewed through this prism, the order appealed from
appears to be injunctive in nature. Because virtually all of BTG's
assets are located outside of Massachusetts, the order, if granted,
will operate by restraining BTG's conduct (i.e., commanding it to
take certain actions and prohibiting it from taking others). This
is the classic modus operandi of injunctive relief. See 11A Wright
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& Miller, supra § 2941, at 32-33 (defining injunctions as orders
that "require a party either to do or to refrain from doing some
act").
This perception is reinforced by the fact that the
parties and the district court treated C-H's motion as a motion for
a preliminary injunction. Although a reviewing court must look
beyond the nomenclature that parties or trial judges employ and
gauge the practical effect of a requested order, Morales Feliciano,
303 F.3d at 7, earlier characterizations of the underlying motion
are relevant to that determination, see Teradyne, 797 F.2d at 46,
47. Here, this factor tilts in favor of appellate jurisdiction.
The motion for reconsideration that C-H filed in the
district court dispels any lingering doubts. The motion papers
make pellucid that C-H wanted the court preliminarily to enjoin
BTG, its agents, officers, employees and all persons acting in
concert with it, "from spending, dissipating, transferring,
selling, or otherwise disposing of, any of BTG's assets or cash up
to the value of $15,453,548, other than in the ordinary course of
business, without first paying the same amount to [C-H]." This
iteration shows that what C-H really wanted was a freeze order —
and freeze orders directed at unspecified assets typically are in
the nature of preliminary injunctions. See, e.g., FTC v. H. N.
Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that
while an asset freeze can have "an effect comparable to that of an
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attachment, it is not an attachment," but is an injunction). The
freeze order that C-H sought is no exception.
Teradyne buttresses this reading of the record. In that
case, the district court entered an order enjoining the defendant
from disposing of $4,000,000 worth of assets and requiring it to
set that amount aside in an interest-bearing account to ensure
satisfaction of any future judgment or arbitration award that might
eventuate in an ongoing dispute between the parties. 797 F.2d at
44-45. We held that such an order should be treated as an
injunction, id. at 47, and the factors to which we attached weight
are equally present here.2 First, the requested relief in that
case, as here, did not involve posting a bond or surrendering
specified property, but, rather, contemplated compelling a party to
act and/or refrain from acting. Id. at 46. Second, there, as
here, the district court and the parties treated the requested
relief as a preliminary injunction. Id. Third, and finally, the
Teradyne court thought tying up a large chunk of funds pending the
uncertain outcome of arbitration to be a "significant constraint."
Id. That consideration is magnified here, as C-H seeks to restrict
the use of almost four times as much money pending the outcome of
litigation.
2
The directive to escrow funds in a separate account
represents the only qualitative distinction between the order
sought in Teradyne and the order sought in this case. We see this
as a distinction without a legally significant difference.
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Because we find the relief requested here to be in the
nature of an injunction, pure and simple, we need not probe the
applicability of the collateral order doctrine. See supra note 1.
It suffices to say that, after independent review of the record, we
are confident that we have jurisdiction to hear and determine this
interlocutory appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We ordinarily review the grant or denial of a motion for
preliminary injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. Ross-Simons
of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996)
(Ross-Simons I). This is a deferential standard of review, and the
deference that it entails is most appropriate with respect to
issues of judgment and the balancing of conflicting factors. See
Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm'n, 184 F.3d
88, 96 (1st Cir. 1999). Even then, however, appellate courts must
be careful to ensure that deference does not mutate into blind
allegiance. The trial court's discretion is not unbridled and
"[a]buse occurs when a material factor deserving significant weight
is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all
proper and no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a
serious mistake in weighing them." Indep. Oil & Chem. Workers of
Quincy, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st
Cir. 1988).
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We review the district court's answers to abstract
questions of law de novo. Goya Foods, Inc. v. Wallack Mgmt. Co.,
290 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 974 (2002). An
error of law is, of course, always an abuse of discretion.
Rosario-Urdaz v. Rivera-Hernandez, 350 F.3d 219, 221 (1st Cir.
2003).
IV. THE MERITS
Before sorting through the thicket of competing
arguments, we note — and put to one side — an issue that is not
squarely presented. Although this is a diversity case, C-H's
motion explicitly invoked Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). As a result, the
district court based its decision on that rule and, more generally,
on federal equitable principles. In briefing this appeal, C-H has
eschewed any argument that the availability of injunctive relief
should be determined, in the first instance, by reference to the
tenet that the law of the forum state supplies the rule of decision
in diversity cases. See generally Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 318 n.3
(raising that possibility and reserving the question). We
therefore deem any such claim waived. See Teamsters Union v.
Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) (describing
as "settled" the principle that, with only a very narrow band of
exceptions, "legal theories not raised squarely in the lower court
cannot be broached for the first time on appeal"); Clauson v.
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Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 666 (1st Cir. 1987) (similar). Given this
waiver, our decision necessarily hinges on principles of federal
law.
A. Framing the Issue.
In some situations, federal courts possess general
equitable power to issue prejudgment injunctions in the nature of
freeze orders so as to ensure the adequacy of postjudgment
remedies. See United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S.
378, 385 (1965); DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325
U.S. 212, 220 (1945). The fact that such an order may be within
the raw power of a federal court does not end the inquiry, but
simply sets the stage for two further queries. The logically
antecedent question involves whether, categorically speaking, a
particular case is of a type in which such an order may be issued.
The second involves the proper legal standard to be employed in the
exercise of that power.
The first of these questions is extremely complex. In
Grupo Mexicano, the Supreme Court held that the district court "had
no authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing
petitioners from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of
respondents' contract claim for money damages" where no preexisting
lien or equitable interest had been claimed. 527 U.S. at 333. It
is unclear whether Grupo Mexicano directly controls this case. On
the one hand, its rationale favors the conclusion that the district
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court lacked the inherent authority to grant the relief that C-H
solicited. See, e.g., id. at 318-27 (finding that federal courts
ordinarily lack the equitable authority to issue prejudgment
attachments in actions at law). On the other hand, the application
of the Grupo Mexicano rationale here would entail an extension of
the Court's holding. After all, it is at least arguable that the
existence of a security interest (such as C-H possesses) is a
salient distinction.
Fortunately, we have the luxury of being able to leave
this question for another day. Thus, we assume for argument's sake
that the district court had the authority to grant the relief
requested — a preliminary injunction in the nature of a freeze
order. This assumption enables us to proceed directly to the
second question and decide what legal standard governs the exercise
of that assumed power.
B. Choosing the Standard.
It is familiar lore that the issuance of a preliminary
injunction depends on the outcome of a four-part inquiry. See,
e.g., Ross-Simons I, 102 F.3d at 15; Narragansett Indian Tribe v.
Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1991). C-H asseverates that this
inquiry is inapropos here because a federal court must apply state
attachment standards to motions seeking prejudgment freeze orders.
As best we can decipher its asseveration, C-H seems to be saying
that, in cases where the relief sought is in the nature of an
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equitable attachment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 should be read in light of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 64 and be construed as importing state-law
standards for determining the availability of relief.3 BTG
disagrees. It maintains that this case is a prototypical Rule 65
case — no more and no less — and that, therefore, the usual four-
part test pertains.
To begin, circuit precedent suggests the use of the
traditional four-part standard. In Teradyne, 797 F.2d at 51-57, we
applied this standard in very similar circumstances (albeit without
focused discussion). So too Unisys Corp. v. Dataware Products,
Inc., 848 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1988), in which we found that the
disputed order resembled an injunction and applied the same
quadripartite test. Id. at 314.
C-H attempts to blunt the force of these precedents by
arguing, first, that the decision to utilize the four-part standard
3
Rule 64, with exceptions not relevant here, provides:
At the commencement of and during the course
of an action, all remedies providing for
seizure of person or property for the purpose
of securing satisfaction of the judgment
ultimately to be entered in the action are
available under the circumstances and in the
manner provided by the law of the state in
which the district court is held . . . . The
remedies [] available include arrest,
attachment, g arnishment, replevin,
sequestration, and other corresponding or
equivalent remedies. . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 64.
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in Unisys was not part of the court's holding (a point that, for
argument's sake, we are willing to assume); and second, that
Teradyne should be read narrowly. To that end, C-H declares that
the Teradyne court recognized the availability of an alternative
equitable attachment standard. But that ipse dixit misreads the
opinion: the Teradyne court discussed the alternative of equitable
attachment only in considering the appealability of the lower
court's order. See Teradyne, 797 F.2d at 45-47. Having determined
(as have we) that the requested relief was really in the nature of
an injunction, the court went on to apply the traditional four-part
test in a straightforward and unequivocal manner. See id. at 51-
52. There are no two ways about it; Teradyne stands four-square
for the proposition that a prejudgment freeze order is in the
nature of an injunction and that, therefore, its propriety should
be analyzed under the traditional four-part test.
C-H next seeks to minimize the impact of these precedents
by citing to decisions of other courts. This is wasted motion.
The rule is firmly settled that, in a multi-panel circuit, a newly
constituted panel is bound by prior panel decisions directly on
point. See Jusino v. Zayas, 875 F.2d 986, 993 (1st Cir. 1989).
Although there are two well-defined exceptions to this rule, see
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Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995),
neither applies here.4
In all events, the precedents that C-H marshals are not
persuasive. A clear majority of courts confronting similar
circumstances have approved the use of the traditional four-part
preliminary injunction standard. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Singer Co., 889 F.2d 1327, 1331 (4th
Cir. 1989); EBSCO Indus., Inc. v. Lilly, 840 F.2d 333 (6th Cir.
1988); Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 707 (S.D. Tex.
2002); cf. Deckert v. Ind. Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940)
(finding injunction reasonable because available remedies at law
would be inadequate). Although most of these decisions have
applied this standard without any developed analysis of the issue
that C-H advances here, see, e.g., Singer Co., 889 F.2d at 1330-31,
resort to that standard makes eminently good sense in this context.
With the exception of a pair of Eleventh Circuit cases —
to which we shall return — the precedents to the contrary comprise
isolated district court rulings. To the extent that these cases
apply state standards rather than the traditional four-part test to
4
The first exception provides that a panel decision may be
"undermined by controlling authority, subsequently announced," such
as a decision of the Supreme Court or of the circuit court sitting
en banc, or a statutory overruling. Williams, 45 F.3d at 592. The
second pertains to those rare instances in which authority that
postdates the original decision "offers a sound reason for
believing that the former panel, in light of fresh developments,
would change its collective mind." Id.
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determine the availability of preliminary injunctive relief under
Rule 65, see, e.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Serafino, 958 F. Supp. 19, 22-
23 (D. Mass. 1997); Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New Engl.
Toyota Distrib., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 973, 978 (D. Mass. 1979), we
regard them as wrongly decided. Moreover, they are not fairly
representative of the genre. See, e.g., Hunter v. Youthstream
Media Networks, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 52, 54 (D. Mass. 2002)
(applying the traditional four-part preliminary injunction standard
in analogous circumstances).
We turn now to the Eleventh Circuit cases hawked by C-H.
See Rosen v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 21 F.3d 1520 (11th Cir. 1994);
Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc., 14 F.3d
1507 (11th Cir. 1994). Those opinions contain language which, at
first blush, might be read to suggest that the Eleventh Circuit
follows a rule opposite to that formulated in Teradyne. See, e.g.,
Mitsubishi, 14 F.3d at 1521-22 (stating that "Rule 64, and not Rule
65 . . . provides the standard for evaluating a request for
preliminary injunctive relief that is, in reality, no more than a
request for a prejudgment attachment"). Taken in context, however,
this language does not betoken an irreconcilable conflict.
In Rosen, the Eleventh Circuit made clear that district
courts had no power under Rule 65 to issue a preliminary injunction
that amounts to a prejudgment attachment when the underlying action
seeks only monetary damages and no statute specifically authorizes
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ancillary prejudgment relief. Rosen, 21 F.3d at 1529. The focus
of the case at hand is different (although we are sympathetic to
Rosen's core holding, we do not need to pass upon that question
here). Furthermore, both Rosen and Mitsubishi dealt with assets
that seem to have been located within the forum state (a
circumstance that, as C-H has acknowledged, is absent here). For
that reason, the district court in each case actually was applying
Rule 64, not Rule 65. Nothing in either decision fairly can be
read to support the notion that state standards govern the
determination of when a federal court, acting under Rule 65, can
issue an injunction in the nature of a freeze order designed to
affect assets located outside the forum state.
C-H has a fallback position. It observes that Grupo
Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 330-31, explicitly preserves the availability
of state-law remedies. This is true as far as it goes — but it
does not take C-H very far. In those few sentences, the Grupo
Mexicano Court explained that a freeze order related to property in
which the putative creditor possessed no legal or equitable
interest essentially amounted to a prejudgment attachment. The
Court then stated that allowing such relief in an action seeking
only remedies at law "could render Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
64, which authorizes use of state prejudgment remedies, a virtual
irrelevance." Id. at 330. The Court's reasoning supports the
continued vitality of Rule 64 — but the mere fact that state
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attachment standards remain applicable in federal courts under Rule
64 tells us nothing about the wonted operation of Rule 65. C-H is
not seeking an attachment under Rule 64, and it has identified no
property that is subject to the district court's in rem
jurisdiction.
At the expense of carting coal to Newcastle, we add that
the very nature of a freeze order counsels against commingling the
jurisprudence of Rule 65 with that of Rule 64. Even though a
freeze order may serve many of the same ends as an attachment, the
former acts upon a party whereas the latter is directed at specific
property. Restraining (or compelling) individual action is
especially strong medicine, and courts should hesitate to issue
such orders on an interlocutory basis without a showing of urgent
need. The traditional four-part standard for preliminary
injunctive relief provides a prophylaxis against the hasty or
intemperate use of that power. Consequently, sound policy
considerations support the imposition of that standard in
connection with freeze orders.
To say more would be to paint the lily. We hold that the
traditional four-part preliminary injunction standard applies in
full flower to motions brought under Rule 65 in hopes of securing
prejudgment freeze orders.
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C. Applying the Discerned Standard.
This brings us to the final leg of our journey. Having
concluded that the district court appropriately resorted to the
traditional four-part standard for preliminary injunctive relief en
route to its alternative holding, the question reduces to the
supportability of the court's determination that C-H failed to
achieve that benchmark. Upon close perlustration, we find no fault
with that determination.
Under the accepted framework, the four elements that a
district court faced with a motion for a preliminary injunction
must assess are the following:
(1) the likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) the potential for irreparable harm if the
injunction is denied; (3) the balance of
relevant impositions, i.e., the hardship to
the nonmovant if enjoined as contrasted with
the hardship to the movant if no injunction
issues; and (4) the effect (if any) of the
court's ruling on the public interest.
Ross-Simons I, 102 F.3d at 15. In conjunction with the use of this
standard, trial courts have wide discretion in making judgments
regarding the appropriateness vel non of preliminary injunctive
relief. Id. at 16.
In most cases — and the case at hand is no outlier —
irreparable harm constitutes a necessary threshold showing for an
award of preliminary injunctive relief. Matos v. Clinton Sch.
Dist., ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2004) [No. 03-1332, slip op. at
8]; accord Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 217 F.3d
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8, 13 (1st Cir. 2000) (describing irreparable harm as "an essential
prerequisite" for receiving such redress). The burden of
demonstrating that a denial of interim relief is likely to cause
irreparable harm rests squarely upon the movant. Ross-Simons I,
102 F.3d at 18.
In this case, the district court found that C-H had
failed to carry that burden. This finding draws substantial
comfort from the record. A finding of irreparable harm must be
grounded on something more than conjecture, surmise, or a party's
unsubstantiated fears of what the future may have in store. Regan
v. Vinick & Young (In re Rare Coin Galleries of Am., Inc.), 862
F.2d 896, 902 (1st Cir. 1988). Here, we have been unable to
discern anything resembling a realistic prospect of irreparable
harm.
Irreparable harm most often exists where a party has no
adequate remedy at law. See Rosario-Urdaz, 350 F.3d at 221. In
this case, C-H ultimately seeks an award of pecuniary damages (and,
in a best case scenario, that is all it will be entitled to
receive). Such an award will make it whole.5 Accordingly, its
legal remedy is adequate.
To escape the ineluctable conclusion that it cannot show
a meaningful risk of irreparable harm, C-H asserts that a denial of
5
We note that, under Massachusetts law, C-H will be entitled
to prejudgment (and perhaps even all post-breach) interest. See
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 6C.
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preliminary injunctive relief will allow "BTG to enjoy the fruits
of [C-H's] investment in the company without any reciprocal
obligations." Appellants' Reply Br. at 22. This assertion begs
the question. At any rate, it is more properly viewed in
addressing the likelihood of success on the merits (an issue that
we need not reach). C-H has not yet proven its mettle. If and
when it does (by prevailing on the merits of its claim), it will be
entitled to execute upon the judgment entered against BTG. Unless
and until that happens, C-H must identify some independent reason
why it will be irreparably harmed without the imposition of interim
relief.
In a second offer to show irreparable harm, C-H posits
that it is not able to monitor its admittedly substantial
investment and that, therefore, it "face[s] the risk that [it] will
be left with nothing at the end of the day." Appellants' Reply Br.
at 22. That sort of statement can be made by virtually every
person who sues another for money damages. Its very ubiquity
indicates why it cannot conceivably be enough to justify the
issuance of a prejudgment injunction of this nature. The case law
so holds. See, e.g., In re Rare Coin Galleries, 862 F.3d at 902;
Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Town of W. Newbury, 835 F.2d 380, 383
(1st Cir. 1987); see also Ross-Simons I, 102 F.3d at 19 (explaining
that a "tenuous or overly speculative forecast of anticipated harm"
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does not possess the substance required to show irreparable
injury).
Two further points seem worthy of mention. First, C-H's
cries of urgency are sharply undercut by its own rather leisurely
approach to the question of preliminary injunctive relief. It
waited more than a year after the commencement of the action to
seek an injunction. That chronology has evidentiary significance:
delay between the institution of an action and the filing of a
motion for preliminary injunction, not attributable to intervening
events, detracts from the movant's claim of irreparable harm. See
JSC Foreign Econ. Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade
Servs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 366, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The longer
the delay, the more pervasive the doubt.
Second, even assuming that there is a risk that BTG will
be unable to pay a future judgment — a conclusion that has utterly
no footing in the record — the Agreement granted C-H a security
interest in all of BTG's property. C-H's counsel conceded at oral
argument that this security interest has been perfected. Thus, C-H
— unlike an ordinary plaintiff — has an alternative means for
ensuring payment of any judgment that it eventually might obtain.
The existence of this anchor to windward further undermines C-H's
argument that it is facing an intolerable risk of irreparable harm.
A preliminary injunction is a potent weapon that should
be used only when necessary to safeguard a litigant's legitimate
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interests. The instant record reflects no basis for a reasoned
belief that such an order is necessary. Accordingly, we hold that
the district court acted well within the encincture of its
discretion in denying a preliminary injunction on the ground that
C-H had failed to make the requisite showing of irreparable harm.6
Cf. Ross-Simons I, 102 F.3d at 19 (noting that, in appeals relating
to preliminary injunctions, "battles over the quality and quantity
of the harm alleged most often will be won or lost in the trial
court").
V. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. To the extent a party seeks a
preliminary injunction under Rule 65, the traditional four-part
standard governs — and this remains so notwithstanding that the
sought-after injunction is in the nature of an equitable attachment
or freeze order. Because the district court applied the
appropriate legal standard and because its ensuing determination —
that, on the facts of this case, C-H had made no showing of
irreparable harm — was not an abuse of discretion, we uphold its
ukase.
Affirmed.
6
In view of this conclusion, we need not address the other
three prongs of the traditional four-part standard.
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