Error: Bad annotation destination
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-1083
CATHEDRAL CANDLE COMPANY
and THE A.I. ROOT COMPANY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION and
DEANNA TANNER OKUN, Chairman, United States International Trade Commission,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION and
ROBERT C. BONNER, Commissioner, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
Defendants-Appellees.
Steven M. Schneebaum, Patton Boggs LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for
plaintiffs-appellants. With him on the brief was Michael J. Schaengold.
Michael Diehl, Attorney-Advisor, Office of the General Counsel, United States
International Trade Commission, of Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees
United States International Trade Commission, et al. On the brief were James M.
Lyons, Acting General Counsel; Neal J. Reynolds, Acting Assistant General Counsel for
Litigation; and Karen Veninga Driscoll, Attorney. Of counsel was Mark B. Rees,
Attorney.
David Silverbrand, Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United
States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, et al. On the brief were Peter D. Keisler,
Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen, Director; Jeanne E. Davidson, Deputy
Director; and Paul D. Kovac, Trial Attorney. Of counsel on the brief was Charles R.
Steuart, Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, United States Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, of Washington, DC.
Appealed from: United States Court of International Trade
Judge Donald C. Pogue
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-1083
CATHEDRAL CANDLE COMPANY,
and THE A.I. ROOT COMPANY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION and
DEANNA TANNER OKUN, Chairman, United States International Trade Commission,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION and
ROBERT C. BONNER, Commissioner, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________
DECIDED: March 9, 2005
___________________________
Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and DYK, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BRYSON. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit
Judge DYK.
BRYSON, Circuit Judge.
Appellants Cathedral Candle Company (“Cathedral”) and The A.I. Root Company
(“Root”) filed this action in the Court of International Trade seeking to compel the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) to distribute payments to them
pursuant to the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
387, § 1(a) [tit. X, § 1003(a)], 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-72 (2000), which is known as the
Byrd Amendment. Cathedral and Root applied for Byrd Amendment distributions from
funds derived from antidumping duties collected on petroleum wax candles imported
from the People’s Republic of China in the years 2000 and 2001. Customs determined
that Cathedral and Root were ineligible for those distributions because the two
companies had not made timely requests for payment. The Court of International Trade
sustained Customs’ ruling. We affirm.
I
In 1985, the National Candle Association filed an antidumping petition alleging
that the importation of petroleum wax candles from China was causing and threatening
to cause material injury to the domestic candle industry. The Department of Commerce
and the International Trade Commission initiated an investigation, in the course of which
the Commission sent questionnaires to domestic producers of candles. Both Cathedral
and Root received and responded to the questionnaires, and both indicated their
support of the petition. The questionnaires were marked “Business Confidential” on the
top of each page, and the “General Information and Instructions” portion of the
questionnaires explained that the commercial and financial information furnished in
response to the questionnaires would be treated as confidential. Following the
investigation, Commerce issued an antidumping order covering Chinese candle imports.
That antidumping order has remained in effect since that time.
The Byrd Amendment, enacted in late 2000, requires Customs annually to
distribute funds collected pursuant to antidumping and countervailing duty orders to
certified “affected domestic producers.” 19 U.S.C. § 1675c. The statute defines an
04-1083 2
affected domestic producer as a party that was a petitioner or supporter of an
antidumping or countervailing duty petition and that continues to produce the product
that was the subject of the resulting order. Id. § 1675c(b)(1). The statute assigns to the
International Trade Commission the responsibility to compile a list that includes
petitioners and “persons that indicate support of the petition by letter or through
questionnaire response.” Id. § 1675c(d)(1). The Commission is directed to forward that
list to Customs, which in turn is required to publish in the Federal Register, at least 30
days before a distribution of funds, a notice of intention to distribute funds to the parties
on the Commission’s list. Id. The statute requires Customs next to request a
certification from each potentially eligible affected domestic producer in which the
producer represents that it desires to receive a distribution, that it is eligible for a
distribution, and that it has qualifying expenditures for which it has not previously
received a distribution. Id. § 1675c(d)(2). The funds, which come from assessed duties
received in the preceding fiscal year, are distributed to affected domestic producers who
satisfy particular statutory criteria. Id. § 1675c(d)(3); See generally Candle Corp. of
Am. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 374 F.3d 1087, 1089-90 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The
distribution of funds from duties assessed each fiscal year must be distributed not later
than 60 days after the end of that fiscal year. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(c).
On December 29, 2000, the Commission sent Customs a list that included the
names of the petitioners and petition supporters for each pending antidumping and
countervailing duty order that was in effect as of January 1, 1999, except for those
orders that were subsequently revoked. Along with the list, the Commission sent a
letter to Customs in which the Commission chairman stated that because section 777 of
04-1083 3
the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f, “prohibits the Commission from disclosing
business proprietary information, with certain specifically enumerated exceptions not
applicable here, the list only includes those persons referenced by section 754(d)(1) [19
U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(1)] that indicated public support for the petition.” Thus, parties such
as Cathedral and Root that had stated their support for a petition under a promise of
confidentiality and had not waived confidentiality as to the information were not included
on the Commission’s list. Customs published the Commission’s list and the
accompanying letter from the Commission chairman on its website in early 2001.
In June 2001, Customs published a notice in the Federal Register of its proposed
rules for distributing funds under the Byrd Amendment. 66 Fed. Reg. 33,920 (June 26,
2001). That publication contained a notification that Customs had received the initial list
of affected domestic producers from the Commission; a statement that the resolution of
any dispute regarding the list of affected domestic producers in any given case was the
responsibility of the Commission, not Customs; a reference to the Customs website
address where the Commission list could be found; and a statement that continued
updates to the list would be processed as necessary. Id. at 33,920-21.
In August 2001, Customs published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed
distribution of Byrd Amendment funds for 2001 along with an updated list of affected
domestic producers. 66 Fed. Reg. 40,782 (Aug. 3, 2001). That publication put potential
distribution recipients on notice that they must file their certifications of eligibility by a
specific date in order to receive distributions for fiscal year 2001. A deadline of October
2, 2001, was set for filing certifications for the 2001 distributions. Neither Cathedral nor
Root was on the August 2001 list, and neither filed a certification with Customs for a
04-1083 4
distribution of Byrd Amendment funds for fiscal year 2001. Neither received a
distribution for that year.
In July of 2002, Customs published in the Federal Register an announcement of
its intention to distribute offsets for fiscal year 2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (July 3,
2002). That publication included an updated list of affected domestic producers. The
new list included seven domestic candle producers, but not Cathedral and Root.
Customs announced that written certifications to obtain a distribution would have to be
received by September 3, 2002.
After the September 2002 deadline passed, Cathedral and Root discovered from
informal contacts within the candle industry that they might be eligible for Byrd
Amendment distributions. They sent letters to the Commission waiving confidentiality
with respect to their support of the antidumping petition and requesting that they be
added to the Commission’s list of affected domestic producers. When it received the
letters, the Commission added Root and Cathedral to the list and forwarded the new
information to Customs. Cathedral and Root then submitted certifications to Customs
seeking Byrd Amendment distributions for 2002. Customs rejected their certifications
as untimely because the September 3 deadline had already passed. Accordingly,
Cathedral and Root received no Byrd Amendment distributions for fiscal year 2002.
However, they were included on the list of affected domestic producers for 2003, and
they received distributions for that year.
Cathedral and Root filed this action in the Court of International Trade,
contending that the Commission and Customs had wrongfully deprived them of their
right to Byrd Amendment distributions for 2001 and 2002. The plaintiffs moved for
04-1083 5
judgment on the agency record. For reasons set forth in a detailed opinion, the trial
court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and entered judgment for the defendants.
The trial court held that Customs had properly dismissed the certifications as
untimely. The court noted that Cathedral and Root had ample notice of the deadline for
filing certifications of eligibility for distributions, giving them time to discover that they
were not on the list of affected domestic producers and to seek an amendment to the
list before the certifications were due. With regard to the appellants’ argument that the
Commission violated the requirements of the Byrd Amendment when it failed to include
their names on the list of affected domestic producers that it forwarded to Customs, the
court noted that the Commission was confronted with a statutory ambiguity arising from
the interplay between the Byrd Amendment and section 777. On the one hand, the
Byrd Amendment required the Commission to forward a list of all affected domestic
producers, while on the other hand section 777 required the Commission to accord
confidential treatment to proprietary business information submitted to the Commission
in the course of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. The court
explained that the Commission interprets section 777 and its regulation on
confidentiality, 19 C.F.R. § 201.6, to require it to keep confidential whether
questionnaire respondents had expressed support for antidumping or countervailing
duty petitions. Moreover, the court noted that the questionnaires sent to Cathedral and
Root were labeled “Business Confidential,” which put Cathedral and Root on notice that
their responses would not be made publicly available. The court added that the
Commission had stated in its explanatory letter, which was posted on the Customs
website, that it regarded expressions of support for petitions that were made in such
04-1083 6
questionnaires to be confidential until and unless the party waived its right to
confidentiality.
The court ruled that even if the list of affected domestic producers was
incomplete, Cathedral and Root were on constructive notice of the list’s existence and
could have petitioned to be added to the list at any time before the deadline for filing
certifications. Their failure to meet the regulatory deadlines, the court held, cannot be
excused because of the failure of the Commission and Customs to provide explicit
notice in the Federal Register as to why certain names were excluded from the list of
affected domestic producers. Cathedral and Root were on notice that there was such a
list, that they might be eligible for inclusion on the list, and that there was a specific
deadline for filing their certifications. Under those circumstances, the court held that
Cathedral and Root were not legally entitled to receive Byrd Amendment distributions
for 2001 and 2002.
II
Cathedral and Root argue that the Commission violated the requirements of the
Byrd Amendment when it failed to include their names on the list of potential affected
domestic producers for 2001 and 2002 and that the omission excused their failure to file
certifications for distributions on a timely basis. In their view, the Byrd Amendment
imposes an unqualified duty on the Commission to forward the names of all petition
supporters to Customs for publication in the Federal Register. That duty, according to
Cathedral and Root, is not in any way limited or qualified by the Commission’s duty
under section 777 not to disclose, without consent, proprietary information that a party
has submitted to the Commission.
04-1083 7
The Commission and Customs contend that the Commission properly omitted
from the list of petition supporters those parties that had indicated their support for the
antidumping petition in their responses to confidential questionnaires and had not
waived their right to confidentiality. They argue that the disclosure requirement of the
Byrd Amendment conflicts with the confidentiality requirement of section 777, as
construed by the Commission and the Department of Commerce through published
regulations and longstanding practice. The Commission argues that it acted reasonably
in attempting to accommodate the two statutory directives by construing the Byrd
Amendment not to require disclosure of information protected by section 777.
The Byrd Amendment requires that the Commission forward a list of petitioners
and petition supporters to Customs. It does not address whether that requirement
applies to information that has been provided under a promise of confidentiality.
Section 777 requires that, except in limited circumstances, information submitted to the
Commission or the Commerce Department that is “designated as proprietary by the
person submitting the information” shall not be disclosed without the consent of the
person submitting the information. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(b)(1)(A).
On its face, the confidentiality obligation imposed on the Commission by section
777 appears to create a potential conflict with the broad disclosure requirement of the
Byrd Amendment. That potential conflict has been sharpened by agency action: Both
the Commission and the Department of Commerce have interpreted section 777 to
apply to information provided by questionnaire respondents, including whether or not
they support a particular antidumping or countervailing duty petition. Based on its
interpretation of section 777, the Commission resolved the conflict between the two
04-1083 8
statutes by concluding that it could not include in the list of petition supporters that it
forwarded to Customs those companies that had provided information regarding petition
support under a promise of confidentiality. Because the Commission had promised
Cathedral and Root that their questionnaire responses, including their support for the
petition in the petroleum wax candle case, would be treated as “business confidential”
information, the Commission determined that section 777 barred it from including
Cathedral and Root in the list of petition supporters that it sent to Customs.
A
The Commission contends that its construction of the Byrd Amendment in light of
section 777 is entitled to deference under the standard set forth in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984). Under that standard, a court must defer to an agency’s construction of a
statute governing agency conduct if the court finds that the statute in question is
ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.
The Supreme Court has stated that the Chevron standard of deference applies if
Congress either leaves a gap in the construction of the statute that the administrative
agency is explicitly authorized to fill, or implicitly delegates legislative authority, as
evidenced by “the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory
circumstances.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). Normally,
courts accord Chevron deference when Congress has authorized the administrative
agency “to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.” Id. (“It is fair to assume generally
that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides
04-1083 9
for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”); see also Nat’l Org.
of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“Chevron deference normally does not apply to informal proceedings.”).
To be sure, the Supreme Court has explained that Chevron deference to an
agency’s legal determination may be appropriate in some instances even if the agency
has not reached its legal conclusion through notice and comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002); Mead, 533 U.S. at
230-31. In such instances, however, the Court has looked for indications that Congress
meant to delegate to the agency the authority to make determinations having the force
of law.
In Barnhart, for example, the Court noted that the administrative interpretation at
issue was one of longstanding duration, that Congress had frequently amended the
statute in question without questioning the administrative construction, and that the
statute was of sufficient complexity that it was fair to assume that Congress understood
that the agency would be required to engage in policymaking when it administered the
statute. See 535 U.S. at 220-22. The Court concluded that “the interstitial nature of the
legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to
administration of the statute, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the
question over a long period of time” indicated that “Chevron provides the appropriate
legal lens through which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.”
Id. at 222.
04-1083 10
B
The deference question in this case is complicated because it involves multiple
statutory provisions, multiple agencies with responsibility for administering the statutory
scheme, multiple pertinent regulations, and multiple forms of informal agency action that
bear on the questions before us. Thus, the Commission, Customs, and the Commerce
Department all have roles to play either under the antidumping and countervailing duty
statutes or under the Byrd Amendment or both; the Commission and Commerce both
have formal regulations that bear on the proper interpretation of section 777; and in
addition to the formal regulations, the Commission points to various informal indications
of agency policy regarding the interpretation of the statutes at issue, including the letter
from its chairman that was sent to Customs and posted on Customs’ website. Finally,
the case requires us to address two separate but related deference issues: the proper
construction of section 777; and the proper interpretation of the Byrd Amendment in
light of section 777, as properly construed.
1
As a first step, we must decide whether the Commission properly construed
section 777 to apply to information regarding the appellants’ support for the petition.
We begin by noting that section 777 is ambiguous with regard to its application to
expressions of petition support provided under a pledge of confidentiality. Because the
language of section 777 and the traditional tools of statutory construction do not make it
clear whether the statute covers such information, the case cannot be resolved on the
basis of what is referred to as “step one” of Chevron, which requires the court to decide
questions of statutory construction “if Congress has directly spoken to the precise
04-1083 11
question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 & n.9; Candle Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 374 F.3d 1087, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We therefore turn to “step two” of the
Chevron analysis, which requires the court to defer to the agency’s interpretation if “the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843; N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 190 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
In arguing that section 777 applies to confidential information regarding petition
support, the Commission relies heavily on its regulation regarding business confidential
information, 19 C.F.R. § 201.6. The Commission promulgated that regulation following
formal notice and comment procedures and pursuant to congressional authorization to
adopt rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions and duties, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1335. The regulation is therefore entitled to full Chevron deference from this court.
See Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (according Chevron deference to notice-and-comment regulations relating to
antidumping law issued pursuant to statutory rulemaking authorization by the
Department of Commerce, the Commission’s coordinate agency in administering the
antidumping laws). This court has long held that Chevron deference applies to formal
statutory interpretations by the Commission with respect to those aspects of the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws administered by the Commission, and that
Chevron deference is not limited to interpretations of those statutes by the Department
of Commerce. See Comm. for Fairly Traded Venezuelan Cement v. United States, 372
F.3d 1284, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Tex. Crushed Stone Co. v. United States, 35 F.3d
1535, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United
States, 966 F.2d 660, 665 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
04-1083 12
2
Granting Chevron deference to the Commission’s regulation, however, does not
answer the question whether the Commission’s interpretation of section 777 as applying
to information regarding petition support is entitled to deference. That is because the
Commission’s regulation, on its face, does not refer to information regarding a
questionnaire respondent’s support for a petition. Instead, the regulation contains a
more general definition of confidential information, which includes “information of
commercial value, the disclosure of which is likely to have the effect of either impairing
the Commission’s ability to obtain such information as is necessary to perform its
statutory functions, or causing substantial harm to the competitive position of the
person, firm, partnership, corporation, or other organization from which the information
was obtained, unless the Commission is required by law to disclose such information.”
19 C.F.R. § 201.6.
The gap between the text of the regulation and the Commission’s interpretation
of section 777 is filled by the Commission’s interpretation of the regulation. The
Commission states in its brief that it interprets the regulation to include information
regarding a questionnaire respondent’s support for a petition. It bases that
interpretation on its contention that such information can be highly sensitive and that the
disclosure of such information can result in competitive injury to the party from which the
information was obtained. Although the Commission points to some prior Commission
statements and precedents to support that interpretation, the specific interpretation of
the regulation as applying to information regarding support for a petition is found only in
04-1083 13
the Commission’s brief. Nonetheless, Supreme Court precedents indicate that such an
interpretation is sufficient to warrant deference.
To begin with, it is well settled that an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations is entitled to broad deference from the courts. See Thomas Jefferson Univ.
v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev.
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
Deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is broader than deference
to the agency’s construction of a statute, because in the latter case the agency is
addressing Congress’s intentions, while in the former it is addressing its own. See Am.
Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, as the
Supreme Court has explained, the agency’s construction of its own regulations is “of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also James v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 372 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Torrington Co. v. United
States, 156 F.3d 1361, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 1998). That generous degree of deference is
due to an agency interpretation of its own regulations even when that interpretation is
offered in the very litigation in which the argument in favor of deference is made. See
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997); Am. Express Co., 262 F.3d at 1382;
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Whittier Props. Inc., 356 F.3d 1132, 1137 & n.27 (9th Cir. 2004);
Drake v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 291 F.3d 59, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In this case, although
the Commission had not previously advanced the precise interpretation of its regulation
that it advances in its brief, there is “no reason to suspect that the interpretation does
04-1083 14
not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question,” Auer,
519 U.S. at 462, and it is therefore entitled to deference.
Applying that standard, we uphold the Commission’s interpretation of its
regulation as covering information regarding a questionnaire respondent’s support for a
petition. While that interpretation is by no means compelled by the language of the
regulation, it is not contrary to the express terms of the regulation, nor is it at odds with
the purposes served by the regulation. Moreover, adding significant force to the
reasonableness of the Commission’s interpretation of section 777 is the plain language
of 19 C.F.R. § 351.105(c)(10), a regulation of the Department of Commerce, the other
agency that Congress has assigned, along with the Commission, to administer the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws. That regulation specifically defines business
proprietary information to include “the position of a domestic producer . . . regarding a
petition.” Although the Commerce regulation was not promulgated by the Commission,
and although Congress has created a clear division of labor between the Commission
and Commerce under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, see Hosiden Corp.
v. Advanced Display Mfrs. of Am., 85 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the two
agencies must necessarily work cooperatively in administering those statutes to the
extent possible, and there is therefore nothing surprising or improper about the
Commission adopting the same interpretation of section 777 as is found in Commerce’s
regulation. The Commerce regulation directly answers the question whether
information regarding support of a petition is confidential information within the meaning
of section 777. In light of the plain terms of the Commerce Department’s regulation and
the Commission’s similar interpretation of its own regulation, we conclude that the
04-1083 15
Commission’s interpretation of section 777 as applying to information regarding a
domestic producer’s support for a petition is reasonable and is therefore binding on us.
3
The next step in the analysis is to determine whether, in light of the
Commission’s interpretation of section 777, to which we defer, the Commission properly
concluded that the Byrd Amendment did not require it to disclose Cathedral and Root’s
support for the petroleum wax candle antidumping petition, as to which they had been
promised confidentiality. To read the Byrd Amendment as conflicting with section 777
would require us to conclude that the Byrd Amendment implicitly repealed section 777
insofar as it applies to the disclosure of confidential information regarding petition
support. The Supreme Court has frequently explained that repeals by implication are
not favored, and it has instructed that “where two statutes are capable of co-existence, it
is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the
contrary, to regard each as effective.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1018 (1984); see also Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (evidence of intention
to repeal earlier statute must be “clear and manifest”; courts must read seemingly
conflicting statutes “to give effect to each if we can do so while preserving their sense
and purpose”); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (“When there are
two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible.”). The
Commission so construed the Byrd Amendment in this case, and we uphold the
Commission’s construction.
To be sure, we do not believe that the Commission’s interpretation of the Byrd
Amendment is entitled to Chevron deference, for several reasons. First, the
04-1083 16
Commission did not adopt its interpretation of the Byrd Amendment through the
issuance of a regulation or through other formal process of the sort normally required to
invoke Chevron deference. Congress did not authorize the Commission to construe the
Byrd Amendment either through regulation or adjudication, and the Commission has not
done so. Instead, the Commission’s interpretation is embodied in its practice, as recited
in the chairman’s letter sent to Customs along with the initial Byrd Amendment list of
petitioners and supporters. Second, the Commission’s construction of the Byrd
Amendment is only as old as the Byrd Amendment itself, and thus dates only to late
2000. Although consistently adhered to since that time, the Commission’s position is
not a “longstanding” agency interpretation of the sort presented in Barnhart. Finally,
there is no indication that Congress foresaw that the Commission would need to make
policy determinations in the course of applying the Byrd Amendment. Accordingly, we
conclude that the Commission’s interpretation of the Byrd Amendment in light of section
777 is not entitled to full Chevron deference.
Even if Chevron deference does not apply, an agency’s construction of a statute
that it is charged with administering is still subject to some deference under the
standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944). While the Skidmore standard does not entail the same degree of deference to
administrative decisionmaking as the Chevron standard, it nonetheless requires courts
to give some deference to informal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory
dictates, with the degree of deference depending on the circumstances. Thus, the
Court in Mead explained that “the fair measure of deference to an agency administering
its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked
04-1083 17
to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness,
and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.” 533 U.S. at 228. The approach
employed “has produced a spectrum of judicial responses, from great respect at one
end . . . to near indifference at the other.” Id. The Court went on to explain that an
agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision “may merit some deference whatever its
form, given the ‘specialized experience and broader investigations and information’
available to the agency . . . and the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial
understanding of what a national law requires.” Id. at 234, quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S.
at 139. The degree of deference accorded to an agency’s informal written interpretation
of a statute, the Court added, may also depend on “the writer’s thoroughness, logic, and
expertise, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other source of weight.” id. at 235.
In other cases, the Court has described the range of deference encompassed
within the Skidmore standard in varying ways. It has noted that “reasonable agency
interpretations carry “at least some added persuasive force,” Metro. Stevedore Co. v.
Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 136 (1997), that “some deference” must be accorded to an
agency’s interpretive rule even if the rule is not entitled to full Chevron deference, Reno
v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995), that “some weight” is due to informal agency
interpretations of statutory provisions, though not the “same deference as norms that
derive from the exercise of . . . delegated lawmaking powers,” Martin v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991), and that such
interpretations are “entitled to respect,” Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587
(2000); Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler,
537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003).
04-1083 18
Beyond these general statements, the Court has not made clear the precise
degree of deference owed to such informal agency interpretations of statutes, a task
that may be impossible in light of the wide range of administrative actions that are
subject to analysis under the Skidmore standard. At times, the Court has characterized
the degree of deference to particular agency interpretations of statutes as depending on
“the extent that the interpretations have the ‘power to persuade.’” Christensen, 529
U.S. at 587. We are confident that the Court did not mean for that standard to reduce to
the proposition that “we defer if we agree.” If that were the guiding principle, Skidmore
deference would entail no deference at all. Instead, we believe the Supreme Court
intends for us to defer to an agency interpretation of the statute that it administers if the
agency has conducted a careful analysis of the statutory issue, if the agency’s position
has been consistent and reflects agency-wide policy, and if the agency’s position
constitutes a reasonable conclusion as to the proper construction of the statute, even if
we might not have adopted that construction without the benefit of the agency’s
analysis.
The agency action at issue in this case has many of the characteristics that the
Supreme Court has identified as favoring deference to the agency’s interpretation of the
statute at issue. First, the Commission’s interpretation of the Byrd Amendment
represents an agency-wide position; it is not an interpretation that was made at a low
level within the agency and that does not necessarily represent the views of the agency
as a whole. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 233-34. Second, as reflected by the Commission
chairman’s letter, the Commission’s interpretation was contemporaneous with the
enactment of the Byrd Amendment and has been adhered to consistently by the agency
04-1083 19
since that time. It is not a position formulated belatedly in response to litigation in this
case or others, nor is it inconsistent with positions the Commission has previously
taken. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988). Third, the
Commission has explained its reason for adopting the policy. Although the explanation
in the Commission chairman’s letter to Customs was brief, it made clear the statutory
basis for the Commission’s position. Fourth, the Commission’s interpretation is
consistent with the Commission’s position regarding the commercial sensitivity of
information such as petition support and with its longstanding practice of not revealing
the identity of petition supporters. See Magnesium from Canada, USITC Pub. 2696, at
18 (Nov. 1993) (noting that industry members may be “reluctant to express support for
relief because of possible negative reactions by customers that benefit from dumped or
subsidized imports . . . [or because of possible] common projects or ties with
respondents in other industries”). Finally, the Commission, together with the
Department of Commerce, is responsible for administering the antidumping and
countervailing duty statutes, and the Commission is directly responsible both for
preparing the list of parties eligible for Byrd Amendment distributions and for protecting
proprietary information submitted by private parties in the course of antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations. Thus, the interpretation is the product of the
Commission’s “specialized expertise” in administering the antidumping laws, it is
informed by the “investigations and information available to the agency,” and it reflects a
single uniform interpretation on the part of the agency. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234; Nat’l
Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc., 260 F.3d at 1379. Under these circumstances, we
consider the Commission’s interpretation of statutory construction to be entitled to
04-1083 20
considerable weight. Because that interpretation reflects a reasonable effort to resolve
the potential conflict between section 777 and the Byrd Amendment, we accord it
deference. Thus, based in part on our duty to accommodate seemingly conflicting
statutory directives if possible, and based in part on the agency’s reasoned effort to
effect such an accommodation, we reject the appellants’ contention that the
Commission’s interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the Byrd Amendment,
and that the Byrd Amendment must be interpreted to trump the confidentiality provisions
of section 777. Accordingly, we hold that the Commission did not violate the Byrd
Amendment when it failed to include Cathedral and Root on the list of affected domestic
producers that it forwarded to Customs in December 2000.
C
Contrary to the dissent, we do not believe the Supreme Court’s decision in FCC
v. Nextwave Personal Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003), directly conflicts with
our analysis, or is even especially relevant. The issue in the Nextwave case was
whether a provision of the Bankruptcy Act barring any governmental agency from
revoking a license to a debtor in bankruptcy because the debtor “has not paid a debt
that is dischargeable” prevented the FCC from canceling Nextwave’s licenses due to the
company’s failure to make installment payments for the licenses. The FCC argued that
the statute prohibited only discriminatory cancellations directed at debtors in bankruptcy
and did not bar the agency from declaring licenses void for nonpayment. The Court
disagreed, finding the plain language of the Bankruptcy Act dispositive.
The Nextwave case involved the construction of a single statute; it did not
present a situation, as does this case, in which two statutes are in tension and the court
04-1083 21
is called on to resolve the tension between them. The Court readily disposed of the
government’s argument in Nextwave that the Bankruptcy Act conflicted with the
Communications Act, by noting that nothing in the latter statute required that
cancellation be the sanction for failure to make agreed-upon periodic payments for FCC
licenses. 537 U.S. at 304. The Court concluded that what the FCC described as a
conflict “boils down to nothing more than a policy preference on the FCC’s part.” Id.
This case, by contrast, presents a conflict between two statutory provisions, not a
conflict between a statute and an agency’s policy preference. This case would be
similar to Nextwave if the Commission had decided as a policy matter to refrain from
disclosing the identity of parties who expressed support for a petition. The
Commission’s position, however, was not the product of a policy preference, but was
the result of a statutory directive as the Commission interpreted it. In that setting, it is
our task to construe the two statutes in a way that best resolves any possible conflict
between them, which is what we have sought to do. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 551 (1974) (“The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional
enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the
courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard
each as effective.”).
More pertinent than Nextwave is the Supreme Court’s decision in Traynor v.
Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988). In that case, the Court addressed an apparent conflict
between section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and a veterans’ benefit
provision denying certain benefits to veterans whose disability resulted from “the
veteran’s own willful misconduct,” 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1) (1988). Relying in part on the
04-1083 22
Veterans Administration’s regulatory interpretation of “willful misconduct” to include
alcoholism, the Court resolved the conflict by construing the veterans’ benefit statute, as
interpreted by the Veterans Administration, to qualify the reach of the Rehabilitation Act.
Following a similar path here, we construe section 777 of the Tariff Act, as interpreted
by the Commission, to qualify the scope of the publication requirement of the Byrd
Amendment.1
III
Cathedral and Root next argue that the Commission’s policy of withholding the
identity of petition supporters was not adopted in accordance with section 4 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553, which requires agencies to publish
certain rules and policy decisions in the Federal Register for notice and comment. As
an initial matter, however, the procedures of section 4 do not apply to matters “relating
to . . . benefits,” 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2), which would appear to include Byrd Amendment
distributions. Moreover, the section 4 procedures for rulemaking do not apply to
“interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,
procedure or practice.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). As an informal interpretation of the
requirements of the Byrd Amendment in light of section 777, the Commission’s position
did not constitute a substantive rule having the force and effect of law and therefore was
1
Other courts of appeals have employed a similar approach in resolving
apparent conflicts between statutes. See, e.g., Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels
Apartments, Inc., 192 F.3d 601, 605-07 (6th Cir. 1999) (resolving conflict between two
statutes based in part on administrative interpretation of one of the two); Mowbray v.
Kozlowski, 914 F.2d 593, 599-601 (4th Cir. 1990) (resolving apparent conflict between
two statutes based in part on agency interpretation that “harmonizes” the two); Rembold
v. Pac. First Sav. Bank, 798 F.3d 1307, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 1986) (relying in part on
administrative interpretation to conclude that two statutes are not incompatible).
04-1083 23
not subject to the notice and comment requirements of section 553 of the APA. See
Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 301-02 & n.31 (1979). Instead, the Commission’s position that a party must
waive its right to confidentiality of a questionnaire response prior to being placed on the
list was merely a statement of what the Commission regarded as the legal requirement
of section 777 and thus fell comfortably within the section 553(b)(3)(A) exception for
interpretive statements. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs,
308 F.3d 1262, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Splane v. West, 216 F.3d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. West, 138 F.3d 1434, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1998), quoting
Orengo Caraballo v. Reich, 11 F.3d 186, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For these reasons, it is
exempt from the notice and comment requirements of section 4.
A more difficult question is presented by the appellants’ alternative argument that
the Commission failed to comply with the requirement of section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, as amended by the Freedom of Information Act, that each agency
publish in the Federal Register “statements of general policy or interpretations of
general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D).
See generally Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232-36 (1974). The statute makes clear
that section 552(a)(1)(D) does not require the publication of all statements of policy and
interpretation, because another provision of the same statute, section 552(a)(2)(B),
states that each agency shall “make available for public inspection and copying . . .
those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency
and are not published in the Federal Register.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B) (emphasis
added).
04-1083 24
The line between matters falling within section 552(a)(1)(D) and matters falling
within section 552(a)(2)(B) is notoriously difficult to draw. See Nat’l Leased Hous. Ass’n
v. United States, 105 F.3d 1423, 1433 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1997); N.Y. v. Lyng, 829 F.2d
346, 354 (2d Cir. 1987). Professor Davis commented that the distinction between
“statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability” that are required
to be published in the Federal Register and other “statements of policy and
interpretations” that are not, is incapable of being drawn “except in vague terms.”
Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 5.11, at 341 (2d ed. 1978).
Recognizing the difficulty of drawing that statutory distinction, the trial court found it
unnecessary to decide whether the chairman’s letter should have been published in the
Federal Register. Although the court stated that “it seems probable that 5 U.S.C. § 552
would not require publication of the interpretation,” the court ruled that in any event the
non-publication of the chairman’s letter did not entitle the appellants to any relief
because it did not prejudice them. The trial court explained that the appellants had
constructive notice of the existence of the list of affected domestic producers, they were
advised through the Federal Register that they could raise questions regarding the list
by inquiry to the Commission, and they were directed to the Customs website where the
chairman’s letter could be found. According to the trial court, it “was not necessary for
Plaintiffs to know why they had been left off the list in order to make inquiries.”
On appeal, the Commission argues, inter alia, that it was not required to publish
the Commission chairman’s letter because it was simply an application of the “clear
requirements” of section 777. We do not share the Commission’s view that its
interpretation of section 777, as applied to the publication requirements of the Byrd
04-1083 25
Amendment, is “simply the direct application of an unambiguous statute.” Nonetheless,
although we have found the statutory provisions less than “clear,” we have construed
section 777, in light of the Commission’s interpretation, to bar the Commission from
including those companies that had not waived their right to confidentiality on the Byrd
Amendment list of affected domestic producers.
An agency interpretation that merely restates the requirements of a statute, on its
face or as construed, need not be published, since it is the statutory directive, not the
agency’s interpretation, that governs in such cases. See, e.g., Kaspar Wire Works, Inc.
v. Sec’y of Labor, 268 F.3d 1123, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Dilley v. Nat’l Transp. Safety
Bd., 49 F.3d 667, 669-70 (10th Cir. 1995); Rochna v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 929 F.2d
13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Bowers, 920 F.2d 220, 222 (4th Cir. 1990);
Tearney v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 868 F.2d 1451, 1454 (5th Cir. 1989); Knutzen v.
Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343, 1351 (10th Cir. 1987). Since we have
construed section 777 and the Byrd Amendment in accordance with the Commission’s
interpretation of those statutes, the Commission’s failure to publish its interpretation of
section 777 does not bar the enforcement of the statute as we have construed it.
To be sure, when an agency’s interpretation of a statute plays a role in a court’s
construction of the statute, as it does here, it may appear to be a distinction without a
difference to say that we are not applying the unpublished interpretation, but are
applying a statute that we have construed with the aid of that same unpublished
interpretation. Yet that analytical approach necessarily follows from the proposition that
we give Skidmore deference to unpublished agency interpretations of statutes. If we
were to interpret 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) to mean that an agency’s unpublished
04-1083 26
interpretation of a statute cannot be used in our construction of that statute, we would
be engrafting a Federal Register publication requirement on the Skidmore doctrine,
which would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions applying Skidmore.
See Mead, 533 U.S. at 223, 234-35 (Customs ruling letters are not required to be
published, but may be entitled to Skidmore deference); Koray, 515 U.S. at 61
(according deference to an unpublished agency guideline); Christensen, 529 U.S. at
586-87 (unpublished opinion letter entitled to consideration under Skidmore).
Furthermore, in light of the provision in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) that makes even
unpublished general interpretations effective against persons with “actual and timely
notice of the terms thereof,” making Skidmore deference subject to the publication
requirement of section 552(a)(1)(D) could result in a statute having one interpretation for
persons having notice of the agency interpretation and a different interpretation for
persons not having such notice, which would obviously be a wholly unworkable
outcome.
The Sixth Circuit has suggested, at least in the context of Chevron deference,
that an agency interpretation of a statute that does not satisfy the publication
requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) is not entitled to judicial deference. D&W Food
Ctrs., Inc. v. Block, 786 F.2d 751, 757-58 (6th Cir. 1986). That decision, however, is
contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr.,
815 F.2d 1343, 1351 (10th Cir. 1987), and the approach employed by the Supreme
Court in Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), in the context of Skidmore deference.
In Knutzen, the court gave “some weight” to certain unpublished agency
memorandums in the course of construing the statute in dispute. The court then noted
04-1083 27
that the appellants objected to the agency’s reliance on the memorandums on the
ground that they were not published in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D). The
court answered that objection by stating that in light of its analysis of the statute, the
pertinent regulations, and the memorandums in question, the memorandums merely
applied the governing statutory and regulatory rule and that they were therefore not
required to be published. Knutzen, 815 F.2d at 1350-51.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Morton v. Ruiz, although not explicit on the
point, is consistent with this approach. The Court determined in that case that the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) had violated 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) when it failed to
publish a statement of its policy regarding the eligibility of certain Indian tribal members
for health services. As a consequence, the Court held that the BIA could not rely on
that policy as a basis for “a legislative-type rule,” rendering certain otherwise eligible
Indians ineligible for the statutory benefits. 415 U.S. at 235-36. After having reached
that conclusion, however, the Court went on to address the argument that “[e]ven
assuming the lack of binding effect of the BIA policy,” the policy was entitled to
Skidmore deference in construing the eligibility provision of the underlying statute. Id. at
236. The Court did not reject that argument on the ground that the memorandums, not
having been published in the Federal Register, were not entitled to be given weight
under Skidmore; instead, the Court held that the memorandums did not represent a
consistent agency position with respect to the meaning of the statute in question, and
that, in any event, it was “evident” that Congress did not intend to limit eligibility in the
manner described in the BIA memorandums. Id. at 236-38. Thus, the Court did not
04-1083 28
treat the question of Skidmore deference as foreclosed by the agency’s failure to
comply with the publication requirement of section 552(a)(1)(D).
Employing a similar approach, we treat the availability of Skidmore deference as
not dependent on agency compliance with the publication requirement of section
552(a)(1)(D). As such, we conclude that section 777, as we have construed it in light of
the Commission’s consistent administrative interpretation, bars the inclusion of non-
public petition supporters on the Commission’s list of affected domestic producers. For
that reason we hold that the Commission was not required to publish the chairman’s
letter in the Federal Register pursuant to section 552(a)(1)(D). Accordingly, we
conclude that the conduct of the Commission and Customs in creating and publishing
the Byrd Amendment list of affected domestic producers for 2001 and 2002 did not
excuse the failure of Cathedral and Root to file timely certifications for those years. The
appellants are therefore not entitled to retroactive consideration for those two Byrd
Amendment distributions.
AFFIRMED.
04-1083 29
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-1083
CATHEDRAL CANDLE COMPANY,
and THE A.I. ROOT COMPANY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION and,
DEANNA TANNER OKUN, Chairman, United States International Trade Commission,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION and
ROBERT C. BONNER, Commissioner, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
Defendants-Appellees.
DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Despite the majority’s extensive and sophisticated analysis, I respectfully suggest
that it has reached the wrong result in holding that the claims are time barred. In my
view, the majority’s approach to statutory construction directly conflicts with the
approach required by the Supreme Court’s decision in F.C.C. v. Nextwave Personal
Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003).
The Byrd Amendment itself establishes no time limit for the filing of claims. 19
U.S.C. § 1675c(d) (2000). A Customs Regulation establishes a 60-day time limit,
providing that “each affected domestic producer must submit a certification . . . that
must be received within 60 days after the date of publication of the notice in the Federal
Register. 19 C.F.R. §§ 159.62-63 (2004). Here the claimants did not file within the 60-
day period. Like the majority, I think that this 60-day time limit is generally valid.
However, where, as here, Customs has failed to provide the statutorily required notice
of eligibility to affected domestic producers, I think the time limit cannot be enforced.
The plain language of the Byrd Amendment requires notice to affected domestic
producers of their eligibility, specifying that Customs must publish “a notice of intention
to distribute the offset and the list of affected domestic producers potentially eligible for
the distribution based on the list obtained from the Commission.” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675c(d)(2) (emphasis added). In those cases where “the Commission’s records do
not permit an identification of those in support of a petition,” the statute imposes an
affirmative duty on the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) to “consult with the
administering authority to determine the identity of the petitioner,” when compiling the
list of affected domestic producers. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(1). Customs is also required
to “request a certification from each potentially eligible affected domestic producer.” 19
U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(2).1 The language of the Byrd Amendment thus requires that the
published list provide notice to all potentially eligible affected domestic producers so that
they can then comply with the mandatory certification procedures.
In concluding that the Byrd Amendment does not require notice to all potentially
eligible producers, the majority affords Skidmore deference to the ITC’s interpretation of
the statute as not requiring such notice. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40
(1944). But, even under the more deferential standard of Chevron, deference to an
1
In order to obtain a distribution, the certification must include: a statement
of the producer’s desire to receive a distribution; demonstration of their eligibility to
receive the distribution as an affected domestic producer; and the qualifying
expenditures incurred by the producer during the relevant distribution period. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675c(d)(2); see also 19 C.F.R. § 159.63(a).
04-1083 2
agency interpretation is only required if the statute is ambiguous. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The majority makes no real
effort to show that the Byrd Amendment is ambiguous; and, of course, it is not.
At the end of the day, the majority justifies its result by finding that section 777
conflicts with the Byrd Amendment. But there is no conflict. Section 777 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f, prohibits disclosure of information “designated as
proprietary by the person submitting the information” absent consent. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677f (b)(1)(A) (2000). The plain language of section 777 does not require that the
identity of affected domestic producers who supported antidumping petitions be kept
confidential unless confidentiality was waived. Much less does it require that these
names be kept confidential when the Byrd Amendment requires their disclosure. The
supposed conflict with the Byrd Amendment arises solely because the ITC has
interpreted section 777 to protect the identity of the supporting parties even in those
situations where the Byrd Amendment requires disclosure. The majority defers to that
interpretation under Chevron and finds that the Byrd Amendment must give way. In
other words, the majority reaches the somewhat astonishing conclusion that the
agency’s interpretation of section 777 impliedly takes precedence over the explicit
provisions of the Byrd Amendment. Maj. Op. ante at 16.
By allowing an agency interpretation of section 777 to trump the plain language
of the Byrd Amendment, the majority contravenes this court’s obligation to interpret the
ambiguous language of section 777 so as to accommodate the explicit notice
requirement of the Byrd Amendment.
04-1083 3
In the Nextwave case, the Supreme Court held in similar circumstances that the
explicit command of the Bankruptcy Code overcame the agency’s interpretation of the
Communications Act. 537 U.S. at 304. The question was whether the agency could
properly cancel auctioned licenses for failure to make timely payment. Contrary to the
majority’s claim that the case involved the construction of a single statute, Maj. Op. ante
at 22, Nextwave also involved a potential conflict between two statutory provisions.
The Court noted the express language of Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code, that a
“governmental unit may not revoke a license to a person that is a debtor under this title
solely because such debtor has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case under
this title,” 537 U.S. at 300, (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2000) (ellipses omitted)), and
held that nothing in the relevant section of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(j),
compelled automatic cancellation of a license for failure to meet payment deadlines, id.
at 304. The agency’s interpretation of the Communications Act to require cancellation
could not prevail because “[s]uch administrative preferences cannot be the basis for
denying respondent rights provided by the plain terms of a law.” Id.
So here, we have a situation where the Byrd Amendment is explicit; and section
777 contains no explicit requirement of confidentiality as to the identity of persons
supporting antidumping petitions. The Byrd Amendment’s explicit notice requirement
cannot be defeated by an “administrative preference” for interpreting section 777 to
require confidentiality in such circumstances. None of the courts of appeals cases cited
04-1083 4
by the majority found an implied repeal of a statutory command based on a Chevron
interpretation of a second statute. Maj. Op. ante at 23 n.1.2
The majority’s reliance on Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988), is further
manifestation of its failure to appreciate that an agency’s policy-driven interpretation
under Chevron cannot override the clear command of a conflicting statute. Traynor did
not involve Chevron deference to the VA’s interpretation of section 1662(a)(1) to include
primary alcoholism as “willful misconduct,” but rather an explicit holding that the statute
itself incorporated a previously rendered agency interpretation to that effect.3 Under
2
In two of the cited cases, the agency adopted an interpretation of an
ambiguous statute to avoid a conflict with another explicit statutory command. See
Mowbray v. Kozlowski, 914 F.2d 593, 600-01 (4th Cir. 1990) (agency interpretation of
section 303(3) of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act avoided potential conflict
with section 209(b) of the Supplemental Security Income Program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381
et seq.); Rembold v. Pacific First Federal Savings Bank, 798 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir.
1986) (agency interpretation of the National Housing Act’s judicial review provisions
avoided conflict with the explicit grant of district court jurisdiction provide under the
antifraud provisions of the Security Exchange Act of 1934). Under the logic of those
cases, the agencies should interpret section 777 to prevent a conflict with the Byrd
Amendment. In the third case, the court found that an agency interpretation of one
statute was permissible because it did not conflict with an explicit command of the
second statute. Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels Apartments, Inc., 192 F.3d 601, 607 (6th
Cir. 1999) (agency interpretation of funding mechanism and implementation standards
of § 202 of the National Housing Act was found to create no conflict with the general
prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Fair Housing Act Amendments of
1988).
3
As the Court noted:
[W]e must assume that Congress was aware of the Veterans’
Administration’s interpretation of “willful misconduct” at the time that it
enacted § 1662(a)(1), and that Congress intended that the term receive
the same meaning for purposes of that statute as it had received for
purposes of other veterans’ benefits statutes. . . . In these cases, however,
we need not rely only on such assumptions. The legislative history
confirms that Congress intended that the Veterans’ Administration apply
the same test of “willful misconduct” in granting extensions of time under
04-1083 5
these circumstances the Court gave primacy to the explicit Congressional intent
manifested in section 1662(a)(1) as opposed to the more general provisions of the
Rehabilitation Act, finding that the latter legislation neither “implicitly repealed the willful
misconduct provision of the 1977 legislation [nor] forbade the VA to classify primary
alcoholism as willful misconduct.” Id. at 547. Here, the agency interpretation of section
777 was not incorporated into the statute, and can claim only Chevron deference. That
is not sufficient to override the commands of the Byrd Amendment.
If the required notice was not provided, the agency cannot enforce the time limit.
See Wood v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 241 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (refusing to
deny annuity benefit when statutorily required notice was not provided, even though
employee had not formally elected the benefit during the prescribed time period). Here,
the statutorily required notice was not provided, and the time limit cannot be enforced.
§ 1662(a)(1) as the agency already was applying in granting disability
compensation . . . . Specifically, the [Senate Report] states:
“In determining whether the disability sustained was a result of . . .
‘willful misconduct,’ the Committee intends that the same standards
be applied as are utilized in determining eligibility for other VA
programs . . . . In this connection, see 38 CFR, part III, paragraphs
3.1(n) and 3.301, and VA Manual M21-1, section 1404.” S. Rep.
No. 95-468, pp. 69-70 (1977).
The cited regulations . . . characterize[] primary alcoholism as “willful
misconduct.”
Traynor, 485 U.S. at 546 (some internal citations omitted).
04-1083 6