United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 30, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-50625
RUTH NUNEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PATRICIA SIMMS; GLENNA ARCHER,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
Before GARWOOD and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges, and FELDMAN,
District Judge.1
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Ruth Nunez (Nunez) appeals the district court's
judgment on the pleadings in accordance with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c)
in favor of defendants. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Nunez was hired as a school teacher by the El Paso Independent
School District (District) in 1996. At that time, Nunez was
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District Judge of the Eastern District of Louisiana,
sitting by designation.
issued a probationary contract in accordance with Chapter 21,
Subchapter C, of the Texas Education Code because she did not
qualify for a standard teaching certificate. Nunez had obtained a
temporary emergency permit from the State Board of Educator
Certification on August 1, 1996. These emergency permits expire
three years after their issuance, meaning that Nunez's permit
expired in August of 1999.
After a teacher has been employed under a probationary
contract for at least three consecutive years, state law permits a
school district to employ a teacher under a continuing contract.
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.153. On April 7, 1998, the District
issued Nunez a continuing contract pursuant to the provisions of
section 21.153 of the Texas Education Code.
Nunez claims that on October 31, 2000, she spoke with Farah
Green (Green), a certification officer for the District, who
allegedly told her she could continue teaching as a "permanent
substitute" until she passed the EXET exam needed to obtain
standard certification. Nunez received a letter from defendant
Glenna Archer (Archer) dated October 30, 2000, advising her that,
because her emergency permit had expired and because she did not
therefore meet certification requirements, she was being terminated
from full-time employment effective November 1, 2000. Nunez
alleges she received this letter on November 2, 2000, while
appellees claim she was given the letter on October 30.
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Nunez filed a civil rights suit on September 12, 2001, against
Patricia Simms (Simms), the school principal at Western Hills
Elementary School where Nunez taught, and Glenna Archer, Interim
Associate Superintendent for Human Resources for the District,
alleging that her discharge violated her procedural due process
rights insofar as she did not receive proper notice and an
opportunity to be heard. The defendants answered, claiming the
affirmative defense of qualified immunity and arguing Nunez had no
property interest in her contract because her certification had
expired by its terms. After Nunez filed a second amended complaint
and answer to the defendants' affirmative defenses, the defendants
moved for judgment on the pleadings in accordance with FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(c), maintaining that Nunez had not alleged the violation of
a clearly established constitutional right as she had no property
interest in continued employment with the District.
On May 17, 2002, the district court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss all claims. The court concluded, pursuant to
Texas law, that absent certification, Nunez could not be employed
as a teacher, that the employment contract was therefore void, and
that Nunez consequently had no property interest in continued
employment. The district court further found that the conduct of
the defendants in terminating Nunez was objectively reasonable.
Nunez timely filed notice of appeal.
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Discussion
In analyzing a claim of qualified immunity we first determine
whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly
established federal constitutional right. Hare v. City of Cornith,
Miss., 135 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1998). If the plaintiff does
so, the court must then assess whether the defendant's conduct was
objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law. Id. at
326. The plaintiff's showing of a violation of a clearly
established constitutional right is a “prerequisite” to overcoming
the qualified immunity defense; failure to do so obviates the need
to address the second step of the analysis. Martinez v. Texas
Dep't of Criminal Justice, 300 F.3d 567, 576-77 (5th Cir. 2002).
In order to allege a due process deprivation of a property
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff must
demonstrate a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to that interest.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972). In the
employment context, the sufficiency of a claim of entitlement must
be decided by reference to state law. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S.Ct.
2074, 2077 (1976).
In its Order of Dismissal, the district court found that the
pleadings establish that Nunez's employment terminated because her
temporary, emergency permit had expired, and she was not holding,
and could not present, a standard Texas teaching certificate. The
court stated, “Thus, pursuant to applicable provisions of the Texas
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Education Code, including Sections 21.003 and 21.053, she could not
be employed as a classroom teacher, the employment contract that
had been issued to her was not binding, and she could not be paid
as a classroom teacher.” The court therefore held:
“Under controlling authorities of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, including Montez v. San
Antonio Independent School District, 817 F.2d 1124 (5th
Cir. 1987), of the Texas courts, Grand Prairie
Independent School District v. Vaughan, 792 S.W.2d 944
(Tex. 1990), and Swanson v. Houston Independent School
District, 800 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th
Dist.] 1990, writ denied), and the Texas Commissioner of
Education, Peters v. Dallas Independent School District,
TEA Docket No. 087-R2-400 (Tex. Comm'r Educ. 2000), and
Pitts v. Houston Independent School District, TEA Docket
No. 023b-R1-995 (Tex Comm'r Educ. 1996), the employment
contract that had been issued to the Plaintiff was void,
and she had no property interest in continued employment.
Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of a clearly-
established constitutional right. The conduct of the
Defendants was objectively reasonable in light of
clearly-established law. They did not violate any of
Plaintiff's clearly-established constitutional rights.”
This court reviews de novo a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(c).
Brittan Communications Int’l Corp. v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 313 F.3d
899, 904 (5th Cir. 2002). Heightened pleading in qualified
immunity cases requires that plaintiffs rest their complaint on
more than conclusions alone and plead their case with precision and
factual specificity. Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.
1999).
On appeal Nunez argues that a property interest attached to
her continuing contract when it was entered into, at which time she
held valid emergency certification. A public school teacher has a
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constitutionally protected property interest in continued
employment if he can demonstrate a reasonable expectation of
continued employment. Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 732 (5th Cir.
1989). Nunez contends that, once this constitutional property
interest attached, it could only be removed through
constitutionally adequate procedures.
The Texas Education Code defines “teacher” as a “classroom
teacher, counselor, or other full-time professional employee who is
required to hold a certificate issued under Subchapter B.” Tex.
Educ. Code Ann. § 21.101 (Vernon 1996). “A person may not be
employed as a teacher, teacher intern or teacher trainee,
librarian, educational aide, administrator, or counselor by a
school district unless the person holds an appropriate certificate
or permit issued as provided by Subchapter B.” Id. at § 21.003.
Subchapter B provides for the issuance of emergency certificates.
Id. at § 21.041(b)(2). An “emergency certificate” under section
21.041 is equivalent to an “emergency permit.” 19 Tex. Admin.
Code. § 230.512 (West 1998).
The State Board for Educator Certification may issue emergency
permits when a superintendent cannot secure an appropriately
certified individual to fill a vacant position. Id. at § 230.501
(a),(b). An emergency permit is valid for the remainder of the
school year for which it is activated, and an individual may not
serve more than two additional years in the same assignment. Id.
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at § 230.502 (b),(d). An individual may also not serve as a
classroom teacher for more than three years without obtaining
standard certification. Id. at § 230.502(d).
After a “teacher” has been employed under a probationary
contract for at least three consecutive years, the school district
may elect to employ the teacher under a continuing contract. Tex.
Educ. Code Ann. § 21.153 (Vernon 1996). Nunez alleges, and the
defendants do not dispute, that she was issued an emergency permit
on August 1, 1996, and that on April 7, 1998, she was issued a
continuing contract following three years' employment under a
probationary contract.
Section 21.154 of the Texas Education Code states that:
"Each teacher employed under a continuing contract is
entitled to continue in the teacher's position or a
position with the school district for future school years
without the necessity for annual nomination or
reappointment until the person:
1) Resigns;
2) retires under the Teacher Retirement System of
Texas;
3) is released from employment by the school district
at the end of a school year because of necessary
reduction of personnel as provided by Section 21.157;
4) is discharged for good cause as defined by Section
21.156 and in accordance with the procedures provided
by this chapter;
5) is discharged for a reason stated in the
teacher's contract that existed on or before
September 1, 1995, and in accordance with
procedures prescribed by this chapter; or
6) is returned to probationary status, as
authorized by Section 21.106.”
Section 21.053 of the Education Code provides:
“(a) A person who desires to teach in a public school
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shall present the person’s certificate for filing with
the employing district before the person’s contract with
the board of trustees of the district is binding.
(b) An educator who does not hold a valid certificate may
not be paid for teaching or work done before the
effective date of issuance of a valid certificate.”
Paragraph 5 of the classroom teacher continuing contract form
dated April 7, 1998, signed by Nunez, provided in pertinent part:
“Employee shall comply with, and be subject to, state and federal
law and District policies, rules, regulations, and administrative
directives as they exist or may hereafter be amended.” Paragraph
6 of the contract stated:
“This contract is conditioned on Employee's
satisfactorily providing the certification, service
records, teaching credentials, and other records required
by law, the Texas Education Agency, the State Board for
Educator Certification, the State Board of Education, or
the District. Failure of Employee to maintain
certification in the position(s) to which assigned may be
grounds for dismissal.”
Pursuant to these statutes, it is clear that Nunez was not
qualified to serve as a teacher following the expiration according
to its terms of her certification. We next address the effect of
this on Nunez's contract and the extent to which, under that
contract, she had a property interest in her job at the time of her
termination sufficient to implicate the constitutional guarantee of
due process.
A condition subsequent is "a condition referring to a future
event, upon the happening of which the obligation becomes no longer
binding upon the other party, if he chooses to avail himself of the
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condition." Rincones v. Windberg, 705 S.W. 2d 846, 848 (Tex. App.
- Austin 1986; no writ); Black’s Law Dictionary 293-94 (6th Ed.
1990). The provision in the continuing contract here established
both the initial provision of certification and the subsequent
maintenance of it throughout the contract as conditions subsequent.
While it is true that the contract states that failure to maintain
certification “may be grounds for dismissal,” thereby suggesting
dismissal is not always automatic, such permissive phrasing is
nonetheless consistent with the definition of a condition
subsequent, which gives the party not obligated by the condition
the choice of whether to avail himself of the opportunity to
terminate the contract. Moreover, if the contract were interpreted
to give Nunez a property right in continued employment as a teacher
after her certificate expired according to its terms and she was
not otherwise certified, then it would be to that extent invalid
and ultra vires. Thus, in Montez v. South San Antonio ISD, 817
F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1987), we held that an uncertified teacher had
no property right to continued employment under a continuing
contract of employment as a teacher because under Texas law “a
teacher must be certified in order to be entitled to a continuing
contract of employment” and “[a]ny contract purporting to give him
more than that allowed by Texas law was beyond the power of the
school district and was thus ultra vires” and “bestowed no property
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interest on” the teacher. Id. at 1126.2
In Robey v. Union Hill Indep. Sch. Dist, TEA Docket No. 235-
R2-395 (Tex. Comm'r Educ. 1996), a Texas Education Agency
administrative proceeding, it was found that an employee who did
not complete course work required to maintain his emergency permit,
as required by his contract, “failed to perform the condition
subsequent contained in his contract.” Therefore, the “Respondent
is excused from its obligation to employ [him]. . . for the
remainder of the . . . school year. The issue of just cause for
termination need not be considered.” The language in that contract
was somewhat more explicit than in the case sub judice, as it
stated, in part, “I have been advised and understand that to
establish my eligibility for permit renewal I must complete a
minimum of six semester hours as specified on my deficiency plan
and provide evidence of successful performance on the competency
examination of basic skills approved by the State Board of
Education...” However, Nunez's contract was substantively
indistinguishable, as it also clearly provided that her failure to
maintain certification was grounds for dismissal.
Nunez relies on Frazier v. Garrison ISD, 980 F.2d 1514 (5th
Cir. 1993). The individual plaintiffs in that case held continuing
2
Nunez seeks to distinguish Montez on the ground that she, unlike the Montez plaintiff,
was certified at the time she entered into the continuing contract. However, the contract did not
purport to give her a right to continued employment at anytime while she was uncertified and, as
we held in Montez, Texas law would preclude any such continuing contract.
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teachers certificates when the Texas legislature passed a new law
requiring teacher competency testing and providing for revocation
of a teacher’s certification if the teacher failed the Texas
Examination for Current Administrators and Teachers (TECAT). Those
plaintiffs were also employed as teachers at school districts under
fixed term contracts. Because they failed the TECAT, the
plaintiffs’ teacher certificates were revoked, although absent the
new law and the teacher’s failure of the test called for thereby,
the certification would have continued in effect according to its
terms. By reason of the revocation of their teachers certificates,
the plaintiffs were terminated from their fixed term contracts with
the school districts prior to the end of the stated contract term.
They claimed, among other things, deprivation of property without
due process of law, because according to the teachers “‘[n]o
mechanism was created to challenge erroneous test results or
terminations. The plaintiffs [Teachers] did not receive a due
process hearing.’” Id. at 1528. We noted that the teachers had a
constitutionally protected property interest in continued
employment during the term of their fixed term contracts. Id. at
1529-30. However, we held that they were afforded due process
because:
“. . . the Teachers were given more than one opportunity
to pass the TECAT and, further, there were procedures in
place that afforded the Teachers the opportunity to
appeal the revocation of their certification to the Texas
commissioner of education, and the right to judicial
review of that administrative proceeding in a state
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district court.” Id. at 1530.
We did not hold that any due process hearing at the school board
level was required, and plainly inferred that it was not. In other
words, the plain implication of Frazier is that once a teacher’s
certification validly terminates, the school board may, without a
hearing, terminate the teacher notwithstanding that her fixed term
contract has not expired.
What obviously distinguishes Frazier from this case is that in
Frazier the teacher’s certificate was revoked, prior to the time it
would otherwise expire by its own terms, on account of some alleged
default of the teacher (failure of the TECAT) occurring after the
certification was issued and in effect, while here Nunez’s
certificate simply expired by the mere passage of the time it was
to remain in effect as provided by its own terms.
Moreover, Nunez knew at the time she entered into the
contract, or should have known from the language in the contract
and the provisions of Texas law, that the contract gave her no
right to continued employment while she remained uncertified when
her certificate expired by its own terms. Accordingly, she could
have no reasonable expectation of continued employment after the
expiration of the term of her certification. In Perry v.
Sindermann, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2700 (1972), the Supreme Court held
that a mere subjective "expectancy" is not liberty or property
protected by the Due Process Clause. Therefore, regardless of what
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Nunez's subjective expectation was, it would not have been
objectively reasonable for her to believe, at the time of entering
into the contract, that her entitlement to teach would extend
beyond the point that her certification expired by its own terms.
Finally, in Frazier, the plaintiffs challenged both the lawfulness
of the examination itself and its scoring (“erroneous results”),
and claimed their continuing certificates were wrongfully revoked.
Here, by contrast, Nunez does not dispute that her certification
properly expired by its own terms, nor does she challenge the
lawfulness of the certification system or claim entitlement to, or
wrongful denial of, any certification.
Nunez points to Roberts v. Houston Independent School
District, 788 S.W. 2d 107, 109 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990,
writ denied), a case which we relied on in Frazier for the
proposition that teachers have a property right in their continuing
contracts. Frazier, 980 F.2d at 1529. However, Roberts involved a
termination based on the poor performance of a teacher who
maintained valid certification. Consequently, the question of
whether the property interest created when the contract was entered
into ended when certification expired by its own terms was not at
issue.
Nunez also maintains that state law does not require
termination for lack of certification. While she does not dispute
that lapsed certification constitutes valid grounds for
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termination, Nunez argues that it is not automatically required by
state law. Nunez cites section 21.156(b) of the Education Code as
allowing the school board to provide for suspension without pay
until the end of the school year in lieu of discharge for “good
cause as specified by Subsection (a).” But, section 21.156(a)
applies only to discharge on the basis of school board
determination of the teacher’s “failure to meet the accepted
standards of conduct for the profession as generally recognized and
applied.”3 Nothing of the sort is involved here. Nunez also cites
Texas Attorney General's Opinion No. JC-0185 (2000), which states
that a teacher who loses certification can be converted into a
"permanent substitute." Even if these provisions were applicable,
however, they only give the District the option of continuing to
employ Nunez in some capacity without violating state law, but in
no way bind them to do so. Therefore, this contention by Nunez
does not undercut the conclusion that her contract was no longer
binding on the school once her certification expired by its own
terms, making her at most an at-will employee bereft of a vested
property right in her job.
3
Section 21.156 provides
“(a) A teacher employed under a continuing contract may be discharged at
any time for good cause as determined by the board of trustees, good cause being
the failure to meet the accepted standards of conduct for the profession as
generally recognized and applied in similarly situated school districts in this state.
(b) In lieu of discharge, a school district may suspend a teacher without pay
for good cause as specified by Subsection (a) for a period not to extend beyond the
end of the current school year.”
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Nunez further argues that only a superintendent can fire a
teacher because termination of teachers is one power listed among
the duties of superintendents in section 11.201(d)(4) of the
Education Code. There is no suggestion, however, in this provision
that this is an exclusive power of the superintendent. Moreover,
whether the proper state law procedures were followed in Nunez's
termination is irrelevant to the threshold question of whether she
had a property right in her job after her certification had expired
by its own terms.
Because Nunez had no property interest in continued employment
after her certification lapsed, the clearly established
constitutional right of due process is not implicated. As
demonstrating violation of a constitutional right is a
“prerequisite” to overcoming the qualified immunity defense,
failure to do so obviates the need to address the second step of
the analysis. Martinez, 300 F.3d at 576-77 (5th Cir. 2002).
Hence, we need not address whether the procedures followed in
terminating Nunez were objectively reasonable.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's decision is
AFFIRMED.
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