Barbara Regina Schlein v. Anthony Griffin

ACCEPTED 01-14-00799-cv FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 5/20/2015 4:09:18 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE CLERK CAUSE NO. 01-14-00799-cv FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 5/20/2015 4:09:18 PM FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk HOUSTON, TEXAS BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN, Appellant, vs. ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, Appellee. IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL Appellant: Barbara Regina Schlein Counsel for Appellant: Stephen H. Cagle, Jr. State Bar No. 24045596 scagle@csj-law.com Heather Panick State Bar No. 24062935 hpanick@csj-law.com 2302 Fannin, Suite 500 Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 659-7617 Facsimile: (713) 659-7641 -ii- Appellee: Anthony P. Griffin Counsel for Appellee: Ms. Norma Venso State Bar No. 20545250 nvenso@earthlink.net 830 Apollo Houston, Texas 77058 Facsimile: (281) 286-9990 Telephone: (409) 789-8661 Trial Judge: Honorable Barbara E. Roberts PARTIES IN UNDERLYING DIVORCE MATTER Cross Plaintiff/Petitioner: Barbara Regina Schlein Counsel for Plaintiff/Petitioner: Anthony P. Griffin Cross Defendant/Respondent : Robert John Schlein Counsel for Defendant/Respondent: Bill De La Garza Trial Judge: Honorable Barbara E. Roberts -iii-  TABLE OF CONTENTS IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 I. The Trial Court Erred by Permitting Anthony Griffin, Individually, to Enforce This Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 A. Standard for Privity and Capacity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 B. Griffin Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence Establishing Capacity to Enforce the Fee Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 II. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Evidence of Griffin’s Habit, Custom or Routine Practice.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A. Standard for Habit or Routine Evidence; Rule 406. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 B. Griffin Opened the Door to the Grievances by Attempting to Establish that He Always Kept All of His Clients Informed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 C. The Trial Court Erred by its Treatment of the Complaints. . . . . . . . 18 D. Complaints were Admissible as Similar Happenings Evidence. . . . 21 -iv-  1. Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2. Texas Cases Examined. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 E. Exclusion of the Complaints Bolstered Griffin’s Credibility while Damaging Schlein’s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 F. The Complaints are Necessary Evidence for Exemplary Damages. . 25 III. The Trial Court Erred in Permitting Undisclosed Character Witnesses to Testify as Rebuttal Witnesses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A. Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 B. Griffin Cannot Meet the Standard.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 IV. The Trial Court Erred in Charging the Jury on the Breach of Fiduciary Duty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 V. The Jury’s Answers to the Court’s Charge on Fiduciary Duty was Against the Great Weight and Preponderance of the Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 A. Standard of Review.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 B. Fiduciary Duties Owed by Attorneys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 C. The Evidence Admitted Established Breach Conclusively. . . . . . . . 34 VI. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Evidence which Established a Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a Matter of Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 A. Admissibility of Superceded Pleading. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 B. Griffin’s Original Petition Establishes Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a Matter of Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 VII. The Jury’s Refusal to Find Actual Damages Resulting from Griffin’s Unconscionable Conduct was Against the Great Weight and Preponderance -v-  of the Evidence.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 A. The Jury’s Verdict Should be Disregarded Because Some Evidence of Damages was Provided. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 VIII. Griffin’s Expert Witness, Genevieve McGarvey, Should Not Have Been Permitted to Testify. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 A. Procedural Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 B. Trial Court Erred by Ignoring the Rules Governing Experts and its Own Discovery Control Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 IX. McGarvey’s Testimony was Legally Insufficient to Prove that Griffin’s Fees were Reasonable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A. There is no Evidence to Support the Jury’s Finding of Damages in Question No. 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 APPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 -vi-  INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Cases Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bullock, 870 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Alvarado v. Farah Mfg., 830 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43, 44, 45 Anglot-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1965).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997). . . . 46 Brown v. Green, 302 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Cas. Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50 (Tex. 1939).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Castillo v. American Garment Finishers Corp., 965 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Conquest Drilling Fluids v. Tri-Flo Int’l, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2004, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 -vii- Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Tex. Bank & Trust Co. of Dall., 516 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Davis v. Raney Auto Company, 249 S.W.878 accord Kahn v. Imperial Airport, L.P., 308 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Davis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2005). . . . . . . . . 36 Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp., 871 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1994, writ denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 22, 24 Exxon Corp. v. Perez, 842 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 First Texas Sav. Ass’n of Dallas v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1982, no writ.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Fleming v. Curry, 412 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. filed).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. 2000).. . . . . . . . . . 21 Hoover Slovacek, LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Interstate Northborough P’ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2001).. . . . . . . . . 20 In re Allied Chemical, 227 S.W.3d 652 (Tex. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15 In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15 John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v. SuperMedia, LLC, 408 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. App.– Dallas 2013, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 -viii- Kahn v. Imperial Airport L.P.,308 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2010).. . . . . . 14 Keck, Mahin & Cale v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 20 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Kurtz v. Kurtz, 158 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. App. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Landry’s Seafood House-Addison, Inc. v. Snadon, 233 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2007, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Mediacomp, Inc. v. Capital Cities Communication, 698 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1996). . 12 Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Cabler, 73 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2002, writ denied).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Ortiz v. Glusman, 334 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2011, pet denied) . . . . . 20 Perez v. Kirk Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Sanders v. Total Heat & Air, Inc., 248 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2008, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Serv. Corp. Intern. v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 23 Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Sys., Inc., 847 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Sturges v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., -ix-  39 S.W.3d 608 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 1998) rev’d on other grounds, 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 25, 26 Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608 (Tex. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 2012).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 746 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1998, no writ).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 22 U.S. v. West, 22 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1994).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 34 Woodhaven Partners, Ltd. v. Shamoun & Norman, L.L.P., 422 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. App. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Statutes Tex. Bus. Comm. Code 17.49. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Tex. Gov’t §82.065(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Other Authorities PJC 104.2-3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44, 45 Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.2(f). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 45 Tex. R. Civ. P. 277. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Tex. R. Civ. P. 278. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 -x- Tex. Disc. R. Prof. Cond. 1.04. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Tex. R. Evid. 401.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Tex. R. Evid. 404.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Tex. R. Evid. 406.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 25 Tex. Jur. 3d Evidence 261 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 W. Wendell Hall et al., Hall’s Standards of Review in Texas, 42 St. Mary’s L.J. 3 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 -xi-  STATEMENT OF THE CASE Nature of the case. This is a case involving breach of an attorney fee agreement. Appellant Barbara Regina Schlein (“Schlein”) was persuaded to engage Appellee Anthony Griffin (“Griffin”) in her ongoing divorce case. Parties to the fee agreement were Appellant and “A Griffin Lawyers/Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.” (the “Firm”). After a final decree was entered in the underlying divorce case, Appellant was sued, alleging failure to pay on that case and other cases. [CR 3] The original plaintiff was Griffin, individually. Schlein answered with a general denial, a verified denial challenging Griffin’s capacity to sue, and counterclaimed for breach of contract, legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraud for failure to disclose, defamation, libel, libel per se, and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. [CR 363] Subsequently, in response to Schlein’s traditional motion for partial summary judgment on Griffin’s lack of capacity to maintain suit, Griffin amended his pleadings to identify the plaintiff as “Anthony Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers.” [CR 3; CR 628] Course of proceedings. The parties’ claims were tried to a jury, which found for “Anthony Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers” on its breach of contract claim. The jury assessed $105,750 in actual damages, representing attorney’s fees incurred by Griffin in representing Schlein in her divorce; $22,399.29 in costs related to same; and -1- $62,866 in attorney’s fees for the instant action. The jury also found that Griffin had knowingly engaged in an unconscionable action or course of action; it assessed actual damages in the amount of “0” and $5,000.00 in exemplary damages. [CR-Supp-25-26] Griffin subsequently filed two motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and Schlein filed a motion for new trial, all of which were denied. [CR 1144; CR 1175; CR 1209; CR 1245] The trial court entered judgment on the verdict on June 30, 2014. [CR 1249] This appeal followed. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Appellant raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) The trial court permitted “Anthony Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers” to prosecute this case, although Anthony Griffin was not a party to the subject fee agreement. A Griffin Lawyers is not a registered d/b/a and Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. is a corporation that has not been in good standing since 1998. It further barred evidence that A Griffin Lawyers was a d/b/a, not of Anthony Griffin, but of Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. Did the trial court err? (2) Griffin offered testimony that his habit and routine practice was to keep all of his clients informed about their cases. In rebuttal, Schlein offered 32 grievances and lawsuits filed against Griffin by other clients since January 1, 2009 that raised issues about his fee and complained that he failed to keep clients informed . While Griffin was permitted to call former clients to testify that he kept them informed, the trial court excluded all 32 of these grievances and lawsuits brought against him. Did the trial court err? (3) The trial court permitted Griffin to call undisclosed “rebuttal” witnesses to testify that he always keeps them informed. They also provided favorable character testimony for Griffin. Griffin failed to show good -2-  cause for not disclosing these witnesses before trial. Did the trial court err? (4) The trial court placed the burden on Schlein, rather than Griffin, on the issue of breach of fiduciary duty. Schlein submitted a substantially correct form of the question, which placed the burden on Griffin. Schlein’s question was rejected. Did the trial court err? (5) The jury’s answers to the court’s charge on breach of fiduciary duty were supported by insufficient evidence. (6) Schlein offered Griffin’s original petition to establish that Griffin disclosed privileged communications and that Griffin sued Schlein on a non-existent contingency fee contact. The trial court excluded the original petition. Did the trial court err? (7) The jury’s refusal to find actual damages resulting from Griffin’s unconscionable conduct was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. (8) Griffin failed to timely produce a report or disclose the information relating to his expert witness, Genevieve McGarvey, as required by Rule 194.2(f), Rule 195, and the docket control order issued by the trial court. After pr4eviously ordering that McGarvey was stricken as a result of Griffin’s failure to produce a report and make the requisite disclosures, the trial court changed her mind at trial, and allowed McGarvey to testify. Did the trial court err? (9) The testimony of Griffin’s expert witness, Genevieve McGarvey, was legally insufficient to support a judgment awarding Griffin damages in the form of reasonable attorney’s fees. STATEMENT OF FACTS Schlein’s divorce action had been ongoing for over thirteen months when she was introduced to Griffin by a volunteer attorney in a women’s shelter. [RR 6, 42:6- -3- 23] Griffin urged her to hire his firm to finish her difficult divorce action. Citing his firm’s reputation as “the best,” he told her that he could effectively counter the tactics of her husband’s lawyer. [RR 6, 45:7-18; RR 6, 51:11-21] According to Schlein, Griffin also promised to finish her divorce case for a flat fee. [RR 6, 43:19-25] After two meetings, Schlein agreed to hire A Griffin Lawyers/Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. (the “Firm”). Schlein testified that the promised fee structure, and Griffin’s statements about the reputation of the Firm, were key to her decision to accept the offer. [RR 6, 45:14-18] On November 3, 2009, Schlein and Griffin executed the five-page fee agreement at issue in this case (the “Fee Agreement”). [RR 6, 49:12-50:9; PX-1 (Tab 3)] Also on November 3, Griffin tendered a “Letter of Explanation and Letter Agreement” (“Letter Agreement”). The Letter Agreement was signed by Griffin, referenced the Fee Agreement, and explained its terms and scope. [PX-2 (Tab 4)] Appellant testified that Griffin used the Letter Agreement to explain the Fee Agreement before she signed. [RR 6, 47:1-3] [PX-2] Read together, these two documents outlined the scope of the relationship as follows: (a) Schlein was hiring “A Griffin Lawyers/Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.” to represent her in her divorce and certain listed claims involved in division of property. [PX-1, p. 1] -4-  (b) As consideration, Schlein agreed to pay a $35,000 nonrefundable retainer at a future date. [PX-1, p. 2-3] This retainer was set significantly higher than the firm’s normal retainer for similar work. [PX-1, p. 2] “The retainer is set at an amount that is anticipated that no additional fees will be charged.” [PX-2, p.1] Although Schlein was only required to pay a $35,000 retainer, the Fee Agreement entitled the Firm to seek recovery of its full reasonable fee from Schlein’s ex-husband in the divorce proceeding. [PX-1, p. 3] (c) Two related claims – one involving a suit against a homebuilder (the “Builder Case”) and one involving Schlein’s son – would be handled outside the Fee Agreement. The Explanation Letter stated that for each of these matters “[a] separate contract will be drawn for this purpose; no retainer is contemplated (contingent fee).” [PX-2, p.2] No written fee agreements were drafted or executed in these matters. [RR 6, 48:1-9; RR 6, 48:10-15; RR 6, 48-49: 24-8; RR 7, 17:9-14] (d) The Firm promised to “produce copies of documents as related to this litigation and to keep the client fully informed.” [PX-1, p. 5] The divorce action was tried to a jury verdict in May 2011; a final decree was entered on October 24, 2011. [PX-6] However, the first and only bill by the Firm -5- was created months after trial.1 [RR 4, 113-115; RR 6, 53] This bill was more than triple the $35,000 retainer and purported to include fees for work on matters other than the divorce proceeding, including the Builder Case. [PX-147 (Tab 5)] The Fee Agreement provided that the Firm would “not bill for any additional work unless and until the services rendered exceeded the retainer amount.” [PX-1] Griffin testified that he rendered services in the amount of $35,000 on or about May 17, 2010. [RR 8, 103:2-5] However, Griffin created the only invoice on or about August 5, 2011, over a year later. [RR 8, 103:6-8] Schlein offered to pay Griffin the $35,000 retainer; instead, he terminated the relationship. [RR 4, 102:17-20; RR 4, 111:7-24; RR 4, 112- 115:16-4; RR 4, 133:5] A day later, Griffin sent Schlein an email threatening: (1) to set aside the October 24th judgment by claiming fraud; (2) to retain the valuable tile entrusted to him during the divorce proceeding; (3) assert a lien for his costs and fees in the divorce proceeding; (4) to file a lien based on a contingent fee interest in the Builder Case; and (5) to hold onto Schlein’s client file, comprised of approximately 30 boxes, for up to 30 days. [PX-146 (Tab 6)] Griffin filed suit (in his individual capacity) on March 20, 2013. The Original Petition sought recovery for Griffin’s work on both the divorce case and for a contingent interest in the Builder Case. [CR 3 (Tab 8)] Specifically, Griffin sought “a 1 While the invoice [PX-147] is dated August 5, 2011, Schlein testified she did not see it until October 28. [RR 6 53:14-23] -6- declaratory judgment with respect to the contingent fee contract on the construction litigation that the contract is a valid and enforceable contract and remains in effect.” [CR 3] Subsequently, Griffin amended his pleadings to drop this claim. [CR 296] Schlein challenged Griffin’s capacity, claiming he could not recover against her because he was not a party to the contract and “Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.” was not in good standing. [CR 481] Griffin claimed he was a party because “A Griffin Lawyers” was his assumed name, not the corporation’s. [CR 633; RR 8, 87:10-20] This was contradicted by a bankruptcy petition filed on behalf of the corporation. [CR 522] The trial court refused to consider the bankruptcy petition and did not take judicial notice of same. [RR 10, 7-8:22-20] Schlein’s counterclaim against Griffin was centered on Griffin’s breach of his duty to keep her reasonably informed. [CR 26] Lacking copies of signed letters or relevant emails, Griffin adduced testimony that it was his office’s habit or routine practice to copy clients on all correspondence and pleadings. [RR 6, 165:7-18; RR 6, 125:7-15] In response, Schlein sought to introduce evidence of 32 grievances and lawsuits filed against Griffin by clients whom he represented during the approximate time frame he represented Schlein. Most, if not all of these grievances and lawsuits, were based on Griffin’s fee and his failure to keep his clients informed. [RR 8, 67:3- 14; DX-32-46 and 75-79] Although Schlein was allowed to mention limited portions -7- of three of the grievances, the trial court excluded all of the grievances and lawsuits. [CR 1143; RR 10, 90:18-92:7; RR 10, 172:2-5] The trial court then permitted Griffin to call undisclosed “rebuttal” witnesses to refute these grievances. [RR 10, 168:2-13; RR 10, 170:6-172:22] After nine days of trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Griffin. This appeal followed. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Griffin failed to demonstrate his capacity to enforce the fee agreement at issue. Griffin chose to contract with Schlein through a corporation that has not been in good standing with the Texas Secretary of State since 1998. Such a corporation is barred from using the courts of this state to enforce its obligations. And, as is apparent on the face of the Fee Agreement, A Griffin Lawyers purports to an assumed name of the Firm, not Griffin personally. Because Griffin is not a party to this contract, he cannot enforce it. The trial court erred in excluding the 32 grievances and lawsuits offered to rebut Griffin’s evidence of habit or routine practice. Notwithstanding Griffin’s position taken at trial, the grievances and lawsuits were admissible as habit evidence, as evidence of similar happenings, and in support of Schlein’s claim for exemplary damages. However, once Griffin testified that he always keeps his clients informed -8- of everything going on in their cases, he opened the door to allow Schlein to present this evidence to rebut Griffin’s own habit evidence. The door was opened even further when Griffin was permitted to elicit testimony from his former clients that Griffin kept them informed. The sheer number of grievances and lawsuits filed against Griffin since January 1, 2009, conclusively rebutted any inference of habit or routine practice and destroyed any claim that Griffin kept all his clients informed. Therefore, by excluding this evidence, the trial court permitted Griffin to create a false impression, while depriving Schlein of the opportunity to prosecute her own claims. The trial court compounded its error by permitting Griffin to rebut the mere mention of grievances with a parade of the aforementioned undisclosed “rebuttal” witnesses. These witnesses were permitted to testify as to the good character of Griffin and his habit of keeping them informed. Because these witnesses were undisclosed and because their testimony should have been reasonably anticipated, they should have been excluded. Schlein established that Griffin breached his fiduciary duties as a matter of law. It is undisputed that Griffin took possession of Schlein’s valuable imported Travertine tile during the underlying divorce. When Griffin terminated his relationship with Schlein, he refused to release her tile until his motion to set aside the verdict in the divorce case was heard. Griffin never filed this motion and never returned Schlein’s -9- tile. It is also undisputed that Griffin only sent Schlein one invoice for his services, an invoice that was created months after trial. The chronology of events demonstrate conclusively that Griffin failed to keep Schlein informed, especially with respect to the amount of attorney’s fees he was incurring. Despite this evidence demonstrating Griffin’s breach of fiduciary duty, the trial court rejected Schlein’s jury issue, which placed the burden on Griffin to prove he complied with his fiduciary duty. The trial court further erred by excluding Griffin’s original petition in this action, which asserts an interest in a non-existent contingency fee agreement and discloses a privileged conversation between Schlein and Griffin. Thus, the excluded petition establishes breach of fiduciary duty as a matter law. Finally, Schlein was ambushed at trial not only by undisclosed rebuttal witnesses, but also by a previously stricken expert who was permitted to testify when the issue was raised at trial. Griffin failed to timely designate his expert, Genevieve McGarvey, in accordance with the docket control order, Rule 194.2(f), and Rule 195. Nevertheless, McGarvey was permitted to testify regarding the reasonableness of Griffin’s attorney’s fees in the underlying divorce matter over Schlein’s objection. McGarvey’s conclusory testimony, however, was legally insufficient to support an award of attorney’s fees for Griffin. -10-  ARGUMENT I. The Trial Court Erred by Permitting Anthony Griffin, Individually, to Enforce This Agreement. The Fee Agreement listed "A Griffin Lawyers / Anthony P. Griffin, Inc." as the only party, other than Schlein, to the agreements at issue. [PX-1] When Anthony Griffin brought suit individually to enforce the Fee Agreement, Schlein raised the issue of capacity by verified pleading, and sought summary judgment on the issue. [CR 481] Attached to the Motion were discovery responses and deposition testimony from Griffin, establishing that Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. was not a party to the lawsuit. [CR 504-520] Also included was a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed in 2012 by “Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.,” which claimed “A Griffin Lawyers” as its assumed name. [CR 522 (Tab 7)] In response, Griffin filed an amended petition, which added A Griffin Lawyers to the suit and listed “Anthony Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers” as Plaintiff. [CR 628] Anthony Griffin filed an affidavit asserting that, contrary to prior representations in the bankruptcy court and his deposition, A Griffin Lawyers was not an assumed name of “Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.” but was his own. [CR 640] Schlein objected, asserting that Griffin’s response relied on a conclusory “sham” affidavit and failed to show compliance with the mandatory provisions of Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code 71.051-054, or display an assumed name record which was filed pursuant to that statute. [CR 699] -11-  The trial court denied Schlein’s motion for summary judgment. [CR 751] The trial court also denied Schlein’s effort to raise the issue at trial. [RR 3, 30:8-31:16; RR 3, 33:17-42:17; RR 4, 108:3-20] A. Standard for Privity and Capacity A party must have both standing and capacity to bring a lawsuit. “A plaintiff has standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in the controversy.” Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.1996). A challenge to a party’s privity of contract is a challenge to capacity. See John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v. SuperMedia, LLC, 408 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2013, no pet.); Landry’s Seafood House - Addison, Inc. v. Snadon, 233 S.W.3d 430, 433-34 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2007, pet. denied). Privity between the injured party and the party sought to be held liable is an essential element for recovery in any action based on contract. Sanders v. Total Heat & Air, Inc., 248 S.W.3d 907, 912 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). Privity is established by proving that the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff. Conquest Drilling Fluids v. Tri-Flo Int'l, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 299, 308 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.). Once the issue of capacity is properly raised by a verified pleading, a plaintiff -12- bears the burden of bringing forward evidence showing capacity to act. Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. 2001). Failure to do so can result in waiver of a right to recovery. Id. B. Griffin Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence Establishing Capacity to Enforce the Fee Agreement Because his capacity to sue had been challenged in the trial court, Griffin bore the burden of bringing forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate capacity to sue. See Coastal Liquids Transportation L.P. v. Harris County Appraisal District, 46 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2001). However, the only evidence presented by Griffin was his own conclusory affidavit, which contradicted his earlier deposition testimony without explanation. He produced no assumed-name certificate filed with any governmental agency and, in fact, admitted that no assumed-name certificate was ever filed. [RR 3, 38:23-39:1] Because Griffin failed to adduce competent, admissible evidence of his capacity to enforce the Fee Agreement, the trial court should have granted Schlein’s motion for summary judgment. See e.g., Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 20 S.W.3d 692, 699 (Tex. 2000). Instead, the trial court thwarted Schlein’s efforts to raise the issue during trial. The trial court’s actions resulted in the rendition of an improper verdict. It is axiomatic that an assumed or trade name has no separate legal existence and cannot enter into a contract by itself. See, e.g., Davis v. Raney Auto Company, -13- 249 S.W. 878; accord Kahn v. Imperial Airport L.P., 308 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2010). As a matter of law, Griffin’s signature on the Fee Agreement was on behalf of the only party which it could be – Anthony P. Griffin, Inc., which is also owned by Griffin. [RR 8 87:21-24] Because it was the corporation which Griffin bound by his signature; only the corporation could bring suit. See Anglot-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445, 450-51 (Tex. 2011). Griffin’s own sister, who works for the Firm, testified at trial that the legal name for A Griffin Lawyers is Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. [RR 6, 130:22-25] Yet the corporation has never been a party to this suit. The trial court’s pretrial decision to permit the suit to go forward is a clear abuse of discretion. Further, no deemed finding can supply Griffin with the capacity to bring and maintain suit, because no evidence supports the finding. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex.2002). When challenged pretrial, Griffin failed to produce evidence of compliance with mandatory filing requirements for assumed names. Tex. Bus. Comm. Code 71.051. See [CR 699] At trial, Griffin offered the bare conclusion that A Griffin Lawyers is the assumed name for him, individually. [RR 8, 87:7-20] These conclusions, which are contradicted by overwhelming evidence, are no evidence at all. At trial, the trial court intervened to keep Plaintiff’s capacity arguments away from the jury. [RR 3, 30:8-31:16; RR 3, 33:17-42:17; RR 4, 108:3-20; DX-4; DX-26]. Cross- examination of Griffin was limited to Anthony P. Griffin, Inc., the other “party” to the -14- Fee Agreement. [RR 8, 87:1-88:11] Schlein’s attorney was reduced to a running objection to any reference to Griffin as a party to the contract. [RR 4, 108:3-19] Ultimately, it was Griffin’s burden to secure a finding on capacity, and absent legally sufficient evidence, no finding can be deemed in his favor. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 263. Because no legally sufficient evidence was introduced, the error caused the entry of an improper judgment. II. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Evidence of Griffin’s Habit, Custom or Routine Practice A significant portion of this trial boiled down to whether Griffin kept his client informed. This issue was relevant to whether Griffin complied with the Fee Agreement; it was also central to Schlein’s claims that Griffin misrepresented the nature of their fee agreement and breached his fiduciary duty during and after he represented Schlein. Both Griffin and Schlein offered evidence of habit or routine practice pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 406. While Griffin’s offer was permitted, Schlein’s was largely rejected. The trial court’s rulings on this issue fostered a mistaken impression which led to the rendition of an improper verdict. A. Standard for Habit or Routine Evidence; Rule 406 Texas Rule of Evidence 406 authorizes evidence of an entity’s routine practice “to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity” with that practice. See, e.g., Mediacomp, Inc. v. Capital Cities -15- Communication, 698 S.W.2d 207, 212 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). For testimony of the routine practice of an organization to be admissible, it must show a regular response to a repeated specific situation. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Cabler, 73 S.W.3d 363, 375 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2002, writ denied). Under the nearly identical Federal rule, courts require a showing that the cited conduct is “more than a mere ‘tendency’ to act in a given manner;” the conduct must be “semi- automatic” in nature. Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Sys., Inc., 847 F.2d 1290, 1293 (7th Cir. 1988). Such a showing necessarily requires comparing the number of transactions where the conduct occurred against the total number of transactions. U.S. v. West, 22 F.3d 586, 591-592 (5th Cir. 1994). B. Griffin Opened the Door to the Grievances by Attempting to Establish that He Always Kept His Clients Informed On the crucial issue of whether Griffin kept Schlein informed, Griffin was forced to admit that he had no proof that the vast majority of electronic transmittal letters were actually sent to Schlein; that his firm did not bill copies to individual files; that he did not bill postage to individual files; and that he did not have any of the either. [RR 10, 9:1-19; RR 7, 21:12-14; RR 8, 63:5-10] Faced with this lack of direct evidence, Griffin turned to evidence of routine practice under Rule 406. He offered the testimony of himself and his sister/legal assistant, Linda Griffin, that it was the customary practice of his office to keep clients informed. [RR 6, 126:20-24; RR 6, -16- 165:7-18] In his enthusiasm to create this hypothetical paper trail, Griffin opened the door to the grievances and lawsuits at issue. On direct examination, Griffin testified: Q. Did you keep Barbara Schlein informed of what you were doing on her behalf. A. Absolutely. We have an office manual and we’ve always had this practice: If I write a letter and I send that letter to another lawyer, I copy the client on the letter and client gets a copy of everything. If somebody sends me something that relates to that client, I will then generate a letter to that client and sent it out to that client. There is – with the – if there’s a fax send out, the client gets a copy. If the client doesn’t have a fax, I’d mail it to them. [RR 6, 165:7-18] Linda Griffin’s testimony was in total agreement with her brother’s: Q. Do you know if Barbara Schlein was mailed copies of any parts of her file as the file progressed? A. The practice of the office is all clients receive every piece of paper that goes out from the beginning to the end of the case. Q. So did Mr. Griffin give her copies of what the other side filed, as well? A. Yes. [RR 6, 125:7-15] On the strength of this testimony, Griffin was able to leverage the admission of literally dozens of unsigned electronic letters, which were not even on the Firm’s letterhead, from his computer network as evidence of his communications with -17- Schlein. [RR 10, 10:17-19; PX-85-94; PX-96-117; PX-118-134; PX-136; PX-138- 139; PX-142] Schlein’s objection that these constituted no evidence of sending anything to Schlein was overruled. [RR 8, 14:10-16:6] When Griffin raised the issue of his office’s routine practice with respect to all his clients, he “opened the door.” Put another way, he raised the issue first, inviting a response. Schlein was then entitled to offer evidence rebutting that issue. Serv. Corp. Int'l v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 234-35 (Tex. 2011). Griffin represented to the jury that every client got every piece of paper that was sent out or received in every case. [RR 6, 165:7-18] By doing so, he secured admission of 48 word documents as evidence that he kept Barbara Schlein informed. In doing so, he placed his regular practice with respect to all his clients at issue. C. The Trial Court Erred by its Treatment of the Complaints Schlein responded to Griffin’s evidence by offering the 32 grievances and lawsuits filed against Griffin between January 1, 2009 and the close of discovery (the “Complaints”). Each related to disputes regarding his “non-refundable retainer” and alleged that Griffin failed to keep his clients informed. See Tabs 9, 10 and 11 for samples of such grievances. The trial court limited Schlein’s original discovery request to those which asserted malpractice, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty or fraud. [RR 2, 25:20-24; RR 2, 29:23-30:6; RR 2, 31:19-24; DX-32-48; DX-75- 79; see also CR 1015, p.2] Of the grievances offered, five were final; ten were -18- pending; the rest were dismissed by the disciplinary committee for various reasons. [DX-32-48; DX-75-79] The trial court refused to admit the Complaints. [RR 10, 56-59; RR 10, 67:10- 20; RR 11, 163-166] Schlein was restricted to questioning about only three of the Complaints, which involved agreed judgments or public reprimands. [RR 10, 56:14- 57:9-64:22] Schlein was not allowed to discuss the findings in these cases, only their ultimate outcome. [RR 10, 62:21-22] The trial court excluded one Complaint because Griffin represented it was being appealed, though he never provided any documentation supporting the same. [RR 8, 70:22-72:9; RR 10, 6:19-7:9] This Complaint involved suspension of Griffin’s license. [RR 8 70:20-22] When the trial court refused to otherwise admit the Complaints, the trial court erred. The documents themselves were more reliable than the unsigned client letters previously admitted. The Complaints were offered not only to rebut Griffin’s Rule 406 evidence, but to establish the opposite. The sheer number of grievances and lawsuits speak directly to the way Griffin runs his law practice and the habits and routines that he uses in billing and communicating with his clients. Thus, under rule 406, the Complaints are evidence that “the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.” Tex. R. Evid. 406. -19-  Whether to admit or exclude evidence is a matter committed to the trial court's sound discretion. See City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex.1995). A complaint about exclusion of evidence requires a showing that the error probably resulted in an improper judgment. McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex.1992). This requires the reviewing court to review the entire record. McCraw, 828 S.W.2d at 756; Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co, 765 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. 1989). A successful challenge usually requires the complaining party to demonstrate that the judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded or admitted. Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex.2000); Interstate Northborough P'ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001). The 32 excluded grievances and lawsuits were relevant to rebut Griffin’s testimony about the “habit or routine practice” of his office. Griffin relied on Rule 406 to establish a presumption that he acted in accordance with his habit or routine of keeping his clients informed. The law affords a presumption based on Rule 406 only when a response is Pavlovian; that is, “the same one directed at the same specific stimulus.” Ortiz v Glusman, 334 S.W.3d 812 (Tex.App–El Paso 2011, pet. denied). In the face of the sheer number of these Complaints, Griffin’s right to this presumption is destroyed and admission of the 48 unsigned letters becomes a gross abuse of discretion. The trial court’s error left an erroneous impression in the jurors’ minds and likely led to the rendition of an improper verdict. -20-  D. Complaints Were Admissible as Similar Happenings Evidence 1. Standard The Complaints were also admissible for another reason: to show a common scheme or plan. While evidence of other wrongs or acts is generally not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence is relevant and admissible for this purpose where the offering party can demonstrate sufficient similarity of subject matter and parties. U-Haul Int’l Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 2012). They are especially relevant if the acts involve the same personnel. See Durbin v. Dal–Briar Corp., 871 S.W.2d 263, 268–69 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied), overruled, in part, on other grounds by Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362 (Tex.2000); Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 746 S.W.2d 810, 815 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ). 2. Texas Cases Examined In Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp., the plaintiff alleged the Defendant wrongfully terminated him after he sustained an on-the-job injury. Durbin, 871 S.W.2d at 268-69. The trial court excluded testimony and other evidence that referenced other lawsuits brought against the employer for illegal terminations after a workers compensation claim was filed and instances of other employees who had been similarly wrongfully terminated. Id. The appellate court held that evidence showing that prior employees -21- were terminated illegally was relevant and admissible. Id. The appellate court remanded the case for a new trial holding that “the trial court's exclusion of evidence prevented [the plaintiff] from receiving a fair trial.” Id. at 273. In Cobb, the plaintiff was permitted to offer evidence of the defendant underwriter's previous denials of claims. The court held they were admissible because they were denied around the same time as the plaintiff's claim was denied, they were denied on the same basis, and were admissible to show that the defendant's refusal to pay the plaintiff's claim was “committed or performed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” Id., Cobb, 746 S.W.2d at 815. The court held that the evidence was necessary to establish the plaintiff’s causes of action, especially the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. Here, the grievances involve the “same . . . personnel,” the same law practice, and “the same pattern of conduct.” Id. They all occurred in the same time period of Schlein’s representation and establish an essential element of Schlein’s claims, that Griffin breached the fiduciary duty of care owed to Schlein, that he made misrepresentations regarding the fee agreement, and that Griffin intended to defraud Schlein through a bait-and-switch scheme. The evidence the court ordered admitted in Durbin was for pending lawsuits and unresolved allegations. Here, Schlein has not only pending and dismissed grievances and lawsuits, but grievances that resulted in -22- public reprimands as well. Schlein also has substantially more instances than existed in Durbin which firmly establish the way Griffin ran his practice and communicated with his clients. Both issues are crucial to Schlein establishing her case and substantially more relevant than prejudicial under the Durbin court’s analysis. Such evidence is uniformly held admissible if it shows a party’s material intent because the prior acts were “so connected with the transaction at issue that they may all be parts of a system, scheme or plan.” Sturges v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 608, 613 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998) rev'd on other grounds, 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001). This is “shown through evidence of similar acts temporally relevant and of the same substantive basis.” Serv. Corp. Intern. v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 235 (Tex. 2011). Here, like in Cobb, the grievances occurred around the same time, were made on the same basis as Schlein’s claims, and are admissible to show Griffin’s business practices. The grievances are essential to establish Schlein’s claims that Griffin breached his fiduciary duties owed to her. Additionally, Griffin’s failure to disclose his grievances and disputes with clients was a material omission made the basis of Schlein’s fraud in the inducement and fraud by nondisclosure claim. Therefore, the grievances are also necessary for Schlein to establish her fraud claim against Griffin. -23-  E. Exclusion of the Complaints Bolstered Griffin’s Credibility While Damaging Schlein’s In Durbin, the Court held that the trial court’s exclusion of examples of other workers being fired after making compensation claims left a false impression with the jury that plaintiff was unable to rebut. The Court also considered the effect the excluded evidence likely would have had on the credibility of key witnesses: Minyard was himself terminated, and without specific examples of how the company policy was implemented, the jury may well have concluded he was simply a disgruntled ex-employee seeking revenge. Allowing testimony from other witnesses corroborating Minyard would have added to his credibility, but that was not an option for plaintiff, either. Precluding Minyard from discussing specific instances of termination following on-the-job injuries harmed plaintiff's case by seriously undermining the credibility of his star witness. Second, the trial court's ruling made it impossible for plaintiff to refute Dal–Briar's claim that “no one was ever fired as a result of a worker's comp claim.” As plaintiff was prohibited from introducing examples of workers fired after making compensation claims, the jury was entirely justified in believing Dal–Briar's claim was correct. Had Durbin been allowed to introduce the excluded evidence, Dal–Briar's claim would have been far less plausible. We therefore conclude the exclusion of this evidence was reasonably calculated to lead to, and probably resulted in, an improper verdict. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1). Durbin, 871 S.W.2d at 271 (emphasis added). In much the same way, if the jury had known that on 32 other occasions since January 1, 2009, clients have complained about Griffin’s conduct, including his failure to keep them informed. Schlein certainly would have benefitted greatly by having her -24- story corroborated by other witnesses. Likewise, Griffin’s contention that he always keeps every client informed, would appear much less plausible. F. The Complaints are Necessary Evidence for Exemplary Damages Schlein must be able to put on evidence of Griffin's intent to establish her exemplary damages. Griffin's intent is shown through the numerous grievances filed against him on the same basis on which Schlein brings her claims. Excluding the grievances impermissibly limits Schlein's ability to establish her damages and is therefore reversible error. In Sturges v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the appellate court held that exclusion of prior lawsuits as evidence resulted in the improper rendition of judgment and sent the case back to the trial court for a new trial on damages. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 39 S.W.3d at 613. The trial court excluded evidence of five prior lawsuits and their judgments that were brought on the same cause of action as the plaintiffs. Id. The court stated that while prior bad acts may be prejudicial, and exception lies where “they are so connected with the transaction under consideration in point of time that they may all be regarded as parts of a system, scheme or plan.” Id. The Court held that Wal-Mart's intent was required to establish exemplary damages and the prior lawsuits resulting in judgment against Wal-Mart served to establish Wal-Mart's intent. Because the trial court excluded the evidence, the appellate court remanded the case for retrial on the issue of exemplarily damages. -25- Because the evidence admitted made it appear that Wal-Mart's actions had been an isolated incident, the court held that the prior judgments were necessary for the jury to properly award damages. Id. at 614. The Court further stated: The excluded prior lawsuit documents evidenced the frequency of similar wrongs Wal-Mart committed; the character of the conduct involved; the degree of Wal-Mart's culpability; the extent to which Wal-Mart's conduct offends a sense of public justice and propriety, and the amount needed to deter similar acts in the future. In addition, the prior lawsuits appellants sought to introduce were evidence of a course of conduct showing Wal-Mart's intent to interfere with prospective business relations. Id. Here, Schlein has requested exemplarily damages. Because the prior and current grievances and lawsuits filed by Griffin's clients are evidence of his intent, the grievances are relevant, admissible evidence that Schlein must be allowed to present to the jury. III. The Trial Court Erred in Permitting Undisclosed Character Witnesses to Testify as Rebuttal Witnesses. Having excluded all 32 grievances and lawsuits, the trial court compounded its error by permitting Griffin to call undisclosed rebuttal character witnesses in response. Griffin claimed that the rebuttal witnesses were necessary to refute Schlein’s accusation that he failed to keep her reasonably informed while representing her. [RR 9, 56:19-59:3] Thus, these surprise rebuttal witnesses were called for the purpose of establishing that Griffin kept them informed when he represented them and that they were satisfied with the services he provided. [RR 10, 168-173] Griffin’s former -26- clients also provided character testimony that cast Griffin in a favorable light. [RR 11, 14-15:14-7; RR 11, 18:10-18; RR 11, 30:11-31:4] None of Griffin’s rebuttal witnesses were disclosed in response to Schlein’s Request for Disclosure or identified on Griffin’s Witness List. [CR 63; CR 573] A. Standard A party may introduce previously undisclosed rebuttal or impeachment evidence if (1) the evidence is solely for impeachment or rebuttal, (2) its use could not have been anticipated, and (3) the evidence is not responsive to a direct discovery request. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bullock, 870 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex. 1994) (emphasis added). B. Griffin Cannot Meet the Standard Griffin cannot satisfy the above standard for several reasons. First, Schlein’s Original Amended Answer and Counterclaim filed on June 18, 2013, specifically alleges that Griffin breached his fiduciary duty owed to Schlein by failing to “inform client of matters material to the representation.” [CR 29] Griffin knew for close to a year before trial that his office’s practices with respect to keeping clients informed would be at issue. Therefore, the need for such witnesses was forseeable for at least that long. Second, it is disingenuous for Griffin to contend they did not anticipate Schlein’s attempt to introduce the grievances and lawsuits at trial, when Schlein fought so hard to obtain them. Schlein’s interrogatories required Griffin to “[i]dentify -27- and describe the nature, source, substance, and disposition or resolution of every claim or complaint that has been made at or against you, including, but not limited to, claims or complaints related to malpractice, misrepresentations, fraud, mishandling of funds or any violation of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct.” [CR 152] As a result of Griffin’s objection to this interrogatory, a hearing on Schlein’s motion to compel was heard on October 31, 2013. [CR 196] The trial court narrowed the scope of Interrogatory No. 3 and ordered to Griffin to “[i]dentify and describe the nature, scope, substance, and disposition or resolution of every claim or complaint filed with the State Bar or in which a lawsuit was filed that has been made at or against Griffin, limited to claim or complaints relating to malpractice, misrepresentation, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. [CR 308] On February 14, 2014, Griffin supplemented his answer to Interrogatory No. 3 and the corresponding request for production and identified 32 separate lawsuits and grievances filed against him since January 1, 2009. [CR 624] Most, if not all of the Complaints arose from issues regarding Griffin’s fee, usually his retainer, and his failure to keep the client informed as required by Disciplinary Rule 1.03. [DX-32-48; DX-75-79] Griffin was deposed regarding these lawsuits and grievances on February 28, 2014. [CR 624; RR 2, 32:22-34:12] The Complaints brought by Griffin’s former clients relating to Griffin’s failure to keep clients informed, among other things, were squarely at issue throughout the -28- entire case. Consequently, Griffin was required to disclose the identity of these character witnesses prior to trial and the trial court erred in permitting the testimony. At trial, Schlein objected to these witnesses on the grounds that they were not identified in Griffin’s Responses to Request for Disclosure and were not listed on Griffin’s witness list. [RR 9, 58:17-24; RR 10, 161:16-21] Thus, it was Schlein who was surprised by and unprepared for Griffin’s undisclosed rebuttal witnesses. The trial court’s decision regarding Griffin’s rebuttal witnesses led to the rendition of an improper verdict because the issue of whether Griffin keeps his clients informed was key to nearly all of Schlein’s causes of action against Griffin. Because the undisclosed character witnesses were permitted to testify, the jury was left with an inaccurate impression regarding how Griffin treats his clients. Specifically, the jury was left with the impression that Griffin always kept his clients informed, provided periodic billings, and returned unearned fees. IV. The Trial Court Erred in Charging the Jury on Breach of Fiduciary Duty Schlein’s pleading raised the issue of breach of fiduciary duty. [CR 2, 764] The Court’s original charge placed the burden on Griffin to prove he complied with his fiduciary duty. [RR 12 26:22-28:15; see State Bar of Texas, Texas Pattern Jury Charges Business-Consumer-Insurance-Employment 104.2] At the charge conference, Griffin persuaded the Court to instead submit a question placing the burden on Schlein. [RR 12 26:22-28:15; see PJC 104.3] Schlein tendered a substantially correct -29- question based on PJC 104.2 which was marked “Refused” by the trial court. [CR- Supp-31] Because the trial court erred in placing the burden of proof, reversible error is shown. Schlein’s breach of fiduciary duty allegations against Griffin center on actions after the attorney-client relationship arose. These claims include his failure to keep her informed of facts material to her case, his failure to safeguard property entrusted to his care, and failure to keep her apprised of the status of the amount of attorneys’ fees incurred. As such, Schlein requested a jury question which placed the burden on Griffin to show that his actions were fair. See PJC 104.2-3. The trial court is required to submit to the jury such questions and instructions as are raised by the pleadings and supported by the evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 278. Charge error is preserved by the proponent of a question or instruction by timely requesting an issue, and, where refused, submits a question or instruction in substantially correct form. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277. “[A] judgment cannot be permitted to stand when a party is denied proper submission of a valid theory of recovery or a vital defensive issue raised by the pleadings and evidence.” Exxon Corp. v. Perez, 842 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1992). Because the acts complained of by Schlein were committed during the relationship, the burden should have been placed on Griffin to show the fairness and reasonableness of his actions. Griffin benefitted because he secured a claim for over -30- $100,000 in attorney’s fees. The trial court’s misplacing of the burden of proof probably led to the rendition of an improper verdict. V. The Jury’s Answers to the Court’s Charge on Fiduciary Duty was Against the Great Weight and Preponderance of the Evidence. Schlein presented substantial evidence to the jury of Griffin’s breaches of his duties during and after his representation. The jury’s failure to find that Griffin breached his fiduciary duty was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Alternatively, this failure to find breach of fiduciary duty was supported by factually insufficient evidence. A. Standard of Review To prevail on her legal sufficiency challenge, Schlein must demonstrate that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241-42 (Tex. 2001); Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989). In reviewing a “matter of law” challenge, this Court must first examine the record for evidence that supports the finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 241; Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690. If there is no evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court will then examine the entire record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law. Id. The point of error should be sustained only if the contrary proposition is conclusively established. Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 -31- (Tex.1983). The jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, and the fact-finder may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex.2005). The Court should presume the fact-finder resolved all evidentiary conflicts in accordance with its decision, but only if a reasonable juror could have done so. See Id. In this review, certain evidence contrary to the verdict cannot be disregarded by the reviewing court, even if it leads to a reversal of the verdict. Favorable evidence must always be placed in its proper context, even if that contextual evidence is not favorable to the verdict. Similarly, the reviewing court must consider evidence contrary to the verdict if it shows that favorable evidence is incompetent; this includes unqualified experts. Finally, undisputed or otherwise conclusive evidence may not be disregarded. Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 811-817; see also W. Wendell Hall et al., Hall’s Standards of Review in Texas, 42 St. Mary’s L.J. 3, 33-37 (2010). When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which she has the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 242; Croucher, 660 S.W.2d at 58. The court of appeals must consider and weigh all of the evidence, and can set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. See Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 -32- (Tex.1986). In doing so, the court of appeals must “detail the evidence relevant to the issue” and “state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence in support of the verdict.” Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635. B. Fiduciary Duties Owed by Attorneys In Texas, attorneys are held to the highest standards of ethical conduct in dealing with their clients. Hoover Slovacek, 206 S.W. 3d 557, 560 (Tex. 2006); Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1965). Attorneys owe their clients “absolute perfect candor, openness and honesty, and the absence of any concealment or deception.” Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). The duties owed by an attorney to his client include duties of loyalty; duties of confidentiality; and duties of candor. The attorney’s duty of candor includes a duty of “full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client’s representation.” Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988). “A fact is material if it would likely affect the conduct of a reasonable person concerning the transaction in question.” Fleming v. Curry, 412 S.W.3d 723, 736 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. filed) (applying definition to alleged breach of fiduciary duty by attorney); see also Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Tex. Bank & Trust Co. of Dall., 516 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tex.1974) (outlining same definition of “material” in context of fraud). Because the client must trust his attorney’s advice, an attorney’s -33- failure to disclose material facts is tantamount to concealment. Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 645. The duty of loyalty includes a duty to safeguard client confidences and not make hostile use of those confidences. Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied); Brown v. Green, 302 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). C. The Admitted Evidence Conclusively Established Breach Here, the jury’s verdict is contrary to the evidence, thus it cannot stand. Both Griffin and Schlein testified that she entrusted certain valuable tile from an unfinished house to Griffin’s care, and Griffin stored this tile in his warehouse. [RR CR765; RR 8 6:14-21; RR 8 7:] Griffin then threatened to keep the tile until the trial court heard his motion to intervene and undo the verdict in Griffin’s underlying divorce case. [PX- 146 (Tab 6)] Griffin still had the tile on the date of trial, years later. [RR 6 91:20-22] Lillian Hardwick, Schlein’s expert on duties owed by lawyers, testified this action constituted a breach of the duty of safekeeping of the client’s property. [RR 10 137:25-138:8] This undisputed evidence conclusively establishes Griffin’s breach with respect to safekeeping of his client’s property. This evidence established a breach of fiduciary duty as a matter of law; alternatively, the jury’s verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. -34-  Similarly, Griffin’s own testimony established that he failed to keep Schlein informed with respect to his billing. The Fee Agreement and Letter Agreement were dated November 3, 2009. [PX-1 (Tab 3); PX-2 (Tab 4)] His first bill was dated August 5, 2011; three months after trial and more than 21 months after engagement. [PX-147 (Tab 5)] Griffin testified that he did not send Schlein a bill during that time. [RR 8 72:20-73:18] The uncontroverted testimony of Schlein’s expert, Lillian Hardwick, established that this alone was a breach of Griffin’s duty to keep his client informed. [RR 10 132:5-25] These uncontroverted or undisputed pieces of evidence establish a breach of fiduciary duty as a matter of law; alternatively, the jury’s failure to find this fact is a finding against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. VI. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Evidence Which Established a Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a Matter of Law. Schlein offered Griffin’s Original Petition as evidence of two further breaches of fiduciary duty. The trial court excluded Griffin’s Original Petition because it was superceded by Griffin’s amended petitions. [RR 10 44:2-12] By excluding Griffin’s Original Petition, the trial court excluded evidence which presented a prima facie case of breach of the duties of confidentiality and loyalty and prejudiced Schlein’s ability to establish her breach of fiduciary duty case. In doing so, the trial court erred. -35-  A. Admissibility of Superceded Pleadings Superseded pleadings in a civil action are admissible, although not as judicial admissions. See generally 35 Tex.Jur.3d Evidence 261 (2015). Pleadings in a civil action that are inconsistent with the pleading party's position in another civil action are admissible as admissions of a party opponent. Davis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2005, no pet.). B. Griffin’s Original Petition Establishes Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a Matter of Law The Original Petition sought recovery for a contract which never existed – a contingent-fee agreement in the Builder Case. See Tab 8. As a matter of law, contingent-fee agreements must be reduced to writing in order to be enforceable. See Tex. Gov’t §82.065(a). Griffin is charged with knowing this because the Fee Agreement called for a separate, written agreement for any suit against Centre Builders, and Griffin knew he didn’t have one. [RR 7 17:12-14] Second, the trial court’s refusal to admit the Original Petition filed in this case – a petition not superseded until just before trial – was a clear abuse of discretion. [RR 10, 44: 2-12] This Petition contained within its four corners two breaches of fiduciary duty with respect to Schlein. First, the Original Petition allegedly disclosed confidences revealed by Schlein within the context of the representation in the underlying divorce case. The Petition quoted a conversation with Schlein to establish -36- that she hid assets in the underlying divorce case. [CR-17] This disclosure, in a publicly filed document, constituted a breach of loyalty and confidentiality. The trial court’s action in excluding this previously-filed petition damaged both Schlein’s breach of fiduciary duty claim and her claim for exemplary damages. These pleadings were admissible as statements against interest and admissions of a party opponent. No rule of evidence prevented their inclusion. The trial court’s failure to admit these key pieces of evidence resulted in harmful error, which caused rendition of an improper verdict. VII. The Jury’s Refusal to Find Actual Damages Resulting from Griffin’s Unconscionable Conduct was Against the Great Weight and Preponderance of the Evidence. The jury found that Griffin had engaged in an unconscionable course of conduct, and that he had engaged in that conduct knowingly and intentionally. [CR Supp 23-24; PJC 102.7; Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code 17.49] However, the jury answered the damages question as follows: QUESTION NO. 20 What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Barbara Schlein for her damages, if any, that resulted from such conduct? a. The amount, if any, that Barbara Schlein paid in excess to Anthony Griffin for legal services promised by Anthony Griffin. Answer: [0] -37-  b. the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney's fees incurred as a result of Barbara Schlein having to hire new attorneys to complete the divorce matter. Answer: [0] c. the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney's fee incurred as a result of Barbara Schlein having to hire new attorneys to complete the other matters started by Anthony Griffin. Answer: [0] QUESTION NO. 21 What sum of money, if any, in addition to actual damages, should be awarded to Barbara Schlein against Anthony Griffin because Anthony Griffin's conduct was committed knowingly or intentionally? … Answer: [$5,000.00] A. The Jury’s Verdict Should Be Disregarded Because Some Evidence Was Provided of Damages. Schlein’s expert, Gary Jewell, testified as to his firm’s work directed at completing the following matters: offered the following testimony as to the reasonable and necessary fees accrued by Schlein and caused by Griffin’s unconscionable conduct: • Matters related to the underlying divorce action: $ 27,962.50 [RR 11 79:14- 23] • Matters related to the case against homebuilders: $ 9,896.25 [RR 11 81:11- 24] -38-  • Removal of wrongful lien against unfinished home: $ 2,800.00 [RR 11 81:25-82:11] • Expunction of arrest record related to divorce: $ 2,481.25 [RR 11 82:12- 19] • Resolution of tax case related to the house: $7,498.75 [RR 11 82:20-83:3] The trial court errred in entering judgment for no damages when some evidence supported Schlein’s claim for damages. The cause should be remanded for a redetermination of reasonable attorney’s fees. Generally, if evidence of reasonable attorney's fees is offered, a finding that the services of an attorney are without monetary value is factually insufficient. First Texas Sav. Ass'n of Dallas v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179, 188 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1982, no writ). VIII. Griffin’s Expert Witness, Genevieve McGarvey, Should Not Have Been Permitted to Testify The trial court erred in permitting Genevieve McGarvey (“McGarvey”) to testify regarding whether the fees charged by Griffin in the divorce matter were reasonable and necessary. At trial, the trial court reversed its previous order striking McGarvey’s testimony without any showing of good cause by Griffin, or lack of surprise or prejudice. [RR 3, 12:13-13:6; RR 4, 95:16-20; RR 5, 13:18-19:18 17] The trial court’s ruling violated both the Rules and its own discovery control order and probably resulted in rendition of an improper verdict. -39-  A. Procedural Background On August 16, 2013, the trial court issued a docket control order (the “DCO”) requiring experts for all plaintiffs to be designed by August 30, 2013. [CR 1, 85] Likewise, the DCO set the deadline to designate all other expert witnesses for September 27, 2013. Id. The DCO also stated the following: Any party designating a testifying expert witness is ORDERED to provide no later than the dates set for such designation, the information set forth in Rule 194.2(f) and a written report prepared by the expert setting the substance of the experts’ opinions, unless a deposition is taken of the expert. Any expert not designated prior to the ordered deadlines shall not be permitted to testify absent a showing of good cause. Id. On September 13, 2013, Schlein served her Designation of Expert Witnesses, which disclosed the information called for by Rule 194.2(f). The designation also included a 51 page report from Schlein’s expert, Lillian Hardwick. [CR 1, 312] On September 23, 2013, the trial court entered an amended docket control order (the “Amended DCO”). The Amended DCO set the deadline for all plaintiffs and all other parties for September 30, 2013 and October 30, 2013, respectively. [CR 1, 115]. The Amended DCO contained the same disclosure requirements as the DCO, which are set forth above. On October 3, 2013, a hearing was held on Schlein’s Motion to Compel Discovery and the Court extended Griffin’s deadline to designate his experts and -40- provide the requisite report required by the Amended DCO until October 31, 2013. [CR 1, 117; CR 1, 196; CR 2, 851. This October 31, 2013 deadline was never modified or extended. On October 8, 2013, Griffin identified Genevieve McGarvey as an expert in his First Amended Response to Defendant’s Motion for Disclosures. [CR 1, 573-582] However, Griffin neither disclosed the information required by Rule 194.2(f), nor produced a report. Id. Instead the designation stated: Witness can provide testimony with regards to work performed on behalf of Plaintiff and the issue of reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees in context of the breach of contract and the reasonable and necessary fees in context of the breach of contract and the reasonable and necessary attorneys’ nature of fees for the representation of Defendant. [CR 1, 579] Because Griffin failed to designate McGarvey in compliance with Rule 194.2(f), as well as the Amended DCO, Schlein filed her Motion to Strike Expert Witnesses on January 31, 2014. [CR 2, 568] No response to this motion was filed by Griffin. [RR 4, 95:16-96:22]. On March 14, 2014, the trial court heard and granted Schlein’s Motion to Strike as to experts Greg Enos, Becky Reitz, Marcia Zimmerman, Christopher Beck, Genevieve McGarvey and Norma Venso. [RR 3, 12:20-13:5; RR 4, 95-96; CR 2, 806] On April 2, 2014, Griffin served his Second Amended Response to Defendant’s Motion for Disclosures, which attempted to provide additional disclosures regarding -41- McGarvey’s testimony. [CR 2, 814] However, this Second Amended Response was both late and insufficient. Specifically, McGarvey’s export report attached to the Second Amended Response failed to identify any amount she claimed was a reasonable and necessary fee in the underlying divorce proceeding. [CR 2, 822] On April 7, 2014–155 days after the court ordered deadline, 200 days after Schlein served its expert reports, and 63 days after Schlein moved to strike Griffin’s experts–Griffin filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s order granting Schlein’s Motion to Strike the Expert Designation of McGarvey and Norma Venso. [CR 2, 806; RR 4, 96:21-22] Schlein filed her response on April 10, 2014[CR 2, 833] Griffin’s Motion to Reconsideration was never set for hearing. Nor did Griffin raise the Motion for Reconsideration at the May 2, 2014 pre- trial conference. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 248. [RR 4, 96:21-97:8] Not until the day before trial – May 7, 2014 – did Griffin seek to be heard on his Motion to Reconsider. [RR 3, 82:8-86:18; RR 4, 95:10-100:15; RR 5, 4:5-19:18] Despite Schlein’s objections, he trial court reversed its earlier decision and held that McGarvey was permitted to testify. [RR 5, 4-8; RR 5, 12-13; RR 5, 16-17] -42-  B. Trial Court Erred by Ignoring the Rules Governing Experts and its Own Discovery Control Order The trial court permitted Genevieve McGarvey to testify, despite her untimely designation and lack of an expert report. Griffin made no showing of good cause for her untimely disclosures; further, surprise and prejudice is established on the face of this record. The trial court erred in permitting her to testify. Parties to a lawsuit are under a duty to make a “complete response, based on all information reasonably available to the responding party or its attorney at the time its response is made.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.1. Such responses must be made timely; that is, “within the time provided by court order or these rules.” Id. Failure to comply results in automatic exclusion of the evidence or the witness in question, unless the trial courts finds a) good cause; or b) that the opposing party was not surprised or prejudiced. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6. The burden is on the offering party, and such a finding must be supported by the record. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6(b). The “trial court has no discretion to admit testimony excluded by the rule without a showing of good cause.” Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914; Good v. Smith Cty. Judge Baker, 339 S.W.3d 260, 271 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2011, pet. denied). The burden of establishing good cause is upon the party offering the evidence and good cause must be shown in the record. Castillo v. American Garment Finishers Corp., 965 S.W.2d 646, 652 (Tex. App.–El Paso, 1998, no pet.) (emphasis added). The good -43- cause exception “permits a trial court to excuse a failure to comply with discovery in difficult or impossible circumstances.” Id. (emphasis added). In this case, Griffin failed to produce any evidence to support a finding of good cause, or establishing a lack of surprise or prejudice. Griffin’s Motion for Reconsideration and his argument in the trial court is devoted solely to explaining that, as long as he provided the material at issue within 30 days of the actual trial date, his designations and supplementations were timely. [CR 802; RR 4 95:10-100:8] This has not been the case since the discovery rules were amended in 1999; plaintiffs “can no longer simply choose to delay disclosure until the last minute.” In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 657 (Tex. 2007)(citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.5 and 193.6). Griffin’s later attempt to supplement his expert disclosures on April 2, 2014, also failed to comply with the plain language of Rule 194, which requires disclosure of the “general substance of the expert mental impressions and opinions and brief summary of the basis for them,” as well all documents, tangible things, reports, models, or data compilations that have been provided to, reviewed by, or prepared by or for the expert in anticipation of the expert’s testimony.” [CR 2, 818-823] Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.2(f). Likewise, the report attached to the supplemental disclosures failed to comply with the Amended DCO and Rule 195.5, which requires “factual observations, tests, supporting data, calculations, photographs, or opinions of an expert” to be reduced to tangible form. Schlein’s attorney complained, on the first day -44- of trial, that while an “expert report” containing McGarvey’s opinions was delivered thirty days before trial, the attachments supporting the substance of her testimony were not. [RR 4 99:3-100:8] Schlein relied on the trial court’s order striking McGarvey as a witness and, therefore, suffered surprise and prejudice by the trial court’s change of heart at trial. In Alvarado, the Texas Supreme Court clearly holds that good cause must be demonstrated by the noncomplying party to provide the trial court with the opportunity to exercise discretion as to whether the untimely discovery should be admitted. Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914. Griffin never tried to establish good cause for his failure to timely produce McGarvey’s report. [RR 4, 99-100; RR 5, 5-17] Because a showing of good cause is mandatory, the decision to permit McGarvey to testify was reversible error. The evidence further supports a finding that the inclusion of McGarvey’s testimony caused the rendition of an improper judgment, as McGarvey was the only witness designated to testify regarding the reasonableness of Griffin’s attorneys’ fees in the underlying divorce case. Therefore, the trial court’s decision led to the rendition of an improper verdict because it provided credence to the amounts included on Griffin’s invoice, which were otherwise unsubstantiated. -45- IX. McGarvey’s Testimony Was Legally Insufficient to Prove that Griffin’s Fees Were Reasonable Griffin was required to prove that the attorney’s fees he sought to recover from Schlein were reasonable. Tex. Disc. R. Prof. Cond. 1.04; Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997). In addition to the requirement of Rule 1.04, Texas courts have held that “[w]here parties do not expressly agree as to the amount, the law raises a promise to pay that which is reasonable.” Kurtz v. Kurtz, 158 S.W.3d 12, 18 (Tex. App. 2004)(citing Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Koenigsberg, 65 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1933, no writ). The court in Kurtz agreed that, “as a matter of public policy, reasonableness is an implied term in any contract for attorney’s fees.” Id. The court concluded that their holding was consistent with Disciplinary Rule 104, governing a lawyer’s fee arrangement with his clients. Id. at fn. 6. In Texas, “[t]he issue of reasonableness and necessity of attorney’s fees requires expert testimony.” Woodhaven Partners, Ltd. v. Shamoun & Norman, L.L.P., 422 S.W.3d 821, 830 (Tex. App. 2014). McGarvey was Griffin’s sole witness on the reasonableness of his fees in the underlying divorce case. Over Schlein’s objection, McGarvey was permitted to testify. However, her testimony was legally insufficient to prove that the attorney’s fees charged by Griffin were reasonable, as required by -46- Disciplinary Rule 1.04, which considers the following factors to determine the reasonableness of a fee: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered. Of the 8 above-listed factors, McGarvey offered no evidence of numbers 1, 2, 4, 5 or 8. Moreover, McGarvey’s opinion regarding numbers 3, 6 and 7 was merely conclusory and not evidence of the reasonableness of the entire fee charged by Griffin. For the issues McGarvey did mention, her testimony was the classic ipse dixit of a -47- credentialed witness, with no support or analysis. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex. 1999). Specifically, McGarvey testified that she is familiar with the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees in Galveston County, but offered little more than a bare opinion as to the reasonableness of the $300 hourly rate charged by Griffin to Schlein. [RR 10, 100:11-23 and 101:15-20). At no time did McGarvey testify that a certain amount of attorney’s fees charged by Griffin were reasonable and necessary. [See generally RR 10, 94-110] Instead McGarvey offered irrelevant statements such as, “...[Griffin] spent about 700 days on this file...” (RR 10, 103:15-18). The number of days spent on a file is not evidence of Griffin’s actual time spent working on the case. A. No Evidence to Support Jury’s Finding of Damages in Question No. 5 Lastly, McGarvey’s opinion that the time included on Griffin’s bill “was reasonable and necessary” is conclusory and not competent evidence. Opinion testimony that is conclusory is not relevant evidence because it does not tend to make the existence of a material fact “more probable or less probable.” See Tex. R. Evid. 401. McGarvey provides no analysis or underlying facts supporting how the time spent was reasonable. As such, McGarvey’s testimony is incompetent evidence and cannot support a judgment awarding Griffin damages for attorney’s fees. [See Supp. CR 8] See City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Tex. 2009); See Cas. -48- Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50, 132 S.W.2d 97, 99 (1939); Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex.1997). CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED The trial court erred by allowing Griffin, individually, to prosecute this lawsuit. Griffin’s attempt to cure was ineffective. As such, this court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and render a take nothing judgment based on Griffin’s lack of capacity. The trial court erred by excluding Schlein’s offer of grievances and lawsuits filed against Griffin, which were admissible for purposes of establishing Schlein’s affirmative claims against Griffin. Additionally, Griffin opened the door by presenting evidence that he keep all of his clients informed. Thus, the trial court permitted Griffin to create a false impression regarding his habits in dealing with clients. The trial court’s treatment on this hotly contested issue, probably led to the rendition of an improper verdict. The trial court erred in permitting undisclosed rebuttal witnesses to testify regarding Griffin’s routine practice in keeping clients informed. This testimony, when viewed against the backdrop of the trial court’s previous ruling, probably led to the entry of an improper judgment. -49-  The trial court erred in placing the burden on Schlein with respect to her claim for breach of fiduciary duty. This improper submission probably led to the rendition of an improper verdict. The jury’s failure to find breach of fiduciary duty was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Alternatively, the evidence conclusively established Griffin’s breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court erred by excluding evidence, which conclusively established Griffin’s breach of fiduciary duty. This omission likely led to the rendition of an improper verdict. The jury’s finding of zero actual damages, in light of their findings on liability, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Alternatively, some evidence supported Schlein’s actual damages on this issue. The trial court erred by permitting an expert witness to testify, whose opinions were not timely disclosed and whose exclusion should have been automatic. Even if considered, her testimony was incompetent to support the reasonableness of Griffin’s damages. Her testimony was key, as no other competent evidence supported Griffin’s recovery of actual damages. This Court should reverse and render a take nothing judgment. Appellant Barbara Schlein respectfully requests that this Court reverse the final judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for a new trial, or where -50- appropriate, render judgment in her favor, and for all further relief to which she may be justly entitled. Respectfully submitted, CHRISTIAN , SMITH & JEWELL, LLP By: //s// Stephen H. Cagle, Jr. Stephen H. Cagle, Jr. State Bar No. 24045596 scagle@csj-law.com Heather Panick State Bar No. 24062935 hpanick@csj-law.com 2302 Fannin, Suite 500 Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 659-7617 Facsimile: (713) 659-7641 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT -51-  CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has been forwarded to all counsel of record via the Rules on this the 20th day of May, 2015 Ms. Norma Venso 830 Apollo Houston, Texas 77058 Facsimile: (281) 286-9990 Telephone: (409) 789-8661 By: //s// Stephen H. Cagle, Jr. STEPHEN H. CAGLE, JR. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify that Appellant’s Brief contains less than 15,000 words (counting all parts of the document). Specifically, this brief was prepared using WordPerfect and according to its word-count function, this document contains 13,696 words. Further, the typeface used in this brief is no smaller than 14-point, except for footnotes, which are no smaller than 12-point. By: //s// Stephen H. Cagle, Jr. STEPHEN H. CAGLE, JR. -52-  CAUSE NO. 01-14-00799-cv IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON, TEXAS BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN, Appellant, vs. ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, Appellee. APPELLANT’S APPENDIX LIST OF DOCUMENTS 1. Trial Court’s Judgment dated June 30, 2014, CR 3:1249. . . . . . . . . . Tab 1 2. The jury charge and verdict, RR 13:4-5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 2 3. November 3, 2009 Retention Agreement, P. Ex. 1.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 3 4. November 3, 2009 Letter of Explanation, P. Ex. 2.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 4 5. August 5, 2011 Invoice, P. Ex. 147. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 5 6. October 29, 2011 Email, P. Ex. 146. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 6 -53- 7. Anthony P. Griffin Lawyers, Inc. Bankruptcy Petition.. . . . . . . . . . . Tab 7 8. Anthony P. Griffin Original Petition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 8 9. C. Vereen Grievance File.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 9 10. Guzman Grievance File.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 10 11. Reddin Grievance File. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 11 -54- TAB 1 001249 CAUSE NO. CV-0069481 IN THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW N0.2 GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS FINAL JUDGMENT Plaintiffy s and Defendant Barbara Schlein appeared and alU1ounced swom, it heard evidence and ar.f:,'tltnents of counsel. estions of fact in the case to the jury. In charge of the court and the verdict oftl Griffin Lawyers is entitled to recover from Defenda fees as set forth below. Barbara Schlein, as follows: a) b) The sum of SIXTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUND!f:OUtlX 00/100 DOLLARS ($62,862.00) for reasonable and necj}sa~y ;tto,.; e~ fees. for preparation and trial; tf~-ti.>;"'' ,r, .x_:;:;;.li~ ;;~"·"'~IIY l~l. :::·~K GAl v-;:·.: :· .· ·i-'~.\S Ex. 1 NOTICE OF HEARING PAGE 1 00~49 001250 c) Thesumof~USANDAND00/100DOLLARS($15,000.00)intheevent fa appeal to the Court of Appeals; for reasonable and necessary attorney 1s fees r representation through appeal to the Court of Appeals. The sum of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000.00) in the event of an appeal e Supreme Court of Texas for reasonable and necessary attorney's fees f re esentatlon at the petition for review· stage in the Supreme Court of T nterest on the sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND EIGHTEEN AND :JG'-'·~~'''? ($16,018.66). te est on the total sum awarded at the annual rate of Five Percent g) It is further ORDER from Griffin's unconscionable rt is further ORDERED, ADJUDGE enforcement and collection of this Judgment or th All relief not expressly t;,rranted is denied. This is a final judgment which disposes of all clait s SIGNED this <..30 day of June, 2014. . /· APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY- Defendant ( 1) disagrees with the contt.mJ~J~j~{j~~i«MII:J51'-.., agrees only to the fonn of this judgment, and (3) plans to appeal this d tttnl' Yn ore, Defe11dant expr~ssly reserves all rights to modifY or appeal this proposed ju8~lrte · ·,..g r ···Flrsf NaP 5 Bank v. Fojtik, 775 S.W.2d 632,633 (Tex. 1989) :"'OTICE OF HEARING PAGE2@~50 TAB 2  CAUSE NO. CV~0069481 IN THE COUNTY COURT v. AT LAW N0.2 B GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS COURT'S CHARGE THE JURY: estions about the facts, which you must decide fi·om l. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the e given th it testimony, but in matters of law, you must be additional instructions which L 2. case. 3. Since every answer that is required by state or consider that any required answer · 1 4. You must not decide who you think should win an questions accordingly. Simply answer the qu ti concern yourselves with the effect of your answers. 5. You \Vill not decide the answer to a question by a lot ob~"" any other means of chance. Do not return a quotient ve ~ 'ent v · ict means that the jurors agree to abide by the result to be reache bx din ' ge er each juror's figures and dividing by the number of jurors to an era . Do not do any trading on your answers; that is, one juror should not a cettain question one way if others will agree to answer another q way. Pagel of29  6. Unless otherwise instructed, you may answer a question upon the vote of 5 or o jurors. If you answer more than one question upon the vote of 5 or more jt rs, the same &rroup of at least 5 of you must agree upon the answers to each of those questions. u have taken are for your own personal use. You may take your ii J the jury room and consult them during deliberations, but do not shO\ or · ad your notes to your fellow jurors during your deliberations. Your tes ·e not evidence. Each of you should rely on your independent recollection o 1e evi n e and not be influenced by the fact that another juror has or has not taken tes. duct is subject to review the same as it should be found that you have uct and it may require another trial When words are used in this charge i a sense understood, you are given a proper legal definitio any other meaning. Answer "Yes" or "No" to all questions unless ot erwise ins must be based on a preponderance of the evidence un s.s otherlvise . ·tru find that a preponderance of the evidence supports a "Yes'' a1 . then "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight a evidence introduced before you and admitted in this case. W answer other than "Yes" or "No," your ans,ver must be base evidence unless otherwise instructed. A fact may be established by direct evidence or by circumstm ia fact is established by direct evidence when proved by documentary ev who saw the act done or heard the words spoken. A fact is establish evidence \Vhen it may be fairly and reasonably infened from other facts prove . If you answer questions about damages, answer each question separa ely. Do not increase or reduce the amount in one answer because of the instructions in or your answers to any other questions about damages. Do not speculate about what any party's ultimate recovery Page 2 of29 may or may not be. Any recovery will be detennined by the court when it applies the la\v to - time of judgment. Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any. er ou retire to the jury room you will select your own presiding juror. The first thing esi · gjuror will do is to have this complete charge read aloud and then you will deliberate ur answers to the stions asked. 3. 4. 5. in the space provided; and 6. r~[l n u rc=~ [[") L~~~ LU 01-~- 1 MAY Z3 2014 !!WVIGHT () SUt UV/\N G()UU1Y ClCRK ., By \ Ol'-'lLVt::STON CO., T(£1(/\$ \; • Page 3 of29  QUESTION NO. 1 ar 'ra Schlein fail to comply with the tem1s of the agreement for legal services er 3, 2009, between her and Anthony P. Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers? Page 4 of29  QUESTION NO.2 Griffin fail to comply with the agreement for legal services dated The circumstances to consider in detennining c. d. t the party failing to perform or to offer to perfonn will cure his · o ace unt the circumstances including any reasonable e. Answer "Yes" or6'{Q~ ) ANSWER: ;VC) -'------~ ... Page 5 of29 If you ans\vered "Yes" to both Question 1 and Question 2, then answer the fol!O\ving question. Otherwise, do 1swer the following question. QUESTION NO.3 with the Agreement Hrst? Page 6 of29  If you answered ''Yes" to Question 1, then ans\ver the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the toll :v1 g question. QUESTION NO.4 's failure to comply excused? arhara Schlein is excused if compliance is waived by Anthony it is excused if the following circumstances occurred: 1. a. false representation or concealed h. kno\vledge or infom1ation that d . cover the facts, and p... o c. in would rely on the false et ·n ac '1 or deciding not to act; and ~''"· 2. a. b. of material f~tcts. 1t · Failure to comply \:vith one agreement is agr~ that a new agTeement would take its place. ;<" Failure to comply \Vith a tenn in an agreement is ex~""""-~ term would take its place. ,u> _,.,"""-~ ~----\ Answer "Yes" or(N()_:} ANSWER: _ _c_.JJ_o_._ _ Page 7 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 1, then atlS\ver the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the foll 'I g question for economic damages is subject to federal QUESTION NO. 5 , if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate iffin Lawyers, for his damages, if any, that resulted from such nents of damages, if any, and none other. a ANSWER: b. Page 8 of29 If you ans,:vered "Yes" to Question 2, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not ans,ver the toll vi question QUESTION NO. 6 'ona nd necessary attorney's fees and costs incurred to complete the atter ' m eel but not finished by Anthony Griffin. b. neces · ry attorney's fees and costs incurred to complete the ut n 1ished by Anthony Griffin. ANSWER: Page 9 of29  QUESTION NO. 7 What is a r , sot ' 1e fee for the necessary services of Anthony P. Griffin's attorney in this case, stated i c ol ' s and cents? must be considered in detennining the reasonableness of an • • • • • • ""'...,+-..:'. n results obtained or uncertainty of en ·endered. A. For preparation , and trial. ANSWER: .~, ( J (} 2., lc/I -~-J:).-1 / () , ; B. For an appeal to the Court of Appeals. -+,' ANSWER: +ls~ooo C. For an appeal to the Supreme Comt of Texas J, ANSWER: ~) 251 {)00 Page 10 of29 If you ans\vered "Yes'' to Question 2, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not \Vi g question. QUESTION NO. 8 for each of the following: a. b. c. in the Supreme Court of Texas. d. ANSWER: _--~:.r-2\J_,If--'-'/-'-'\_ _ __ e. For representation through oral ar the Supreme Court ofTexas. )\11 A ANSWER: ---------1------------- Page 11 of29  QUESTION NO. 9 ar , ·a Schlein substantially rely to her detriment on Anthony Griffin's promise, if 1is reliance foreseeable by Anthony Griffin? Page 12 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 9, then answer the following question. Othenvise, do not answer the foil v1 ' question. QUESTION NO. 10 if any, if paid now in cash, \vould fairly and reasonably compensate ages, if any, that resulted from her reliance on Anthony Griffin's Do not a. and cents for damages, if any. b. and costs incuned to complete the ny Griffin. c. ANSWER: ---'-f'-'-,j +'-j }.-'-·,_ _ _ __ Page 13 of29  QUESTION NO. 11 ny Griffin fail to comply with his fiduciary duty to Barbara Schlein? arbara Schlein's attomey, Anthony Grift1n owed Barbara Schlein a fiduciary duty. fiin failed to comply with his fiduciary duty, Barbara Schlein must r 1sactions and actions in question were not fair and equitable to arba1 chlein; or Y use of the conf1dences that c. d. e. important ~ Answer "Yes" or "~"'L~·~ ANswER: tic; Page 14 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 11, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the fo11 ~'1 question. QUESTION NO. 12 if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate ges, if any, that were proximately caused by such conduct? In answering or reduce the amount a. ANSWER: _________i_'!J-_ 1 ;_4------~ b. ANSWER: _ __.:..:../V+/--A-_ _ _ __ c. Page 15 of29 d. the difference between the sales price of Barbara Schlein's house located at 1628 ·nt '·prise Avenue at foreclosure and the value of the house if repairs had been e because of the filing of an insurance claim. " means the emotional pain, torment and suffering bara Schlein. Page 16 of29  QUESTION NO. 13 ny Griffin commit fraud against Barbara Schlein? Fraud occurs when: a party makes a material misrepresentation, and the misrepresentation is made with knowledge of its falsity or made recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion, and\ the misrepresentation is made with the intention that it should be ted onby the other party, and 1e ther party relies on the misn~presentation and thereby suffers g. h. a result of acting without a. b. c. cl. Answer "Yes" or{'No. '• ~'::.~·., ANSWER: /VO Page 17 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question I 3, then answer the follmving question. Otherwise, do not answer the toll vr g question. QUESTION NO. 14 . if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate ges, if any, that resulted ti·om such fi·aud'? n answ .m' uestions about damages, answer each question separately. Do not increase 1c ans\ver because of your answer to any other question about ut what any party's ultimate recovery may or may not be. Any recovery will be le court when it applies the la\v to your answers at the time of judgment. De ot ' d any amo n for interest on damages, if any. a. b. c. the amount of reasonable and n · ess y at Barbara Schlein having to hire new by Anthony Griffin. ' I /,1 ANSWER: /l,; /! / d. mental anguish sustained f}·om November 3, 2009 to "Mental anguish" means the emotional pain, tom1 experienced by Barbara Schlein. ANSWER: ----'-/_'\;+'/_,_~/'-!_____ I Page 18 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 13, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the fall vt g question. QUESTION NO, 15 if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate ges, if any, that were proximately caused by such fraud? ANSWER: ------~~~ Nil\.~.----------- b. ANSWER: N(A c. the amount of reasonable and necessary attorn· Barbara Schlein having to hire new attorneys to co1 by Anthony Griffin. ANSWER: -----'--f\-'+-J/J._A___. I d. mental anguish sustained fi'om November 3, 2009 to date. " ental anguish" means the emotional pain, tonnent and suffering experienced by Barbara Schlein. Page 20 o£29  Answer the following question only if you unanimously ans\:vered "Yes" to Question 11 or Question I 3 1erwise, do not answer the follo-wing question. o a ver "Yes" to any pmi of fhe following question, your answer must be unanimous. ay nswer ''No" to any part of the following question only upon a vote of 5 or more jurors. 0 1er •Jse, you must not a , wer that part of the following question. QUESTION NO. 16 and convincing evidence that the hann to Barbara Schlein resulted con rin ~ing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that b ief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be nt by Anthony Griffin to cause substantial injury or a. b. c. d. e. g. h. Ans\ver "Yes" or "No." Page 21 of29  QUESTION NO. 17 nt ny Grift1n engage in any false, misleading) or deceptive act or practice that ·n relied on to her detriment and that was a producing cause of damages to Barbara b. agreement confers or involves rights that it did not ) c. s rvices with intent not to sell them as advetiised, or d. ,/"""__.-~-~- ,\ .. "'--~ v ' Answer "Yes" or~~'tJc::C?:;:'j ANSWER: No Page 22 of29  QUESTION NO. 18 1y Griffin engage in any unconscionable action or course of action that was a ·e of damages to Barbara Schlein? , use" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringin .. ab t the damages, if any, and without which the ould not have occurred. There may be more than one OWIOH·r D !lULUVAN GALVESl ON CO , ~ f)·~£)~-h~~!M)?dj Page 23 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 17 or Question 18, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do t , 1swer the following question. QUESTION NO. 19 engage in any such conduct knowingly or intentionally'? vin y" means actual awareness of the falsity, unH1irness, or ce · 'eness of the act or practice on which a claim for damages ased. ctual awareness may be inferred if objective ation · dicate that a person acted with actual awareness. e in any such conduct intentionally? In answering this question, consider only of damages .... to Barbara Schlein . Answer '(Yes~) or "No." '~~ ·-''".<" Page 24 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 17 or Question 18, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do 1 · , 1swer the following question. QUESTION NO. 20 a. ANS\VER: b. ANSWER: c. the amount of reasonable and n Barbara Schlein having to hire ne\v by Anthony Griffin. L, ANS\VER: - - - -I- · Page 25 of29 If you answered "Yes" to Question 19, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the toll v1 question. QUESTION NO. 21 Vhat sum of mon" if any, in addition to actual damages, should be awarded to Barbara G .. 'fin because Anthony Griffin's conduct was committed knowingly Page 26 of29 If you answered ''Yes" to Question 17, then answer the tbllowing question. Othenvise, do not QUESTION NO. 22 fee for the necessary services of Barbara Schlein's attorney in this esentation and representation in the trial court. b. c. 11 or review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas. ANSWER: d. e. For representation through or 1 · the Supreme Court of Texas. ANSWER: N fl1 I Page 27 of29 Answer the following question regarding Anthony Griffin only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Que o 16 regarding Anthony Griffin. Otherwise, do ncrf..mswer the following question re rdi Anthony Griffin. QUESTION NO. 23 that you must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of any, should be assessed against Anthony Griftin and awarded to ar :tages for the conduct found in response to Question 16? 1 cans any damages awarded as a penalty or by way of atory puq)oses. Exemplary damages include punitive damages. a. b. c. d. e. propriety. Answer in dollars and cents, if any. ANS WER: _ ____,t'--,}!--{A_·_ _ 1 Page 28 of29  Certificate 1e ry, have answered the above and foregoing questions as herein indicated, and 1 the same into court as our verdict. PRESIDIN JUR · m - - - - ~~~d ~\\~t- ------ Printed Name of the Presiding Juror Jurors' Printed Names ___.,~~=~;d ~~~~-- Page 29 of29 TAB 3 November 3, 2009 ' CONTRACTUAL AG~EEMENT Parties to Agreement This is to authorize A GRIFFIN LAWYERS/ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, INC., hereinafter and sometimes referred to as LAWYERS, to act as lawyers for the undersigned, BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN, hereinafter and sometimes referred to as CLIENT(S), relative to .all matters concerning the divorce/family related matter/civil issues .(tort issues) in a matter styled In the Matter of the Marriage of Barbara Regina Schlein and Robert Schlein; In the County Court at Law, No. 2; Galveston County, Texas; Cause No. 08FD2371. You are Hiring Us to Do What? 1. To investigate your case to determine the viability of the case. 2. To advise· you as to the viability of same. 3. To work with you wi'th respect to your case including appearing on your behalf before any corporation, official, board, department, administrative body or to ll.l!!l!l!~P~LA~fNTf!!!!!!FP!!S..." l EXHIBIT ~ l  fiie suit and in any Court (Federal or State), if necessary and if warranted. Retainer/What is it?/What does It Mean?/What It Isn't? .1. In consideration of the services rendered and to be rendered to client by the said law firm, the cl~ent agrees to pay $35,000.00 (normal retainer $10,000.00 - $25,0DO.OO) as a retainer fee. 1 2. The retai?er is based upon the history of the litigation,, substituting in with a pending matter {mentioned above) and the firm's obligation to make sense of the disparate parts of the above matter and other related matters (amending pleadings, joining claims), etc. 2. Your retainer is the consideration to hire A GRIFFIN ~AWYERS/ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, INC., LAWYERS. As stated in the oral interview, the retainer herein and attorneys' fees are structured with the reputation of the firm, the related matters necessary to process the family matter (tort allegations by Petitioner and/or on behalf of the minor child), consistent with the 1 Currently Petitioner is under an order of the Court that prevents the expenditure of funds without the approval of the Court. No payment of fees will take place unless and until the Court approves the payment of the retainer amount and/or an order is entered releasing the injunction overbroad scope (can be interpreted to include separate property of Petitioner) . The attorneys anticipate filing a motion with the Court to address the broadness of the order and/or releasing of funds to pay the subject retainer.  concept of reasonable attorney's fees based upon the complexity of the issues at hand. The retainer is also based on the consideration for this office not taking other cases (time spent). 3. Said retainer is non-refundable. This means that once the fee is paid, it shall be deemed earned. This does not mean that the retainer represents the total attorney fees due the firm (see 4 herein) . 4. This retainer fee should not be interpreted as constituting the full reasonable fee to which the Lawyers may be entitled for services performed pursuant ··. to an award of the Court or settlement. ( •' Attorney·Fee Determination The determination of attorneys' fees shall be made as follows: 1. The attorney will keep time records in this matter and will not bill for any additional work unless and until the services rendered exceed the retainer amount. 2. The client is informed that the attorneys' hourly rate ranges from $250.00 to $500.00 an hour in the civil rights arena. The rate depends on the nature of the case, the tasks to be performed, the reputation of the ,r-· lawyers, and other factors defined by the relative ( ~-- case law and the civil rights industry/arena/practice.  The hourly rate for Anthony P. Griffin will be billed at $300.00 an hour; associate attorneys will be billed at $150.00 an hour. Cost - We Will Front Cost, Unless Agreed Otherwise. How Do We Get Our Money Back? Costs are the Client 1 S obligation, but the firm will front cost and bill for the costs. 2 Costs reimbursement is due and payable thirty (30) days from any such billing. Guarantees - None There are no guarantees held out with respect to the results of this litigation. ·· . ( •. (_ 2 Again, this is subject to approval of the Court and/or removal of the overbroad language affecting one's separate property.  Withdrawal, Malfeasance, Breach of Contract 1. Withdrawal: Lawyers have an ethical obligation to represent the Client zealously within the bounds of the law, but the Lawyers also have an obligation, when material representation surfaces or where there is a breach of the terms of this contract by the Client, to withdraw from the representation of the Client. Nothing in this contract guarantees any results, including whether a suit will or will not be filed or any other matters that border on guarantees. The only guarantee relates to the representation within the confines of the Code of Professional Responsibility (zealously within the bounds of the law). It has been explained orally that the Lawyers' obligation to the Court and the rules of ethics require investigation and examination of the facts. 2. Investigation/If No Case: If the facts reveal no case exists, the Lawyer shall promptly advise the client and terminate the relationship. The retainer again is non- ·refundable. 3. Investigation/Material Breach: If the investigation reveals a material breach, lie, or misstatement by the client, the Lawyer will advise the Client as to how ( ''-~·· such breach affects the Lawyer's ability to proceed in  the representation. If termination is appropriate, the Lawyer(s) shall advise the client of her rights and shall promptly take any necessary acts to protect the Client (advise as to action) and the firm's rights. Again, the retainer shall be deemed non-refundable. Privilege of Firm It shall be the exclusive privilege of Lawyers to determine when and where suits shall be filed. Again, Lawyers retain the discretion whether to obligate the office in the appeal process. Compromise No compromise or settlement of Client's claims will be rnade ·-..·. without the consent of both Client and Lawyers. ( ,. Power of Attorney Lawyers are hereby granted full authority to sign all legal instruments, pleadings, drafts, authorizations and papers that shall be reasonably necessary to conclude settlement and/or reduce to possession any and all monies or other things of value due to Client under this claim as fully as Client could so do in person. ('.. ......~ Keeping the Client Informed Lawyers agree to produce copies of documents as related to this litigation and to keep the client fully informed. Venue Lies in Galveston County All sums due and payable at Lawyers' office in Galveston County, Texas.· ~GCi~D AGREED to on this the ____ day of --~.~--------L----~~------1 2009. BARBAR~ REGINA SCHLEIN 2106 PLEASANT PALM CIRCLE c LEAGUE CITY, TEXAS 77573 832.738.6047 EIYIA.IL: brsChlein@msn. com SIGNED~ AGREED to on this the~~y of -id)"---_D~V-----'--}_, 2 oo9 . ~HONY~ A GRIFFIN LAWYERS 1115 MOODY GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102 EMAIL: agriffin@agriffinlawyers.com c :word. schlein_barbara_retain9r_,cont:ract.  ~.1!"-··.. · ( NOTICE OF CLIENTS The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys . . Although not every complaint against or dispute with a lawyer involves professional misconduct, the State Bar Office of General Counsel will provide you with information about how to file a complaint. For more information, please call 1.800.932.1900. This is a toll-free phone call. TAB 4  .. ~ ................. A GRIFFIN V. WYERS Galveston island Galveston, Texas 77550 November 3, 2009 Barbara Regina Schlein 2106 Pleasant Palm Cixcle League City, Texas 77573 RE: CAUSE NUMBER 08FD2371i IN THE Y~TTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN AND ROBERT JOHN .SCHLEINi IN THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW, NO. 2; GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS (EXPLANATION OF CONTRACT AND LETTER AGR.EEMENT) Ms. Schlein: . Please find attached the contract b:f employment. This letter is designed to explain our agreement and course of action, Please note the following: • contr-~otrelates to Family Matters but Contemplates Amending Complaint. The contract relates to the family matter but contemplates adding claims and/or amending the pleading to address the abuse allegations the fraud in the marriage (forgery and misappropriation of identification that is the subject of pending criminal litigation. The retainer is set at an amount that it is anticipated that no additional fees will be charged. • Separate Lawsuits t:h.at will be filed at tlle time of substitution and/or prior to sUbstitution. :r:t is contemplated that a separate lawsuit will be brought against the builder at or near the sW:>stitution. It is my belief the builder should be placed in a position of. payment for his breach of contract and that the house. We can bring the lawsuit and add your spouse and a necessary P~ltmFF'S I' EXHI~IT I _2;;;:;.___  A separate contract will be drawn for this purpose; no retainer is contemplated (continge~t fee}. • Separate Lawsuits that will be filed at the tixne of substitution and/or prior to substitution. It is contemplated that a separate lawsuit will be brought against your spouse for the discovered abuse of minor child. It is my belief a separate lawsuit broadens the playing field and makes the other side defend outside of the divorce and Dibrell's court. Of course there will be an attempt to move the matter back to the divorce court, but it is my belief that the action of your child is an independent action. A separate contract will be drawn for this purpose; no retainer is contemplated (contingent fee}. • Unsure and will need to research the Reitz. I am currently unsure on the breach of fiduciary lawsuit. The grievance matter can be addressed by obtaining a grievance form. After learning the file better, I will supplement and advise. ( '· ·. .' ....._;.... ..·' If you have any questions, please inform. Sincerely, Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Moody Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102 APG/ files Encl. -Contract of Employment HAND DELIVERED fr-.. c:wora.schlein_barbara.client_transmittal ~->-·- ...·· TAB 5  A GRIFFIN LA WYERS Galveston Island Galveston, Texas 77550 August 5, 2011 Barbara Regina Schlein P. o. Box 1061 League City, Texas 77574 RE: CAUSE NUMBER 08FD2371; IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN AND ROBERT JOHN SCHLEIN; IN THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2i GALVESTON COUNTY,· TEXAS BARBARA SCHLEIN V. ROBERT SCHLEIN, BILL DE LA GARZA, DAVID M. OUALLINE AND BILL DE LA GARZA & ASSOCIATESi IN THE 212TH JUDICJ:AL DISTRICT COURT; GALVESTON COUNTY 1 TEXAS; CASE NO. 10CV0344 CAUSE NO. 10CV1237; BARBARA SCHLEIN V. CENTRE INTEREST, INC. D/B/A CENTRE BUILDERS V. ROBERT SCHLEIN; ,IN THE 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; GALVESTON COUNTY TEXAS I (BILLING STATEMENT) Ms. Schlein: This· is our billing statement with respect to the family case. I have exercised billing discretion and have not billed for telephone conferences, interviews or normal transmittal of information to the client and postage (this cost under normal circumstances would add another $30,000.00 to one's bill). I am setting out the work performed and then setting our proposal associated with the fee statement. It has been a challenge and pleasure to have represented your interest. Our statement of time and task is as follows: I' • PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT I 147  r-·-------.------------- -.---------------------.--- Date Task/Function Time Expended ~·3.:1009 Letter addressed to 2.0 client contract of employment; contract of employn1ent; discussion of other lawsuit 11.05.2009 Beck's "sup'f•ll;m.;ntal 2.0 production of documents; revie1w Letter to client - 11.23.2009 tramsmitting mediator responsive documents; :aec!k' s supplemental orc,duct:ion 12.04.2009 !-''----- :Getter to client ·--·-o- transmitting Beck's letter; retrieving file and De La Garza's request for new mediation 12.18.2009 - Lette:c t:o "'Client with -0-- respect to protective order hearing for .2.17.2010 and cancellation of '·., deposition ( .. · ~·------ 12.20.2009 Work on l?etitioneJ:' s Motion f<:>:t' Summary 4.0 .rudgment 12. 21.2009 ~ork on Petitioner's 5.0 111otion to Withdraw Funds; I?et.itioner' s Second Junended Petition; tJ:ansmi t tal to court 12.28.2009 Lett.er t:o client; -0- -· -- transmittal of affidavit 12.31.2009 -- Letter to client; -o .. mediation date for :1..27.2010 01.04. 2010 - •rra:nsmittal to -0- - d:i.ent/pro!ecti ve order 01.11.2010 -- Letter to client; hearing on motion to withdraw funds hearing set for January 25, 2010 01.10.2010 Work on ll'rit of mandamus 12.0 and mot:lon to stay 01.11.2010 Work on w:ri t of mandamus 10.0 and motion to stay 01.12.2010 Work on writ of mandamus 12.0 -- anq motion to stay 01.13.2010 Work on writ of mandamus 12.0 and m~_!:.ion to st~L_ ____ ~-13.2010 Transmitt.al of wr:i.t of ----- ··0·· --------  mandamus to client - 01.19.2010 Work on Petitioner's 5.0 Motion for Summary Judgment; transmittal to .. court 02.08.2010 Work on PetitioneJ:' s 3.0 Motion to Disqualify Counsel; t1·ansmi ttal to court 03.28.2010 Work on motion in 3 .o opposition to appointmer.1t of :~:·eceiver 03.29.2010 Lette:r to client/refund -0- of Lillian Hardwick; transmittal hearing date for de novo hearing and opposing second amended motion for appointment of receiver 04.05.2010 Transmittal of letter to 8,0 client/appointment of receiver date moved; preparation of writ of mandamus/court of cLppeals 04.06.2010 Preparation of writ of - 10.0 mandamus ·... Preparation of writ and s.o ( _ .. 04.07.2010 transmittal 04.14.2010 Amendmemt to mandamus 3.0 04.12.2010 - Transmittal of letter to -0- client/new hea.ring date on. motion for enforcement 04.21.2010 ·------.... Review and transnli ttal 1.0 of ruling on mandamus 05.04.2010 Preparation and 8.0 transmittal of writ of - mandamus Supreme court 05.11.2010 Transmittal of inventory -o- found in the file 05.24.2010 Transmittal to client -o- copy of order and respondent's motion to compel 05.15 . .2010 work on mandamus to s.o Texas Supreme Court 05.16.2010 Work on mandamus appeal 8.0 to supreme court 05.17.~!010 I Work on mandamus appeal to su12reme Court 8.0 05.24. ~lOlO 'l'ransmitta.l to client - 1---- -0- copy of order and respondent's motion to compel 06.03.2010 Transmittal to client; 4.0 -- 3  ---- confirmation of. filing; (~ hearing and preparation ·...... for hearing 07.06.2010 Transmittal to -0- client/confi:t'mation. of payment of vendorjch.ristopher Beck ~-.07.2010 Transmittal of notice ··0- from SupremE~ Court - 07.10.2010 Work on supplemental 8.0 diSC!OVery 07.11.2010 -------- Work on supplemental 10.0 ---------- discovE!J:'7f response 07.20.2010 -- Letter t,;, 2.0 clie:nt/Schlein' s Motion :Eor S~t.nctions and Second Notice of Deposition on Written Questions to Custodian of Investment Center; r-eview of documents 08.03.2010 - Transmittal of 3.0 -- Responde:n.t 1 s M'otion for Preferential Settinsr and c:c,nfirmation of mc,tion for sanctions; review of Respondent's Response to ·· .. Motion for Sanctions ( ... ' f (interim attorney's feE!Sl issue) ~-09.2010 Transmittal of motion ---- l.O -- for jury trial setting an~ pcLyment of jury fee 08.13.2010 Transmittal t.o client; -0- hea:dng trm1script of 06.03.2010 09.27.2010 --------- ----------- Order tra.n.srni t taJ. denial -·0- -- of Emergency ~~~oti on/Texas Supreme Court 09.30.2010 -- f-•Transm~tta ' 1 of response 4.0 to mandamus pending before court of appeals; :t:"eview o:E J=esponse; preparation of Petitioner's Emergency Motion to Allow Expenditure Clf Separate Prope:t:tv F~!!lds _ 10.22.2010 Review of suppl-ement 3.0 documents submitte:d by Respondent; t.ra_TL~Hni t tal to client 10.26.2010 Supreme COUl"t 1 S order -{)- denying disqualification '------------- of cotunsel/Supreme --------------------- -- --- 4  - Court's decision; transmittal information to client 11.24.2010 Transmittal of answer -0- and cross-claim/Robert Schlein 12.01.2010 Petitioner's Motion to 3.0 Recuse/preparation and fil:i.l:lg 01.0'7.20H '!'ransmi t tal letter to -o- client/ruling and referral of Admiliistrative Judge/motion to recuse 01.20.20U Petitioner's Motion for 4.0 Reconsideration Special Exceptions to Petitioner's Second Amended Petition and Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Denial to Allow Expenditure of Flmds from the SeparatE~ Property Account b'unds of Pe1:itionl3r -- 1-'---·----------- . --ol-"2 4 . 2 011 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of 3.0 C·' Interim Attorney's Fees Award and Motion for Preferential Setting 01.31.2011 Petitioner's Second 1.5 Amended Peti~ion/revision 0.2.21.2011 Preparation and amended 1.5 - petition/Petitioner's 'I'h.ird Amended Petition ------ 02.23.2011 ~- Letter to Court -0- Coordinator with respect to proposed order 02.25.2011 Letter to client; 1.5 amended motion to appoint and receiver; work on amended response to appointment of receiver 02.28.2011 Let tel: to client; plBa of intervention 03.04.2011 - Transmit t:;d of Schlein's ----- -0- motion t:o continue 03.10.2011 -- 1-· • NotJ.ce o f h E~ar~ng; . -0- transmittal 03.18.2011 !?reparation and 5.0 Hearing/motion to continue 04.14.2011 Review and transmittal 4.0 ------- '--·----------- ---- 5  ,---------------------- ------------------------ of 9 02 Notice of ll':LlinHEl ------------.---------- of J'J? Morg·an Records r--- 04.25.2011 -----------r-::------ •.rransmi ttal of letter to ---· -0- client; reset of pretrial conference for 5.06.~~011 05.02.2011 --- Transmittal of lE:.tter to ----- -0- cliemt; :Rule l l J~greem-.mt/Inventory and Appraisement; Respondent's Special E;,.:ceptions and Notice of Deposition; Barbara Re1gi.na Schlein 05.03.2011 - -- Transmittal of -- -0- Respondent's Amended Answer to Petitioner's Third Amended Petition 05.06.2011 Pretrial conference 2.0 5.0.9.2011 - Work on inventory 5.10.2011 Work on inventory; - 3.0 6.0 deposition of Robert Sc:hlein Work Oil invtilltory ~·~ ~~~ ~~~~1 2.0 Depe~sition of Barbara 6.0 Regina Schlein; Helen Stewart 'l'ruscott; preparation f. or depositic•n. f--·------------- 05.13.2011 Trai.lsmit.t'S.ia£___ -0- Responder~.t' s Supplemental Answer to Production and Re:;rponde:r.t' s Inventory and Appraisement 05.13.2011 - Preparation for 1:a. o l?et.J.tione:r" s First. Amended lV!otion. for r~:i.mine and Petitioner's Er..hi.bit List --- n --- 05. J..4 .20].1 05.15.2011 ----------- r-;, 1\ \\ II \\ 8.0 8.0 - 05.17.2011 ?reparation and Hearing 5.0 on Motion for Appointment of Receiver -05.18 .2011 Notice of Conflicting -o- Setting 05.20.2011 I?:r:eparation a."l.d filing 12.0 Petitione:r·r s Fourth Amended Petition and preparation for t:dal Prepar;;ltion fo:c tr.·ial 12.0 05.21.2011 05.22.2011 Pre;earat.!on for trial 15.0 -- - •rrial ].5. 0 05.23.2011 05.24.2011 - ----- •rrial- 12.0 - ----- 6 r· '· 05.25.2011 05.26.2011 05.27.2011 Trial Trial Trial - 12.0 12.0 12.0 06.10.2011 --- Petitioner's Motion for 8.0 Entry of Final Judgment and Propo~ed Division of _¥roperty - 06.20.2011 Respondent's Motion to 4.0 Disregard Jury Findingsi J:eview and transmittal 06.27.2011 Transmittal and review 2.0 of Respondent's Proposed Division Total hours work expended= 352.5 Billable hours x $250.00 an hour 'l'otal amount = $88,125.00 Copy costs $18, 000.00 2 Cost ( s) $4,399.29 2 Total bill including attorneys' fees and costs = ···... $110,524.29 ( ~·· ' ; Discounted amount of fees $8lr000.00 3 l. Total number of pa.ges 120,000 paHes x.l!'i a page; internal costs billed in- house. 2 Charles Cannon $75.00 Galveston [Clerk of Court] $37.25 Galveston [Clerk of Court] $200.00 Galveston [Clerk of Court] $ 3.00 Galveston [Clerk of Court] $104.00 Galvestcm [Clerk of Court] $ 16.00 Galveston [Clerk of Court] $ 30.00 [jury fee] Subpoena fees $130.00 First court of Appeals $250.00 [wJ:its] Supreme Court $250.00 Sandra L. Powell $1,630.00 Sandra L. Powell $ 475.00 Bank of America $528.15 Jl? Morgan $4.77.95 Stephanie Me Clure $192.94 3 The following cases are not being bille:d, to-wit: Civil litigation pending in the Justice of the Peace Court (Bank of America v. Barbara Schlein (you prevailed in this litigation) (normal fee ($3,500.00); State of Texas v. Barbara Schlein, M\mic:lpal Court City of Manvel {you prevailed in this litigation) (normal fee ($500.00}; State of Texas v. Austin Reed (League City, Texas) (normal fee ($500. 00}; State of Te:r.:a~ v. Barbara Schlein, County Criminal Court, Hal:ris Cmmty (n.OJ.."TTIal fee $7,500.00}; County of Galveston, et 7  ., Total including discounted fees $103,383.29 Total discounted bill (discounting fees and costs) ~ $95,000.00 [amount d'Ue] The relevant. documents confirming the payment of the subject fees and/or costs are enclosed. If you have any questions, please inform. Sincerely, /S/ Anthqny P. Griffin Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102 APG/ files Encl (s). - Bills/confirmation of paymEmt, etc.· EMAIL TR.ZillSMISSION AND REGULAR l\1AIL c:word.schlein_barbara.billing_statement (~. or- ---------- al. v. Barbara Schleln (tax suits) (normal fee $5,000 - $10,000.00). This is roughly $22,000.00- $25,000.()0 in feE~s nc•t billed). 8 TAB 6  Gmatl- demand tor payment/close ofbusmess on Tuesday, November ll LUll rage 1 or t Anthony Griffin demand for payment/close of business on Tuesday, November 1,2011 1 message Anthony Griffin Sat,Oct29,2011 at10;03AM To: Barbara Schlein Ms. Schlein: Please accept this email as confirmation of the termination of our services for non-payment of fees. Your statement seeking to pay $50,000.00 for our work Is unacceptable. Your actions to hide funds to make them non-accessible for the payment of fees is intolerable. Your statements challenging my representation are insulting but are consistent with your previous actions associated with your underlying intent. Please accept this our demand for payment of attorney's fees and costs ($95,000.00). If we do not receive a cashier's and/or certified check on or before the close of business Tuesday November 1, 2011 to pay both fees and costs incurred on your behalf, we will take actions, without future noti~ to protect our interest. Ariy future action taken will encompass additional fees and costs associated with your non-payment (roughly an additional $75,000.00). If payment Is not made, please note we anticipate undertaking the following to protect our interest: 1. A motion to the trial court in the family case to set aside the v~rdict; we will do so In the form of a motion for _ Intervention and motion for new tried as an adverse party (allegation fraud on the court and the hiding of assets). We will work to unwind the agreement (and thus unwind the transactions at the Investment Center; fraud will vitiate any such transactions undertaken and place the matter before the trial court to start all over again); 2. We will retain and secure the tile in the warehouse until the motion is decided by the Court. We will not release any property until after the motion is decided by the Court; 3. We will bring on Wednesday of this week a lawsuit In the District Court with respect to our fees and costs. We will copy all parties in the other litigation in order to put them on notice of our lien and the dispute in question. We will sue for the non-discounted amount of fees and costs and not the discounted version (see previously billing statement of August 5, 2011 ). You have a copy of that bill and we have discussed the same {roughly $209,399.29 is non-discounted fees and costs will be the subject of the suit to recover~ due and owing to our firm). 3. We will file motions to withdraw on the following cases, to-wit: i) Barbara Schlein v. Robert Schlein, in the County Court at Law, No.3, Galveston County, Texas; U) Barbara Schlein v. Robert Schlein and Bill Qe La Garza, in the 212th Judicial District Court; Galveston County, Texas; iii) Ex Parte Barbara Schlein (expunction proceeding in Houston, Texas); iv) tax case pending in Galveston County; v) Barbara Schlein v. Centre Bu!!ders!Davjd Flores, in the 10th Judicial District Court; Galveston County, Texas. The m.otionswlll be on file by Wednesday ofthis week. On the Flores matter we will appear and obtain a trial setting In April/May 2012. We will file a lien In Flores matter In order to retain our interest; we will not waive our contingent fee in that case. I wfll tender your file on or before December 1; 2011. You should make arrangements to travel to Galveston to retrieve the files. There are approximately thirty boxes of materials, therefore you should have a vehicle large enough to obtain all materials at one time. Any future interaction will be by fax, email or letter. Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102 . •·1·.·•·__ PLAitmFF'S EXHIBIT https://mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&ik=35e2c7523a&view=Dt&a=barbata%20schlein&as ... 11/4/~11 TAB7  Case 12-80185 Document 1 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 3 0 Health Care Business 0 Chapfor7 0 Chapter IS Petition for 0 IndiVidual (iowludes Joint Debtors) D Single Asset Real Estate as dct.ned In 0 Chaptor9 Recognllion or a Foreign S"" Exillblt Don pag~ 2 r>ftlrl$form. I 1 U.S.C. § IOl(SlB) li2l Chapter I I Main Proceeding i!'J Corporation (Includes LLC and LLP) D Railroad 0 Chapter 12 0 Chapter IS Pelition for 0 8 Partne!sh!p Other (lfdeblftbe Unltcd States § I 0 I (8) as ulncurred by an bi!Siness debts. aGainst debtor is pending: Code (the lntemnl Revonue Code). Individual prlmarlly for a personal, family, or household Cbe~ko b"Q;: Pull Filing Fee ottocbed. obtor is a small bualness debtor as deflned In II U.S.C. § 101(51D). Debtor Is nota small business debtor as deRned In II U.S. C.~ !Ol(SI D). 0 Filing l'ee to be paid lnlnstollmenl$ (•ppllcable to indlviduala only). Mijst attach signed application for tho oourl's conslderatlon certifYing that the dcbtot· is Qteck If:..-·· _ ..... ~nableto pay fee except in installments. Rule 1006(b), See Offlclal Form 3A. IU--'oebtor's aggrcgale noncontlngent liquidated debts (excluding debts owed to lnslr a longer part of such I BO days. than in any other District. D There !sa bankruptcy elSe concern In~: debtor's affillate, general partner, or paTtnershlp pending In this District. D Debtor Is a debtor in a foreign proceeding and has its principal place of business or principal assets in the United States in this District, or has no prb>4:lpal placo of buslnoss or assets In the United Statos but Is a defendant In an action or proceeding [In 11 ftdernl or state eourl} in this D1811"1ot, or the Interests ofthe parties will bo served In regard to tho roliefsoughtln this Dlslrlot. Certification by a DebtOI' Who Resides liS a Tenant or Residential Properly (Check all appllcablo boxes.) 0 Landlord has a judgment against tho debtor for possession of debtor's resldellco. (lfbox checked, complete tl«o foUowiog.) (Name of landlord that obtalncdjudgment) (Address of landlord) D Debtor claims that UQder applicable nonbankt11ptoy !aw, there a~ clrcumataMIIS under which tho deblor would bo permitted to cure the elltlre moneta!')' de.filult that gave rise to the judgment for pos!Cssion, after tbc judgment for possession was entered, and D Debtor has Included with this petition the depoolt with th~ court of any rent that would becotnc due during tho 30-day period after the filing of tho petition. 0 Debtor certifies that he/she has served tho Landlord with tblsoortiflcotion. (11 U.S.C. § 362(1)). 4'78  Case 12-80185 Document 1 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 3 of 3 Pa 3 Name ofDebtor{s): Anthony P. Gnffin, lnc. Sl S~unl(l) of Debtor{&) (lndivldoai/Joillt) Signature ora Foreign llepresenmtlve I deoiare undcl· penalty of porjury t'hal the ill formation provided in this pel!!ion is truo I declero under penally of perjmy that the Information provided in this petl1ion Is true and correot. and ComlCI, thai I am the foreign representative of a dobtor in a fol·ofgn proceeding, (If pcMhioMI' Is an i~dlvldual whoso dclm aro primarily consumer dobts and hos and that I am authorized to me Ibis petition. ohoacn to file undcrclulpter7) I am awaro that I may proceed under chapter 7, II, 12 (Ckeck only on~ boK.) or 13 of title II, United States Coda, undel'81and tho rollefavaUable undor each such chapter, and cbooso to proceed under chapter 7. D I request relief in accordance wltb cbap!er IS of title II, United Stales Code. [If no llltorney repreoonts me and no bankruptcy petition preparer signs the petition) I Cerilned copies of tho documents requbod b,v II u.s.c. §ISIS aro attaQhed. have obtllined and read th0 notlco r<:qulrcd by J1 U.S.C. § 342(b). D Pursuant toll U.S.C. § 1511, [request relief in a<:cordanocwith th~ I request relief in accordance with the chapter of tltlo 11, United States Code, chapler of title 11 specified 111 this pelllion. Aocrtiflcd copy of the specified In this petllion. o1·der granting recognition of the foreig11 main procoodlnt~ls attached. x lSI Anthon • Glrffln x N/A (Signature ofi'orel!ln Representative) X NIA Signature of Joint Debtor (Printed Nameof'f'orelgn Representotive) Telophono Number (If not represented by atlomey) Date Date Slgn9ture of Non-Attorney Ilankmpwy hlltloll Preparer x /siAN I declare under penally of perjury that: (I) I am a bankruptcy petition prcparcr as Slenattll' torney for Debtor(s) defined In 11 U.S.C. ~ II 0; (2) I prepared this document for compensation and have ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN provided the debtor with e copy of Ibis document and the notlocs and lnfontlatfon required under 11 U.S.C. §§ IIO(b), !IO(h), and 342(b); and, (3) if rules or guidelines havo been promulgated pursuant to t I U.S.C. § liO(h) setting a maxlmu1n Firm Namo fee for smiccs chargeable by bankruptcy pelltlon prcparers, I have given the debtor notice of the 1n11XImum amount botoro preparing any dccumcnl fur filing for a debtor 1115 21ST STREET, GALVESTON, TEXAS 77650 or accepting any fee from tbe debtor, as required In that section. Off'lcial Form l91s attached. Addre5S 409.763.0386 N/a TelcJlhono NUinber Printed Name and title, if any, ofBankn!ptcy Petition Proparer 04104/2012 Date Social-Security number (If the bankruptcy pe~tion preparer 1$ not an individual, •In a case in which§ 707(b)(4XD) applies, this stgnaturc also constitutes a ~ate tho Socfai·Securlty number of the oCtlcer, prlnelpal, responsible person or certification that theattomey has no knowledge after an Inquiry that the lnfonnatlon parln~r .,fthe bankruptcy pelfticm proparor.) (Required by II U.S.C.§ II 0.) in the schedules is Incorrect. Slgn~t11rc of Debtor (Corporatlon/Parbtonhlp) I declare under penalty of perjury tbat the Information provided in this petition 1s true Address and correct, and that I have been autl101'lzed to tuc this petition on behalf of the dobtor. X Slgnatllfll X /S/ Y P. GRIFFIN Dato Signature of Authodzed Indf vidual ANIHQ['jV p, @BYfFIN Signaturo of bankruptcy petition preporer or officer, princlP!II, responl$1ble per$on, or Printed Name of Autho•·lzed Jndlvidual partner whose Soclai..Security number is provided above. Presld$nt Title or Autllorizcd Individual Names and Social-Security numbors of all other Individuals who prepared or assisted 04104/2012 Date lr1 preparing this document unless the bankruptcy petition preparer Is nol nn !ndMdual. If 111ore than one person prepared this document, attach additional sheets conforming to the appropriate official form tbr each person. A baukn1ptcy petlllon prdpm-er's f«ilrwe to comply wlliiiM provM~1s oftitle II and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Pl'ocedlll'e may result In fines or lmprlsonmem or both, ll (].S.C. 110; Ill U.S.C. 156. 479  Case 12-80185 Document 1-1 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 1 B IA (Official Fonn I, E~hlblt A) (9/97) i.to ftl~,/Je.l'i(Jcltct.tt/lfJPf$ (e.g.;lalto.~ toKcm.d 100) wifh the p~urlties tmd Exchange Commission pJmmanJ to '1},1/f'i/ 'e¢Ut1fi£'1:1!!:?i~ftmM..Il!:t;6JlJtMil.!Od Is requestmg relutJ under chapter 11 o; rhe Bankruptcy UJae, this ·comp etM?)JI({ a(fMIIillJ..fo· flleptarl!of.I;J UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT Southern District of Texas - Galveston Inre Aritl'lob}! P. 9riffin, Ina. ) Case No. Debtor ) ) ) Chapter 11 EXHIBIT "A" TO VOLUNTARY PETITION 1. If any of the debtor•s securities are registered under Section 12 of the Seomitles Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC tile number is .;.N.:.:;IA;.;..._ _ _ _ _ _..,........, 2. The folloWing fmancial data is the latest avallable infonnation and refers to the debtor's condition on Q4.!):1.2012 a. Total assets $ _ _..._.~·9~87'-'! .• 6~3~3.~00 b. Total debts (including debts listed in 2.c., below) $ _ _ _1~,2~0~0:.z::.O~OO~.O~O c. Debt securities held by more than SOP holders: $ _ _ _ __ secured CJ unsecured 0 subordinated 0 $_..._ _...__ _ secured 0 unsecmed 0 subordinated 0 $ _ _ _ _ __ seemed CJ unseCW"ed 0 subordinated CJ s _____ secW'Cd CJ unsecmed CJ subordinated CJ secured 0 unseCW"ed 0 subordinated 0 s ___"'"""..,...._ d. Number of shares ofprefened stock e. Number of shares COJumon stock }PDQ Comments. ifanv: -·-·--'"'·-·---~".. ---,·-'-'-'-'-....:...-~-~--- Small business, closely held; 1000 shares all owned by Anthony P. Griffin. 3. Brief descrintion of debtor's business: Law practice/pre-development work In context of property acquisitions 4. Libi the names of any pt:rson who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 5% or more of the votilU!: securities of debtor: Anthony P. Griffin 480  Case 12-80185 Documen11-2 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 1 aJl\l(Ol'fio.li!lJ!.Qrh!t, l'lthmit:<}){mflt) [lfito.t1IIi b~l i}fffie ilebtl)l;"s JvnowJtidgrSoll_iil.pt:qpiiJ!lY -uw.neil•hy flt' ill :p~$esstou,l)l''th.ed~btar :lbat, tQ ~he b~t 9f:thG ,\ill~Jw;l:;;itnc:>wl.~g9J,;p<>.~~~H>.r l~~~~~g_~i{:!p J!Osea_\hr<;lllllf •lm)JJ!nii!nlllndldDntitia'ble harm.i'llfhe-;pubtio health onsafo(y·(llijacli .addltionill sheets: if i\~0$81\ey):. :None; . i. Wlth resp®H() -·ea® f)lll'OOI. ·ol':~ai propetfy odtwn af;'jlemnalpropetly 1drmll'fied ln = You have fired your attomey but are having problems gett1ng your file back fi·om ~ 5; the attorney. · ~0 .......... c:n ~... ,....., ~~ = ~ You may want to consider contacting the Client-Attorney Assistance Program i ~ ' (CAAP) at 1-800-932-1900. C!\..AP was established by the State Bar of Texas to help people resolve these kinds of issues with attomeys quickly, without the filing of a fonnal grievance. CAAP can resolve many problems without a g1ievance being filed by providmg information, by suggesting various self-help options for dealing with the situation, or by contacting the attomey either by telephone or letter. I have not ___ contacted the Client-Attorney Assistance Program. II. INFORMATION ABOUT YOU -- PLEASE KEEP CURRE}'I'T @ 1. TDCJ/SID # - - - ' 'rJ /;c., -"--------- t'v1s. Name: Address: ----------------------------------------------------- City: -~---------------- State: _ _ Zip Code: _______ Employer and address _____!_!NL.'_citc.::1~-------------------------------------------- 3. Telephone number: Residence _ _ _ _ _ __ Work: __N~'/.:_;__I>:.c___ _ __ 0709  Other: ____________________ 4. Drivers L1cense # Date of Birih ----------------- 5. N:.1me, address, and telephone number of person who can always reach you. Name --"'-----------~--------------- Address . I' Telephone _____________________~--- 6. Do you understand and write in the English language? -------~-"·-<.£_ _,_·-____________ If no, what is your pnrnary language? _______ Wl1o helped you prepare ibis fonn? __L.:_"~·---'---":>'--v--'--'-'--'-/~_... _______________________ Vi'ill they be available to translate future conespondence during this process? )1.1/77 7. Are you a member of the judiciary? ____::_N_!L_~v_-___________ If yes, please provide Comi, Com1ty, City, State: III. INFORMATION ABOUT ATTORNEY Note: Grievances are not accepted against law firms. You must specifically name the attomey against whom you are complaining. A separate gnevance fonn must be completed for each attorney against whom you are complaining. State: -~ y_- ,, ,. Telephone number: Work L/D'i -7~5 --CJir/... Home _______________ 3_ Have you or a member of your family filed a grievance about this attomey previously? Yes_ No v If "yes", please state its approximate date and outcome. /V/4 4 Please check one of the following: / This attorney \vas hired to represent me. Th1s attorney was appointed to represent me. This attomey was hired to represent someone else. Please give the date the attorney was hired or appointed and what the attorney was hired or appointed to do. 3 t'J c 7 #-z oo F 0709 2  5. What was your fee arrangement with the attomey? -+·._,__>:......• _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ If you signed a contract and have a ~' please attach. If you have~ of checks and/or receipts, please attach. Do not send originals. 6. If you did not hire the attorney, what is your connection with the attorney? Explain briefly ·-:t h :""-<. ~ /.rl-!o rz. N"' · · '"7 I. Are you cmTently represented by an attorney? ~-L.,tl/,..!:....:t.J=-·------- lf yes, please provide information about your cuuent attomey: _ _LN"'--"-f~"'l'---------- 8. Do you claim the attorney has an impairment such as depression or a substance use disorder? If yes, please provide specifics (your personal observations of the attomey such as sluned speech, odor of alcohol, ingestion of alcohol or drugs in your presence etc., including the date you observed this, the time of day, and location). 9. Did the attorney ever make any statements or admissions to you or in your presence that ·would indicate that the attorney may be experiencing an impairment such as depression or a substance use disorder? If so, please provide details. IV. INFORMATION ABO liT YOUR GRIEVANCE 1. Where did the activity you are complaining about occur? City: /~ ,.4 l VI? do rJ 2. If your grievance is about a lawsuit, answer the followmg, if known: a. Name of court --~------------------------------ 0709 3  b Title of the suit £4 c/c; i ,'). >(..Jl:,..,_?.....:.:·'.N=--·;:..:d_.'....:.'....:.'_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ c Case number and date suit was filed --------------------- d. If you are not a party to this suit, wl1at is your connection with it? Explain briefly. r.J/.; U you have~ of court documents, please attach. 3. Explain in detail why you think this attomc:y bas done something improper or has failed to do something which should have been done. Attach additional sheets of paper if necessaty. If you have~ of letters or other documents you believe are relevant to your grievance, please attach. Do not send originals. Include the names, addresses, and telephone number of all persons who know something about your grievance. Also, please be advised that a copy of your grievance will be forwarded to the at'tomey named in yom· grievance. 0709 4 V. HOW DID YOU LEAR.N ABOlJT THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS' ATTOR.N"EY GRIEVANCE PROCESS? Yellow Pages Internet / Other VI. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WAIVER I hereby expressly v,:a1ve any attomey-client p1ivilege as to the attomey, the subject of this grievcmc.e, and authorize such attorney to reYeal any inforrnation in the professional relationship to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Cmmsel of the State Bar of Texas. I understand that the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel mamtains as confidential the processing of Grievances. 1 / i 1 . Signature: ) ~frv-JJV1,.. hJ< \/-., v r Vi......L-0"-\_ D ate: "';'•!·J/ ,.... I/ ""-'lY"'/. ,- . ' TO ENSURE PROMPT ATTENTION, THE GRJ.EVANCE SHOULD BE MAILED TO: THE OFFICE OF CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL P.O. Box 13287 Austin, Texas 78711 0709 5  ·~- ......·~-t"!,,' -~- •••.,.... . . :,.,., ......... . · - 1 . ! .' ) .. A GRIFFIN LA WYERS October 3, 2008 Gah'eston Island Gah'esron. Texas 17550 Cea.c::.,_r Vereen 'I RE: CONTRAcT OF EMPLOYMENT Mr. Vereen: Please find enclosed the contract of emploYment. Please retain the original for reoords. ~ur Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lawyers llls Moody Galveston, Texas 77sso 409-763- 0386 l.8oo.7so.soJ4 APG; Facsimile No_ 409.763.4102 files Encl. -Contract of EmploYment c =worrJ. ve reen. Ceasar. client. t J. gram Program Director 1-800-')32-1 900 December 29, 2010 [Vlr. Ceasar W. Vereen RE: Mr. Anthony P. Griffin, Attorney at Law Record: #482965 Dear Mr. Vereen: Thank you for contacting the Client-Attorney Assistance Program (CAAP) for assistance in resolving a problem you are experiencing with your attorney. CAAP is a statewide dispute resolution progrnm of the State Bar of Texas. lts objective is to assist the public in resolving concerns, disputes, or misunderstandings with Texas lawyers and to facilitate and improve communications betv.-'een clie!lts and their lawyers. The attorney gnevance process extsts to address lavv·yer misconduct or unethical behavior according to the Texas Disctp!Jnary Rules of Professional Conduct. The enclosed Jetter was mailed to Mr. Griffin. This is a formal but friendly effort intended to facilitate communications and to prompt an effective and positive solution. Please allow a reasonable time for Mr. Griffin to respond to our letter. However, should you not hear from him, please contact me at 1-800-204-2222, ext. 1768 to discuss other options that may bring about resolution. If! do not hear from you in thirty (30) days, I will assume matters have been resolved and close your file. Yours truly, Program Associate Enclosure P.O. Box 12487, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 787ll-24S7 Grievance Information Hotline: 1-800-932-1900 CAAP Fax: 512-427-41.22 CAAP E-mail: c:lap@texasbar.co)!!  From: Vereen, Ceasar W. Dear Anthony P. Griffin {Attorney}, I Ceasar W. Vereen regret to alert you under these circumstances in regards to my civil rights case. On or around the 21 September 2008 I enlisted your services in regards to an unfair act committed against me whenever I inquired about acquiring a bail bonds license. The following events led to this notification: 1. Before we even spoke on the fees of your services, I presented my case to you in which at that time you assured me we had a valid case. I gave you all required documents and credentials regarding this case. Once that was done we agreed on your cost of $10,000.00 to begin the process of alleviating this matter. . 2. Mr. Griffin, It has been 26 months and no progression has been made on this case. You fail to notify me of our standings in resolving this matter. I have contacted your office over 21 different occasions on contaCting you to speak on- this case. 3. I have even spoken with you and your secretaries as well and have constantly received rescheduled appointments in which your party failed to comply with. I as one of your customers feel t_hat your services are not sufficient considering the seriousness of this matter. 4. Lastly, on 18 November 201 0, I called your office and your secretary put me on hold. She went to consult with you in which she returned and told me to call you at one o' clock. I called at one and you, yourself told me to call you back at five o' clock. I complied with that and then at that time, you then told me that you were leaving for the day and to call you Monday. That same Monday I called you back and you told me to call you at seven o'clock. It greatly upsets me of the level of professionalism portrayed on behalf of this case; therefore I feel, it is best for you to refund my $10,000.00 fee. I expect a reply at least within the next ten working days. Thank~Y Signe Ceasa W. e --"-- A GRIFFIN LA WYERS Galveston Island Galveston, Texas 77550 August 13, 2008 Ceasar VerPAr. RE: THANK YOU Mr. Vereen: 1Thank you for visiting with our firm on August 11, 2008. Good luck in obtaining your retainer. 2 Thank you for considering our firm. Sincerely/ Griffin 1 We would be required to show either the Board improperly and arbitrarily denied the permit after granting same (thus bringing the suit under state law/arbitrary act) and/or by bringing suit under 2federal law (racial discrimination in violation of federal law) . The retainer is $10,000.00 and is deemed earned upon payment. The retainer would be non-refundable. In context of additional attorneys, no such attorneys' fees would be due and owing unless we are the prevailing party and would be on contingent basis. Any costs associated with the. litigation will be incurred by the firm and will not be reimbursed unless we are the prevailing party and/or the case settles.  A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Moody Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102 APG/ files c:word.miscel27.vereen.ceasar.interviewedbutnotretained  NOTICE OF CLIENTS The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys. Although not every complaint against or dispute with a lawyer involves professional misconduct, the State Bar Office of General Counsel will provide you with information about how to file a complaint. For more information, please call 1.800.932.1900. This is a toll-free phone call.  BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY PANEL OF THE STATE BAR DISTRICT NO. 5B GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, H0021132504 PETITIONER, [CEASAR W. VEREEN] v. ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, RESPONDENT. RESPONDENT'S ORIGINAL ANSWER TO THE HONORABLE ~JIDENTIARY PlL~L: Respondent, Jl...nthony P. Griffin, submits this his original answer to the Original Evidentiary Petition and would answer as follows: Response to Factual Allegations 1. Respondent admits that Complainant paid a retainer of ten thousand dollars ($10, 000. 00) a..11.d would assert that the retainer was non-refQT1.dable: 2. Respondent would admit that the Complainant called the office on a number of occasions and left messages with staff. Respondent denied that he did not make attempts to contact the client and call the Complainant. Respondent also denied that he didn't have time to talk with the Complainant/Client and that he answered the client's questions. 3. Respondent denies not working on the Cowplainant's/Client's file and denies that the only action taken was the making of an open records request.  4. Respondent denied paragraph B in that relationship was terminated prior to the letter from the client. Response to Rule Violations 5. Respondent denies neglecting the client's matters and violating Rule ~Ol(b) (l). Respondent will admit to not working at his usual efficiency and such state had existed during the restructuring related to the h1.1.rricane. 6. Respondent denies keeping the client informed, denied comply with respect and any violation of 1.03(a). 7. Respondent denies taking steps to protect the client's interest and any violation of Rule l.lS(d). The time line associated with the facts prevent a violation of 1.15 (d) and is inconsistent >'lith the oral request of the client. Prayer for Relief 8. It is prayed that the relief requested be denied in all parts. DATE: August 29, 2011. Respectfully submitted, ANTHO~i P. GRIFFIN A GRIFFIN LAWY~~S 11J.5 TWENTY FIRST STREET GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102 STATE BAR NO. 08455300  CERTIFI~~TE OF SERVICE This is to certify that on this the 30th day of August, 20ll, a true and correct copy of Respondent's Original Answer was forwarded to opposing counsel by facsimile transmission and regular mail, to-wit: Sa~ON BREAUX SAUCEDA ASSISTANT DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL 600 JEFFERSON, SUITE lOOO HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002 -- c, word. grei vancef i l.e_ [ varr;!en_ ceasar] _original_ ans>~er  STATE BAR OF TE-XAS Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel July 31,2012 RECEIVED AUG - 2 201Z DISTR1C SB EVIDENTIARY PANEL Lindsa Glover, Chair Tim Beeton Mere th J. Duncan Kelly M. Haas Je William B. Harvey RE: NOTICE OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING Case No. H0021132504 [Ceasar Vereen], Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Anthony P. Griffin, Before the Evidentiary Panel of the State Bar District 5B Grievance Committee Dear Panel Members: Attached please find Petitioner's Original Evidentiary Petition, Respondent's Original Answer, and the Notice ofEvidentiary Hearing (08/13/12) for the hearing scheduled on Monday, August 1 13, 2012, at 9:00 a.m., at the Galveston County Justice Center, 600 59 h, 2nd Floor, Room 2100, Galveston, Texas 77551. Thank you for your attention to this matter. If you will not be able to attend the hearing, please contact Rosie Solis, Docket Coordinator, as soon as possible. Shannon Breaux Sauceda ,, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel SBS/sml Endosures Anthony P. Griffm 1115 21 51 Street Galveston, Texas 77550 Via Certified Mail No. 7005 2570 0000 1445 3047~ Return Receipt Requested g:\gencral\gri !lin .a_sbs\504 _ vereen\correspondence\08!312_hearing_packets_panel_respondenl 073 l 12. do ex 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 758-8200 Toll Free: (866) 224-5999 Fax: (713) 758-8292  ~ .~ BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY PANEL OF THE STATE BAR DISTRICT NO. 5B GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, § H0021132504 [CEASAR W. VEREEN] § Petitioner, § § v. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, ~ RECEIVED ,C..UG - 2 lOl2.- FILED § Respondent. § AUG D9 2011 ORIGINAL EVIDENTIARY PETITION STATE BAR OF TEXAS HOUST~OC /1 COMES NOW Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, V ~ committee of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, and would respectfully show unto the Evidentiary Panel as follows: I. PARTIES Petitioner is the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE (hereinafter referred to CJS "Petitioner"), a committee of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS. Respondent is ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent"), Texas Bar Card No. 08455300, a licensed attorney and a member of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS. II. NATURE OF PROCEEDING Petitioner brings this disciplinary proceeding pursuant to the STATE BAR AcT, TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE ANNOTATED §81.001, et seq. (Vernon 2003); the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; and the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. The Complaint that fom1s the basis of this cause of action was filed on or after January 1, 2004. / III. VENUE Respondent's principal place of practice is Galveston County, Texas; therefore, venue is appropriate in Galveston County, Texas, pursuant to Rule 2.11B of the TEXAS RULES OF ·DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Respondent may be served at 1115 21st Street, Galveston, Texas 77550, or any place he may be found. IV. PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT The acts and omissions of Respondent, as hereinafter alleged, constitute professional misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06Vofthe TEXAS RULES OFDISCIPLlNARY PROCEDURE. V. CAUSE OF ACTION I. On or about October 3, 2008, CEASAR W. VEREEN (hereinafter referred to as "VEREEN") hired Respondent for representation in a discrimination claim associated with the revocation and/or denial of VEREEN'S bail bonding license. 2. VEREEN paid Respondent Ten Thousand and No/1 00 Dollars ($1 0,000.00) for the representation. 3. During the course of the representation, VEREEN made numerous attempts to contact Respondent to ascertain the status of the case. 4. Upon calling Respondent's office, VEREEN was usually informed that Respondent would have to answer his questions; but that Respondent was not available at that time. 5. Respondent did not return VEREEN'S calls. 6. On a few occasions VEREEN reached Respondent directly and during these brief calls, Respondent indicated that he did not have time to speak and told VEREEN to call back. 7. Meanwhile, Respondent failed to take any action to pursue VEREEN'S case, other than .to make an open records request. Originnl Evidenrimy PelitiOIIIAnthony P. Griffin Page 2 ( ·,:IGENERALiGR IFFlN.A_SBS\504 _ Vereen\PLEADINGS\EP_COD _RFD.docx  ; ) . ' 8. By letter dated December 2, 2010, VEREEN effectively terminated the representation and requested a refund of his fees; however, Respondent failed to return any unearned fees. VI. RULE VIOLATIONS The acts and/or omissions of Respondent described above constitute conduct in violation of the following Rules of the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: • l.Ol(b)(l) in representing a client, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter; • 1.03(a) a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and • l.lS(d) upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that has not been earned. VII. The Complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention of the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS by CEASAR W. VEREEN'S filing of a grievance on or about February 18, 2011. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, respectfully prays that this Evidentiary Panel discipline Respondent, ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, by reprimand, suspension or disbarment, as the f.acts shall warrant; order restitution to Complainant, if applicable; and grant all other relief, general or specific, at law or in equity, to which Petitioner may show itself to be justly entitled including, without limitation, costs and attorneys' fees. Original E••ir!emimJ' Pernion!Anthony P. Grinin Page 3 l i:'tiENER.AL'.GRlFFlN.A_SBS\504_ Vereen\PLEADINGS\EP_COD_RFD.docx  Respectfully submitted, STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel LINDA A. ACEVKPO Chief Discip 1· ·· ounsel s Assistant Disciplinary Counsel State Bar No. 24002896 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 758-8200 Fax: (713) 758-8292 ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on August Cj, 2011, a true and correct copy of the Original Evidentiary Petition was delivered to the ~wing: Via Certified Mail No. 7004 0750 0000 6728 4477 Anthony P. Griffin 1115 21st Street / Galveston, Texas 77550 / £J.< s / Page 4 Origin<1/ E1·ide111iary Petition/Anthony P Griffin G:\GEN ERALIGRJFFJN.A_S BS\504_Vereen\PLEADlNGS\EP _COD _RFD.docx  A GRIFFIN LAWYERS Galveston Island Galveston, Texas 77550 April 26, 2011 Jai L. Jones Assistant D~sciplinary Counsel Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel State Bar of Texas 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 P.E: H002ll3250-1 CEASAR WILLIAM VEREEN - ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN {P~SPONSE TO GRIEVP~CE ~IT APOLOGY) Ms. Jones: Please acc~flt tl~1is letter as rr~y· response to tb.e g-rievance. !'1y apology for the delay in transmitting; the response wa.s due in part to my being in trial during the relevant period. In addition, in context of the above, I spoke with the State Bar Investigator on Good Friday and informed him that I i-.rould this response done post haste. My trial in Dallas scheduled for Wednesday has just been non-suited and thus my ability to complete this response. J>,gain, r.he Bar's consideration of t.his delay in responding would be appreciated. In context of Mr. Vereen's case, I am attaching a copy of my file with this submission. The file materials are under Attachment Ai my notes as attached under .t>Lttachrnent B; materials reviewed and tendered by the client are attached under at.tachment C. I'4:r. Vareen hired our firm on or about October 3, 2008. We v.rere hired to explore whet.her Mr. vareen had a claim of discrimination associated with the revocation and/or denial of his bail bonding license. It was the client's position that he had done all things required by the County of Brazoria to allow him to obtain his bonding license. In fact the record reveals that lVJ.r. Vareen v-1as granted a license (see J>,ger,da records for 3uly 3, 2008) , but the license was ul.t imat.;:;ol y· :cescinde,::t by ·the Ba.il Bond Board. I have no reco:cd c. E. the client contacting our firm tv-1enty one times during our period of representation, I re.r:1ernber t-hat t"he.re was an extended pe!:iod of time bet\,.ree:n our hiring and :r-tr:·. Vereen's next contact. with our firm. He preceded his termination of our firm with two phone calls (one E!Xplaining that his ·long period of non-contacti approximat.ely one year) ; the other seeking an update of my reviei•J of t.he :~:·ecords (I requested that he come in for an interview to e)..--plain the pro's and con's of the litigation. I explained that I needed have all the information at present (we 'i'JeJ~e st:Lll within r.:.he statutory period), but would have the :l.r,fonnat ion -vir.cen he caine in for an appointment. t'Ir. Vereen also expressed his lack of desire not proceed. His 1etter reque;;ting a f:ull refund is reflective of this position. The next request was through the bar for a fee refLmd. Mr. Vereen signed a non-refundable retainer contract. The time expended Ciri his case was approximately twenty five (25) hours, If you desire a time and accou...Tlting record I can provide t.he same. t"'ly billable rate in cases such as this is $350.00 an hour. In context of resolution of the money issue, vJe '~JiLl refund ~E},g_Q_Cl__~-(~_g on or before June 1, I haoo:Je r1crt !';:r.. e.ac~i.l-:..:;ci. by,.. relationship ~.rith ttte cli7.-rlt:.r Because of int:e:cvening cir::::umstances, a lawsuit was not filed but the non- filing· 1111ere not. the fault of this firm. Thank you for your attention to same. Sincere).¥; ~_/ - . ;, // / / ~- / ~---- "- '·~---- ~ Anthony P. Griffi'IT, A Griffin I ..awvers ~' - '-.. lJ.15 Twent.y First Street Galvest.on, Texas 77550""' '· 409.763.0386 ' 1.800.750.5034 ' Facsimile No. 409.763.4102 APG/. files license (see ?.geLda records for ,July 3,. 2008), but th·.:: licer1se was ultirna.tel.)r :cescir1ded. t>)l the Ba.il Bc)n.d Board. I have no rec;.~·rd 0f the cJ.:lent contacting our fi:t'm tvJenty one i::imes during our period of representatic·n. I remember that there was an extended period of time bet'i•teen our hiring and }1r. Vereen's 1-:ext contact with our firm. He preceded his termination of our fiL~ with two phone calls (one explaining that his.long period of non-contact; approximately one year) ; t.h€: other seeking an update of my revie1...- of t.he record.s (I requ.ested that he come in for an interview to explain the p:n.)'S and con's of the litigation. I explained that I need..3d have all the infm."1nat.ion at present (we we1~e still within c:he st.atutory period), but would hav.e the info:cmat ion when he came in for cUl. appointment. lV.i:r. Vereen a.lso expressed his lack of desire not proceed. His Jetter reqv.esting a full refund is reflective of this position. The next request was through the bar for a fee refund. Mr. Vereen signed a non-refundable retainer contract. The time expended on his case was approximately twenty five (25) hours. If you desire a. time and accounting record I can provide t.he same, !Jly billable rate in cases such as this iB $350.00 an hour. In context of resolution of the money issue, 'iile wiLl refund ~?t_QQ_Q_-_c~g on or before June 1, I ll.a:\.re not. b!~e.ache.cl b}'" rc:l2:.::ionshi_p v~rit.h ttu:; client:~ Because of intJ2~l.-vening cir:::·umstances, a lawsuit was not filed but the non-filing were not the fault of this firm. Thank you for your attention to same. Bin·:en~].y;. /~ ./'- L·---~-----.// "" "-., Anthony P. Griffii'h, J._ Griffin Law-yers ',,"-.. ll.l5 T·v.1ent:y First Street '\. Gal·v·est.(::.n, Texas 77550 ·,·,. 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102 APG/ files xc: Ceasar Vereen l92 Cou...Tlty Road 69BB .P-..r1gleton ~ ~re;:eaEJ 7rl515 Interoffice - Rita Westerman (please note docket)  BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY PANEL OF THE STATE BAR DISTRICT NO. SB GRIEVANCE COMMITI'EE COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, § 80021132504 [CEASAR W. VEREEN] § Petitioner, § § v. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS § ANmONY P. GRIFFIN, § § Respondent. § JUDGMENT OF PUBLIC REPRIMAND Parties and Appearance On AugUst 13, 20 12, came to be heard the above-styled and numbeted cause. Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, appeared by and through its attorney of record, Shannon Breaux Sauceda, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and announced ready. Respondent, ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent''), Texas Bar Number08455300, appeared in person and through attorney of record, Norma Venso, and announced ready. Jurisdiction and Venue The Evidentiary Panel SB having been duly appointed to hear this complaint by the chair of the: Grievance Committee for STAiE BAR OF TEXAS District 5, finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action and that venue is proper. Professional Misconduct The Evidentiary Panel, having considered all of the pleadii:J.gs, evidence, stipuhitions, and argument, finds Respondent has committed Professional Misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06(V) of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Judgment of Ppblls Reori.mwnd Pqe tor4  Findings of Fact The Evidentiary Panel, having considered the pleadings, evidence aqd argument of counsel, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 1. Respondent is an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas and is a member of THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS. 2. Respondent resides in and maintains his principal place ofpractice in Galveston County, Texas. 3. On or about October 3, 2008, Ceasar Vereen (hereinafter referred to as "Vereen") hired Respondent for representation in a discrimination claim associated with the revocation and/or denial of his bail bonding license. Vereen paid Respondent Ten Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars ($1 0,000.00) for the represem.tion. 4. During the course of the representation, Vereen madenumerous attempts to contact Respondent to ascertain the status of the case, but was usually informed that Respondent was not available at that time. Respondent did not return Vereen's calls. On a few occasions Vereen reached Respondent directly and during_these brief calls, Respondent indicated that he did not have time to speak and told Vereen to call back.. 5. Meanwhile, Respondent failed to take any action to pursue Vereen's case, other than to make an open records request 6. By letter dated December 2, 20 I0, Vereen effectively terminated the representation and requested a refund of his fees; however, Respondent failed to return any unearned. fees. 7. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS has incurred reasonable attorneys' fees and direct expenses associated with this Disciplinaiy Proceeding in the amount ofThree Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Nine and 48/100 Dollars ($3,979.48) 8. Respondent owes restitution in the amount of Nine Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($9,000.00) payable to Ceasar Vereen. Conclusions of Law The Evidentiary Panel concludes that, based on foregoing findings of fact, the following TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf have been violated: l.Ol(b)(l) [in representing a cl.ient, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter]; 1.03{a) [a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for CFI.-13 Judgment of Publjs Beprimand P~t~:elof4 information}; and 1.15(d) [upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client. allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that bas not been earned]. Sanction The Evidentiary Panel, having found Respondent has committed Professional Misconduct, heard and considered additional evidence regarding th~ appropriate sanction to.be imposed against Respondent After hearing all evidence and argument and after having considered the factors in Rule 2.18 of the TEXAS RULE OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE, the Evidentiary Panel finds that the proper discipline of the Respondent for each act of Professional Misconduct is a Public Reprimand. Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that a Public Reprimand be imposed against Respondent in accor(jace with the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.. The Evidentiary Panel finds that the sanction imposed against Respondent is the appropriate sanction for each of the violations set forth in this Judgment. Restitution, Attorneys' Fees and Expenses It is further 0 RDERED Respandent shall pay restitution on or before September 14, 2012, to Cell:lar Vereen in the amount ofNine Thousand and No/ I 00 Dollars ($9,000.00). Respondent shall pay the restitution by certified or cashier' s.check or money order made payable to Ceasar Vereen and delivered to the STATEBAROFTEXAS, ChiefDiscipliruuyCounsel's Office, P.O. Box.l2487, Austin. Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701). It is further ORDERED Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and direct expenses to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS in the amount of Three Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Nine and 48/l 00 Dollars ($3,979.48). The payment shall be due and payable on or before Cf6·13 Judgment or Public RePrimand PllfleJ of4 .. September 14, 2012, and shall be made by certified or cashier's check or money order. Respondent shall forward the funds, made payable to the STATE BAR OF TEXAs, to the Chief Disciplinmy Counsel's Office. P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St, Austin, Texas 78701). It is further ORDERED that all amounts ordered herein are due to the misconduct of Respondent, are assessed as a part of the sanction in accordance with Rule 1.06(Y) of the TExAs RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Any amount not paid shall accrue interest at the maximum legal rate per annum until paid and the STATE BAR OF TEXAS shall have all writs and other post- j udgrnent remedies against Respondent in order to collect all unpaid amowtts. Publication This reprimand shall be made a matter of record and appropriately published in accordance with the TEXAS RULES OF DISC!PLINAR V PROCEDURE. Other Relief All requested relief not expressly granted herein is expressly DENIED. SIGNED this ~day of~uat. '2012. EVIDENTIARY PANEL DISTRICT NO. SB STATE BAR OF TEXAS Judgment of Public Re.primand Pqe4of4 TABlO  STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the ChiefDisciplinalJ' Counsel RECEIVED MAR I 0 ~e~@ March 19, 2012 Via Certified Mail No. 7004 1350 0002 6835 5366, Return Receipt Requested Anthony P. Griffin 1115 21st Street Galveston, Texas 77550-4624 RE: Case No. H0111134143 Kristina Guzman- Anthony P. Griffin Dear Mr. Griffin: The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has completed its investigation of the above-referenced Complaint and determined on March 6, 2012, that there is Just Cause to believe that you have committed· one or more acts of Professional Misconduct, as defined by the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE (TRDP). In accordance with TRDP 2.14D, a statement of your acts and/or omissions and the TEXAS DlSCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT that the Chief Disciplinary Counsel contends are violated by the alleged acts and/or omissions follows: On or about May 12, 2010, Kristina Guzman (hereinafter referred to as "Complainant") hired Anthony P. Griffin (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent") for representation in an employment retaliation matter. Respondent's tee was Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00). Complainant paid Respondent a total amount of Four Thousand One Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($4,100.00), with an agreement to pay the remaining balance in installments. Respondent and Complainant did not execute an employment contract. Thereafter, Respondent failed to take any action on Complainant's part except for preparing a rough draft of the petition in or around April20 11. During the course of the representation, Complainant made numerous attempts to contact Respondent to ascertain the status of her case; however, Respondent failed to communicate with Complainant.· · g.\general\griffin.a_ sbs\143_guzman\correspondence\election letter.docx 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 EXHIBIT Phone: (713) 758:-8200 Toll Free: (866) 224-5999 Fax: (713) 758-8292 l :b-Ji  STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel Anthony P. Griffin March 19, 2012 RE: Case No. Hllll-34143 Page2 On or about July 11, 2011, Complainant left a message for Respondent notifying him that she might be moving out of state and therefore, was requesting a refund of unearned fees. Minutes later, Respondent finally responded that he would not refund her money, but would look at her file and call her back. Respondent failed to call Complainant as promised. As such, on or about August 24, 2011, Complainant sent Respondent a letter whereby she terminated Respondent's representation and requested a detailed invoice of the services he provided, as well as the return of her client file. Respondent failed to provide Complainant with an accounting and further failed to return her client file. These alleged acts violate the following TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: l.Ol(b)(l) in representing a client, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer; 1.03(a) a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 1.04(a) a lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect an illegal fee or unconscionable fee; 1.04(d) a contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined; 1.14(b) upon receiving funds or other property in which a client has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property upon request; and l.lS(d) upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that has not been earned. Pursuant to TRDP 2.15, you must notify this office whether you elect to have the Complaint heard by an Evidentiary Panel of the District Grievance Committee or in a district court of proper venue, with or without a jury. The election must be in writing and served upon the Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office no later than twenty (20) days after your receipt of this g:\general\griffin. a_sbs\ !43_guWJan\correspondence\election Jetter .docx STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Chief Disciplinary CoullSel Anthony P. Griffin March 19,2012 RE: Case No. H111134143 Page 3 notice. Failure to file a timely election shall conclusively be deemed an affirmative election to proceed before an Evidentiary Panel in accordance with TRDP 2.17 and 2.18. Enclosed is a form in which to indicate your election and principal place of practice. It should be mailed to the undersigned at the address shown at the bottom of this letter. In making your election, you should be aware than an Evidentiary Panel proceeding is confidential unless a public sanction is entered and that a private reprimand is only available before an Evidentiary Panel. District court proceedings are public and a private reprimand is not an available sanction. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact the undersigned at the phone number listed below. annon Breaux Sauceda Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Enclosure: Respondent's Election and Principal Place of Practice Certification CF8-IB g:\general\gri ffin. a_sbs\ 14 3___.,ouzman \correspondence\election letter .do ex COMPLAINT AGAINST § § ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN § H0111134143 [KRISTINA GUZMAN] § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS § RESPONDENT'S ELECTION & PRINCIPAL PLACE OF PRACTICE CERTIFICATION I, Anthony P. Griff"m, hereby elect: (Choose one of the following) _ _ _ _ District Court _ _ _ _ Evidentiary Hearing - District Grievance Committee I, Anthony P. Griffm, hereby certify that: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _(Physical Address- no P.O. Box) _ _ _ _ _ _ _(City), _ _ _ _ _ _ _(County), Texas, is my principal place of practice. SIGNED this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2012. ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN **RETURN TillS FORM WITHIN 20 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF ELECTION NOTICE** g:\general\griffin.a_ sbs\143_gu zman\correspondence\election lerter.docx  A GRIFFIN LAWYERS Galveston Island Galveston, Texas 77550 January 27, 2012 Jai Collier Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel State Bar of Texas 600 Jefferson{ Suite 1000 Houston/ Texas 77002 RE: H0111134143 - KRISTINA GUZMP~ - ANTHONY PAUL GRIFFIN (RESPONSE TO GRIEVANCEj Ms . Collier: Please find enclosed the hard copy of the above referenced documents. Thank you for.your attention to same. Sincerely, n hony P. Griffin A. Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile ~o. 409.763.4102 APG/ files Encls. - Response & Attachments 1 - 4 91 7108 2133 3934 9976 8562 fACSIMILE TRANSMISSION AND REGULAR MAIL xc: Kristina L. Guzman CER'l'IF'IED MAIL, RRB. NO. 91. 7108 2133 3934 9976 8562 c: wc.rd. grievancefile_ [guzrnan_kristina]_oppcsingco·llllsels_t.ransmi ttal  A GRIFFIN LA WYERS Galveston island Galveston, Texas 77550 January 27, 2012 Jai Collier Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Office of the Chief Disciplinaly Counsel State Bar of Texas 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000. Houston, Texas 77002 RE: H0111134143 - k'RISTINA GUZMll..N - Al~THONY P. GRIFFIN (RESPONSE TO GRIEVANCE} Ms. Collier: Please accept this letter as our response to the grievance filed by tbe above person. Please note as follows: " We were hired on May 10, 2010 by Ms. Guzman. The client was referred by Barbara Smith, a former client. 11 We were hired to look at an employment discrimination case and a tortious interference claim. 2 A copy of my file materials are enclosed under herein (attachment 1} . " There is in the file a copy of a letter dated May 10, 2010, confirming the payment of a retainer $5,000.00 and one-third of the recovery. I have searched my computer and have not found that I followed through and provided a contract. of employment, but I am willing to provide 1 The problem with the client's EEOC charge related to her not being an employee of BP. This was axplained to her; she was not capable of bringing an employment discrimination claim against a uon-employer. xc: Kristina Guzman CERTIFIED MAIL, RP$ NO. 91 7108 2133 3934 9976 8562 c: word. grievancefil.e_gu:;man_krist:\.J::a. 20~1. 3314.  CAUSE NO. 12CV1732 COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF § Petitioner, § § vs. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAs § ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, § § Respondent. § lOth JUDICIAL DISTRICT AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Parties and Appearance On this day, came to be heard the above-styled and numbered cause. Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, by and through its attorney of record, Shannon Breaux Sauceda, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and Respondent, ANlliONY P. GRIFFIN (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent), Texas Bar Number 08455300, by and through his attorney of record, Norma Venso, announce that an agreement has been reached in the above-styled matter. Jurisdiction and Venue On the 18th day of July, 2012, pursuant to Rule 3.02 of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE, the SUPREME CoURT OF TEXAS appointed the Honorable Darlene Byrne to preside over this disciplinary action. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action, and that venue is proper. Both Parties waived their rights to trial by jury. Professional Misconduct The Court, hav1ng considered the pleadings and the agreement of the parties, finds that Respondent has committed Professional Misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06(V) ofthe TEXAs RuLEs OF DJsC!PLlNARY PROCEDURE. Respondent has committed professional misconduct as de.fined by AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Pa~te) ort Rule 1.06V of the TExAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE and in violation of Rules 1.03(a) [a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status ofa matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information]; 1.04{d) [a contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined]; and 1.15(d) [upon termination of representation. a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client. allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that has not been earned], of the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES Of PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; Article X, Section 9, of the STATE BAR RULES. Sanction It is AGREED and ORDERED that the sanction of a Probated Suspension shall be imposed against Respondent in accordance with the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with the suspension being fully probated pursuant to the tenns stated below. The period of probated suspension shall begin on August 30, 2013, and shall end on August 29, 2014. Terms of Probation It is further AGREED AND ORDERED that during all periods ofsuspensio~ Respondent shall be under the following terms and conditions: 1. Respondent shall not violate any term of thls Judgment. 2. Respondent shalt not engage in professional misconduct as defined by Rule l.06(V) of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Ptge:Z orz  3. Respondent shall not violate any state or ferleral criminal statutes. 4. Respondent shall keep the STATE aAR. OF TEXAs membership department notified of current mailing, residence and business addresses and telephone .numbers. 5. Respondent shall comply with Minimum Continuing Legal Education requirements. 6. Respondent shall comply with Interest on Lawyers Trust Account(IOLTA) requirements. 7. Respondent shall promptly respond to any request for information from the Chief Disciplinary Counsel in connection with any investigation of any allegations of professional misconduct. 8. Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and direct expenses as ordered in this Judgment. 9. Respondent shall pay restitution as ordered in this Judgment. Prob2tion Revocation Upon determination that Respondent has violated any term of this Judgment, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel may, in addition to all other remedies available, file a motion to revoke probation with the Court and serve a photocopy of the motio~ on Respondent pursuant to Tcx.R.Civ.P, 21a. Revocation will not be invoked on the basis of grievance matters pending against Respondent at the time that this Judgment is executed. The Court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the Court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether Respondent has violated any term of this Judgmenl. If the Court finds grounds for revocation, the Court shall enter an order revoking probation and imposing an active suspension upon Respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year commencing on or after the date of revocation. Respondent shall not be given credit for any term of· probation served prior to revocation. AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION Pagel of .3  It is further AGREED AND ORDERED that any conduct on the part ofRespondent which serves as the basis for a motion to revoke probation may also be brought as independent grounds for discipline as allowed under the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT and TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Restitution, Attornevs' Fees and Expenses It is further AGREED and ORDERED Respondent shall pay restitution to Kristina Guzman in the amount of Two Thousand Three Hundred Fifty and No/1{}0 Dollars ($2,350.00). The restitution payment shall be made by certified or cashier's check or money order and made payable to Kristina Guzman. The payment shall be submitted to the ChiefDisciplioary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487, Austin. Texas 7871 l-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), on or before March 5, 2013. It is further AGREED and ORDERED Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and direct ex,penses to the STATE BAR Of TEXAS in the amount ofTwo Thousand Five Hundred and No/1 00 Dollars ($2,500.00) . The payment or attorneys' fees and direct expenses shall be made by certified or cashier's check or money order and made payable to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS. The payment shall be submitted to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487,Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), onorbeforeMarch5, 2013. It is further AGREED and ORDERED that all amounts ordered herein are due to the misconduct ofRespondent and are assessed as o part of the sanction in accordance with Rule 1.06(Y) of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Any amount not paid shall accrue interest at the maximum legal rate per annum until paid and the STATE BAR OF.TEXAS shall have all writs and other AGREED JUDCMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION .!'ate 4of4 post-judgment remedies against Respondent in order to collect all unpaid amoun.ts. Publication This suspension shall be made a matter of record and appropriately published in accordance with the TEXAS RL'LES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Other Relief IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk ofthis Court shall forward a certified copy of the cvrrent Disciplinary Petition on file in this case, along with a copy of this Judgment to the following: (1) CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, Supreme Court Building, Austin, Texas 78711; (2) The STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, P. 0. Box 12487, Austin. Texas 7&711; and (3) Respondent, by and through his attorney of record, Norma Venso, 83 0 Apollo SL, Houston, Texas 77058. IT IS ORDERED that all costs of court incurred in the prosecution ohhis lawsuit shall be taxed against Respondent, for which the Clerk may have execution if they are not timely paid. AU'"'""""' relief not oxpress!y gmctod horein1 exp=dy DENIED. SIGNED this _gQ_ day of Ha' f( '2013. ...... AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSlON Page SofS AGREED AS TO BOTH FORM AND SUBSTANCE: STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Chid Disciplinary Counsel LINDA A. ACEVEDO SAUCEDA ~IJ.· ~ N VENSO jl,\lfYJl Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Attorney at Law State Bar No. 24002896 State Bar No. 20545250 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 &30 Apollo Street Houston, Texas 71002 Houston, Texas 77058 Phone: (713) 758-&200 Phone: (409) 789-8661 Fax: (7l3) 758-8292 Fax: {281) 286-9990 ATIORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, AITORNEY FOR RESPONDENT, COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN State Bar No. 08455300 AGREED JUDGMENT 0 F PROBATED SUSPENSION Page 6 of6  CITATION ~'ROFESS!ONAl Cl\/ll PROCESS. THE STATE OF TEXAS COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE VS. ANTHONY P. Cause No.: 12-CV-1732 GRIFFIN lOth District Court of Galveston County TO: Anthony P. Griffin,lllS 21st Street, Galveston, Texas 77550, or any other place he may be found. GREETINGS: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED. You may employ an attorney.lf you or your attorney do not file a written answer with the Clerk who issued this citation by 10:00 a.m. on the Monday next following the expiration of twenty days from the date you were served this citation and petition/motion, a default judgment may be taken against you. Said written answer may be filed by mailing same to: District Clerk's Office, 600 59th Street, Suite4001, Galveston, Texas 77551-2388. The case is presently pending before the lOt\District Court of Galveston County sitting in Galveston, Texas, and the; Original Petition- DCA was filed; July 30, 2012. It bears cause number 12-CV-1732 and see the attached petition/motion for named parties to the suit. Issued and given under my hand and the seal of said court at Galveston, Texas, on this the 30th day of July, 2012. Issued at the request of: Doryn Danner Glenn, District Clerk Shannon Breaux Sauceda Galveston County, Texas State Bar of Texas Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel By: 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 SEE AlTACHED FORM NOTE: Status Conference set: 11/01/2012 at 10:00am OFFICER/AUTHORIZED RETURN Came to hand on the ___ day of _ _ _ _ _ __, 20_ at o'clock_. M. and executed at._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ in __________County,Texas,on the _ _ day of 20_ at ___ o'clock _m, by delivering to in person a true copy of this Citation together with the accompanying _ _ copy(ies} of the ; Original Petition -DCA attached thereto and I endorsed on said copy of the Citation the date of delivery. To certify which I affix my hand officially this the ___ day of - - - - - - - - - ' 20_. Fee-Serving: _ _ __ Sheriff/Constabie Amount: _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ County, Texas BY: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Authorized Person/Deputy Signature On this day personally appeared known to me to be the person whose signature appears on the foregoing return, personally appeared. After being duly sworn by me, he/she stated that this citation was executed by him/her in the exact manner recited on the return. · Sworn to and subscribed before me, on this dayof 20 ------ -------------------------- Notary Public  CAUSE NO. COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, Petitioner, vs. ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, Respondent. ORIGINAL DISCIPLINARY PETITION TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, a committee of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, and would respectfully show unto the Court as follows: I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN Pursuant to Rules 190.1 and 190.3 of the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Petitioner intends discovery in this case to be conducted under the Level2 Discovery Control Plan. II. PARTIES Petitioner is the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE (hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner"), a committee of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS. Respondent is ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent"), Texas Bar Card No. 08455300, a licensed attorney and a member of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS. III. NATURE OF PROCEEDING Petitioner brings this disciplinary action pursuant to the STATE BAR AcT, TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE ANNOTATED §81.001, et seq. (Vernon 2003); the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; and the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. The Complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was filed on or after January 1, 2004.  IV. VENUE Respondent's principal place of practice is Galveston County, Texas; therefore, venue is appropriate in Galveston County, Texas, pursuant to Rule 3.03 of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Respondent may be served at his business address, 1115 21st Street, Galveston, Texas 77550, or any place he may be found. V. PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT The acts and omissions of Respondent, as hereinafter alleged, constitute professional misconduct as defmed by Rule 1.06V of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. VI. CAUSE OF ACTION 1. On or about May 12, 2010, KRISTINA GUZMAN (hereinafter referred to as "GUZMAN") hired Respondent for representation in an employment retaliation matter. Respondent's fee was Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00). GUZMAN paid Respondent a total amount of Four Thousand One Hundred and No/1 00 Dollars ($4, 100.00), with an agreement to pay the remaining balance in installments. Respondent and GUZMAN did not execute an employment contract. 2. Thereafter, Respondent failed to take any action on GUZMAN'S part except for preparing a rough draft of the petition in or around April2011. 3. During the course of the representation, GUZMAN made numerous attempts to contact Respondent to ascertain the status of her case; however, Respondent failed to communicate with GUZMAN. 4. On or about July 11, 2011, GUZMAN left a message for Respondent notifying him that she might be moving out of state and therefore, was requesting a refund of unearned fees. Minutes later, Respondent finally responded that he would not refund her money, but Original Disciplinary Peliliow"Anlhony P. Gnffin Page 2 g:\litdocs\gri ffin .a. p_sbs\ 143 _,ouzman _lit\pleadings\dp.docx would look at her file and call her back. Respondent failed to call GUZMAN as promised. As such, on or about August 24, 2011, GUZMAN sent Respondent a letter whereby she terminated Respondent's representation and requested a detailed invoice of the services he provided, as well as the return of her client file. Respondent failed to provide GUZMAN with an accounting and further failed to return her client file. VII. RULE VIOLATIONS The acts and/or omissions of Respondent described above constitute conduct in violation of the following Rules of the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: l.Ol(b)(l) in representing a client, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer; 1.03(a) a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 1.04(a) a lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect an illegal fee or unconscionable fee; 1.04(d) a contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined; 1.14(b) upon receiving funds or other property in which a client has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property upon request; and 1.15(d) upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that has not been earned. VIII. The Complaint that forms tl1e basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention of the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS by KRISTINA GUZMAN'S filing of a grievance on or about November 28, 2011. Original Disciplinary PetlliDIVAnthony P. Griffin Page 3 g.:\litdocs\griffin. a.p_sbs\ 143 _guzman _I it\pleadings\dp.docx  PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, respectfully prays that this Court discipline Respondent, ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, by reprimand, suspension or disbarment, as the facts shall warrant; order restitution to Complainant, if applicable; and grant all other relief, general or specific, at law or in equity, to which Petitioner may show itself to be justly entitled including, without limitation, expenses, costs of court, and attorneys' fees. Respectfully submitted, STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Clrief Disciplinary Counsel LINDA A. ACEVEDO Assistant Disciplinary Counsel State Bar No. 24002896 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 758-8200 Fax: (713) 758-8292 ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE Original Disciplinary Pet ilion/Anthony P. Gritlin Page4 g \litdocs\griffin.a.p_sbs\143 _guzman_lit\pleadings\dp.docx  THE DISTRICT COURTS OF GALVESTON COUNTY CIVIL CASE INFORMATION STATEMENT The case Information Statement is for administrative purposes only. It shall be filed with the Parties Original Pleadings and shall be served upon all other parties to the action. All Status Conferences will be set for Thursdays following 90 days from the date of filing according to each Courts scheduled times 10m District Court- 10:00 A.M. 212m District Court- 9:00 A.M. 56tll District Court- 9:30 A.M. 405Ut District Court - 9:30 A.M. 122na District Court-9:30A.M. Notice of Status Conference Setting: Please calendar this event Date 11101/2012 set in the lOth District Court 12-CV-1732- lOth District Court Commission For Lawyer Discipline vs. Anthony P Griffin Nameofp· 11ng t h"IS t orm nmary_ Attorney fT Name of Opposrng Attorney, if known Attorney Name Attorney Name Attorney Bar No. Attorney Bar No. Attorney Address Attorney Address Attorney Phone No. Attorney Phone No. Attorney Fax No. Attorney Fax No. Briefly describe the case, including special characteristics that may warrant extended discovery or accelerated disposition. If discovery LEVEL 3 is requested, explain why. Attach additional sheets, if necessary. Estimated time for discovery Estimated trial time Do you presently anticipate adding any parties? If so when? Level Assignment Preferred: (please check one) Level1 Level2 Level3 $50,000 or less All Other Cases Court Order Only Is this case suitable for ADR? (yes or no) _ _ _ _ _ __ ADR M e t h o d ? - - - - - - - - - Signature of Attorney_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date signed _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Printed Name of Attorney: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __  ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS Misc. Docket No. 12-9119 Appointment of a District Judge to Preside in a State Bar Disciplinary Action The Supreme Court of Texas hereby appoints the Honorable Darlene Byrne, Judge ofthe 126th District Court, Austin, Texas, to preside in the Disciplinary Action styled: The Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Anthony P. Griffin to be filed in a District Court of Galveston County, Texas. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall promptly forward to the District Clerk of Galveston County, Texas, a copy of the Disciplinary Petition and this Order for filing pursuant to Rule 3.03, Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. As ordered by the Supreme Court of Texas, in chambers, With the Seal thereof affixed at the City of Austin, this JB:I:..da-y of July, 2012. ~~-~ BLAKE HAWTHORNE, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS  This assigrunent, made by Misc. Docket No. 12-9119, is also an assignment by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas pursuant to Texas Government Code,§ 74.057. fL Signed this {~ day of July, 2012. Wallace B. Jefferson Chief Justice Misc. Docket No. 12-9119 Page2  STATE BAR OF TEXAS Ojfzce of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel December 21, 2011 CMRRR#: 70101870000315035500 Mr. Anthony Paul Griffin 1115 21st Street Galveston, Texas 77550-4624 Re: H0111134143 Kristina Guzman- Anthony Paul Griffin Dear Mr. Griffin: The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has received the above-referenced Grievance, a copy of which is enclosed with this notice. This office has examined the Grievance and determined that the information provided alleges Professional Misconduct. Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, this matter has been classified as a Complaint. Please advise this office immediately if you are represented in this matter by an attorney. You must furnish to this office a written response to the- Complaint within thirty (30) days of receipt of this notice. The response should address specifically each allegation contained in the Complaint, and should further provide all information and documentation necessary for a determination of Just Cause as defmed in the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 2.10 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, you are required to provide a copy of your response directly to the Complainant. ·Pursuant to Rules 8.01(b) and 8.04(a)(8) of the Texas Disciplinary Ru1es of Professional Conduct, failure or refusal to timely furnish a response or other information requested by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, without timely asserting legal grounds to do so, constitutes Professional Misconduct. The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel maintains as confidential Disciplinary Proceedings, except that the pendency, subject matter, and status of a Disciplinary Proceeding may be disclosed by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel if the Respondent has waived confidentiality or the Disciplinary Proceeding is based upon conviction of a serious crime. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel may provide appropriate infonnation, including the response, to law enforcement agencies, under Rule 6.08 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. You will be notified in writing of further proceedings in this matter. 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: 713-758-8200 Fax: 713-758-8292 s· erely, 1 1. ~euVt\L~ L. Collier stant Disciplinary Counsel Office ofthe Chief Disciplinary Counsel State Bar of Texas JLC/ra Enclosure(s): Grievance (Copy of Complaint) CF2-3.  RECEIVED DEC 20 2611 STAlE BAR OFTEXASOFFICE OF THE CHJEF))ISCIPLINARY COUNSEL HOUSTONCDC . STATEBAROFTEXAS RETU NING GRIEVANCE FORM lt ender / I. GENERALINFORMATION ~QV} 0 20!1 Before you fill out thi~ pap~nvork, there may be a.faste:r way to resolve the iss are currently having with aii attorney. If you are considering filing a grievance against a Texas attorney for any of the f, reasons: Chief Disciplinary Counsel You believe your attorney is neglecting your case. · State Bar of Texa~/ Your attorney does not return phone calls or keep you informed about the statuS'~~-··..-· of your case. · You have fired your attorney l:lut are having problems getting your file back from the attorney. ' · You may want to consider contacting the Client-Attorney Assistance Program (CAAP) at 1-800-932-1900. CAAP was established by the State Bar of Texas to help people resolve these kinds of issues with attorneys quickly, without the filing of a formal grievan9e. CAAP can resolve many problems without a grievance being filed by providing information, by suggesting various self-help options for dealing with the situation, or by contacting the attorney either by telephone or letter. I have L_ I have not ___ contacted the Client-Attorney Assistance Program. NOTE: Please be sure to fill out each section completely. Do not leave any section blank. If you do not know the answer to any question, write "I don't know." . ' . I!. INFORM:ATION ABOUT YOU-- PLEASE KEEP CURRENT I. TDCJ/SID # PIMr. -f\lf-V-L..!..llA--L--.,---- r¢ Ms. Name:. \) 'f\.YI5fl (/\.?! 6uzm:::u1 Imiriigration # _ _ _ _ _ __ Address: City:~·~~----.-- State: _ _ _ _ Zip Code: ---~-.-- 0411 2. Employer:_ Employer's Address: --------------------------------------------- 3. Telephone number: Residence e-·. I • I' •. Work: -----~-----~ Other: - - - - - - - - 4. Drivers License # Date of Birth ' -------- 5. Name, address, and telephone number of person who can always reach you. Name Address Telephone. 6. Do you understand and write in the English language? -·--".~"+-'-e~5_,_______~_ If no, what is your primary language? · Who helped you prepare this form?----------:---:-:----....._- Will they be.available to transla'te future correspondence during this process? - - - - 7. Are you a Judge? :-'-b>.::::.-!!0"------.,.-,------- If yes, please provide Court, County, City, State: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - III. INFORMATION ABOUT ATTORNEY Note: Grievances are not accepted against law firms. You must specifically name the attorney against whom you are complaining. A separate grievance form must be completed for each attorney against whom you are complaining. 1. Attorney name: \\(')\='nOb~ 0ri.f-.fi V1 Address: ! I (6 Moody fu;oe: City: Gu \ves\o Y\ State:_U~--- Zip Code: :r'l S&o 2. Telephone number: Work tfotl ·J !f3· o 32>11 Home _ _ _ _ _ __ 3. Have you or a me!)l'l:fer of your family filed a grievance about this attorney previously? Yes_ No _../_1lff'"yes", please state its approximate date and outcome. _ _ _ _ __ 0411 2  Have you or a member of your family ever filed an appeal with the Board of Disciplinary Appeals about this attorney? Yes __ No L If"yes," please state its approximate date and outcome. 4. Please _9heck one of the following: _L_ This attorney was hired to represent me. This attorney was appointed to represent me. This attorney was hired to represent someone else. Please give the date the attorney was hired or appointed. Malj \ 1.. 12Dl 0 Please state what the attorney was hired or appointed to do. IZ..tpr.e~i 5. What was your fee arrangement with .the attorney? __,$.___5"""+1.... ()""0--"0"'-------·-·_·_ _ _ _ __ How much did you pay the attorney? ~~~'--~.Yf'-'-\4.QPO-L---------------- If you signed a contract and have a~' please attach. If you have~ of checks and/or receipts, please attach. Do not send originals. 6. If you didcr;ot hir~ the attomey;what is your connection with the attorney? Explain briefly 7. Are you currently represented by an attorney? __N-'--"'-'l"")_ _ _ _ __ If yes, please provide information about your current a t t o r n e y : - - - - - - - - - - - - 8. Do you claim the attorney has an impairment, such as depression or a substance use disorder? If yes, please provide specifics (your personal observations ofthe attorney 0411 3  such as slurred speech, odor of alcohol, ingestion of alcohol or drugs in your presence etc., including the date you observed this, the time of day, and lJ)Cation). (J ·. 9. -Did the attorney ever make any statem-ents or admissions to you or·in your presence that would indicate that the attorney may be experiencing an impairment, such as depression or a substarice:use disorder?':Jfso, please prov1de.details. -.. -- IV. INF.ORMATION ABOUT YOUR GRIEVANCE I. Where did the activity you are complaining about occur? · .· 2. If ymlr grie_vance is. about a ·lawsuit, ariswer the following, if known: .. a: Name ofcourt --------------------------------~----------------- b. Title of the suit·- ------------------~------~----------------------- c. Case number and date suit was· filed_-____c,__...:,..__ _ _ __.:.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ d. If you are not a party to this suit, what is your connecti-on with it? Explain briefly . ....~ ... :...::-. :.... ' . 3. .··Explain in detail why you think this attorney has done ·something improp~r or has fa lied to do something which should have been done. Attach additional sheets of paper if . : . . . • ' ·,j:' \ .• ' necessary. If you have copies of letters or other documents you believe are relevant to your grievance, please attach. Do not send originals. Include the names, addresses, and telephone number of all persons who k'~ow something about your grievance. - 0411 4  Also, please be advised that a copy of your grievance will be forwarded to the attorney named in your grievance. DY\. ~ W.,'l..OIO Nv; brlfBn Was ~ -tv. cqr.eSeb;t me fov c.t_, t{.-\-o.llo..:haf\ c..o.s-e ll1jlLlf\51: mlj pr'E-v,oas .emplnr:jPY, &i&hno -vs-12e ~ fwif'fi, ~tiN ~ V\t 'Jjou.Ld. f..epr&nt rru fn v- wtdJu be. CA ftz.U to roo..Kr o.. P~ m:C.Dt t.u\il--,"1 T fuv..nJ. "'- Ji,b. 1~n w~s \Cc.Nlo(_V'o~h 4o a..Cup+ ±hat orj..(frt' .ll-6-t. o.f-+4 +N.. La~-\- dJ.od ii 1/"l.J!, .\br -\-4 Q~~!\Wf fM fl~J:= oc t.SpDo.O n B:pci/ JC/,tD/1 IN08'fi..t ~s\o- ~.QfOir.tto\ttlt Sc.h.td.I.U-<(( ~ woi- wwn c,r;;.f;n -\l,y= 'E»:ot~po. 'Dr! or =\-\> dciVlh" -M lit.41u1">h?n .frl>tn. VAS 6~ ;1. ~t.(J 'ro C:Onbrrn ±N. a. ppni~n-t. lf-+ ~roll.! n,~-\f lJ. t:{-.GSptr. :::Z: o..yri v'..fd e:i bri~.fi f'\ ·fit.(.. \.\.t ~c. \0\oW\.(&_'j:l.d '(\AQ. and £111 n,(\~ spoK-1 4-'hat ht lb)t'l.S i V) cou.tr au A!Uj ~ ~ ~ A:JuJ..JJ...4 ~~l.. To rN.. ~ec...u,S& V>£ hctd: a.... NAAac,Vu . Ht ~~ wi+-n N.s Q.Ss;s~ ~ Y'i. rul.v\ s.-ed 'vu..t -\1> '5~, \!'f\1. a..n a.f2P oi f\tnv nf b ( ~ folio~ 111j 3\A.nrla :; f¥ri ( I ? ~l. ( 1 tV' o.. \O'.OOo.-""9-~f'~il'\~± bl\ ~01 tf) 1'ta!\.T...- \Uj'Stif¥\C':7tA."L~ ll-rrivd CL-+~ ilPf-i~ 11' \O'.OOCU'A· ~~fin s~ IIDW?jhl~ \5 ybdtw.-.(.-c'> ~pinCj ~ yo~b olmf+ u£ \A)hcl h.t. ~ d ~ ~ ~~'NJ -\-D er..e.W\J-, \k_ eM a l'lM- t.ompkJe -\N... ro~h d-nrt4 and ,fretted-~ 4 w~ ~l c;u)- ~ f1~iu t&>e~. \tL shU \0.\!J.fW'\\ I f\qu.i fin, ±ht.sw-u.& o~\-4- br~eJ:nd et>.f~.lli~ ct.ssis.t-:ud- &1-s ~~d- '{\).. N.t.d. s.~,\lS~ ttWI.Y ~Wr t\..t I tH.Yf b~A..)--,~,-1.- :k- f\).e-w.K (nti I{£ an.'-3--}tu..~ V. HOW DID YOU LEARN ABOUT THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS' ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE PROCESS? Yellow Pages Internet Other 0411 5 VI. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WAIVER I hereby expressly waive any attorney-client privilege as to the attorney, the subject of this grievance, and authorize such attorney to reveal any information in the professional relationship to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas. I understand that the Office o( Chief Disciplinary Counsel maintains as confidential the processing ofGrievances. · · Sighatur~~ ~·· _!_f..LI·_,3~·-=-'l.L/~~~~- ·Date: ·..... To ENSURE PROMPT ATTENTiON; THE GRIEVANCE SHOULD BE MAILED TO: THE OFFICE OF' CHIEF DISCIPUNARY COUNSEL P.O. Box 13287 · ·Austin:, Texas 78711 .. -·; . :·· .'(' . 0411 6 On July 30, 2011 at 10:30am I contacted Griffin law firm and spoke with a male assistant who answered the phone and advised that Griffin was out of the office and wouldn't be returning until later that week. I stated to the individual that I've been calling for weeks and months and was tired of leaving a voicemail message and would never receive a call back. The individual suggest that I call Griffin on a direct cell phone line, and the number he gave me was {713} 408-1346. At 10:32 am I contacted Griffin who didn't answer so I left him a voice message stating that I had made many calls inquiring the status of the case and had not received a call back and that I was possibly moving out of the states and was requesting my refund of money back due to the false agreement we·;held from the May 12, 20:!.0. Griffin returned my phone call back and at approximately 10:36am and replied that "it didn't work like that, and give him a couple of days to look over my files". He stated that he would contact me within a couple of days. I never received a call from Griffin like he said from the previous phone conversation we held. So on August 24,20111 sent Griffin a certified letter through the USPS letting. him know that I wanted all work to be stopped, I wanted a bill receipt of all the work he have done, and to turn over all files. In return Griffin sent in the mail a letter stating NO REFUND/ CLOSING FILE. He had stated in his letter that "We have performed consistent with our contract," which was a false statement. No work other than the rough draft he typed was done which took place on April17, 2011. Mr. Griffin had confirmed that the lawsuit would not take longer than a year to finalize. After our meeting we held on April17, 2011 he stated that from that date it would be one month exactly and everything would be finalized.  - ') 2. 010 -~I P::~eas-:= accep-c t::h.is let t>=-r o_s c-.::-.::lfirTnat.i.c)n c>f ~-~~= ~-?ayTnerlt: :>f $3,00C~OO on yot:r :ceta.ine.r:- c~f $5,..00C~O·~; Coal2:-1.c~2 ·r~.:~ 11 be. p-3.ya!.:·J_e o-\p:::-~ 9 0 · da~:.. fJ~=.r:!. o6.) _ Pl ea.se: :-:: ·:: t.e t 11-=~ t. -.~Je will prepare a contract and forward ~nder ssparate ccve~­ Th;.:mk yc.-cJ. for coE.sid·;:,ring our finn. Si11ce:cely, ---- ------- /_..........- __ ..-····' · .•.. _ ·~----AII-:.:~iC;ny Griffi-r1 P. A Griffi_n Lawyers 11~'--~i ~~()Cd~{ Galvescon, Texas 7'7550 4t)9. 75~:.: _ 03BE- i. SOli .. 750- 5(!:!4 Facsimile No. 409.763_4102 E~.PG/ files ::; : ··1o.r:d g:.l7.m-=.n __ kr.ist.i:::1..3._ clie::-}t:_G0::Jfirr:l<::t: i.o-:-,;,  ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN. INC. A Projessiona l C01poratioH Lawyers Galveston Is land Galveston, Texas 77550 ,_7uly 6 r 2C:O Tc: K~istina Guzman ~~':::-orr:: 1-'..nthony P. GriffiD. 1 ::.inc.  CAUSE NO. KRISTINA - GUZMAN IN THE. v. JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT E? CORPORATION - USA ~~u MICHAEL CASTANEDA GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS PLAINTIFF, KRISTINA L. GUZMAN'S, ORIGINAL PETITION TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COUIRT: This lawsuit is brought by Kristina L. Guzman, J hereinafter and sometimes referred to as Plaintiff, against BP Corporation and Michael Castaneda, hereinafter referred to as Defendants. Plaintiff brings this suit complaining that her rights under Texas law have been violated. Plaintiff sues for damages: I. This matter is a schedule 2 matter as that term is defined under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. II. At all times material to this action, Plaintiff has been a resident of the County of Galveston. Defendant, BP Corporation, can be served with process by serving its registered agent, to-wit: Defendant, Michael Castaneda, can be served with process by serving him at  III. Plaintiff began employment with Wackenhunt Security on November 3, 2009 as a Patrol Officer at the BP, Texas City, Texas site. Plaintiff worked the site without incident or complaint. On or about September 27, 2009, Plaintiff was called in office, based on a complaint from Ben Weir, Security j Operations Center. Plaintiff told that Weir complained with respect to her having a tongue ring. Plaintiff denied having a ring and a picture was taken of her tongue. During the process of taking the picture, Plaintiff was informed as to who made the complaint and was informed by Reza Ahwazi, Wackenhut BP Project Manager, that Ben Weir wanted her out of the plant. On or about September 25 1 2009, Ben Weir, approached Plaintiff and inquired whether she changed her hair for him. Plaintiff didn't know what to say·to the comment. Plaintiff then went to her management Reza Ahwazi and reported the comment. She informed her management she didn't know Mr. Weir and did not know why the comment was being made (a good faith complaint). Mr. Ahwazi stated he would investigate the matter. IV.  In Ahwazi's investigative report he explains that he presented the complaint to Ben Weir and Castaneda. The following information is found in the report: I immediately proceeded to SOC to communicate the incident with Ben Weir first and ask him If he was involved in these inappropriate comments. I brought the matter to Officer Ben Weir attention. He answered its bunch of B.S. and asked to bring this matter to Michael Castaneda's attention. Officer Ben Weir and I walked to Mr. Castaneda's office and I handed over the statement by Officer Guzman to Mr. Castaneda, after a very brief look at the statement Mr. Castaneda aia, (this is stupid) and that nothing makes sense, moments later Mr. Castaneda turned over the statement hack to me and said (forget about it) and there's no merit to this and no one needs to know about this. Although I believed that this matter should be investigated by BP further, I decided that for the sake of our contract and of our officers, I thought it would be best that I closed the case with no fault on Officer Ben Weir's side. Wackenut's contract and existence ln the BP ended February 12, 2010. The new contract was taken over by Securitas Security. Securitas hired all of the other patrol personnel that were under the contract with Wackenhut, but did not hire Plaintiff. ' When Plaint.iff inquired of Securitas why she was not hired, Plaintiff was informed that BP did not want her out at the facility. It is Plaintiff's belief that she was denied employment with Securitas because of her good faith complaint that she reported about Weir's comments. v.  ,-",nthony Gdfin M:r. Griffin per ou:.- conversation '\Ve held on 07-30-2011 at 2.?proximately l032am. I am requesting that all vwrk on the case Kristin2. Guzman -vs. - BP be stopped. I ru'TI also requesting that you provide a detailed bill receipt and tunwver all files. I have made previocs phone calls a week after-talking with you about requesting my funds of $4. 100 dollars back that \Vas advised b:,: yourself. Thank You Kristina L. Guzman ' ~-- ~· -~. ~ .-,~--~ -~- _v··-.,/ .-. !\ l • _~ •• ,•· ,"'. ,.· -~: /-~-~-_( ~ _.....--:..... ~ -::·-~----·-.. (:,_ ~ ! /-h ··----~ i .j . ,.. !·L_.. i·;__ _c__ .· •.- ; ·-''··./  A GRIFFIN LA WYERS Galvesron Island Galveston, Texas 77550 August 29, 2011 Kristina L. Guzman J RE: NO REFUND/CLOSING FILE Ms. Guzman: Please note that I am acknowledging that you have a desire to terminate t.he processing of your case because of your movin9 from the area. Please note that there will be :no refund. We have· performed consistent with our contract. Good luck in the future and on your move. Sincerely, ___ ::.--:-- ' ' (/ ------ __________ ./"' ~ ---_.-/- /~--- -· ................. Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lavryers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102 APG/ files xc: Interoffice -Rita Westerman (close file) c: word-guzman_J-:ristina_cli6nt3_transrni ttal  CAUSE NO. 12-CXV-1732 COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN THE lOTH V. JUDICIAL DISTR~;,, ~C§!JRT \% tin, Texas 78701). Judgmcn1 ofPlll1:ially Prob9ted Suspension Page 4 of9  Respondent shall pay restitu1jon to Polly Reddin in the amount of Five Thousand and No/1 00 Dollars ($5,000.00). In July 2013, Respondent tendered payment to Polly Reddin in the amount of Five Thousand aud Noll 00 Dollars ($5,000.00), and has therefore satisfied this condition of the Judgment. Respondent shall complete the Law Office Management Program by January 14,2014, and provide proof of completion to the STATEBAROFTEXAS, ChiefDisciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), by January 14, 2014. It is further 0 RD ERED that during the term of active suspension ordered herein, or that may be imposed upon Respondent by the BOARD OF DISCIPLINARY APPEALS (hereinafter referred to as "BODA") as a result of a probation revocation proceeding, Respondent shall be prohibited from practicing law in Texas; holding lumself out as an attorney at law; performing any legal services for others; accepting any fee directly or indirectly for legal services; appearing as counsel or in any representative capacity in any proceeding in any Texas or Federal court or before any administrative body; or holding himself out to others or using his name, in any mmmer, in conjunction with the words "attorney at law,'' "attorney,." "counselor at law," or "lawyer." It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall immediately notify each of Respondent's current clients and opposing counsel in writing of this suspension. in addition to such notification, it is fmther ORDERED that Respondent shall return any files, papers, unearned monies and other prope1ty belonging to current clients in Respondent's possession to the respective clients or to another attorney at the client's request. :It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall file with the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711~2487 (1414 Colorado St., Judgment of Partially Probated Suspension Page 5 of9  Austin, Texas 78701) on or before thirty (30) days after the date this Judgment is signed, an affidavit stating all current clients and opposing counsel have been notified of Respondent's suspension and · that all files, papers, morues and other property belonging to all current clients have been returned as ordered herein. It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall, immediately, notifY in writing each and every justice of the peace, judge, magistrate, administxative judge or officer and chief justice of each and every court or tribunal in which Respondent has any matter pe!iding of the tenus of this Judgment, the style and cause number of the pending matter(s ), and the name, address and telephone number of the client(s) Respondent is representing. It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall file with the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701) on or before thirty(30) days aflerthe date this Judgment is signed, an affidavit stating Respondent has notified in writing each and every jmtice of the peace, judge, magistxate, and chiefj mstice of each and every court in which Respondent has any matter pending of the terms ofthis judgment, the style and cause number of the pending matter(s), and the name, address and telephone number of the client(s) Respondent is representing in Court. It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall immediately surrender his law license fu'1d permanent State Bar Card to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ChiefDisciplinMy Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), to be forwarded to the SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS. Terms of Probation It is furt..'ter ORDERED that during all periods of suspension, Respondent shall be under the following terms and conditions: Judgment of Partially P1·o bated Suspwsion Page 6 of9  1. Respondent shall not violate any term of this Judgment. 2. Respondent shall not engage :in professionai misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06(V) of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLTI-.!ARY PROCEDURE. 3. Respondent shall not violate any state or federal criminal statutes. 4. Respondent shall keep the STATE BAR OF TEXAS membership department notified of current mailing, residence and business addresses and telephone numbers. 5. Respondent shall comply with Minimum Contin.uing Legal Education requirements. 6. Respondent shall comply with Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) requirements. 7. Respondent shall promptly respond to any request for information from the Chief Disciplinary Counsel in connection with any investigation of any allegations of professional misconduct. Probation Revocation Upon information that Respondent has violated a term of this Judgment, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel may, in addition to all other remedies available, file a motiori to revoke probation pursuant to Rule 2.23 of the TEXAS RULES OF DJSCIPLINAR Y PROCEDURE with the Board of Disciplinary Appeals (hereinafter refened to as "BODA") and serve a copy of the motion on Respondent pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 21 a. BODA shall conduct an evidentiary hea.ring. At tl1e hearing, BODA shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether Respondent has violated any term of this Judgment. If BODA finds grounds for revocation, BODA shall enter an order revoking probation and placing Respondent on active suspension from the date of such revocation order. Respondent shall not be given credit for any term of probation served prior to revocation. It is further ORDERED that any conduct on the part of Respondent which serves as the basis for.a ~notion to revoke probation may also be brought as independent grounds for discipline as Judgment of Partially Probated Suspr.nsion Page 7 of 9 allowed under the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT and TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Restitution. Attorneys' Fees and Expenses It is fwther ORDERED Respondent shall pay restitution to Polly Reddin in the amount of Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00). 1".1 July 2013, Respondent tendered payment to PollyReddin in the amount of Five Thousand and No/1 00 Dollars ($5,000.00), and has therefore satisfied this condition of the Judgment. It is further ORDERED Respondent shall pay aU reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and direct expenses to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS in the amount of One Thousand Six Hundred Ten and No/100 Dollars ($1 ,61 0.00). In July 2013, Respon~cnt made a payment to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS in the amount of Five Hundred and No/1 00 Dollars ($500.00). The remaining payment One Thousand One Hundred Ten and Noll 00 Dollars ($1, 11 0.00) shall be due and payable on or beJore January 14, 2014, and shaH be made by certified or cashier's check or money order. Respondent shall forward the funds, made payable to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ChiefDisciplinary Counsel's Office, p_Q_ Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701). It is fw.ther ORDERED that all amounts ordered herein are due to the misconduct of Respondent, are assessed as a part of the sanction in accordance with Rule l.06(Y) of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Any amount not paid shall accme interest at the maximum legal rate per annum until paid and the STATE BAR OF TEXAS shall have all writs and other post- judgment remedies against Respondent in order to r.ollect all unpaid amounts. Judgm~.nt of Partially Probated Snspcnsinn Page 8 of9  Publ.ication This suspension shall be made a matter of record and appropriately published in accordance with the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Other Relief All requested relief not expressly granted herein is expressly DENIED. siGNED this 22nd.dayof Ocrobey '2013. EVIDENTIARY PANEL DISTRICT NO. 5-2 STATE DAR OF TEX...\.S Judgment of Partially Probated Suspensioo Page 9of9  STATE BAR OF TEXAS I RECEIVED JUL .L 8 201 ~ Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel July 16, 2012 Via Certified Mail No. 7010 1870 0003 1503 6200, Return Receipt Requested Anthony P. Griffin 1115 21 51 Street Galveston, Texas 77550-4624 RE: Case No. H0031234738 Polly Reddin- Anthony P. Griffin Dear Mr. Griffin: The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has completed its investigation of the above-referenced Complaint and deterrriined on July 5, 2012, that there is Just Cause to believe that you have committed one or more acts of Professional Misconduct, as defined by the TEXAS RULES OF DlSCIPLfNARY PROCEDURE (TRDP). In accordance with TRDP 2.14D, a statement of your acts and/or omissions and the TEXAS DlSClPLfNARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT that the Chief Disciplinary Counsel contends are violated by the alleged acts and/or omissions follows: On or about October 4, 2011, Polly Reddin (hereinafter refened to as "Complainant") hired Anthony P. Griffm (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent") to file a civil suit related to the payment of a debt. Complainant paid Respondent Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00) for the representation with the understanding from Respondent that he would file suit on her behalf. During the course of the representation, Complainant made numerous attempts to contact Respondent to ascertain the status of her case; however, Respondent failed to communicate with Complainant. Complainant made an appointment to meet with Respondent on February 24, 2012, which was later canceled. When Complainant met with Respondent on February 27, 2012, Respondent presented Complainant with a petition that contained several enors. Complainant made another appointment to meet with Respondent on March 2, 2012, but that appointment was also canceled. At the next appointment scheduled on March 5, g: \general\griffin. a_sbs\73 B_red dm\corres pondencc\el ecti on letter docx 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 758-8200 Toll Free: (866) 224-5999 Fax: (713) 758-8292  STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel Anthony P. Griffin July 16,2012 RE: Case No. H0031234738 Page2 2012, Complainant was informed that the corrected paperwork was not ready and to come back the next day. On March 6, 2012, Complainant called Respondent's office before she made the trip and was told that Respondent was out of town and her corrected paperwork still was not ready. As a result, on March 6, 2012, Complainant sent Respondent an email whereby she terminated his representation and requested a refund of her retainer. Respondent failed to refund any unearned portion of the retainer. These alleged acts violate the following TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: l.Ol(b)(l) in representing a client, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer; 1.03(a) a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and 1.15(d) upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that has not been earned. Pursuant to TRDP 2.15, you must notify this office whether you elect to have the Complaint heard by an Evidentiary Panel ofthe District Grievance Committee or in a district court of proper venue, with or without a jury. The election must be in writing and served upon the Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office no later than twenty (20) days after your receipt of this notice. Failure to file a timely election shall conclusively be deemed an affirmative election to proceed before an Evidentiary Panel in accordance with TRDP 2.17 and 2.18. Enclosed is a form in which to indicate your election and principal place of practice. It should be mailed to the undersigned at the address shown at the bottom of this Jetter. In making your election, you should be aware than an Evidentiary Panel proceeding is confidential unless a public sanction is entered and that a private reprimand is only available before an Evidentiary Panel. District court proceedings are public and a private reprimand is not an available sanction. g:\general\griffin.a_sbs\738_reddin\correspondence\election Jetter.docx  COMPLAINT AGAINST § § ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN § H000031234738 [POLLY REDDING] § GALVESTON, TEXAS § RESPONDENT'S ELECTION & PRINCIPAL PLACE OF PRACTICE CERTIFICATION I, Anthony P. Griffin, hereby elect: (Choose one of the following) - - - - District Court _ _ _ _ Evidentiary Hearing - District Grievance Committee I, Anthony P. Griffin, hereby certify that: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Physical Address- no P.O. Box) _ _ _ _ _ _ _(City), _ _ _ _ _ _ (County), Texas, is my principal place of practice. SIGNED this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2012. ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN **RETURN THIS FORM WITHIN 20 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF ELECTION NOTICE** g:\general\gri ffin .a_sbs\73 8_red din \correspondence\election letter. do ex  STATE BAR OF TEXAS Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel April10,2012 CMRRR#: 70101870000315040597 Mr. Anthony Paul Griffin 11 15 21st Street Galveston, Texas 77550-4624 Re: H0031234738 Polly Reddin- Anthony Paul Griffin Dear Mr. Griffin: The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has received the above-referenced Grievance, a copy of which is enclosed with this notice. This office has examined the Grievance and determined that the information provided alleges Professional Misconduct. Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, this matter has been classified as a Complaint. Please advise this office immediately if you are represented in this matter by an attorney. You must furnish to this office a written response to the Complaint within thirty (30) days of receipt of this notice. The response should address specifically each allegation contained in the Complaint; and should further provide all information and documentation necessary for a determination of Just Cause as defmed in the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 2.10 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, you are required to provide a copy of your response directly to the Complainant. Pursuant to Rules 8.0l(b) and 8.04(a)(8) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, failure or refusal to timely furnish a response or other information requested by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, without timely asserting legal grounds to do so, constitutes Professional Misconduct. The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel maintains as confidential Disciplinary Proceedings, except that the pendency, subject matter, and status of a Disciplinary Proceeding may be disclosed by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel if the Respondent has waived confidentiality or the Disciplinary Proceeding is based upon conviction of a serious crime. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel may provide appropriate information, including the response, to law enforcement agencies, under Rule 6.08 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. You will be notified in writing of further proceedings in this matter. 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: 713-758-8200 Fax: 713-758-8292 Enclosure(s): Grievance (Copy of Complaint) CF2-J.  OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL STATE BAR OF TEXAS RECEIVED GRIEVANCE FORM APR 02 2012 I. GENERAL INFORMATION STATE BAR OF TEXAS Before you fill out this paperwork, there may be a faste~~e£~ the issue you are currently having with an attorney. If you are considering filing a grievance against a Texas attorney for any of the following reasons: You believe your attorney is neglecting your case. Your attorney does not return phone calls or keep you informed about the status of your case. You have fired your attorney but are having problems getting your file back from .the attorney. You may want to consider contacting the Client-Attorney Assistance Program (CAAP) at 1-800-932-1900. CAAP was established by the State Bar of Texas to help people resolve these kinds of . issues with attorneys quickly, without the filing of a formal grievance. CAAP can resolve many problems without a grievance being filed by providing information, by suggesting various self-help options for dealing with the situation, or by contacting the attorney either by telephone or letter. I have ___ I have not V contacted the Client-Attorney Assistance Program. NOTE: Please be sure to fill out each section completely. Do not leave any section blank. If you do not know the answer to any question, write "I don't know." II. INFORMATION ABOUT YOU- PLEASE KEEP CURRENT 1. TDCJ/SID# _ _ _ _ _ ~:. Name: flJI~KcJJin Immigration# _ _ _ _ _ __ Address: State: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Zip Code:-~---- 0411 2. Employer:_ Employer's Address:_·· 3. Telephone number: Residence Work: Other: - - - - - - - - 4. Drivers License # _ _ Date of Birth___,~~~.:::....._.:::.....___ 5. Name, address, and telephone number of person who can always reach you. Name _______________ Address.....:_______________~~-=--- Telephone _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ 6. Do you understand and write in the English language? ---'k\"4-.~...t'_SL......._ _ _ __ lf no, what is your primary language? · Who helped you prepare this form? _....!N...!.·~o=--~o:.Lr.J..:.ceO::::...._______________ Will they be available to translate future correspondence during this process? _____ 7. Are you a Judge? _ _....~.rJ:...!....!:o=--._ _ _ __ If yes, please provide Court, County, City, State: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ffi. INFORMATION ABOUT ATTORNEY Note: Grievances are not accepted against law fmns. You must specifically name the attorney against whom you are complaining. A separate grievance form must be completed for each attorney against whom you are complaining. · Address: .//IS . (Y)ooal'-1 City: C-rc. lves +t>11 State: lex 'i .s Zip Code: ""]I s-s- D 2. Telephone number: Work 4o1- ·7 &3-· o381..Jlome _ _ _ _ _ __ Other 'gOO-').S'D-'5o:Jf 3. Have you or a member of your family filed a grievance about this attorney previously? Yes~ No V If"yes", please state its approximate date and outcome. _ _ _ _ __ 0411 2  Have you or a member of your family ever filed an appeal with the Board of Disciplinary Appeals about this attorney? Yes _ _ No JL If''yes," please state its approximate date and outcome. 4. Please check one of the following: V This attorney was hired to represent me. This attorney was appointed to represent me. This attorney was hired to represent someone else. Please give the date the attorney was hired or appointed. _ __._f....:O=-----=~J_---.:..1-'1:..___ _ __ Please state what the attorney was hired or appointed to do. X bi reJ hiM +6 reprebe,J- fhe C1ar11:xl {!h tr:.a'jt> Utle C:C~td /(e/sA..,..__'> 5. What was your fee arrangement with the attorney? JJ5·DOD. qp re--+a ,·tfl er "'f How much did you pay the attorney? _.ff_--"S~~"""a"""m~'-'----C?_P___________~- If you signed a contract and have a ~ please attach. If you have~ of checks and/or rec~ipts, please attach. Do not send originals. 6. If you did not hire the attorney, what is your connection with the attorney? Explain briefly 7. Are you currently represented by an attorney? ___,f'l'--.o_______ If yes, please provide information about your current attorney: -------------------- 8. Do you claim the attorney has an impairment, such as depression or a substance use disorder? If yes, please provide specifics (your personal observations ofthe attorney 0411 3  such as slurred speech, odor of alcohol, ingestion of alcohol or drugs in your presence etc., including the date you observed this, the time of day, and location). 9. Did the attorney ever make any statements or admissions to you or in your presence that would indicate that the attorney may be experiencing an impairment, such as depression or a substance use disorder? If so, please provide details. IV. INFORMATION .ABOUT YOUR GRIEVANCE 1. Wbere did the activity you are complaining about occur? County: ~u.\ves-ton 2. If your grievance is about a lawsuit, answer the following, if known: a. Name of court -------------------------------------------------- c. Case number and date suit was filed ------'N'-'-'e=---"-oJ--"e"---'--r__......[__,,'-·.u.lc_.'""'J'--------- d. If you are not a party to this suit, what is your connection with it? Explain briefly. If you have~ of court documents, please attach. 3. Explain in detail why you think this attorney has done something improper or has failed to do something which should have been done. Attach additional sheets of paper if necessary. A He.. c 1\e cl If you have ~ of letters or other documents you believe are relevant to your grievance, please attach. Do not send originals. Include the names, addresses, and telephone number of aU persons who know something about your grievance. 0411 4  Also, please be advised that a copy of your grievance wiD be forwarded to the attorney named in your grievance. on 1o · 011 - w ,f-L- )7ifl1 t2ha<.f t1.. t!ilSe. f-Ie. aql'eed 1-o fu_fp mi.f (!use tl'fu//J~i Ker:5Aaw 6tfer!;-/-f5 {l;tJ c./o;d /Yle .Ju includt::; Ck/ec"-51? 77f/e. ;-b J me lo hr,-/1 1 Ai 111 a# -sOlA?'.o.P rc..ia.,'"e"' A-s~ h-e.ea c.J /1e U)a.s e &JA 12..fs c./AB tJeK:.+ [i:(?if T b rou.r!t I ) ,·Ju ..Me Chec.-f fl,. --fire re lu /r1er b C)r;J f ..fhe '5uj'l -5-J-arleJ Ot·tJ i-J- t:_iea"'eJ my hct,L.tf:: /Jl:j JD/'7/"/..c:>l/, , ?: f'/Dn ~k+o AJM he wt:t5 oul. I le-/-1- l)c;,·ce /11e5~~9""" OfLJ never fV&.5 {!u!le.J ~- Ianl.14r'11'!:"- ;Jo;;). T {}et-fled O.fjo~t<-~'n avul t-VuS ·lo,J. because o+ J)1e A~lidc:y nD-J{;;t 7 W bee"~ do~~e.k..-hr<-<.c.y 13!'-:J.Dk). T.se,vf an e-ma_f/ .fo /J1r .br,'f~·'] an..d atp./a ftJ resp?oJ7se -h #e. e-ma.( (. J.ina!l't W.r'-(~ry ;)dll..d dOJC). . I drove.. +o Gu.. /ve:fo-1 +o £ce 1£ h;2 o{{/ce c.va.s s+i;t +here_. /-Ji:5 11 5c:c n::...f7(.y fp ld rne O.§a in fo.., . br dkn was 17D t -/!Jere he wcc.s --/it~ rO(_.t)J/lcr Dl-{;.:1- JL.,~" {/he '6e.-i- u_p ari thff'C1/A l /1'1~1>/ t~r me heca .... .se T 1Je74~ fo fork.{)tain czJ;~~-1 /f httal heert. V. HOW DID YOU LEARN ABOUT THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS' ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE PROCESS? Yellow Pages Internet v Other 0411 5  I 6J /l -/-/71" e./ /2r .,.,_,_.__ F 0 ~ I I -:r -a .~no._/l·t1~5 o~J.. i1_p-};. rt~-- ~t-ac! k~ _J~~~- --sA~-- + 6q ~ J Jc: fs t;;~~c;.J£.. le 0 a..p_pa./rl::.i'vYiex::/_ ~r .. 1"---. +- yll_f,A. _ . 1-9 __ /f?o/t. .ax€t::_ f!0-P-.-t!t:-?.. ___f7_j_~_q~c£. -~~~/_______ . . . ___________ _ ~ {))Ckj ) e. will h(!LJ~ _fo ..cit? . . Satfr.(2,. cfA;'!.'l·-----:5.~- _________________ _ j. 7" :_J{· ~() 0:es ._.a LP..tuf __ E~J~~~ ~-:..'1-- _:;~:f:_~ __c)~.!..?___~ ~_d______________________ _-~ JJ1 e~ _(Ia 1_/r:_j_ a.~ J.. 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I? . _(lp__ f _t2-c:_f?!f2It?.(/2£ . ~~-~~-- _ ! }ehdv,M /N an (Z#_.,r-o'O-_ ?Je/f~ _/l To: anthonypgriffin Subject: re:fund of retainer Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2012 12:24 pm Dear Mr. Griffin, I am writing this letter to end our client I Lawyer relationship. I am requesting a refund of my retainer for the following reasons: I came in and spoke to you about my situation and you agreed to take the case. At that time you told me our best bet was to file suit against the title compa.ny because they had neglected to do there jobs to protect me and included First Step Learning Center also. You told me you would be filing suit the followng week so you needed a $5000.00 retainer. I agreed to this and rushed to come up with the money. Here we are 5 months later and nothing has been done. I have e-rnailed you and recieved no response to e-mails I have called on several occasions and dont even get the courtesy of a returned call. I finally drove to Galveston to see if your office was even still there to be told by the secretary you werent there you were out getting rid of junk. She set me up an appointment for February 24th 2012 and it was cancelled by your office. I was told to come in on Monday the 27th when I got there I felt like some papers had been thrown together to shut me up. When I asked about the lawsuit against the title company you asked me why would I sue them? I then reminded you it was your idea. I then had to refresh your memory on that. Which just proves my point Ive been pushed to the side and its been to long since my file has even been looked at. I then got another appointment to come back on March 2nd 2012. I explained to you we have wasted to much time and needed to move on this. So March 2nd comes and again your office cancelled my appointment. When I asked for my money back your response to me was to calm down you would have everything together for me Monday March 5th 2012 so I again drove to Galveston to collect my paperwork and I was again informed they werent ready to come in the morning .So March 6th is here I thought I better call before making another wasted trip to Galveston I was then told by your office that you were in Lousianna and my stuff was still not ready and you had e-mailed me. I checked my e-mail and never recieved anything from you. When I questioned her the response I get is all I can do is tell you what he said. Well I think Ive been patient enough and clearly not treated in a professional manner. I am very disppointed in the way things have been handled. I would like to recieve my retainer back ASAP so we can move forward. Thank You, Polly Reddin http://mail.aol.com/35683-lll/aol-6/en-us!Lite/PrintMessage.aspx?user=Z2Clj5wR86&fol... 3/6/2012 AOL Mail - Print Message Page 1 of 1 From: Polly< To: anthonypgri:ffin Subject: Suit for First Step Daycare or Polly World Inc . . Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2012 3:55pm --i Mr. Griffin, I was trying to follow up on the suit. I looked on my books and I paid the retainer in october. I thought by now we might have started something but I still havent heard anything from your office. Do You --now when we might get things started? Please call and let me know something. Thank You Polly Reddin 409-771-1854 http://mail.aol.com/3 5683-llllaol-6/en-us!Lite/PrinL\.1essage.aspx?user=Z2C 1j 5wR86&fol... 3/6/2012  - .., 5679 I l I I ! ! I j. rI. I I ' 20111006005500626455 3475 I • 0:  A GRIFFIN LAWYERS Galveston Island Galveston, Texas 77550 October 4, 2011 CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT Parties to Agr~ement This is to authorize A GRIFFIN LAWYERS/ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, INC. , hereinafter and sometimes referred to as LAWYERS, to act as lawyers for the undersigned, POLLY REDDIN, hereinafter and sometimes referred to as CLIENT{S), relative to all matters concerning breach of contract, deceptive trade, etc .. You are Hiring Us to Do What? 1. To investigate your case to determine the viability of the case. 2. To advise you as to the viability of same. 3. To work with you wit.h respect to your case including appearing on your behalf b~fore any corporat~on, official, board, department, administrative body or to file suit and in any Court {Federal or State), if necessary and if v.rarranted. Retainer/What is it?/What does It Mean?/What It Isn't? 1. In consideration of the services rendered and to be rendered to client by the said law firm, the client  agrees to pay $5,000.00. 2. Your retainer is the consideration to hire ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, INC., h~wfZRS. 3. Sa.id retainer is no:.1-refundable. This means that once the fee is paid, it shall be deemed earned. This does not mean that the retainer represents the total attorney fees due the firm (see 4 herein}. 4. This retainer fee should not be interpreted as cor:stituting the full reasonable fee to which the loav..ryers may be entitled for services performed pursuant to an award of the Court or settlement. Att.orney Fee Determination The determina.tioD of attorneys' fees shall be made as follow~:: 1. The attorney ~J.as the right to petition the Court, in the event the plaintiff prevails in this litigation, for reasonable attorneys' fees, consistent with the Texas la·;.,;. If -::t~e lawyer elects to receive the fee award from the Court, then any such fees awarded by 1:he Court shall noi: be paid by the client or out of 1:he client's portion. This paragraph contemplates the attorney petitioning the Court for additional fees. 'I'his does not take place unless you are the prevailing 2  party in the litigation. 2. The client is informed that the attorneys' hourly rate ranges from $250.00 to $500.00 an hour in the civil rights arena. '.rhe rate depends on the nature of the case, ·the tasks t:o be performed, the reputation of the lawyers, and other factors defined by the relat.i ve case la·w and the civil litigation and/or area of practice. 3. 'I'he lawyers are entitled to thirty three and third (33 1/3%) of any and all recovery obtained on behalf of the client (gross recovery) which may be obtained by virtue of compromise settlement/trial/verdict. 4. This provision allowing a contingent basis for recovery of attorneys' fees does not prevent the attorney from applying for the collecting at.torney fees under the Texas law. 5. .P.ny fee awarded by the Court shall be applied dollar for dollar to offset the contingent fee set out above (by way of example - if the client recovers $100.00, the attorney fee award shall derive off the top of the 3~~" $100.00 ~~d forty percent (~) shall be deducted. leaving the client a recovery of $60.00). If on application for reasonable attorney fees the Court 3  awards $35.00 in lawyer fees, the client's obligation shall be $25.00 (a dollar for dollar application). 6. In the ev-ent the reasonable attorney fee award exceeds the contingent fee a~ffird, there shall be no deduction of fees from th~ Clientrs portion and the fee award will be the attor:neyrs sole recovery of fees. No excess over the contingent fee amount shall be applied to the Client's recovery. 7. In· the event the contingent fee, or vice versa, award exceeds the award by the Court, the Lawyers are awarded the greater of the two sums. Cost - We Will Front Litigation Cost, Unless Agreed Otherwise. Hm..• Do We Get Our Money Back? Cost associated 'I'Tit:h this litigation shall be deducted from the client's portion .. By way of example- If recov-ery is :;noo. 00 (by compromise settlement) and 3\\:J~C) Attorney fees deducted at~= $60.00 Then costs would be deducted-from the client's balance. ThE!r•afore, If costs associated with the suit was $10.00, then the client's recovery would be $60.00 minus $10,00 $50.00. 4  The srune type of deduction of costs takes place under circumstances where contingent fees do not apply. Guarantees - None There are no guarantees held cut lfli th respect to the results of this litigation. Withdra\ltal, Malfeasance, Breach of Contract 1. Wit:hdrawal: Lawyers have an ethical obli•:ration to represent the Client zealously within the bounds of the law, but the Lawyers also have an obligation, when material repr·O!sentation surfaces or where there is a breach of '·:he terms of this contract by the Client, to '\Ti'!:hdraw from the represe·ntation of the Client. No;:hing in this contract guarantees any results, including whether a suit will or will not be filed or ;;my other rr,atters t.hat border on guarantees. The only guarantee re1:5tt:es to the repr:eHentation within the confines of the Code of Professional Responsibility (ze3.lously within the bounds of the law) . It has been e.Arplained orally tbat the Lawyers' obligation to the Court and the rules of ethics require investigation and examination of the facts. 2. Investig.::Lt:i.on/If No Case: If t:he facts reveal no case 5  exists, the La\\ryer shall promptly advise the client and tenninate ·the relationship. The retainer again is non- refundable. 3. Investigat.ion/I'iaterial Breach: If the investigation reveals a material breach 1 lie, or misstatement by the client, the Lawyer will advise the Client as to how such breach affect.s the J:.awyer' s ability to proceed in the representation. 'lf termination is appropriate, the La.1ryer (s) shall advise the client of her rights and shall promptly take any necessary acts to protect the Client (advise as to action) and the firm's rights. A9ain, the :cetainer E~hall be deE>.nled non-r·efundable. It shall be the exclusive privilege of Lawyers to determine when and where sui:.s shall be filed. Agc-.in, Lawyers retain the discretion whether i:o obligate the office in the appeal process .. Compromise No compromise Ol:- settlement of Client's claims will be made without the consent of both Client and r.awyers. I 6  Power of Atto~~eY. Lawyers are hereby granted full authority to sign all legal instruments, plead.ings,. drafts, aut.hori_zations and papers that shall be J:easonably ner::essary to conclude settlement and/or reduce to possession any and all monies or other things of value due to Client under this claim as fully as Client could so do in person. ~. '  Keeping__ the Client Inf.:>rmed Lawyers agree to produce copies of documents as related to this litigation .and to keep the client fully informed. Venue Lies in Galveston County -~11 sums due and payable at Lawyers' office in Galveston County, Texas. -~ SIGNED AND AGREED to on this the ___ .day of ---~-' 2011. d14.~~~__:___ POLLY REDDIN . >REED ~ef2~ 2011. liNTH·ClNY P. GRIFFIN A GRIFFIN LAWYERS 11.15 MOODY GAL"i?ESTON, 'rEXP..s 77550 409.763.0385 1.800.750.5034 FACBilvfiLB N:::>. 409.753.43.02 agr.iffin@agriffinlawyers. com anthonypgriffin@grnail.com c:: \'iord. redd.iJl_L:-olJ.y. con.t::ract_ernploym·:mt 8  NOTICE OF CLIENTS The Stat.e Bar of Texas investigate::; and prosecutes professional misconduct c-Jr~mitted by Texas attorneys. Although not every complaint against. or dispute with a la:wyer involves professi.::mal misconduct, the State Bar 1 Office of G-eneral Counsel w:ill provide you with information aJxmt how to file a complaint:. j For more information, plea.se call 1.800.932.1900. a toll-free phone call. '!'his ·l· J.l I I i I I 9  A GRIFFIN LAWYERS Galveston Island Galveston, TexaS 77550 February 27, 2012 Polly Reddin RE: POLLY WORLD, INC. V. RERSHAW ENTERPRISES, INC. AND DEBBIE KERSHAWr IN THE ____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS; CAUSE NO. (PLAINTIFf'' S ORIGINAL PE'riTION) {ROUGH DRAFT) {DEMAND LETTER) (NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS) Ms. Reddin: A rough draft of the lawsuit is attached. I need the total amount due on the note as of March 1, 2012. I am also enclosing a new demand letter, to perfect the recovery of attorneys' fees.· The lis pendens will be filed once the lawsuit is filed. If you have any questions, please inform. Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 l.B00.750.5034 Facsiwile No. 409.763.4102 -----·---· ···--- - ·~-·-- --·----·--- ----- APG/ files Encls. c: word. reddin_yolly. client~_tr-~nsmittal. 2011_334€'  A GRIFFIN LAWYERS Galveston Island Galveston, Texas 77550 February 27, 2012 Debbie Kershaw Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. 2910 Mary Moody Northern Boulevard Galveston, Texas 77551 RE: DEMAND ON NOTE - CONTRACT ON LOAN AGREEMENT DATED FEBRUA.In, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 l.B00.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102  APG/ files Encl. - Contract CERTIFIED MAIL, RRR NO. 91 7108 2133 3934 9976 8494 AND REGULAR MAIL c:word.r~ddin_polly.kershaw_demand_letter.201133~8 2012-03-08 14:36 X544 014097634102 » 409 948 9901 p 1/3 A GRIFFIN lAWYERS Gah•e.'>TOII lslatld Galvestml, Te.>::as 77550 March 8 , 2 0 12 ·· 1 0 : D11 ,tL • M • TO: POLLY REDDIN . --·--:::;.> -- ~ FROl"': AN'l'HONY P. GRIFFIN A GR IFFH1 T.JAWYKr~S 1.1.1.5 MOODY GALVES'I'O::N' I TEX..ll.S ~ 775<;:,0~ ..- 409.763.4102 RE: P"JLLY WO~D, r;.-.c_ \/. KKRSJ-tr..W ENTER??.J:S.E::S, HJC. AND DEBBI8 KER.SH,'\.W; :tN 'I'HE JUDICil'J.J DISTRTCT !:'OUR'l'; GAl.V.E~:"l-;-(~1\f COi.l1-ITY 'J'EXA.S j C'l-!lj 0:;£ NO. I {Cm.JFim•·1A·;:ION ·r-m~·r RELA'flOUSHIP 'I'BRi~IIDl.TED) NO. OF PAGES FAXED ~clu!;'ive of cov;::;r.) If you have difficult:y receivin~J l:his t.ransmission or any part thereof, please call 409.76~.038£. 2012~03-QS 14:37 X544 014097634102 » 409 948 9901 p 2/3 A GRIFFIN lAWYERS Call'e.ttcm /sltmd Gal1•esto11. Texas 77550 March 7, 2012 Polly Redd5.IJ RE:: POLLY WORLD, INC. V. KERSHP~W m.TTERPRISF:S 1 INC. AND DEBBIE KERSHAW; IN TilE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT i GALVERJ'Ol'i crmN"'l'Y, TRXAS; ('AuSE NO. (CONFIRMATION THAT Rll!I.Ll',TICNSHIP 'rEID-UN"Al'.f.W) {CO:NFIF.MATION TEAT C0NTPACT Ol'' RMPLOYNMENT Cil.LIJS !i'<~R A NObT-RRI<'OND.P.B!:.~ Rf-:'~'J;l:t~E.P..} FJ!s . Reddin : Please note tha·:: t;hi.s r::c-nfirrns the t:eTir'.ination of our relationship. If you need atld::.t:.io.na:: copies of t.he mat:e·cials fJ~om yo:rr· file, ple::~He i:nfoJ.J:fi. '1"11e ~cpy and/or documents in my fi::i..e are copies of .jocuruEnts tende~·ea to me by you. This also confirms tlm.t our retainer is non· refundable. If yc-u d.::!sire us 1·o provide you a des(!r:ipL.ion of the scope and :ur..tu!·e of the wut:·k pe:1:formed, ple<.=tSI.! inform. 2012-03-08 14:38 )(544 014097634102 » . 409 948 9901 p 3/3 A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 -409.763.0386 1.. 800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102 APG/ files xc: Interoffice - Rita Westerman \please close file) c 'word. r.edLl:iH_polly. client3_trar-.sml ttal. 2011_3348  A GRIFFIN lAWYERS Galveston lsland Galveston, Texas 77550 March 7, 2012 Polly Reddin RE: POLLY WORLD, INC. V. KERSHAW ENTERJ?RISES, INC. AND.DEBBIE KERSHAW; IN THE ____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; GALVESTON CO~ITY, TEXAS; CAUSE NO. (CONFIRMATION THAT RELATIONSHIP TERMINATED) (CONFIRMATION THAT CONTRACT OF EMPLOYNMENT CALI...S FOR A NON-REFUNDABLE RETAINER) Ms. Reddin; Please note that this confirms the terwination of our relationship. If you need additional copies of the materials from your file, please inform. 'The copy and/or documents in my file are copies of documents tendered to me by you. This also confirms that our retainer is non- refundable. If you desire us toprovide you a description of the scope and nature of the work performed, please · · inform.  A Griffin Lawyers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas 77550 409.763.0386 1..800.750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102 APG/ files xc: Interoffice - Rita Westerman (please close file) c:word.reddin_polly.client3_transmittal.2011_3348  CAUSE NO. POLLy WORLD I INC. IN THE v. JUDICIAL. DISTRICT COURT KERSHAW ENTERPRISES, INC. , AND DEBBIE KERSHAW GALVESTON COONTY, TEXAS} PLAINTIFF, POLLY WORLD, INC.'S, ORIGINAL PETITION TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: This lawsuit is brought by Polly World, Inc., herein after and sometimes referred to as Plaintiffr against Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. and Debbie Kershaw, hereinafter and sometimes referred to a.s Defendants. Plaintiff would show unto the Court as follows; I. This matter is a Schedule 2 matter as that terin is defined by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 190.3. II. Plaintiff, Polly World, Inc. is a corporation doing business in the State of Texas. .. Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. is an entity incorporated in the State of Texas and be served with process by serving its registered agent, to-wit: Debbie Kershaw can be served with process by serving her at 2910 53ru Street, Galveston, Texas.  III. On or about Jl,pril 15, 2008, the parties entered into agreements associated with property described as Abstract 628, Page 101, M. Menard Surface of Tract 83 (542 Acres), City of Galveston, Galveston County, Texas. The agreements included Contract of Loan Agreement in which Kershaw Enterprises, Inc., and Polly World, Inc. acknowledged documentation of· agreement between the Buyer (Kershaw) and Seller {Polly World) surrounding the sell of the subject property, with all existing and proposed improvements, including personal property. The written agreement provided that Lender (Polly World) agrees to a secondary lien on said property subject to Borrower's lender {Moody Bank) haYing the first lien on the subject property. The Contract of Loan Agreement evidencing "the loan a.'llount of $170,000.00 being evidenced by a promissory note to Seller bearing interest at the rate of nine (5%) per annum payable. in monthly installments of $1,200.00 per month. The note shall be payable at any time prior to maturity without penalty" ·- (a copy of t:he Cor'•Lract of Loa..J. Agreement is attached herein) . The parties also entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement (attached and incorporated for all purposes) . Polly World also executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien and a General Conveyance, Assignment and Bill ···- --------·-·-------..---·-------  of Sale {attached and incorporated for all purposes herein) . IV. DAMAGES AND PRAYER Defendant has failed to pay ~~d has defaulted on the subject due. Defendant's r.Jutstanding debts on said note is $ , for which Plaintiff brings this claim. Plaintiff also prays -for prejudgnient and post-judgment interest, costs ·:>f court and. all matters under law and equity that Plaintiff may be entitled. Plaint:iff sues for reasonable and attorneys fees. Plaintiff prays for trial by jury. DATE: February 27, 2012. Respectfully submitted, ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN A GRIFFIN LAWYERS 1115 T~ FIRST STREET GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102 STATE BAR NO. 08455300 ATI'OR..Y'iEY FOR PLAINTIFF POLLY WORLD, INC. c:word.reddin_polly.plaintiff_crigio~l-l,e~ition.20ll·334a ------~-----·--- -·- . - -·- .. --- -·---  NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF GAL'i.lESTON Consistent with § 12.007, Texas Property Code, this Notice of Lis Pendens is filed in order to encumber real property described as follows: Abstract 628, Page 101, M. Menard Surface of Tract 83 (542 Acres), City of Galveston, Galveston County, Texas. This lis pendens pertains to the establishment of an interest in renl propert.y, or the enforcement of an encumbrance against real property. An action has been filed in the district court with respect to same, styled Polly World, Inc .. ..:~.: Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. and Debbie Kershaw, in the Judicial District Court, Galveston County, Texa.s, Cause No. Affiant so swears and affirms on this the day-· _ _ _ , 2012. POLLY REDDIN  SUBSCRIBED P~ SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this the day of _ _ _ , 2012. ·NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR STATE OF TEXAS MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: c;wo~d.reddin_pally_lis_peodeae ---· ··--· ---· ---·--- ·-· -- ··- - -- -------  BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY P~~EL OF THE STA.TE BAR DISTRICT NO. 58 GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE CO~n~ISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, PETITIONER, v. H0031234738 [POLLY REDDIN] ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS RESPONDENT. RESPONDENT'S ORIGINAL ANSWER TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE: Respondent files this his response to the original evidentiary petition and asserts as follows: 1. Respondent asserts a general denial and prays that the Commission proves the allegations by the strictest proof allowed under law. 2. Respondent admits in part and denies in part the allegations contained in paragraph 1. Plaintiff was hired by the client to advise and consult. The client does not have the right under the Code/Disciplinary Rules to dictate when and where the lawsuit is filed as long as the cause ls filed timely. 3. Respondent admits and denies paragraph 2. The Respondent admits that appointments were made and sometimes canceled. During one particular appointment, . Respondent did tender a "rough draft" to the client to make corrections. A rough draft is what is connotes - and the notion that the same represents malfeasance is consistent with the practice of law. In addition, Respondent would show that a lawyer's schedule oft- times is controlled by the lawyer's trial docket and the cancellation of an appointment (with notice) is a proper practice and not a violation of the Disciplinary Rules. 4. With respect to the rule violations, Respondent denies violating with respect to neglect. The facts set out by the Commission do not support same as a matter of law. In addition, the client was informed as to the status of her case and the client was tendered her paperwork in a timely fashion. The Respondent contends that the retainer was non-refundable and the work having been performed. Prayer for Relief 5. It is prayed that the requested relief be denied herein. DATE: October 26, 2012. ubmitted, ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN A GRIFFIN LAWYERS 1115 TWENTY FIRST STREET GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550 409.763.0386 1.800.750.5034 FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102 STATE BAR NO. 08455300  CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that the foregoing answer was forwarded to opposing counsel on this the 26th day of October, 2012 by email transmission/facsimile transmission and/or by regular mail, confirmation copy, to-wit: SHANNON BREAUX SAUCEDA ASSISTANT DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL 600 JEFFERSON, SUITE 1000 HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002 /S/ ANTHONY P. ANTHONY c:word.grievancefile_reddin_polly_original_answer  A GRIFFIN LAWYERS Galveston island Galveston, Texas 77550 May 22, 2012 Robert Nelson Chief Investigator Office of the Chief Disciplin~ry Counsel State Bar of Texas 600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002 RE: H0031234738 POLLY REDDIN - ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN (RESPONSE TO GRIEVANCE} Mr. Nelson: Please accept this as our response to tbe subject grievance. Please note that it is our position that we have not violated any rights and/or duties due and owing to the client. In context of background, please note as follows: • The initial interview took place on September 29, 2011. The client was referred by a former client, Kenny Childs. • A copy of the contract of employment is attached. The retainer was $5,000.00, nonrefundable. • The client came to this office conce.:cned with respect to a debt that was due and. ow:i.ng to her from a Debbie Kershaw, and Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. The debt originated out of the purchase of a property from the client the note was 1 $170,000.00 and was signed on or about February 2008. The client was conc<2:rned that Kershaw Enterprises, Inc./Debbie.Kershaw d/b/a First Step had violated the terms of the Loan Agreement . . The client's ar~urnent related to the title company related to the client's feelings that the  title company did not prepare the appropriate paperwork to protect their interest. ~ Attached under Tab B are copies of the contractual documents prepared by the title company "' The client had previous counsel in the form of Lyons & Plackemeir, P.L.L.C. This firm wrote a letter dated December 23, 2010 providing notice of the debt (Tab C) . m Under Tab 4 is the work performed for the client, to-wit: (i) letter dated October 4 2011 1 transmitting the contract of employment; ii) demand letter to Kershaw adding "reasonable an.d necessary at·torneys fees"; letter from former counsel did not have this language and thus this would have p1:ecluded the client recovering attorneys' fee; iii) the rough draft of Notice of lis pendens prepared for the client; iv) our letter dated February 27, 2012 to the client transmitting the rough draft of the lawsuit, the lis pendens and the demand letter; v) the rough draft of the lawsuit; vi) our letter dated March 7 1 2012 making clear the relationship between this office and the client is now terminated. My disagreement with the client is one related to time-line and the decisions that the lawyer traditionally makes (when and where file suit) . Plea.se note that the language contained in the contract is borrowed from the Disciplinary Code and case law. The then followed her time-line with an e}::plicit threat - if the lawsuit is not filed by a. certain date and/or the rough completed by a certain date, then our relationship will be terminated. I agreed - the relationship should be terminated. My letter followed this agreement. The client also inquired with respect to refund of part and/or all of the non-refundable retainer. I informed the client that I had performed work and this would not occur; our letter followed. 2  If any additional information is needed, please inform; my apology for the delay in transmitting this information. Anthony P. Griffin A Griffin Le.vfYers 1115 Twenty First Street Galveston, Texas · 77550 409.763.0386 l . BOO. 750.5034 Facsimile No. 409.763.4102 APG/ ·files FACSH1ILE TR.I:illSMISSION AND REGULAR J.V1.~IL XC: .Polly Reddin c:word.grievancc_folder_reddin.polly_respcnse_grieva.nce 3