J-S64010-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEVEN LESLIE HARRIS
Appellant No. 3334 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered July 22, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at No: CP-15-CR-0003632-2014
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEVEN LESLIE HARRIS
Appellant No. 3335 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 22, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at No: CP-15-CR-0003633-2014
BEFORE: STABILE, J., SOLANO, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2016
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S64010-16
Appellant, Steven Leslie Harris, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed on July 22, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
following his conviction of driving under the influence (“DUI”), possession of
a small amount of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, aggravated
assault upon a police officer, and resisting arrest.1 Appellant contends the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, in limiting evidence
relating to his mental treatment and behavior, and in instructing the jury
regarding Appellant’s mental status. Following review, we affirm.
In its May 15, 2015 order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress and
in its December 17, 2015 Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court provided
detailed factual and procedural histories of this case. We incorporate those
histories herein as if fully set forth. Trial Court Order, 5/15/15, at 1 n. 2
(pp. 1-2)2 and Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/17/15, at 1-3. Briefly, on August
30, 2014 at approximately 12:44 a.m., Pennsylvania State Trooper Lori
Edgar (“Trooper Edgar”) was on DUI roving patrol in full uniform but in an
unmarked car in Chester County, when she observed Appellant operating his
vehicle slowly. She followed Appellant’s vehicle and engaged her mobile
vehicle recordings (“MVR”) system for approximately a mile and one-half.
____________________________________________
1
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1); 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(31) and § 780-
113(a)(32); and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3) and § 5104.
2
Footnote 2 of the May 15, 2015 order begins on the first page of the order
and spans seven pages.
-2-
J-S64010-16
Based on her training and her observations of Appellant’s vehicle, Trooper
Edgar concluded the operator of the vehicle might be under the influence of
alcohol or a controlled substance. Believing further investigation was
warranted, she activated her lights and sirens to initiate a traffic stop.
The traffic stop was conducted near an intersection in West Bradford
Township. Trooper Edgar asked Appellant for his driver’s license,
registration and insurance card. When Appellant failed to produce the
registration, Trooper Edgar advised Appellant that she believed he was
smoking marijuana in the vehicle. When Trooper Edgar instructed Appellant
to exit the vehicle, he instead rolled up his window and locked the doors.
A second trooper arrived on the scene but Appellant also ignored the
second trooper’s direction to exit the vehicle. Eventually, Appellant unlocked
the doors and was assisted in exiting his vehicle. He then became more
uncooperative and combative. When he began wrestling with Trooper
Edgar, the second trooper tased Appellant. Appellant yelled for the trooper
to tase him again and attempted to strike the trooper in the face. The
trooper did tase Appellant again and Appellant was taken into custody. He
was charged with DUI and related offenses under one docket number and
with aggravated assault and related offenses under a separate docket
number. The two cases were consolidated before the trial court and before
this Court.
-3-
J-S64010-16
After his preliminary hearing and waiver of arraignment, Appellant
filed a motion to suppress, claiming the vehicle stop and vehicle search, as
well as the search of his person, were unlawful for lack of warrant and lack
of probable cause. Motion to Suppress, 2/2/15, at 1-2.
At the suppression hearing conducted on April 16, 2015, Trooper
Edgar testified as to the events occurring before and after the traffic stop.
The video from the MVR system was shown during the hearing. The trial
court denied the motion to suppress by order dated May 15, 2015. The case
proceeded to trial on June 2, 2015, with a jury returning a guilty verdict on
all charges. On July 22, 2015, the trial court imposed an aggregate
sentence of three months and three days to 18 months in county prison,
followed by four years and thirty days of probation. The trial court
subsequently modified the sentence to allow Appellant to participate in the
prison’s re-entry and work release programs at the warden’s discretion. This
timely appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
Appellant now asks this Court to consider three questions:
1. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] Motion to
Suppress where the contemporaneous video recording of
[Appellant’s] driving clearly establishes that police had no
authority or justification to stop his vehicle?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in limiting and
excluding evidence regarding [Appellant’s] mental status and
behavior, when [Appellant’s] intent was central to the
resolution of the case, and when he and his mother had long,
-4-
J-S64010-16
relevant experience with the effects of his autism spectrum
disorder?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its instruction to the
jury regarding consideration of [Appellant’s] mental status
and intent, where that specific intent was the crux of the
issue to be resolved by the jury?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
In his first issue, Appellant asserts trial court error for denying his
motion to suppress. This Court has recognized:
An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported
by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed
before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of
the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual
findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is
bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court's legal
conclusions are erroneous.
Commonwealth v. (Patrick Scott) Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa. Super.
2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. (Curtis) Jones, 988
A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)).
Appellant contends the video recording established that the officer
lacked authority or justification for stopping his vehicle based on his driving.
In its order denying suppression, the trial court stated:
Trooper Edgar testified that she . . . observed [Appellant’s]
vehicle sitting at the stop sign for approximately 45 seconds
before proceeding through the intersection at three to five miles
per hour.
-5-
J-S64010-16
Having observed [Appellant’s] vehicle traveling at an
unreasonably slow speed in the early morning hours, Trooper
Edgar turned her unmarked patrol vehicle around and activated
the MVR system. Given the slow rate of speed of [Appellant’s]
vehicle, Trooper Edgar was easily able to catch up to it. As
[Appellant’s] vehicle approached the town of Marshallton,
Trooper Edgar observed it weaving within the lane of traffic,
braking, and failing to maintain a constant speed. Based on the
trooper’s training and experience, she believed this conduct was
indicative of an impaired operator warranting further
investigation. After continuing to follow [Appellant’s] vehicle for
approximately a mile and [a] half, Trooper Edgar activated her
lights and siren to initiate a vehicle stop. Although Trooper
Edgar stated on her police radio that she was conducting a
routine traffic stop, she testified that she stopped [Appellant’s]
vehicle for the sole purpose of investigating whether he was
impaired. The vehicle stop was initiated for suspected DUI and
may have led to further incriminating evidence such as an odor
of alcohol/drugs, glassy/blood-shot eyes, or slurred speech.
Because the trooper neither observed [Appellant] commit a
violation of the Motor Vehicle Code nor stopped the vehicle for
any such violation, probable cause was not required to initiate
the stop. Rather, Trooper Edgar articulated specific facts
establishing that she stopped [Appellant’s] vehicle for suspicion
of DUI. The trooper objectively pointed to specific and
articulable facts leading to a suspicion of criminal activity.
Trial Court Order, 5/15/15, at 1, n. 2 (pp. 4-5).
Our review confirms that the trial court’s factual findings are supported
by the record. Appellant’s assertions that Trooper Edgar was following
Appellant’s car at a distance less than the driver’s manual “four second rule”
or that Appellant’s braking was appropriate in response to caution signs do
not change our conclusion. Appellant specifically challenges a statement by
the trial court that “no warning signs existed on the bridge where [Appellant]
displayed the aforementioned behavior.” Appellant’s Brief at 27. However,
Appellant acknowledges that the 15 mph sign in question is not on the
-6-
J-S64010-16
bridge but rather before the bridge. Id. at 28. The additional sign on the
bridge designated a curve in the road. See id. at 29.
We recognize, as did both the trial court and Trooper Edgar, that there
were signs along the roadway that would appropriately prompt a driver to
apply brakes to decrease speed. However, that does not account for all of
the braking or general slow travel or for the weaving with his lane of travel.
We agree with the trial court’s determination that Trooper Edgar’s testimony
was credible and that “when viewed objectively through the eyes of a
trained police office, the totality of [Appellant’s] behavior establishes
suspicion of DUI. A trained and experienced officer could reasonably infer
that based on the time of day coupled with his erratic driving that
[Appellant] may be operating his motor vehicle while intoxicated.” Trial
Court Order, 5/15/15 at 1 n.2 (p. 5) (citing Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14
A.3d 89 (Pa. 2011) (citations to notes of testimony and exhibit omitted).
Because we conclude that the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, we are bound by those findings. Further, we
discern no error in the court’s legal conclusions, which we adopt and
incorporate herein by reference. See Trial Court Order, 5/15/15, at 1 n.2
(pp. 2-5). Appellant’s first issue fails.
In his second issue, Appellant asserts the trial court abused its
discretion by limiting and excluding evidence regarding Appellant’s mental
treatment, status and behavior. Appellant argues that preclusion of
-7-
J-S64010-16
evidence of his autism spectrum disorder rendered him incapable of proving
his lack of criminal intent. As a challenge to the admissibility of evidence,
our standard of review is abuse of discretion. Braun v. Target Corp., 983
A.2d 752, 760 (Pa. Super. 2009). As this Court reiterated in Braun,
Pennsylvania trial judges enjoy broad discretion regarding the
admissibility of potentially misleading and confusing evidence.
Relevance is a threshold consideration in determining the
admissibility of evidence. A trial court may, however, properly
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Generally, for the
purposes of this evidentiary rule, prejudice means an undue
tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis. The
erroneous admission of harmful or prejudicial evidence
constitutes reversible error.
Id. (citations and brackets omitted).
As the trial court explained, Appellant was allowed to testify at trial
about his status and behavior. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/17/15 at 5-6
(quoting Notes of Testimony, 6/3/15, at 143-44). However, limiting that
testimony and excluding testimony of Appellant’s mother relating to an
autism spectrum disorder was warranted under the circumstances. As the
trial court explained, Appellant did not provide the requisite notice of intent
to offer a mental health defense. Id. at 6 (citing R.Crim.P. 568). We find
no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reasoning, which we adopt and
incorporate herein by reference. See id. at 4-8. Appellant’s second issue
does not provide any basis for relief.
-8-
J-S64010-16
In his third issue, Appellant asserts trial court error stemming from the
instruction delivered in response to a question posed by the jury in the
course of its deliberations. As the trial court explained:
During deliberation, the [c]ourt received several written
questions from the jury, one of which stated as follows: “The
defense started with a direction of prior mental health issues.
The questioning stopped, but the jury was not instructed to
consider or not consider the information.” (N.T., 6/4/15, at 38;
Court Ex. 1). Before responding to the jury’s question, the
[c]ourt called counsel to the courtroom and discussed it with
them and obtained their respective positions regarding how the
jury would be instructed.
Because the evidence introduced in this case did not support a
mental health defense[,] the [c]ourt returned the jurors to the
courtroom and instructed them as follows: “There is no mental
health diagnosis in the record. You are to consider all of the
facts of record when deliberating on a verdict on any of the
charges brought against [Appellant.]” (Id. at 54.)
Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/17/15, at 8-9.
Our standard of review in assessing a trial court’s jury
instructions is as follows:
[W]hen evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, this
Court will look to the instructions as a whole, and not
simply isolated portions, to determine if the instructions
were improper. We further note that, it is an
unquestionable maxim of law in this Commonwealth that a
trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions,
and may choose its own wording so long as the law is
clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury
for its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of
discretion or an inaccurate statement of the law is there
reversible error.
Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 188, 200 (Pa. Super.
2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Kerrigan, 920 A.2d 190,
198 (Pa. Super. 2007)).
-9-
J-S64010-16
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014).
We agree with the trial court that the instructions as a whole, including
its response to the jury’s inquiry, were proper. Again, as the trial court
recognized, there was no mental health diagnosis for the jury to consider.3
We find no abuse of discretion or inaccurate statement of law in the
instructions. We adopt, and incorporate herein by reference, the trial court’s
thorough discussion of this issue. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/17/15, at 8-10.
Appellant’s third issue lacks merit.
Judgment affirmed. In the event of further proceedings, the parties
shall attach to their filings copies of the trial court’s May 15, 2015 Order and
its December 17, 2015 Rule 1925(a) Opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/15/2016
____________________________________________
3
The court acknowledged that Appellant’s mental health status was properly
considered for sentencing. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 12/17/15, at 9-10.
- 10 -
Circulated 10/31/2016 10:05 AM
Circulated 10/31/2016 10:05 AM