IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1602
Filed July 21, 2021
TRAVARIS JAMES CHANCELLOR,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Samantha Gronewald,
Judge.
Travaris Chancellor appeals the grant of summary judgment dismissing his
second application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Alexander Smith of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Gentry Brown Bergmann &
Messamer L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Vogel, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2021).
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VOGEL, Senior Judge.
Travaris Chancellor appeals the grant of summary judgment dismissing his
second application for postconviction relief (PCR). We previously affirmed his
conviction for two counts of murder in the second degree. See State v. Chancellor,
No. 10-0930, 2011 WL 3481006, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2011). Procedendo
for his direct appeal issued on October 25, 2011. Chancellor filed his first PCR
application on October 17, 2012. The district court denied his first application after
a PCR trial, and we affirmed the denial on appeal. See Chancellor v. State, No.
16-0956, 2017 WL 4315039, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017). Procedendo for
this appeal issued on November 29, 2017.
On January 17, 2019, Chancellor filed this, his second PCR application.
After supplementing his application, Chancellor alleged “new evidence exists
relating to the testimony of several key witnesses from the trial that was not
available at the time of trial” and his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain this
evidence prior to trial. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing
Chancellor’s application was time barred. The court agreed and granted summary
judgment. Chancellor appeals.
“We review summary dismissals of [PCR] applications for errors at law.”
Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2018). Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). “We view the record in the light most
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favorable to the nonmoving party,” drawing “all legitimate inferences from the
evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 784.
Generally, a PCR application must “be filed within three years from the date
the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the
writ of procedendo is issued.” Iowa Code § 822.3 (2019). There is no dispute
Chancellor filed this 2019 PCR application more than three years after procedendo
issued, in 2011, on his direct appeal. “However, this limitation does not apply to a
ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time
period.” Id.
At the time of summary judgment, the only new evidence in the record was
a one-page “interview summary,” drafted by a private investigator purporting to
show that a witness from the criminal trial may be willing to provide additional
testimony conflicting with the witness’s earlier trial testimony. At the 2009 trial, the
witness testified Chancellor’s acts were clearly intentional, but the summary
suggested the witness may now claim the acts were unintentional. The PCR court
found
nothing in the record to suggest that these arguments [of newly
discovered evidence] could not have been advanced within three
years from the date of the writ of procedendo. There is also nothing
in the record demonstrating a sufficient reason for these arguments
having not been asserted in Applicant’s first [PCR application].[1]
1 The district court held the PCR hearing on July 3, 2019. At the time of the hearing,
Chancellor had not yet located the witness, though third-parties informed him of
the substance of the testimony the witness would recant. The court left the record
open to allow Chancellor to submit additional information, and he submitted the
“interview summary” on July 31. However, the court appeared to overlook the
“interview summary,” as the August 21 ruling does not mention it, and the court
found Chancellor’s “speculation regarding an unnamed witness who has yet to be
located possibly recanting his/her trial testimony is not sufficient to generate a
genuine issue of material fact.” After filing his notice of appeal, Chancellor filed a
4
Depending on the facts of the case, a witness’s statement after trial may
qualify as evidence that could not have been raised within the three-year period.
See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003). However, nothing in
the investigator’s summary contains an indication the witness would have been
unable to give the summarized testimony at trial. As the State noted, at the first
PCR trial in 2016, Chancellor testified that the witness “always told me that she
told her family it was an accident.” Because Chancellor knew that the witness’s
story may be in conflict with her trial testimony, there is no new evidence that could
not have been raised within the applicable time period. Chancellor’s PCR
application is time barred by section 822.3.
Chancellor also maintains his PCR application is timely under Allison v.
State, 914 N.W.2d 866, 891 (Iowa 2018). Because the district court did not decide
his Allison argument, it is not preserved for our review. See Lamasters v. State,
821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review
that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before
we will decide them on appeal.” (quoting Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537
(Iowa 2002)).
motion for limited remand seeking a specific ruling on whether the information in
the “interview summary” could have been raised within the limitations period. Our
supreme court denied the motion for remand in a single-justice order and after a
three-justice review. For our purposes on appeal, we assume the “interview
summary,” which was included in the appellate filings, is properly in the record
when evaluating whether Chancellor presented a ground of fact that could not have
been raised during the limitations period.
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We affirm the grant of summary judgment dismissing Chancellor’s PCR
application as time barred under section 822.3.
AFFIRMED.