IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ROUZBEH SAFAVI AMINPOUR, ) No. 81868-6-I
)
Respondent, ) DIVISION ONE
)
MARYAM AMINPOUR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v. )
)
CHRISTIAN MYLES ENGLUND, )
)
Appellant. )
BOWMAN, J. — Christian Englund appeals the trial court’s order granting
reconsideration of its decision to deny an anti-harassment petition and its
subsequent decision to issue the anti-harassment order against him. Englund
argues the court erred in concluding the substantial injustice prong of CR
59(a)(9) warranted reconsideration. We reverse and remand to vacate the anti-
harassment order.
FACTS
In January 2019, Rouzbeh and Maryam Aminpour bought two parcels of
land adjoining Englund’s property. A gravel driveway historically used by
Englund and his family to access their property crossed a portion of the
Aminpours’ land. Englund had no easement to use the driveway. In March
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
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2019, the Aminpours proposed a contract for a limited easement but Englund
“did not feel comfortable with many of the provisions of the contract.”
The relationship between the parties deteriorated and the Aminpours
installed security cameras on their land. The cameras captured Englund walking
around with a 30-inch machete, “act[ing] as though he was chopping plants.”
The Aminpours felt threatened by Englund’s actions and installed more security
cameras along the driveway. They asked Englund to “discontinue displaying the
machete on their property,” but he “chose to escalate his alarming behavior.”
Englund said that the Aminpours never asked him to stop using a
machete. He claimed he purposefully used a machete instead of “higher-risk
power tools” to “clear brush” and “keep quiet peace for the neighbors and
animals.” He added that the Aminpours were not present in the area when he
used the machete. Englund also said he used the machete only during the
summer and fall “because the weeds only are long enough around July, so it
definitely has a seasonal aspect.”
The Aminpours complained that Englund harassed them in other ways as
well. They pointed to an incident where Englund “nearly hit” Rouzbeh1 with his
car. And they accused Englund of making false accusations to the King County
Department of Local Services Permitting Division that delayed their home
construction and defaming their character to other neighbors. They also
captured Englund on video saying he “ ‘steps on’ people like [the Aminpours] and
violently simulat[ed] doing so.”
1
We refer to Rouzbeh Aminpour by his first name when necessary for clarity and intend
no disrespect by doing so.
2
No. 81868-6-I/3
On May 27, 2020, the Aminpours petitioned for an anti-harassment order
against Englund in King County District Court. The court issued a temporary
protection order but transferred the case to superior court because “the action
involves title or possession of real property.” The superior court scheduled the
matter for a full hearing by video teleconference on Tuesday, June 23, 2020.
Attorneys represented each party and both sides submitted written affidavits.
The Friday afternoon before the hearing, the Aminpours’ attorney tried to
submit video footage from their security cameras through the court’s electronic
filing system but could not upload the files within the correct sizing parameters.
At the hearing, the Aminpours’ attorney explained to the trial court that he was
unable to upload the videos. The judge offered to continue the hearing so the
attorney could resubmit the videos. After consulting with the Aminpours, counsel
elected to proceed without the videos, relying on witness testimony, affidavits,
and screenshots from the videos to describe Englund’s conduct.
The court heard testimony, reviewed the affidavits, and considered
exhibits submitted by both parties. It denied the anti-harassment order because
the preponderance of the evidence did not show a “course of conduct”
establishing harassment as required by RCW 7.92.030(1).
On July 6, 2020, the Aminpours moved the court to reconsider its ruling
under CR 59(a)(9), claiming that “substantial justice was not done” as the court
“was unable to view critical evidence because the Aminpours were unable to [file]
video evidence of Respondent Christian Englund’s threatening conduct.” They
submitted the videos as exhibits to their motion to reconsider. Englund opposed
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the motion. The superior court granted the Aminpours’ motion to reconsider,
stating, “[T]he court viewed the videos and found them to be compelling evidence
of unlawful harassment.” It then issued the anti-harassment order against
Englund to protect only Rouzbeh.
Englund appeals.
ANALYSIS
Englund contends the trial court abused its discretion in considering the
Aminpours’ motion to reconsider under CR 59(a)(9) because the Aminpours had
the surveillance videos for nearly a year before the hearing, were given the
opportunity to continue the hearing to present the evidence, and made a tactical
decision to proceed without the videos. We agree.2
Motions to reconsider are left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
we will not reverse a trial court’s ruling absent a showing of manifest abuse of
discretion. Wilcox v. Lexington Eye Inst., 130 Wn. App. 234, 241, 122 P.3d 729
(2005). A court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or
bases its decision on an erroneous application of the law. State v. Cox, 17 Wn.
App. 2d 178, 186, 484 P.3d 529 (2021). A trial court also abuses its discretion if
the record does not support its conclusions. Hundtofte v. Encarnacion, 181
Wn.2d 1, 10, 330 P.3d 168 (2014).
2
We note that Rouzbeh’s appellate brief cites language from unpublished appellate
decisions or the unpublished portions of certain decisions without the proper advisory warnings.
We caution against this practice and encourage all parties to follow the directive in Crosswhite v.
Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 197 Wn. App. 539, 544, 389 P.3d 731 (2017), that “a party must do
more than simply identify the opinion as unpublished. The party must point out that the decision
has no precedential value, is not binding on any court, and is cited only for such persuasive value
as the court deems appropriate. The party should also cite GR 14.1.”
4
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CR 59(a) lists several grounds on which an “order may be vacated and
reconsideration granted.” Under CR 59(a)(9), a court may reconsider its order
where “substantial justice has not been done.” See Zorotovich v. Wash. Toll
Bridge Auth., 4 Wn. App. 801, 804-05, 484 P.2d 928, reversed on other grounds,
80 Wn.2d 106, 491 P.2d 1295 (1971). But courts should rarely grant
reconsideration for lack of substantial justice “given the other broad grounds
available under CR 59.” Lian v. Stalick, 106 Wn. App. 811, 825, 25 P.3d 467
(2001).
The Aminpours argued in their motion to reconsider that substantial
injustice compelled reconsideration of the court’s order denying their petition for
an anti-harassment order. They claimed the hearing was unjust because they
were unable to file their videos “in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic,”3 so the
court “did not have the opportunity to view the recordings of Mr. Englund’s
alarming conduct.”4 But the record does not support Aminpours’ suggestion that
COVID-19 precluded them from presenting their video evidence.
The Aminpours had the surveillance video footage several months before
the hearing on their anti-harassment petition but did not try to upload them to the
court’s electronic filing system until the Friday afternoon before their hearing. At
the hearing, the Aminpours’ attorney explained that he was unable to upload the
3
COVID-19 is the World Health Organization’s official name for “coronavirus disease
2019,” first discovered in December 2019 in Wuhan, China. COVID-19 is a severe, highly
contagious respiratory illness that quickly spread throughout the world.
4
In its written ruling, the trial court does not explain what injustice warranted
reconsideration of its order denying the Aminpours’ petition. It states only that “[a]t the hearing in
this matter, the court did not have access to the referenced videos and relied solely on the
description of the Respondent’s actions. On Reconsideration, the court viewed the videos and
found them to be compelling evidence of unlawful harassment.”
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videos. He told the court that he would like the videos to be considered, but “if
not[,] we can go forward without them and have the petitioner certainly describe
the contents of the video.” The court responded that “I’m not telling you how to
proceed counsel. If you want the Court to review those videos we can continue
this [hearing] but it’s up to you.” After consulting with his clients, counsel told the
court, “I can still go forward without them.”
Nothing amounting to a substantial injustice precluded the Aminpours from
supporting their petition for an anti-harassment order with video evidence.
Counsel’s choice to proceed without the evidence amounts to a strategic
decision. That the strategy failed is not an injustice under CR 59(a)(9) warranting
reconsideration of the court’s original decision to deny the anti-harassment
petition.
We reverse and remand to vacate the anti-harassment order.5
WE CONCUR:
5
Rouzbeh requests attorney fees and expenses on appeal under RAP 18.1 and former
RCW 10.14.090(2) (1992), which states, “The court may require the respondent [in an anti-
harassment action] . . . to reimburse the petitioner for costs incurred in bringing the action,
including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Because Rouzbeh does not prevail on appeal, we deny
his request for attorney fees.
6