Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED MARCH 8, 2005
JACQUELYN V. MAGEE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 126219
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM
In this case involving the Civil Rights Act, the Court
of Appeals held that plaintiff’s claims of sexual
harassment, sex and age discrimination, and retaliation
were timely filed, because the lawsuit was brought within
three years of the date she resigned her employment with
defendant.1
We conclude that plaintiff’s claims were not filed
within the limitations period because none of the alleged
discriminatory or retaliatory conduct occurred within the
1
Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued March 2, 2004
(Docket No. 243847).
three years that preceded the filing of the complaint. We
therefore reverse that part of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand the matter to the trial court for
reinstatement of the trial court’s grant of summary
disposition to defendant.
I
Plaintiff Jacquelyn Magee was an hourly production
employee who began work for defendant DaimlerChrysler in
1976. She went on medical leave for emotional distress on
September 12, 1998, and, without first returning to work,
resigned her job on February 2, 1999.
On February 1, 2002, Magee filed a lawsuit under the
Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., claiming that she
had been unlawfully discriminated against and harassed
during most of her twenty-two years at DaimlerChrysler.
Magee’s complaint lists separate counts for sex harassment
based on hostile work environment, sex harassment based on
quid pro quo harassment, retaliation, sex discrimination,
and age discrimination.2
2
Magee’s complaint also includes a separate count
alleging constructive discharge. The trial court dismissed
this count, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s ruling. Magee did not appeal, and the dismissal of
that claim is not before this Court.
2
In her complaint, Magee alleges that she suffered
harassment from the 1980s until her last day of work on
September 12, 1998, and that her supervisors periodically
retaliated against her during this period as a result of
her resistance to the harassment. Magee alleges that this
constant harassment caused her to leave her job at
DaimlerChrysler on September 12, 1998, and that she decided
to resign on February 2, 1999, because she anticipated that
the harassment would continue if she returned.
DaimlerChrysler moved for summary disposition,
asserting that Magee’s February 1, 2002, complaint failed
to allege any discriminatory acts after September 12, 1998,
and that the complaint was therefore not filed within the
three-year period of limitations applicable to Civil Rights
Act claims, MCL 600.5805(10).
The trial court initially denied DaimlerChrysler’s
motion without prejudice, allowing Magee to amend her
complaint to allege harassment or retaliation occurring up
to her February 2, 1999, resignation. However, because
Magee’s amended complaint continued to allege only
harassment and retaliation through September 12, 1998, her
last day of work, the trial court granted DaimlerChrysler’s
motion and dismissed Magee’s complaint.
3
Magee appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Court
of Appeals, which relied on this Court’s recent decision in
Collins v Comerica Bank, 468 Mich 628; 664 NW2d 713 (2003),
to reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the harassment,
retaliation, and discrimination claims. The Court of
Appeals concluded that these claims were timely, because
they were filed within three years of the date of Magee’s
resignation.
DaimlerChrysler then sought leave to appeal to this
Court. After hearing oral argument from both parties on
the application, this Court has now determined that the
Court of Appeals misapplied Collins and erroneously
reinstated Magee’s Civil Rights Act claims.
II
In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of
action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations
is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.
Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich 226, 229-230; 661 NW2d
557 (2003). Likewise, this Court reviews de novo rulings
on summary disposition motions. Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich
661, 664; 685 NW2d 648 (2004).
III
In Collins, supra at 633, this Court held that a cause
of action for discriminatory termination does not accrue
4
until the date of termination. The plaintiff employee,
Gwendolyn Collins, was suspended pending an investigation;
when the investigation was completed several weeks later,
her employment was terminated. Within three years of her
termination, Collins filed a complaint alleging that her
termination was the result of race and gender
discrimination. The Court of Appeals ruled that Collins’s
suit was not timely under the three-year period of
limitations because her causes of action accrued on the
last day that she actually performed employment duties (as
opposed to her later termination date). This Court
disagreed with the Court of Appeals last-day-worked
analysis and reversed, holding that a claim for
discriminatory discharge cannot arise until a claimant has
actually been discharged. Id.
Relying on Collins, the Court of Appeals in this case
reasoned that Magee’s claim also accrued on her termination
date as opposed to her last day of work. The Court
acknowledged that Magee resigned, and was not terminated.
But it found significant that “her last day of work was
followed by a period in which she was on a medical leave of
absence” and that she was employed by DaimlerChrysler while
on leave. Accordingly, it concluded that her causes of
action, if any, arose on February 2, 1999.
5
The Court of Appeals reliance on Collins to reinstate
Magee’s claims of sexual harassment, sex and age
discrimination, and retaliation is misplaced. Magee was
never terminated from her employment and does not allege
discriminatory termination. She bases her Civil Rights Act
claims on alleged discriminatory conduct that occurred
before her leave of absence. Indeed, when given a chance
to amend her complaint to plead claims falling within the
period of limitations, Magee was unable to do so. Collins,
a discriminatory termination case, simply does not apply in
this situation.
To determine whether Magee’s claims were timely filed,
we look to MCL 600.5805(10), which establishes that the
applicable period of limitations is three years from the
date of injury. Because Magee alleged no discriminatory
conduct occurring after September 12, 1998, the period of
limitations on Magee’s claims expired, at the latest, three
years from that date, or by September 12, 2001.
Accordingly, as the trial court held, Magee’s February 1,
2002, complaint was not timely filed.
The dissent argues that the defendant violated the
Civil Rights Act within the three years preceding the
filing of plaintiff’s claim by failing to “prevent future
harassment . . . .” Post at 3. This interpretation of the
6
Civil Rights Act amounts to a continuing violations
doctrine in which an employer is continuously liable from
the time it or its agent violates the act until the time
that violation is remedied by the employer. Thus, in
Justice CAVANAGH’s view, a plaintiff subjected to a hostile
work environment on December 31, 2005, may file a timely
complaint in December 2030 if the employer has failed to
remedy the sexual harassment in the ensuing twenty-five
years. This theory renders nugatory the period of
limitations established by the Legislature in MCL
600.5805(10). It is therefore a theory we must reject.3
For these reasons, we reverse the relevant part of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to
the Macomb Circuit Court for reinstatement of the order
granting DaimlerChrysler’s motion for summary disposition.
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
3
Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631
NW2d 686 (2001).
7
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
JACQUELYN V. MAGEE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 126219
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
WEAVER, J. (concurring).
I concur in the result of the opinion per curiam that
reverses the Court of Appeals judgment in part and remands
the matter to the trial court for reinstatement of the
trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant.
Under the facts pleaded by plaintiff, the three-year period
of limitations1 began to run when plaintiff went on medical
leave on September 12, 1998, for emotional distress.
Plaintiff’s claims were required to be filed within three
years of September 12, 1998. Because they were not, the
trial court was correct to grant summary disposition to
defendant. Therefore, I concur in the result of the
opinion per curiam.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
1
MCL 600.5805(10).
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
JACQUELYN V. MAGEE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 126219
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
I disagree with the majority’s contention that
defendant engaged in no discriminatory conduct during the
three years that preceded the filing of plaintiff’s
complaint. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
Plaintiff began working for defendant in 1976. Over
the years, plaintiff complained of various incidents of
harassment. Plaintiff complained that her foreman was
making sexual advances toward her. When plaintiff was
assigned to a different supervisor, her former foreman
still worked in the same complex and continued to harass
her. Because of the harassment, plaintiff was ordered by
her psychiatrist to take an approximately four-month
medical leave. When plaintiff returned from her medical
leave, her former foreman was still working in the same
complex as plaintiff.
A subsequent foreman of plaintiff’s also made sexual
advances toward her, including intentionally touching
plaintiff’s breast. For an entire year, plaintiff also
complained to defendant about a sign in the men’s restroom
that referred to plaintiff in a derogatory and sexually
suggestive manner. Because of the stress of the harassment
she continued to suffer, plaintiff was ordered to take
another medical leave of absence.
While she was employed by defendant, plaintiff’s union
steward also made sexually suggestive comments about
plaintiff’s “ass” and touched her in an inappropriate
manner. Plaintiff’s coworkers made sexually suggestive
comments about her body and began hitting her with
cardboard sticks. When plaintiff asked her union steward
to intercede, he just laughed and said, “Yea, hit that
ass.” Plaintiff repeatedly complained to defendant, yet
nothing was done. When plaintiff requested a transfer, her
union steward told her that she could transfer if she had
sex with him. Once plaintiff was transferred, the union
steward told her that she “owed” him and he wanted her to
have sex with him. He later stopped plaintiff from
training for another position because she was not having
2
sex with him. Plaintiff again complained to a foreman, but
he said there was nothing he could do. Because of the
stress plaintiff was suffering as a result of the
harassment, plaintiff was then ordered to take a third
medical leave.
Because defendant took no steps to stop the harassment
while plaintiff was on her third medical leave, she was
forced to decide not to return to the harassing
environment. Defendant’s discriminatory conduct in failing
to take steps to prevent future harassment continued
throughout plaintiff’s medical leave. Requiring plaintiff
to return to the harassing setting to work in the unchanged
environment would be unreasonable and possibly dangerous to
plaintiff’s health, considering that her doctor had ordered
three medical leaves because of the stress of the
harassment. As plaintiff explained, in order to have even
been considered for a possible transfer to another plant
after having been out on her third harassment-related
medical leave, she would have had to return to the plant
she left and hope for a transfer, despite that her multiple
complaints had garnered no response before or during her
medical leave. Thus, for plaintiff to be able to try and
leave the harassing environment, she would have had to
return to work with the same men who harassed her and whose
3
conduct necessitated that plaintiff take medical leaves in
the first place, without any assurance that defendant would
protect her.
This case presents a unique set of circumstances
because plaintiff’s doctor-ordered medical leave was
directly related to the harassment. Plaintiff’s final
medical leave was actually her third leave related to the
stress of the harassment she suffered. Defendant
maintained a hostile work environment despite plaintiff’s
repeated complaints. Defendant’s failure to stop the
harassment after these complaints is, under the facts of
this case, discriminatory conduct. Because this conduct
occurred during the three years that preceded the filing of
plaintiff’s lawsuit, I find that her complaint was timely
filed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
4