Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED MAY 29, 2002
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY,
COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation,
as Subrogee of IBRAHIM MROUE
doing business as Family Bakery,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 117470
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CORRIGAN, C.J.
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether the
“household exclusion” provision of MCL 500.3123 applies where
a person owning damaged property is insured under a no-fault
property protection policy that does not cover the vehicle
that person was operating at the time of the accident. We
hold that the exclusion applies in those circumstances. We
thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand
this case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
I. Underlying Facts and Procedural History
Ibrahim Mroue drove a rented Ryder truck into a bakery
that he owned, causing damage to real and personal property.
The Ryder truck was insured under a no-fault policy issued by
defendant Old Republic Insurance Company. Plaintiff State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company, the insurer of the real
property, paid Mroue for the damages. As Mroue’s subrogee,
State Farm filed this action seeking indemnification from Old
Republic for the amount that State Farm had paid to Mroue.
A no-fault insurer’s liability to pay property protection
benefits to its insured is subject to exceptions, including
MCL 500.3123(1)(b), the “household exclusion,” which provides:
(1) Damage to the following kinds of property
is excluded from property protection insurance
benefits:
* * *
(b) Property owned by a person named in a
property protection insurance policy, the person’s
spouse or a relative of either domiciled in the
same household, if the person named, the person’s
spouse, or the relative was the owner, registrant,
or operator of a vehicle involved in the motor
vehicle accident out of which the property damage
arose. [Emphasis added.]
The circuit court granted summary disposition for Old
Republic on the ground that Mroue, the owner of the real
2
property, was a named insured in the Old Republic policy.
Thus, since Mroue could not recover, State Farm could not
recover as his subrogee.
The Court of Appeals reversed,1 holding that the
exclusion in MCL 500.3123(1)(b) did not apply because Mroue
was not a named insured in the Old Republic policy. Old
Republic appealed, and we remanded to the Court of Appeals for
reconsideration. Our order directed the Court to consider
whether MCL 500.3123(1)(b) excluded coverage only if a
property protection insurance policy covered a “vehicle
involved in the motor vehicle accident out of which the
property damage arose,” or if the statute precluded coverage
regardless of whether the vehicle insured under a property
protection insurance policy was involved in the accident.2
On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed. It
concluded that the phrase “by a person named in a property
protection insurance policy” refers to the policy on the
vehicle or vehicles involved in the accident. The Court
stated that the use of the article “a” was not significant and
that the grammatical construction of the sentence dictated the
use of the article “a.”3
1
234 Mich App 465; 595 NW2d 149 (1999).
2
461 Mich 928 (1999).
3
242 Mich App 105, 109; 617 NW2d 715 (2000).
3
II. Standard of Review
This case requires us to ascertain the meaning and proper
application of MCL 500.3123(1)(b). Issues of statutory
interpretation are questions of law that we review de novo.
Oade v Jackson Nat’l Life Ins Co, 465 Mich 244, 250; 632 NW2d
126 (2001); Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248;
596 NW2d 574 (1999).
III. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
When interpreting statutory language, we must ascertain
the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from
the words expressed in the statute. Wickens v Oakwood
Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). When
the Legislature has unambiguously conveyed its intent in a
statute, the statute speaks for itself, and judicial
construction is not permitted. Huggett v Dep’t of Natural
Resources, 464 Mich 711, 717; 629 NW2d 915 (2001);
Donajkowski, supra at 248. Because the proper role of the
judiciary is to interpret and not to write the law, courts do
not have authority to venture beyond the unambiguous text of
a statute.
Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause
in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would render any
part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. Wickens, supra at
60. Further, we give undefined statutory terms their plain
4
and ordinary meanings. Donajkowski, supra at 248-249; Oakland
Co Rd Comm’rs v Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass’n,
456 Mich 590, 604; 575 NW2d 751 (1998).
IV. Analysis
MCL 500.3123(1)(b) excludes property damage from no-fault
property protection coverage if the property owner, the
person’s spouse, or a relative of either residing in the same
household, is “named in a property protection insurance
policy” and was “the owner, registrant, or operator of a
vehicle involved” in the accident. Contrary to the Court of
Appeals decision and the dissent’s contention, the statute
does not require that the individual be named in a property
protection insurance policy covering “a vehicle involved in
the motor vehicle accident out of which the property damage
arose.” 242 Mich App 109. Rather, the plain meaning of MCL
500.3123(1)(b) indicates that if Mroue was named in a property
protection insurance policy and was the “operator of a vehicle
involved” in the accident, coverage for damage to his property
would be excluded. Whether the no-fault policy covered a
vehicle involved in the accident is not relevant under the
plain language of the statute. Therefore, if Mroue was named
in a no-fault policy covering, for example, a personal
vehicle, the statute would exclude property protection
coverage. Stated another way, MCL 500.3123(1)(b) allows a
5
party in Mroue’s circumstances to recover from the rental
vehicle’s insurer only if he was not named in a no-fault
policy.
Like the Court of Appeals, our dissenting colleagues
would essentially rewrite the statutory phrase “named in a
property protection insurance policy” to state, “named in the
property protection insurance policy.” Thus, the dissent does
not give effect to the distinct meanings of the words “a” and
“the.” In Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 461-462; 613 NW2d
307 (2000), we overruled Dedes v Asch, 446 Mich 99; 521 NW2d
488 (1994), an earlier case that had misconstrued “the” to
mean “a.” We explained in Robinson that
(1) common English usage,
(2) the rules of statutory construction enacted by
our Legislature,4 and
(3) the assumption of legislator competence and
comprehension that all courts should apply to acts of the
Legislature,
make clear that a difference exists between the indefinite
article “a” and the definite article “the.”5 We presume that
4
See, e.g., MCL 8.3a.
5
The following passage from Hagerman v Gencorp
Automotive, 457 Mich 720, 753-754; 579 NW2d 347 (1998)
(Taylor, J., dissenting), reflects the heart of the Robinson
position:
Traditionally in our law, to say nothing of
our classrooms, we have recognized the difference
(continued...)
6
the Legislature understood the distinct meanings of these
terms. We are not free to conflate their meanings.
The Court of Appeals and the dissent’s reasoning that the
grammatical construction of the sentence in the statute
mandated the use of “a” instead of “the” is flawed. The
Legislature chose the specific construction of the sentence
and was not bound by any particular language or structure. If
the Legislature had intended to use the definite article “the”
instead of the indefinite article “a,” it could have simply
changed the construction of the sentence. It is untenable
that the Legislature intended a meaning other than that
plainly expressed because it somehow felt itself confined to
the particular grammatical construction utilized.
Our dissenting colleagues further contend, without citing
any authority, that the phrase “a person named in a . . .
5
(...continued)
between “the” and “a.” “The” is defined as
“definite article. 1. (used, esp. before a noun,
with a specifying or particularizing effect, as
opposed to the indefinite article or generalizing
force of the indefinite article a or an). . . .”
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, p 1382.
Further, we must follow these distinctions between
“a” and “the” as the Legislature has directed that
“[a]ll words and phrases shall be construed and
understood according to the common and approved
usage of the language . . . .” MCL 8.3a.
Moreover, there is no indication that the words
“the” and “a” in common usage meant something
different at the time this statute was enacted . .
. . [Emphasis in original.]
7
policy” is clearly linked to the subsequent phrase “[the]
operator of a vehicle involved in the motor vehicle accident.”
They contend that the text would be rendered mere surplusage
if the above phrases were not linked. The phrase “involved in
the motor vehicle accident,” however, follows the term
“vehicle” and clearly modifies that term. Nothing in the text
of the statute suggests that the phrase “involved in the motor
vehicle accident” modifies the phrase “a property protection
insurance policy.” The dissent essentially rewrites the
statute by reading the language “a property protection
insurance policy” as stating “a property protection insurance
policy covering a vehicle involved in the motor vehicle
accident.”
It is not the role of the judiciary to second-guess the
wisdom of a legislative policy choice; our constitutional
obligation is to interpret—not to rewrite—the law. The
Legislature apparently determined that where the household
exclusion applies, damaged property should be covered, if at
all, by a form of insurance other than a mandatory no-fault
policy. Not only does our interpretation of the statute
comport with the plain language of the text, but it is also
consistent with the legislative intent that may reasonably be
inferred from the text, i.e., to preclude a person who damages
his own property from collecting property protection insurance
8
benefits under that person’s no-fault policy. In this case,
the property damage clearly would have been excluded if Mroue
had been driving his own vehicle. The result should not be
different merely because he was driving a rented one.
We acknowledge that our interpretation of the statute
would allow a party in Mroue’s circumstances to recover from
an insurer in Old Republic’s circumstances where that party
does not have another no-fault policy, but would prevent
recovery where he does. While such a factor might be
considered fortuitous, the plain language of the statute
mandates this interpretation.
Further, perhaps the Legislature chose to exclude these
risks from no-fault coverage to reduce consumer premium costs
for this mandatory insurance.6 For example, MCL
500.3123(1)(a) also excludes from property protection
insurance benefits:
6
In Michigan Educational Employees Mut Ins Co v Morris,
460 Mich 180, 194; 596 NW2d 142 (1999), this Court recognized
the Legislature’s goal of rendering mandatory no-fault
insurance affordable:
“The no-fault insurance act was a radical
restructuring of the rights and liabilities of
motorists. Through comprehensive action, the
Legislature sought to accomplish the goal of
providing an equitable and prompt method of
redressing injuries in a way which made the
mandatory insurance coverage affordable to all
motorists.” [Quoting Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350,
366; 343 NW2d 181 (1984) (emphasis added).]
9
Vehicles and their contents, including
trailers, operated or designed for operation upon a
public highway by power other than muscular power,
unless the vehicle is parked in a manner as not to
cause unreasonable risk of the damage which
occurred.
Therefore, a driver must obtain motor vehicle collision
coverage to collect benefits for property damage to the
driver’s own vehicle. By exempting coverage for property that
can be insured through policies other than a mandatory no
fault policy, the Legislature has, consistent with its ongoing
efforts over the years,7 attempted to make such mandatory
insurance affordable.
V. Conclusion
In these circumstances, the plain language of MCL
500.3123(1)(b) limits no-fault property protection benefits to
persons not named in a no-fault property protection policy.
Because this aspect of the statute was not considered in the
circuit court, the record was not developed regarding whether
Mroue was named in a no-fault property protection policy other
than the policy covering the rental truck. Accordingly, we
7
The Legislature made a similar effort to reduce
mandatory insurance premiums when it revised the original no
fault scheme, 1972 PA 294, seven years after its enactment.
The essential insurance act, 1979 PA 145, was designed, inter
alia, to permit certain costly coverages to be excluded by
insurers and thus to contain premium costs.
10
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this
case to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
WEAVER , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and MARKMAN , JJ., concurred with
CORRIGAN , C.J.
11
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation,
as Subrogee of IBRAHIM MROUE
d/b/a Family Bakery,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 117470
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the
“household exclusion” provision of the no-fault act applies if
a person is named in any no-fault property protection policy.1
Rather, I would conclude that the provision should apply only
when the person (or a spouse or family member) involved in an
accident causing property damage is named in the property
protection insurance policy covering the vehicle operated in
the accident. To hold otherwise elevates the literal reading
1
MCL 500.3123(1)(b).
of the statute into an overbroad exclusion that hinges
recovery on the fortuitous event that an individual owns any
other no-fault policy. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
In this case, the Court was called upon to determine the
meaning of MCL 500.3123(1)(b), which provides:
Damage to the following kinds of property is
excluded from property protection insurance
benefits:
* * *
(b) Property owned by a person named in a
property protection insurance policy, the person's
spouse or a relative of either domiciled in the
same household, if the person named, the person's
spouse, or the relative was the owner, registrant,
or operator of a vehicle involved in the motor
vehicle accident out of which the property damage
arose.
It is well settled that we must discern and give effect to the
intent of the Legislature when applying statutes. See Sun
Valley Foods v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).
First, the Court must examine the text, and, where there is no
ambiguity, the statute must be applied as written. See, e.g.,
Tryc v Mich Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d
642 (1996). However, if the meaning of the statute is
ambiguous, the plain meaning as well as the placement and
purpose of the words in the statutory scheme must be analyzed.
Sun Valley Foods at 237.
2
In this case, the majority employs a method that
extensively analyzes the meaning of “a” in reference to “a”
policy of insurance, without considering the practical
consequences or the statutory intent. While claiming reliance
on the plain meaning of “a,” the majority imposes an expansive
interpretation on the article, prohibiting recovery for
property damage where an individual involved in the accident
has any no-fault policy, not simply when the individual has a
policy for the vehicle involved in the accident.
Moreover, use of the article “a” is dictated by
grammatical construction of the sentence and by the chance
occurrence that the accident involved more than one vehicle
and, thus, more than one policy, thereby precluding the use of
“the.” Had the Legislature intended such a broad exclusion
simply by choosing the word “a,” the statute surely would have
been drafted to reflect that unusual departure from the common
purpose of “provid[ing] victims of motor vehicle accidents
assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for certain economic
losses.” McKenzie v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 458 Mich 214, 229,
n 3; 580 NW2d 424 (1998). I am unconvinced that the use of
the word “a” in the statute carries such a broad significance,
and I am instead persuaded that the exclusion is intended to
apply only to policies insuring vehicles involved in the
accident.
3
The majority correctly acknowledges our duty to
reasonably infer legislative intent from the text of statutes.
Unfortunately, the Court fails in this duty by proclaiming
irrelevant a portion of the statutory text it would prefer to
ignore.
Whether the no-fault policy covered a vehicle
involved in the accident is not relevant under the
plain language of the statute. [Slip op, p 5.]
To the contrary, the text of the statute excludes coverage
only for “[p]roperty owned by a person named in a property
protection insurance policy . . . if the person named . . .
was the owner, registrant or operator of a vehicle involved in
the accident . . . .” MCL 500.3123(1)(b). Though not
entirely without ambiguity, the statute clearly links “a
person named in a . . . policy” with “the operator of a
vehicle involved in the accident” and, thus, excludes coverage
only when the operator has a policy on the vehicle or vehicles
involved in the accident. Otherwise, the text would be
rendered mere surplusage. To declare “not relevant” a portion
of a statute that would negate its conclusion illustrates the
majority’s excessive reliance on ambiguous terms at the
expense of the most reasonable interpretation. Because the
Court today ignores the forest for the trees, I would affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
KELLY , J., concurred with CAVANAGH , J.
4