Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED APRIL 24, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant
and Cross-Appellee,
v No. 117468
BONNIE JUNE SHERMAN-HUFFMAN,
Defendant-Appellee
and Cross-Appellant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant was charged with and convicted of third-degree
child abuse1 after she spanked the victim, her daughter,
1
MCL 750.136b(5), which provides:
A person is guilty of child abuse in the third
degree if the person knowingly or intentionally
causes physical harm to a child. Child abuse in
the third degree is a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 2 years.
twice, and pushed her in the face, causing a nosebleed and
bruising on the victim’s face and back. The Court of Appeals
affirmed defendant’s conviction, holding that third-degree
child abuse is a specific intent crime and that the
prosecution presented sufficient evidence of defendant’s
specific intent to harm her child. We originally granted
leave to consider whether third-degree child abuse is a
specific or general intent crime. We conclude, however, that
there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of third
degree child abuse regardless of whether the statute requires
general or specific intent.2 Accordingly, we affirm
defendant’s conviction.
In determining whether sufficient evidence exists to
sustain a conviction, this Court reviews the evidence in a
light favorable to the prosecution. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich
508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). This Court must consider
“‘whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational
trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Id. at 513-514, quoting People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 366;
285 NW2d 284 (1979). See also People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392,
399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
2
The statement by the Court of Appeals that third-degree
child abuse is a specific-intent crime is dictum, in light of
our finding that there was sufficient evidence to support
defendant’s conviction under either standard.
2
Here, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of
defendant’s guilt at trial. Defendant admitted striking her
child. The victim’s testimony corroborated defendant’s
admission. The testimony of school, law enforcement, and
medical personnel established that the victim sustained
physical injury in the form of extensive bruising to parts of
her body and a nosebleed. Further, the injuries to the
victim’s face were sufficiently painful that the victim asked
for an ice pack at school on the following day.
Michigan’s third-degree child abuse statute states that
a defendant must “knowingly or intentionally” cause physical
harm to a child. Regardless of whether the statute requires
general or specific intent, the evidence is sufficient to
convict defendant of third-degree child abuse because she knew
of her daughter’s susceptibility to bruising, due to asthma
medication taken by the victim, yet still spanked her with
enough force to dislodge a blood clot from her daughter’s nose
and to cause bruises that raised the suspicion of several
school, law enforcement, and medical personnel. Thus, the
prosecution presented sufficient evidence that defendant had
the requisite mens rea to convict her of third-degree child
abuse.
Accordingly, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to
3
convict defendant of third-degree child abuse.
Defendant also argues that the prosecution failed to
prove that her conduct toward the victim was not a reasonable
disciplinary measure. She invokes MCL 750.136b(7)3 to make
this argument.
Defendant did not formally invoke the “reasonable
discipline” statute at trial, but she did indicate in her
trial testimony that the victim (her daughter) was “getting
real, real lippy” with her and that she intended to punish the
victim by spanking her. The trial court did not expressly
refer to the “reasonable discipline” statutory provision in
its findings of fact. However, the trial court obviously
rejected the credibility of the pivotal testimony of defendant
and the victim as it refused to accept their assertions that
much of the victim’s bruising was due to sources other than a
physical assault by defendant. Further, as summarized above,
the evidence indicated that the victim was attacked forcefully
enough to dislodge a blood clot, triggering a nosebleed, and
3
This section [which defines the child abuse
crimes] shall not be construed to prohibit a parent
or guardian, or other person permitted by law or
authorized by the parent or guardian, from taking
steps to reasonably discipline a child, including
the use of reasonable force.
4
to leave visible bruising on various parts of her body.4
Wherever the outer limits of “reasonable discipline” are to be
drawn, given the injuries inflicted by the force used in this
matter, they were plainly exceeded.
Accordingly, we conclude that, in rejecting defendant’s
version of events, the trial court implicitly concluded that
this case did not involve the use of reasonable discipline.
In this regard, we note the presumption that a trial judge in
a bench trial knows the applicable law. See, e.g., People v
Cazal, 412 Mich 680, 686-687; 316 NW2d 705 (1982) (stating
that “a trial judge should be aware of lesser-included
offenses without the need for instruction” and referring to
“the trial judge’s knowledge of the law”).
Therefore, we presume that the trial court correctly
rejected the applicability of the “reasonable discipline”
provision and did not address it more specifically for the
simple reason that any claim of “reasonable discipline” in
this case was plainly unsupportable. Additionally, we affirm
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the prosecution
4
While defendant indicates that asthma medication being
taken by the victim made her more susceptible to bruising,
because this was known to defendant, rather than being
exculpatory, it provided all the more reason that defendant
should have shown restraint in her treatment of her child.
Moreover, defendant admitted that she hurt her hand in
connection with her “punishment” of the victim, which
underscores the use of an extreme degree of force against the
child.
5
presented sufficient evidence to convict defendant of third
degree child abuse.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and CAVANAGH , WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and
MARKMAN , JJ., concurred.
6