Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED JANUARY 23, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 118615
DONALD ANDREW HAMILTON,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________________
PER CURIAM
The circuit court dismissed a drunk driving charge
against the defendant because the arrest was made by a police
officer acting outside his jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. We conclude that the fact that the arrest was made
by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not require
exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of the arrest
or dismissal of the charge. We reverse and remand to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
I
During the early morning hours of November 21, 1999, city
of Howell Police Officer Darren Lockhart observed the
defendant driving on M-59 in Howell Township.1 The officer
observed that the vehicle did not have operating taillights
and left the pavement and briefly touched the shoulder of the
roadway. He stopped the vehicle on suspicion that the driver
was operating under the influence of liquor and because the
vehicle was being driven without operating taillights. The
officer performed sobriety tests and arrested the defendant
for OUIL. It was later determined that the defendant had two
prior OUIL convictions and that his license had been
suspended. This led to his being charged with felony OUIL,
third offense, MCL 257.625(10)(c), and operating a vehicle on
a suspended license, MCL 257.904(3).
The defendant moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that
the arrest by the officer outside his jurisdiction was
illegal. The district judge disagreed and bound the defendant
over to the circuit court. However, the circuit court granted
the defendant’s motion to quash and dismissed the case.
1
In the district court, the parties stipulated to the
essential facts.
2
The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.2 The Court noted that the prosecutor conceded the
officer was not acting in conjunction with the other law
enforcement agencies and was not in hot pursuit of the
defendant at the time of the stop. It rejected the
prosecutor’s arguments that the arrest could be justified
under MCL 762.3(3)(a),3 which relates only to venue and not to
the authority of officers to act outside their jurisdictions.
The Court also rejected the suggestion that the arrest could
be justified on a theory that officers acting outside their
jurisdictions have the same authority as private citizens to
make arrests for felonies committed in their presence or with
probable cause. MCL 764.16. In this case, the Court said
that principle was not applicable because the officer did not
have probable cause to believe that the defendant had
committed a felony. It then turned to the question whether
suppression of evidence and dismissal was appropriate as a
remedy for the statutory violation. It concluded that
suppression of the evidence and dismissal was required.
2
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 26, 2001
(Docket No. 225712).
3
If an offense is committed on the boundary of
2 or more counties, districts or political
subdivisions or within 1 mile thereof, venue is
proper in any of the counties, districts or
political subdivisions concerned.
3
II
Ordinarily, this Court reviews a trial court's ruling
regarding a motion to suppress for clear error. People v
Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983).4 However,
the ruling in the present case turns not on factual
determinations, but on a question of law, which we review de
novo. People v Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 522; 581 NW2d 219 (1998);
People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 698; 564 NW2d 13 (1997). As is
explained later, the question before us is one of statutory
interpretation—whether the Legislature intended that a
violation of MCL 764.2a should result in exclusion of evidence
obtained as a result of the arrest. People v Sobczak-Obetts,
463 Mich 687, 694; 625 NW2d 764 (2001). Such questions of
statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. People v
Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626, 631; 597 NW2d 53 (1999).
III
It is undisputed that, at the time of the stop and
arrest, Officer Lockhart was acting outside his jurisdiction.
MCL 764.2a,5 captioned authority of peace officers outside
4
In this case, the question of suppression of evidence
and dismissal of the charge are closely intertwined, as the
critical evidence supporting the OUIL charge was obtained as
a result of the arrest.
5
A peace officer of a county, city, village, or
township of this state may exercise authority and
(continued...)
4
their own bailiwicks, provides that police officers may
exercise their authority in jurisdictions other than their own
if they are working in conjunction with authorities of that
other jurisdiction. In this case, the officer was not acting
in conjunction with law enforcement officers having
jurisdiction in Howell Township, and thus his actions were not
within MCL 764.2a. It is also undisputed that the officer did
not have a warrant to arrest the defendant or to search his
personal property, and that the officer was not in “hot
pursuit” of the defendant within the meaning of MCL 117.34.6
The officer was acting outside his jurisdiction, without
a warrant, not in hot pursuit, and not in conjunction with law
enforcement officers having jurisdiction. Thus, as the Court
of Appeals recognized, he had no greater authority than a
private person. “As a general rule, peace officers who make
5
(...continued)
powers outside his own county, city, village, or
township, when he is enforcing the laws of this
state in conjunction with the Michigan state
police, or in conjunction with a peace officer of
the county, city, village, or township in which he
may be, the same as if he were in his own county,
city, village, or township.
6
When any person has committed or is suspected
of having committed any crime or misdemeanor within
a city, or has escaped from any city prison, the
police officers of the city shall have the same
right to pursue, arrest and detain such person
without the city limits as the sheriff of the
county.
5
a warrantless arrest outside their territorial jurisdiction
are treated as private persons, and, as such, have all the
powers of arrest possessed by such private persons.” People
v Meyer, 424 Mich 143, 154; 379 NW2d 59 (1985). Under MCL
764.16,7 a private person has the authority to make a felony
arrest, but lacks the authority to make a misdemeanor arrest
except in nonapplicable circumstances. “‘No one without a
warrant has any right to make an arrest in the absence of
actual belief, based on actual facts creating probable cause
of guilt.’” People v Panknin, 4 Mich App 19, 27; 143 NW2d 806
(1966), quoting People v Bressler, 223 Mich 597, 600-601; 194
NW 559 (1923), paraphrasing People v Burt, 51 Mich 199, 202;
16 NW 378 (1883). Here, the officer only had probable cause
to make an arrest for a misdemeanor, i.e., OUIL. The fact
that defendant may have committed a felony, i.e., OUIL, third
offense, was only discovered after the arrest.8 Accordingly,
7
MCL 764.16 provides in relevant part:
A private person may make an arrest in the
following situations:
(a) For a felony committed in the private
person’s presence.
(b) If the person to be arrested has committed
a felony although not in the private person’s
presence.
8
As the Court of Appeals explained:
The prosecutor admits that the traffic stop
(continued...)
6
the officer lacked the statutory authority to make the arrest
under MCL 764.16.
The Court of Appeals concluded that because the arrest
was illegal, it warranted exclusion of evidence as the
remedy.9 We disagree. That the officer acted without
8
(...continued)
was made because the vehicle had no taillights and
appeared to be weaving. Viewing a car with no
taillights gave Lockhart probable cause to believe
that a civil infraction had occurred in his
presence. Furthermore, even if the weaving of the
vehicle gave Lockhart probable cause to believe
that defendant was intoxicated, Lockhart still had
no authority to arrest defendant under MCL 764.16;
MSA 28.875 because he was not aware that a felony
had occurred in his presence. A person guilty of
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated is
generally guilty of a misdemeanor.
MCL 257.625(8)(a); MSA 9.2325(8)(a). As previously
noted, if defendant had been convicted of operating
a motor vehicle while intoxicated, he would have
been guilty of a felony pursuant to
MCL 257.625(10)(c); MSA 9.2325(10)(c), because it
would have been his third conviction within ten
years. However, the lower court record indicates
that officer Lockhart was unaware of defendant’s
previous convictions at the time he stopped and
arrested defendant. Therefore, at most, Lockhart
had probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor
had been committed in his presence. [Slip op at 3
4.]
9
The Court of Appeals concluded:
We find that the information was properly
quashed because the exclusionary rule of evidence
is applicable in this case. In Meyer and Clark
[People v Clark, 181 Mich App 577; 450 NW2d 75
(1989)], the police officers’ violations were
statutory, not constitutional, because probable
cause existed to arrest the defendants for
committing felonies. Meyer, supra at 160; Clark,
(continued...)
7
statutory authority does not necessarily render the arrest
unconstitutional. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule only
applies to constitutionally invalid arrests, not merely
statutorily illegal arrests. People v Lyon, 227 Mich App 599,
611; 577 NW2d 124 (1998). “The constitutional validity of an
arrest depends on whether probable cause to arrest existed at
the moment the arrest was made by the officer.” Id. Here,
the officer did have probable cause to arrest the defendant.
The stop of the vehicle was justified because of the apparent
equipment defect and the defendant’s erratic driving, giving
rise to the suspicion that he was operating the vehicle while
9
(...continued)
supra at 580. Similarly, in [People v Davis, 133
Mich App 707; 350 NW2d 796 (1984)], this Court
found that although the police officers may have
acted in violation of MCL 764.2a; MSA 28.861(1) in
surveilling and arresting the defendant outside
their jurisdiction, the exclusionary rule was
inapplicable because probable cause existed to
arrest the defendant for the commission of a
felony. Davis, supra at 714-715. This Court has
stated that “[t]he per se exclusionary rule arose
out of and applies to constitutionally invalid
arrests. The constitutional validity of an arrest
depends on whether probable cause to arrest existed
at the moment the arrest was made by the officer.”
People v Lyon, 227 Mich App 599, 611; 577 NW2d 124
(1998). Because probable cause did not exist to
arrest defendant for the commission of a felony,
his arrest by Officer Lockhart was constitutionally
invalid. Thus, the exclusionary rule applied to
the evidence against defendant, and the district
court abused its discretion by binding defendant
over to the circuit court. Accordingly, the
circuit court properly quashed the information.
[Slip op at 4.]
8
intoxicated. After the stop, the sobriety tests administered
by the officer provided probable cause to arrest the defendant
for OUIL.
The key premise of the Court of Appeals decision is that
this was an unconstitutional arrest because of the lack of
probable cause to arrest for a felony. However, probable
cause to arrest for a felony is not required; rather, probable
cause that a crime (felony or misdemeanor) has been committed
is the constitutional requirement for an arrest. Accordingly,
that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest
defendant for OUIL, third offense (a felony), does not render
the arrest unconstitutional. Instead, that the officer did
have probable cause to arrest defendant for OUIL (a
misdemeanor) means the arrest did not violate the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures. Because
the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the
exclusionary rule does not apply here.10
A number of decisions establish that statutory violations
do not render police actions unconstitutional. For example,
10
That the arrest here did not violate the Fourth
amendment is further evidenced by the fact that if the
Legislature had provided that a municipal police officer like
Lockhart could exercise police powers in other jurisdictions
within the state, such an exercise of legislative authority
would have been valid and there could have been no
constitutional objection to this arrest. Thus, the only
violation here is the statutory one based on Lockhart’s
noncompliance with MCL 764.2a.
9
in People v Meyer, supra, an undercover officer participated
in a narcotics transaction outside his jurisdiction.
Defendant sought to have the resulting charges dismissed.
However, as we said:
The defendant makes no claim that Officer
Carpenter’s actions in this case resulted in any
constitutional deprivation to the defendant, and we
perceive none. [Id. at 156].[11]
Similarly, in People v Burdo, 56 Mich App 48, 52; 223 NW2d 358
(1974), in the context of an arrest for a misdemeanor not
committed in the officer’s presence, arguably in violation of
MCL 764.14, the Court of Appeals explained:
Where, as here, the officer had probable cause
to believe that the crime had been committed, and
therefore had the constitutionally required basis
to search and seize, there would appear to be no
need to suppress such evidence, even though the
arrest was statutorily illegal.
It is clear from previous decisions of this Court that a
statutory violation like the one in this case does not
necessarily require application of an exclusionary rule. The
question in such cases is whether the Legislature intended to
apply the drastic remedy of exclusion of evidence. In several
recent decisions we have found such intent lacking. See
People v Sobczak-Obetts, supra (failure to comply with the
statutory requirement that an affidavit in support of a search
11
See also People v Sobczak-Obetts, supra at 707,
contrasting the constitutional violation of a defective search
warrant with violations of statutory procedures for executing
valid warrants.
10
warrant be left with the defendant at the time of execution of
the warrant, MCL 780.654, 780.655); People v Stevens, supra
(failure to comply with the “knock and announce” statute, MCL
780.656, in executing a search warrant).
As in Sobczak-Obetts and Stevens, we find no indication
in the language of MCL 764.2a that the Legislature intended to
impose the drastic sanction of suppression of evidence when an
officer acts outside the officer’s jurisdiction. Rather, we
believe that the language supports the analysis of several
Court of Appeals decisions that the statute was intended, not
to create a new right of criminal defendants to exclusion of
evidence, but rather to “protect the rights and autonomy of
local governments” in the area of law enforcement. See People
v Clark, 181 Mich App 577, 581; 450 NW2d 75 (1989); People v
McCrady, 213 Mich App 474, 480-481; 540 NW2d 718 (1995).12
IV
Because MCL 764.2a does not require exclusion of evidence
obtained as a result of police conduct that is not in
accordance with the statute, the circuit court erred in
suppressing the evidence and dismissing the charges against
12
Clearly, Officer Lockhart acted here without statutory
authority. It is not to condone such activity to conclude
that its sanction does not lie with the suppression of
evidence. We do not address whether there are any other
administrative, civil, or criminal remedies available for
failure to comply with MCL 764.2a.
11
the defendant. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Livingston Circuit
Court for further proceedings.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and WEAVER , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and MARKMAN , JJ.,
concurred.
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., would grant leave to appeal, but
would not dispose of this case peremptorily.
12