No. 79-16
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
-
RICHARD RAYMOND HOEHNE,
Claimant and Respondent,
GRANITE LUMBER CO., Employer,
ALASKA PACIFIC ASSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court,
Hon. William Hunt, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Utick and Grosfield, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
H.L. McChesney, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on briefs: April 3, 1980
Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e
Court.
The W o r k e r s ' Compensation C o u r t f o u n d t h a t c l a i m a n t -
r e s p o n d e n t R i c h a r d Hoehne s u f f e r e d a compensable i n j u r y a r i s i n g
o u t o f and i n t h e c o u r s e o f h i s employment w i t h G r a n i t e Lumber
Company. A l a s k a P a c i f i c A s s u r a n c e Company ( A l a s k a P a c i f i c ) ,
G r a n i t e Lumber's insurance c a r r i e r , appeals.
R i c h a r d H o e h n e commenced e m p l o y m e n t w i t h G r a n i t e L u m b e r
Company i n P h i l l i p s b u r g , Montana, i n e a r l y March, 1978. His job
c o n s i s t e d o f r e m o v i n g 2 " b y 4 " s t u d s f r o m a c o n v e y o r s y s t e m and
s t a c k i n g them i n a p i l e .
A b o u t t w o w e e k s a f t e r commencement o f t h e j o b , claimant's
f i n g e r s s t a r t e d g o i n g numb w h i c h c a u s e d p a i n and r e s u l t e d i n
sleeplessness. Hoehne c o n t i n u e d t o work and t h e p a i n i n h i s
w r i s t s and arms s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s e d . Mr. H o e h n e had n o p r i o r
h i s t o r y o f m e d i c a l p r o b l e m s w i t h h i s h a n d s and i t i s u n q u e s t i o n e d
t h a t h i s c o n d i t i o n was c a u s e d b y t h e c o n t i n u a l s t r a i n i n v o l v e d i n
l i f t i n g and s t a c k i n g lumber.
Claimant c o n s u l t e d w i t h Dr. Cunningham, a local physician
who i n t u r n r e f e r r e d h i m t o D r . Cooney, a neurologist i n
M i s s o u l a , Montana. Dr. Cooney e x a m i n e d t h e c l a i m a n t on May 1 0 ,
1978, a n d d i a g n o s e d t h e c o n d i t i o n as a " c o m p r e s s i v e n e u r o p a t h y o f
t h e median nerves i n t h e c a r p a l t u n n e l s b i l a t e r a l l y " (i.e. bila-
t e r a l carpal tunnel syndrome).
H o e h n e was t h e n r e f e r r e d t o D r . Gary, a Missoula neuro-
s u r g e o n who p e r f o r m e d s u r g e r y o n t h e c l a i m a n t ' s h a n d s o n May 1 6 ,
1978. He was a b l e t o commence w o r k i n g i n o t h e r c a p a c i t i e s i n
l a t e June o r e a r l y J u l y , 1978. No p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y r e s u l t e d
f r o m t h e i n j u r y and M r . H o e h n e i s now a b l e t o d o t h e same t y p e o f
w o r k as he was a b l e t o do p r i o r t o h i s e m p l o y m e n t w i t h G r a n i t e
Lumber.
R i c h a r d H o e h n e f i l e d a c l a i m d a t e d May 7 , 1978, with the
D i v i s i o n o f Workers' Compensation. He s o u g h t r e i m b u r s e m e n t o f
m e d i c a l expenses and t e m p o r a r y t o t a l c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s f r o m
March 16, 1978, t h r o u g h J u n e 19, 1978. Alaska P a c i f i c denied
l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e i n j u r y on t h e b a s i s t h a t c l a i m a n t had n o t s u f -
f e r e d a compensable i n j u r y p u r s u a n t t o t h e Montana Workers'
Compensation Act. Mr. Hoehne r e q u e s t e d a h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e
Workers' C o m p e n s a t i o n C o u r t w h i c h was h e l d on O c t o b e r 1 8 , 1 9 7 8 .
On A u g u s t 2 8 , 1979, t h e c o u r t i s s u e d i t s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and
c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w i n t h e m a t t e r and e n t e r e d j u d g m e n t in
claimant's favor.
The f i n d i n g s o f f a c t r e v e a l : that the claimant's injury
" w a s r e l a t e d t o h i s a c t i v i t y o n t h e j o b and t h a t i t a r o s e o u t o f
and i n t h e course o f h i s employment"; and t h a t a l t h o u g h c l a i m a n t
c o u l d n o t r e l a t e h i s c o n d i t i o n t o any s p e c i f i c i n c i d e n t o r hap-
p e n i n g on t h e j o b , i t " d e v e l o p e d g r a d u a l l y " and " g o t s t e a d i l y
worse."
T h e s o l e i s s u e on a p p e a l i s whether the claimant s u f f e r e d
a n i n j u r y as d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 3 9 - 7 1 - 1 1 9 ( 1 ) , MCA, which
provides:
" ' I n j u r y ' o r ' i n j u r e d ' means: (1) a tangible
h a p p e n i n g o f a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e f r o m an unex-
p e c t e d cause o r unusual s t r a i n r e s u l t i n g i n
e i t h e r e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l p h y s i c a l h a r m and
s u c h p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n as a r e s u l t t h e r e f r o m
and e x c l u d i n g d i s e a s e n o t t r a c e a b l e t o i n j u r y ,
e x c e p t as p r o v i d e d i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 2 ) o f t h i s
section;"
The a p p e l l a n t does n o t a t t a c k t h e W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n
Court's findings of fact, i n s t e a d i t i s contended t h a t t h e f i n -
d i n g s do n o t s u p p o r t t h e l e g a l c o n c l u s i o n o f a c o m p e n s a b l e
injury. The h e a r t o f t h i s c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t a c o n d i t i o n w h i c h
a r i s e s a n d g r a d u a l l y becomes w o r s e o v e r a p e r i o d o f t i m e ,
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o no s p e c i f i c i n c i d e n t , i s n o t a " t a n g i b l e hap-
p e n i n g o f a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e f r o m an u n e x p e c t e d cause o r u n u s u a l
strain." R e s p o n d e n t , on t h e o t h e r hand, contends t h a t a s e r i e s
o f " t a n g i b l e h a p p e n i n g s o f a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e " and " u n u s u a l
s t r a i n " r e l a t e d t o t h e work a c t i v i t i e s o f a l u m b e r s t a c k e r o v e r a
t w o and o n e - h a l f month p e r i o d r e s u l t e d i n an i n j u r y w i t h i n t h e
d e f i n i t i o n o f section 39-71-119(1), MCA. Thus, the sole d i f -
f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s on a p p e a l i s t h a t one b e l i e v e s a g r a -
dual development o f j o b - r e l a t e d i n j u r y which i s not a t t r i b u t a b l e
- 3 -
t o one s p e c i f i c i n c i d e n t i s an " i n j u r y " and t h e o t h e r b e l i e v e s i t
i s not.
T h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r an i n j u r y f i t s w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i -
t i o n a l requirements o f t h e Workers' Compensation A c t has been
p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t i n numerous cases.
I n James v. V.K.V. L u m b e r Company ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 145 Mont. 466,
4 0 1 P.2d 282, a l u m b e r s t a c k e r s u f f e r e d a b a c k i n j u r y when he
b e n t o v e r t o p i c k up a 10 t o 15 pound cement b l o c k . T h i s a c t was
w i t h i n t h e c l a i m a n t ' s normal work a c t i v i t y . T h e c a s e was d e c i d e d
on t h e b a s i s o f s e c t i o n 92-418, R.C.M. 1947, which provided:
" I n j u r y o r i n j u r e d defined. 'Injury' or
'injured'means a t a n g i b l e happening o f a
t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e -o m a n u n e x p e c t e d c a u s e ,
fr -
r e s u l t i n g i n e i t h e r external o r internal physi-
c a l h a r m , a n d s u c h p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n as a
r e s u l t t h e r e f r o m and e x c l u d i n g d i s e a s e n o t t r a -
ceable t o injury." (Emphasis added.)
In a 3-2 d e c i s i o n , we f o u n d no i n j u r y w i t h i n t h e p r e v i o u s
definition, s i n c e t h e c a u s e o f t h e i n j u r y was n o t u n e x p e c t e d .
" L i f t i n g t h e f i f t e e n p o u n d b l o c k was e x p e c t e d a n d d o n e r o u t i n e l y
... II
Mont. a t 469, 4 0 1 P.2d a t 283.
A c a s e s i m i l a r t o J a m e s was p r e s e n t e d i n J o n e s v. Bair's
Cafes (1968), 152 Mont. 1 3 , 4 4 5 P.2d 923. An e m p l o y e e , h i r e d as
a dishwasher, s u f f e r e d a back i n j u r y f r o m p i c k i n g up a heavy t r a y
o f dishes. However, t h e 1 9 6 7 l e g i s l a t u r e h a d amended s e c t i o n
92-418, R.C.M. 1947, t o i n c l u d e "unexpected cause, - unusual
or
strain." T h i s l a n g u a g e h a s n o t b e e n amended s i n c e 1 9 6 8 a n d h a s now
been c o d i f i e d i n s e c t i o n 39-71-119(1), MCA. I n J o n e s we f o u n d a n
" i n j u r y " w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n and s t a t e d :
"Now, i n 1 9 6 7 , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n c l u d e d t h e w o r d s
' o r unusual s t r a i n . ' What i s t h e m e a n i n g ? How
d o we m e a s u r e ' u n u s u a l s t r a i n . ' I t seems c l e a r
t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d t o c h a n g e and
m o d i f y t h e James d e c i s i o n . By a d d i n g t h e
s e p a r a t e d i s t i n c t p h r a s e , ' o r u n u s u a l s t r a i n ,'
t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d t o c o v e r j u s t such a
s i t u a t i o n as we h a v e h e r e . T h e r e was n o
' u n e x p e c t e d c a u s e ' b u t t h e r e was an ' u n u s u a l
s t r a i n ; ' t h u s t h e m e a s u r e w o u l d seem t o be t h e
r e s u l t o f a t a n g i b l e happening o f a t r a u m a t i c
n a t u r e w h i c h r e s u l t s i n p h y s i c a l harm, b e i t a
rupture, a s t r a i n or a sprain. We c a n o n l y r e l y
on c r e d i b l e medical evidence t o determine it.
H e r e we h a v e s u c h m e d i c a l e v i d e n c e . " 152 Mont.
a t 1 9 , 4 4 5 P.2d a t 9 2 6 .
We h e r e e x p r e s s o u r a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n i n J o n e s . The
l e g i s l a t i v e amendment was i n t e n d e d t o c h a n g e t h e m a j o r i t y ' s d e c i -
s i o n i n James and t o a l l o w c l a i m a n t s r e l i e f when an i n j u r y i s t h e
r e s u l t o f an " u n u s u a l s t r a i n " o c c u r r i n g on t h e j o b .
With regard t o t h e requirement o f a " t a n g i b l e happening o f
a traumatic nature," t h i s C o u r t has s t a t e d :
" N o t o n l y m u s t c l a i m a n t show an u n u s u a l s t r a i n ,
b u t t h a t t h e s t r a i n must r e s u l t f r o m a t a n g i b l e
happening o f a traumatic nature ... A tangible
h a p p e n i n g m u s t be a p e r c e p t i b l e h a p p e n i n g ,
W e b s t e r ' s T h i r d New I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i c t i o n a r y .
Some a c t i o n o r i n c i d e n t , o r c h a i n o f a c t i o n s o r
i n c i d e n t s , m u s t be shown w h i c h m a y b e p e r c e i v e d
as a c o n t r i b u t i n g cause o f t h e r e s u l t i n g i n j u r y
. . ." E r h a r t v. G r e a t W e s t e r n S u g a r company -
( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 M o n t . 3 7 5 , 3 8 0 - 3 8 1 , 5 4 6 P.2d 1 0 5 5 ,
1058. (Emphasis added. )
I n o u r p r e s e n t c a s e t h e t a n g i b l e h a p p e n i n g was n o t a
single isolated incident, as was t h e s i t u a t i o n i n J o n e s , but
rather a chain of actions or incidents, i.e. the stacking of
l u m b e r on a d a i l y b a s i s . Under t h e preceding d e f i n i t i o n e i t h e r
s i t u a t i o n i s a " t a n g i b l e happening."
No a t t a c k h a s b e e n made o n t h e c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n and t h e
record c l e a r l y establishes t h a t respondent's i n j u r y resulted from
h i s w o r k a c t i v i t i e s as an e m p l o y e e o f G r a n i t e L u m b e r . As a
r e s u l t numerous cases w h i c h f i n d no " i n j u r y " because o f a f a i l u r e
o f p r o o f on t h e e l e m e n t o f c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s i m p l y d o n o t a p p l y
t o t h e present appeal. These cases g e n e r a l l y a r i s e i n cases
i n v o l v i n g h e a r t c o n d i t i o n s o r mental i l l n e s s . See Moen v. Decker
C o a l Co. (1979), Mont. , 6 0 4 P.2d 765, 36 St.Rep. 2220
(myocardial infarction); Dumont v. Wickens Bros. Const. Co.
(1979), Mont. , 5 9 8 P.2d 1 0 9 9 , 3 6 St.Rep. 1471 ( h e a r t
attack); E r h a r t v. G r e a t W e s t e r n S u g a r Company, supra; (mental
breakdown); H u r l b u t v. V o l l s t e d t K e r r Company ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont.
303, 5 3 8 P.2d 344 ( m y o c a r d i a l i n f a r c t i o n ) ; M c A n d r e w s v. Schwartz
(1974), 164 Mont. 402, 5 2 3 P.2d 1379 ( a r t e r i o s c l e r o s i s ) .
Affirmed.
Chief J u s t i c e \
W concur:
e
............................
Justices
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting:
In determining what is an "injury" (section 39-71-
119(1), MCA), under the Workers' Compensation Act, this
Court has demonstrated a quixotic ability to mount its horse
and ride off in all directions.
In McAndrews v. Schwartz (1974), 164 Mont. 402, 523
P.2d 1379, compensation was denied to a claimant with arterio-
sclerosis obliterans in a femoral artery principally because
the Act excluded "disease not traceable to injury."
In Erhart v. Great Western Sugar Company (1976), 169
Mont. 375, 546 P.2d 1055, compensation was denied to a
claimant who suffered a mental breakdown because there was
no tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected
cause or unusual strain.
In Ness v. Diamond Asphalt Company (1964), 143 Mont.
560, 393 P.2d 43, compensation was denied where an employee
suffered a myocardial infarction while at work, but not
because of his work.
In Greger v. United Prestress, Inc. (1979), - Mont.
, 590 P.2d 1121, we held that contact dermatitis caused
by repeated exposure to chromate ions in materials used by
the claimant in his work was an occupational disease, compensable
as such, and not as an industrial accident.
In Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Company (1975), 167 Mont.
303, 538 P.2d 344, we held that unusually cold weather did
not constitute an "unusual strain" to make a myocardial
infarction suffered thereby in an otherwise diseased heart
compensable.
In Dumont v. Wickens Bros. Const. Co. (1979),
Mont. , 598 P.2d 1099, 36 St.Rep. 1471, we held that a
claimant found dead in bed had not established a heart
condition "traceable to injury" from long hours, stresses
and strains on the job, and we denied compensation.
In the recent case of Moen v. Decker Coal Co. (1979),
- Mont. , 604 P.2d 765, 36 St.Rep. 2220, the majority
denied compensation in a myocardial infarction case on the
basis of no tangible happening of a traumatic event. I
dissented because the evidence showed that the infarction
occurred on the job, after which the claimant was subjected
to further unusual strain of an unexpected nature which
aggravated his condition and led to his death.
In the instant case, we have a claimant who was doing
the job he was hired to do, stacking lumber. While he was doing
the ordinary chores of his job, his tendons swelled, pinching
the nerves in his hands. Where is the traumatic happening
of a tangible event? Where is the unexpected cause or
unusual strain, if his job is to stack lumber? These elements
simply do not exist.
It is far more likely that claimant is entitled to
compensation under the Occupational Disease Act of Montana.
(Sections 39-72-101 et seq., MCA). The swelling of his
tendons from the repeated exertions of stacking lumber is
not unlike the development of contact dermatitis from repeated
exposures to chromate, as in Greger, supra.
Here is the anomaly of these decisions: Section 39-71-
119, MCA, defining a compensable "injury," provides that
"injury" excludes disease not traceable to injury, but
excepts three classes of diseases: cardiovascular, pulmonary,
or respiratory. Under the decisions of this Court, it has
constantly ruled myocardial infarctions are not compensable,
--
though they are within the exception. Here we make something
akin to tendonitis cornpensable, though it is -
outside the
exception.
- 8 -
I would hold that the claimant is entitled to compensation
under the Occupational Disease Act of Montana. His benefits
would be the same, but he would not be entitled to benefits
for partial disability. (Section 39-72-703, MCA.) Here
that is not important, because no residual disability is
claimed.