Hoehne v. Granite Lumber Co.

No. 79-16 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 - RICHARD RAYMOND HOEHNE, Claimant and Respondent, GRANITE LUMBER CO., Employer, ALASKA PACIFIC ASSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court, Hon. William Hunt, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Utick and Grosfield, Helena, Montana For Respondent: H.L. McChesney, Missoula, Montana Submitted on briefs: April 3, 1980 Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. The W o r k e r s ' Compensation C o u r t f o u n d t h a t c l a i m a n t - r e s p o n d e n t R i c h a r d Hoehne s u f f e r e d a compensable i n j u r y a r i s i n g o u t o f and i n t h e c o u r s e o f h i s employment w i t h G r a n i t e Lumber Company. A l a s k a P a c i f i c A s s u r a n c e Company ( A l a s k a P a c i f i c ) , G r a n i t e Lumber's insurance c a r r i e r , appeals. R i c h a r d H o e h n e commenced e m p l o y m e n t w i t h G r a n i t e L u m b e r Company i n P h i l l i p s b u r g , Montana, i n e a r l y March, 1978. His job c o n s i s t e d o f r e m o v i n g 2 " b y 4 " s t u d s f r o m a c o n v e y o r s y s t e m and s t a c k i n g them i n a p i l e . A b o u t t w o w e e k s a f t e r commencement o f t h e j o b , claimant's f i n g e r s s t a r t e d g o i n g numb w h i c h c a u s e d p a i n and r e s u l t e d i n sleeplessness. Hoehne c o n t i n u e d t o work and t h e p a i n i n h i s w r i s t s and arms s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s e d . Mr. H o e h n e had n o p r i o r h i s t o r y o f m e d i c a l p r o b l e m s w i t h h i s h a n d s and i t i s u n q u e s t i o n e d t h a t h i s c o n d i t i o n was c a u s e d b y t h e c o n t i n u a l s t r a i n i n v o l v e d i n l i f t i n g and s t a c k i n g lumber. Claimant c o n s u l t e d w i t h Dr. Cunningham, a local physician who i n t u r n r e f e r r e d h i m t o D r . Cooney, a neurologist i n M i s s o u l a , Montana. Dr. Cooney e x a m i n e d t h e c l a i m a n t on May 1 0 , 1978, a n d d i a g n o s e d t h e c o n d i t i o n as a " c o m p r e s s i v e n e u r o p a t h y o f t h e median nerves i n t h e c a r p a l t u n n e l s b i l a t e r a l l y " (i.e. bila- t e r a l carpal tunnel syndrome). H o e h n e was t h e n r e f e r r e d t o D r . Gary, a Missoula neuro- s u r g e o n who p e r f o r m e d s u r g e r y o n t h e c l a i m a n t ' s h a n d s o n May 1 6 , 1978. He was a b l e t o commence w o r k i n g i n o t h e r c a p a c i t i e s i n l a t e June o r e a r l y J u l y , 1978. No p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e i n j u r y and M r . H o e h n e i s now a b l e t o d o t h e same t y p e o f w o r k as he was a b l e t o do p r i o r t o h i s e m p l o y m e n t w i t h G r a n i t e Lumber. R i c h a r d H o e h n e f i l e d a c l a i m d a t e d May 7 , 1978, with the D i v i s i o n o f Workers' Compensation. He s o u g h t r e i m b u r s e m e n t o f m e d i c a l expenses and t e m p o r a r y t o t a l c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s f r o m March 16, 1978, t h r o u g h J u n e 19, 1978. Alaska P a c i f i c denied l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e i n j u r y on t h e b a s i s t h a t c l a i m a n t had n o t s u f - f e r e d a compensable i n j u r y p u r s u a n t t o t h e Montana Workers' Compensation Act. Mr. Hoehne r e q u e s t e d a h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e Workers' C o m p e n s a t i o n C o u r t w h i c h was h e l d on O c t o b e r 1 8 , 1 9 7 8 . On A u g u s t 2 8 , 1979, t h e c o u r t i s s u e d i t s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w i n t h e m a t t e r and e n t e r e d j u d g m e n t in claimant's favor. The f i n d i n g s o f f a c t r e v e a l : that the claimant's injury " w a s r e l a t e d t o h i s a c t i v i t y o n t h e j o b and t h a t i t a r o s e o u t o f and i n t h e course o f h i s employment"; and t h a t a l t h o u g h c l a i m a n t c o u l d n o t r e l a t e h i s c o n d i t i o n t o any s p e c i f i c i n c i d e n t o r hap- p e n i n g on t h e j o b , i t " d e v e l o p e d g r a d u a l l y " and " g o t s t e a d i l y worse." T h e s o l e i s s u e on a p p e a l i s whether the claimant s u f f e r e d a n i n j u r y as d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 3 9 - 7 1 - 1 1 9 ( 1 ) , MCA, which provides: " ' I n j u r y ' o r ' i n j u r e d ' means: (1) a tangible h a p p e n i n g o f a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e f r o m an unex- p e c t e d cause o r unusual s t r a i n r e s u l t i n g i n e i t h e r e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l p h y s i c a l h a r m and s u c h p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n as a r e s u l t t h e r e f r o m and e x c l u d i n g d i s e a s e n o t t r a c e a b l e t o i n j u r y , e x c e p t as p r o v i d e d i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 2 ) o f t h i s section;" The a p p e l l a n t does n o t a t t a c k t h e W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n Court's findings of fact, i n s t e a d i t i s contended t h a t t h e f i n - d i n g s do n o t s u p p o r t t h e l e g a l c o n c l u s i o n o f a c o m p e n s a b l e injury. The h e a r t o f t h i s c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t a c o n d i t i o n w h i c h a r i s e s a n d g r a d u a l l y becomes w o r s e o v e r a p e r i o d o f t i m e , a t t r i b u t a b l e t o no s p e c i f i c i n c i d e n t , i s n o t a " t a n g i b l e hap- p e n i n g o f a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e f r o m an u n e x p e c t e d cause o r u n u s u a l strain." R e s p o n d e n t , on t h e o t h e r hand, contends t h a t a s e r i e s o f " t a n g i b l e h a p p e n i n g s o f a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e " and " u n u s u a l s t r a i n " r e l a t e d t o t h e work a c t i v i t i e s o f a l u m b e r s t a c k e r o v e r a t w o and o n e - h a l f month p e r i o d r e s u l t e d i n an i n j u r y w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f section 39-71-119(1), MCA. Thus, the sole d i f - f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s on a p p e a l i s t h a t one b e l i e v e s a g r a - dual development o f j o b - r e l a t e d i n j u r y which i s not a t t r i b u t a b l e - 3 - t o one s p e c i f i c i n c i d e n t i s an " i n j u r y " and t h e o t h e r b e l i e v e s i t i s not. T h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r an i n j u r y f i t s w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i - t i o n a l requirements o f t h e Workers' Compensation A c t has been p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t i n numerous cases. I n James v. V.K.V. L u m b e r Company ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 145 Mont. 466, 4 0 1 P.2d 282, a l u m b e r s t a c k e r s u f f e r e d a b a c k i n j u r y when he b e n t o v e r t o p i c k up a 10 t o 15 pound cement b l o c k . T h i s a c t was w i t h i n t h e c l a i m a n t ' s normal work a c t i v i t y . T h e c a s e was d e c i d e d on t h e b a s i s o f s e c t i o n 92-418, R.C.M. 1947, which provided: " I n j u r y o r i n j u r e d defined. 'Injury' or 'injured'means a t a n g i b l e happening o f a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e -o m a n u n e x p e c t e d c a u s e , fr - r e s u l t i n g i n e i t h e r external o r internal physi- c a l h a r m , a n d s u c h p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n as a r e s u l t t h e r e f r o m and e x c l u d i n g d i s e a s e n o t t r a - ceable t o injury." (Emphasis added.) In a 3-2 d e c i s i o n , we f o u n d no i n j u r y w i t h i n t h e p r e v i o u s definition, s i n c e t h e c a u s e o f t h e i n j u r y was n o t u n e x p e c t e d . " L i f t i n g t h e f i f t e e n p o u n d b l o c k was e x p e c t e d a n d d o n e r o u t i n e l y ... II Mont. a t 469, 4 0 1 P.2d a t 283. A c a s e s i m i l a r t o J a m e s was p r e s e n t e d i n J o n e s v. Bair's Cafes (1968), 152 Mont. 1 3 , 4 4 5 P.2d 923. An e m p l o y e e , h i r e d as a dishwasher, s u f f e r e d a back i n j u r y f r o m p i c k i n g up a heavy t r a y o f dishes. However, t h e 1 9 6 7 l e g i s l a t u r e h a d amended s e c t i o n 92-418, R.C.M. 1947, t o i n c l u d e "unexpected cause, - unusual or strain." T h i s l a n g u a g e h a s n o t b e e n amended s i n c e 1 9 6 8 a n d h a s now been c o d i f i e d i n s e c t i o n 39-71-119(1), MCA. I n J o n e s we f o u n d a n " i n j u r y " w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n and s t a t e d : "Now, i n 1 9 6 7 , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n c l u d e d t h e w o r d s ' o r unusual s t r a i n . ' What i s t h e m e a n i n g ? How d o we m e a s u r e ' u n u s u a l s t r a i n . ' I t seems c l e a r t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d t o c h a n g e and m o d i f y t h e James d e c i s i o n . By a d d i n g t h e s e p a r a t e d i s t i n c t p h r a s e , ' o r u n u s u a l s t r a i n ,' t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d t o c o v e r j u s t such a s i t u a t i o n as we h a v e h e r e . T h e r e was n o ' u n e x p e c t e d c a u s e ' b u t t h e r e was an ' u n u s u a l s t r a i n ; ' t h u s t h e m e a s u r e w o u l d seem t o be t h e r e s u l t o f a t a n g i b l e happening o f a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e w h i c h r e s u l t s i n p h y s i c a l harm, b e i t a rupture, a s t r a i n or a sprain. We c a n o n l y r e l y on c r e d i b l e medical evidence t o determine it. H e r e we h a v e s u c h m e d i c a l e v i d e n c e . " 152 Mont. a t 1 9 , 4 4 5 P.2d a t 9 2 6 . We h e r e e x p r e s s o u r a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n i n J o n e s . The l e g i s l a t i v e amendment was i n t e n d e d t o c h a n g e t h e m a j o r i t y ' s d e c i - s i o n i n James and t o a l l o w c l a i m a n t s r e l i e f when an i n j u r y i s t h e r e s u l t o f an " u n u s u a l s t r a i n " o c c u r r i n g on t h e j o b . With regard t o t h e requirement o f a " t a n g i b l e happening o f a traumatic nature," t h i s C o u r t has s t a t e d : " N o t o n l y m u s t c l a i m a n t show an u n u s u a l s t r a i n , b u t t h a t t h e s t r a i n must r e s u l t f r o m a t a n g i b l e happening o f a traumatic nature ... A tangible h a p p e n i n g m u s t be a p e r c e p t i b l e h a p p e n i n g , W e b s t e r ' s T h i r d New I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i c t i o n a r y . Some a c t i o n o r i n c i d e n t , o r c h a i n o f a c t i o n s o r i n c i d e n t s , m u s t be shown w h i c h m a y b e p e r c e i v e d as a c o n t r i b u t i n g cause o f t h e r e s u l t i n g i n j u r y . . ." E r h a r t v. G r e a t W e s t e r n S u g a r company - ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 M o n t . 3 7 5 , 3 8 0 - 3 8 1 , 5 4 6 P.2d 1 0 5 5 , 1058. (Emphasis added. ) I n o u r p r e s e n t c a s e t h e t a n g i b l e h a p p e n i n g was n o t a single isolated incident, as was t h e s i t u a t i o n i n J o n e s , but rather a chain of actions or incidents, i.e. the stacking of l u m b e r on a d a i l y b a s i s . Under t h e preceding d e f i n i t i o n e i t h e r s i t u a t i o n i s a " t a n g i b l e happening." No a t t a c k h a s b e e n made o n t h e c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n and t h e record c l e a r l y establishes t h a t respondent's i n j u r y resulted from h i s w o r k a c t i v i t i e s as an e m p l o y e e o f G r a n i t e L u m b e r . As a r e s u l t numerous cases w h i c h f i n d no " i n j u r y " because o f a f a i l u r e o f p r o o f on t h e e l e m e n t o f c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s i m p l y d o n o t a p p l y t o t h e present appeal. These cases g e n e r a l l y a r i s e i n cases i n v o l v i n g h e a r t c o n d i t i o n s o r mental i l l n e s s . See Moen v. Decker C o a l Co. (1979), Mont. , 6 0 4 P.2d 765, 36 St.Rep. 2220 (myocardial infarction); Dumont v. Wickens Bros. Const. Co. (1979), Mont. , 5 9 8 P.2d 1 0 9 9 , 3 6 St.Rep. 1471 ( h e a r t attack); E r h a r t v. G r e a t W e s t e r n S u g a r Company, supra; (mental breakdown); H u r l b u t v. V o l l s t e d t K e r r Company ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. 303, 5 3 8 P.2d 344 ( m y o c a r d i a l i n f a r c t i o n ) ; M c A n d r e w s v. Schwartz (1974), 164 Mont. 402, 5 2 3 P.2d 1379 ( a r t e r i o s c l e r o s i s ) . Affirmed. Chief J u s t i c e \ W concur: e ............................ Justices Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting: In determining what is an "injury" (section 39-71- 119(1), MCA), under the Workers' Compensation Act, this Court has demonstrated a quixotic ability to mount its horse and ride off in all directions. In McAndrews v. Schwartz (1974), 164 Mont. 402, 523 P.2d 1379, compensation was denied to a claimant with arterio- sclerosis obliterans in a femoral artery principally because the Act excluded "disease not traceable to injury." In Erhart v. Great Western Sugar Company (1976), 169 Mont. 375, 546 P.2d 1055, compensation was denied to a claimant who suffered a mental breakdown because there was no tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain. In Ness v. Diamond Asphalt Company (1964), 143 Mont. 560, 393 P.2d 43, compensation was denied where an employee suffered a myocardial infarction while at work, but not because of his work. In Greger v. United Prestress, Inc. (1979), - Mont. , 590 P.2d 1121, we held that contact dermatitis caused by repeated exposure to chromate ions in materials used by the claimant in his work was an occupational disease, compensable as such, and not as an industrial accident. In Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Company (1975), 167 Mont. 303, 538 P.2d 344, we held that unusually cold weather did not constitute an "unusual strain" to make a myocardial infarction suffered thereby in an otherwise diseased heart compensable. In Dumont v. Wickens Bros. Const. Co. (1979), Mont. , 598 P.2d 1099, 36 St.Rep. 1471, we held that a claimant found dead in bed had not established a heart condition "traceable to injury" from long hours, stresses and strains on the job, and we denied compensation. In the recent case of Moen v. Decker Coal Co. (1979), - Mont. , 604 P.2d 765, 36 St.Rep. 2220, the majority denied compensation in a myocardial infarction case on the basis of no tangible happening of a traumatic event. I dissented because the evidence showed that the infarction occurred on the job, after which the claimant was subjected to further unusual strain of an unexpected nature which aggravated his condition and led to his death. In the instant case, we have a claimant who was doing the job he was hired to do, stacking lumber. While he was doing the ordinary chores of his job, his tendons swelled, pinching the nerves in his hands. Where is the traumatic happening of a tangible event? Where is the unexpected cause or unusual strain, if his job is to stack lumber? These elements simply do not exist. It is far more likely that claimant is entitled to compensation under the Occupational Disease Act of Montana. (Sections 39-72-101 et seq., MCA). The swelling of his tendons from the repeated exertions of stacking lumber is not unlike the development of contact dermatitis from repeated exposures to chromate, as in Greger, supra. Here is the anomaly of these decisions: Section 39-71- 119, MCA, defining a compensable "injury," provides that "injury" excludes disease not traceable to injury, but excepts three classes of diseases: cardiovascular, pulmonary, or respiratory. Under the decisions of this Court, it has constantly ruled myocardial infarctions are not compensable, -- though they are within the exception. Here we make something akin to tendonitis cornpensable, though it is - outside the exception. - 8 - I would hold that the claimant is entitled to compensation under the Occupational Disease Act of Montana. His benefits would be the same, but he would not be entitled to benefits for partial disability. (Section 39-72-703, MCA.) Here that is not important, because no residual disability is claimed.