No. 84-507
IN THE SUPREME COIJRT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
MILBANK MUTUAL INSURANCE COLWANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-
MELVIN EAGLEMAN, JR.
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Roosevelt,
The Honorable M. James Sorte, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Carol C. Johns, Nontana Legal Services, Wolf Point,
Montana
For Respondent :
Cannon & Sheehy; Edmund F. Sheehy, Jr., Helena,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 13, 1985
Decided: September 12, 1985
Filed:
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e F r e d J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t .
The R o o s e v e l t County D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d a default
judgment in favor of Milbank Mutual Insurance Company
(Milbank) on December 9 , 1983. Appellant, Melvin Eagleman,
Jr. (Eagleman), a p p e a l s . W e reverse.
The i s s u e s a r e :
1. F7as E a g l e m a n ' s notice of appeal timely f i l e d with
t h i s Court?
2. Did the District Court have subject matter
jurisdiction?
Eagleman i s a n e n r o l l e d member o f t h e F o r t Peck S i o u x
and A s s i n i b o i n e T r i b e s and r e s i d e s on t h e F o r t Peck R e s e r v a -
tion. Eagleman took a 1981 Ford Thunderbird without the
permission of the owner, plaintiff's insured, Lawrence F.
Blackdog. Eagleman damaged t h e v e h i c l e w i t h i n t h e e x t e r i o r
b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e F o r t Peck R e s e r v a t i o n .
Milbank paid its insured $7,400 and brought a civil
a c t i o n a g a i n s t Eagleman i n D i s t r i c t C o u r t s e e k i n g $7,400 i n
damages. Eagleman d i d n o t a p p e a r and a d e f a u l t judgment was
entered.
I n A p r i l 1 9 8 3 , t h e Department o f , J u s t i c e , Motor V e h i c l e
Division, notified Eagleman that his driver's l i c e n s e was
suspended f o r f a i l u r e t o s a t i s f y t h e judgment. On September
'11, 1 9 8 4 , Eagleman f i l e d a motion t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t
judgment on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t it was v o i d u n d e r R u l e 6 0 ( b ) ( 4 ) ,
M.R.Civ.P.
The motion was deemed denied by operation of law on
September 21, 1984. O O c t o b e r 26,
n 1984, t h e D i s t r i c t Court
g r a n t e d a motion f o r an e x t e n s i o n o f t i m e f o r f i l i n g n o t i c e
of a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t on a showing o f e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t .
Eagleman f i l e d n o t i c e o f a p p e a l on O c t o b e r 26, 1984.
Was Eagleman's notice of appeal timely filed with this
Court?
On September 11, 1984, Eagleman filed a motion to set
aside the default judgment. Rule 59 (d), M.R.Civ.P. requires
that a hearing on the motion be had within 10 days. Since no
hearing was held within 10 days, Eagleman's motion was deemed
denied on September 21, 1984.
Eagleman filed notice of appeal on October 26, 1984,
thirty-five days after his motion was deemed denied. Milbank
contends the notice of appeal was not timely filed.
Under Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., the time to file a notice
of appeal may be extended. In Zell v. Zell (1977), 172 Mont.
496, 499-500, 565 P.2d 311, 313, we discussed excusable
neglect and the extension of time to file a notice of appeal.
We believe that allowing a party to
request such an extension of time before
or after the expiration of the original
time prescribed by Rule 5,
M.R.App.Civ.P., is the better procedure
and we adopt this view.
This does not, however, give a party an
unlimited amount of time to request an
extension of time from the district
court. Rule 5 provides:
"Upon showing of excusable neglect, the
district court may extend the time for
filing the notice o f appeal by any party
for a period not to exceed 30 days from
the expiratior o-- the origins 1 time
'?
=scribed 3 - Rule."
this - (Emphasis
supplied.)
On October 26, 1984, Eagleman was granted an extension
of time for filing a notice of appeal upon a showing of
excusable neglect. The notice of appeal was filed within the
30-day extension of time authorized by Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P.
The appeal was timely filed.
Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t have s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n ?
T h e r e i s no d i s p u t e t h a t Eagleman i s a n e n r o l l e d member
of t h e F o r t Peck S i o u x and A s s i n i b o i n e T r i b e s and t h a t t h e
accident occurred within t h e e x t e r i o r boundaries of t h e F o r t
Peck R e s e r v a t i o n .
Subject matter jurisdiction over civil litigation in
Montana between I n d i a n s and n o n - I n d i a n s a r i s i n g o u t of con-
d u c t on a n I n d i a n r e s e r v a t i o n i s g o v e r n e d by t h e t h r e e - p a r t
t e s t o f S t a t e e x r e l . I r o n B e a r v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 162
Mont. 335, 346, 512 P.2d 1292, 1299:
B e f o r e a d i s t r i c t c o u r t c a n assume j u r i s -
d i c t i o n i n any m a t t e r s u b m i t t e d t o i t , it
must f i n d s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n by
determining: (1) w h e t h e r t h e f e d e r a l
t r e a t i e s and s t a t u t e s a p p l i c a b l e have
preempted s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n ; ( 2 ) w h e t h e r
t h e e x e r c i s e o f s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n would
interfere with ... [ t r i b a l ] self-gov-
e r n m e n t ; and ( 3 ) w h e t h e r t h e T r i b a l C o u r t
is currently exercising jurisdiction o r
has exercised j u r i s d i c t i o n i n such a
manner a s t o p r e e m p t s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n .
The f i r s t and s e c o n d e l e m e n t s o f t h e t e s t w e r e a d o p t e d
f r o m W i l l i a m s v . Lee ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 358 U.S. 217. The U n i t e d S t a t e s
Supreme C o u r t h a s i n t e r p r e t e d t h e s e two e l e m e n t s t o b e d i s -
junctive; if either is present, the state lacks subject
matter jurisdiction.
C o n g r e s s h a s b r o a d power t o r e g u l a t e
t r i b a l a f f a i r s u n d e r t h e I n d i a n Commerce
C l a u s e , A r t . 1, 58, c l . 3. This congres-
s i o n a l a u t h o r i t y and t h e "semi-indepen-
d e n t p o s i t i o n " o f I n d i a n t r i b e s have
g i v e n r i s e t o two i n d e p e n d e n t b u t r e l a t e d
b a r r i e r s t o t h e a s s e r t i o n o f s t a t e regu-
latory authority over t r i b a l reservations
and members. F i r s t , t h e e x e r c i s e o f such
a u t h o r i t y may b e pre-empted by f e d e r a l
law. Second, it may u n l a w f u l l y i n f r i n g e
"on t h e r i g h t o f r e s e r v a t i o n I n d i a n s t o
make t h e i r own l a w s and b e r u l e d by
them." W i l l i a m s v. L e e , 358 U.S. 217,
220 ( 1 9 5 9 ) . The two b a r r i e r s a r e i n d e -
pendent because e i t h e r , s t a n d i n g a l o n e ,
can b e a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r h o l d i n g
state law inapplicable to activity
undertaken on the reservation or by
t r i b a l members.
White Mountain Apache T r i b e v. B r a c k e r ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 448 U.S. 136,
142-43 (citations omitted).
Has s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n been preempted by f e d e r a l t r e a -
ties o r relevant statutes? The 1851 T r e a t y o f F o r t Laramie
reserved land for the S i o u x and A s s i n i b o i n e T r i b e s . J,and
r e s e r v e d by t r i b e s t h r o u g h . t r e a t i e s , a g r e e m e n t s r a t i f i e d by
C o n g r e s s , o r e x e c u t i v e o r d e r s was o r i g i n a l l y beyond t h e r e a c h
of s t a t e governmental a u t h o r i t y . However, s u b s e q u e n t f e d e r a l
law p e r m i t t e d s t a t e s t o assume j u r i s d i c t i o n , w i t h t h e t r i b e ' s
consent, over c i v i l causes of action arising within Indian
country. Montana has not obtained c i v i l jurisdiction over
the Fort Peck Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes under either
Public Law 280 or the Civil Rights Act of 1968. See 28
U.S.C. § 1 3 6 0 ( a ) ; 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a). A s we s t a t e d i n Iron
Bear:
I n Montana, t h e s t a t e assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n a f t e r
P u b l i c Law 280 on o n l y o n e r e s e r v a t i o n , [the]
Flathead [Reservation] .
I t h a s n o t a c t e d concern-
...
i n g t h e o t h e r s i x Montana r e s e r v a t i o n s
i r o n Rear,
-- 162 Mont. a t 342, 512 P.2d a t 1297.
Because Montana h a s n o t o b t a i n e d j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r t h e
above l a w s and t h e T r i b e s have d e c i d e d t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c -
tion i n t h i s area, it may b e a r g u e d t h a t f e d e r a l p r e e m p t i o n
is in effect. Because r e c e n t f e d e r a l c a s e s a r e n o t c l e a r , w e
c h o o s e n o t t o r u l e on t h e p r e e m p t i o n i s s u e .
Would t h e e x e r c i s e o f s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t e r f e r e w i t h
tribal self-government? The N i n t h C i r c u i t C o u r t o f A p p e a l s ,
which u s e s a s i m i l a r t e s t , r e c e n t l y a n a l y z e d i n f r i n g e m e n t o f
t r i b a l s o v e r e i g n t y and s t a t e d :
A t r i b e ' s i n t e r e s t i n self-government
c o u l d b e i m p l i c a t e d i n o n e o f two ways.
F i r s t , i f a s t a t e o r f e d e r a l c o u r t re-
s o l v e s a d i s p u t e which was w i t h i n t h e
province of t h e t r i b a l c o u r t s o r of o t h e r
nonjudicial law-applying tribal institu-
tions, that court would impinge upon the
tribe's right to adjudicate controversies
arising within it. Second, if the dis-
pute itself calls into question the
validity or propriety of an act fairly
attributable to the tribe as a govern-
mental body, tribal self-government is
drawn directly into the controversy.
We have recognized that the tribal court
is generally the exclusive forum for the
adjudication of disputes affecting the
interests of both Indians and non-Indians
which arise on the reservation ...
We emphasize that the Indians in the Fort
Belknap community are, and always have
been, entitled to assume exclusive juris-
diction over civil controversies within
the reservation. However, if the dispute
itself does not implicate the tribal
government and the tribe has decided not
to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction,
it does not follow that the state courts
are without power to resolve a contro-
versy occurring within the state but on a
reservation ...
R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Auth.. (9th Cir.
cert. denied, U.S.
105 S.Ct. 3476 (1985) (citations omitted).
Subchapter 1, 5 107 of the Fort Peck Tribes Comprehen-
sive Code Of Justice (1983) defines the extent of the Tribal
Court's jurisdiction as follows:
The [Tribal] Court shall have jurisdic-
tion over any action where one party to
the action shall be an Indian, ... and
(a) the cause of action arises under the
Constitution or laws of the Tribes; or
(b) an Indian party to the action re-
sides on the Fort Peck Reservation.
Likewise, the 1965 Tribal Code stated that the Tribal Court
had jurisdiction over all civil actions "where the plaintiff
is not a member of the Tribes and the defendant is an Indi-
an. " Chap. I, S 2 (b), Fort Peck Tribal Code (1965).
The dispute between Milbank and Eagleman, an enrolled
member of the tribes, is a civil controversy arising within
the exterior boundaries of the reservation. The Fort Peck
Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes are entitled to and have assumed
exclusive jurisdiction. Under the facts of this case, it
would be an infringement of tribal self-government to allow a
non-Indian to sue a tribal member in a forum other than one
the Fort Peck Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes have established
for themselves.
The Fort Peck Code further establishes that the Tribal
Court is currently authorized to exercise jurisdiction over
this type of a case. This meets the third test of --
Iron Bear.
We hold that the District Court's exercise of jurisdic-
tion interferes with tribal sovereignty and the right to
self-government of the Fort Peck Sioux and Assiniboine
Tribes.
We reverse the judgment of the District Court for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and direct the court to vacate
its judqment against the defendant.
We concur: