Milbank Mutual Insurance v. Eagleman

No. 84-507 IN THE SUPREME COIJRT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985 MILBANK MUTUAL INSURANCE COLWANY, a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- MELVIN EAGLEMAN, JR. Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Roosevelt, The Honorable M. James Sorte, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Carol C. Johns, Nontana Legal Services, Wolf Point, Montana For Respondent : Cannon & Sheehy; Edmund F. Sheehy, Jr., Helena, Montana Submitted on Briefs: June 13, 1985 Decided: September 12, 1985 Filed: Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e F r e d J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t . The R o o s e v e l t County D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d a default judgment in favor of Milbank Mutual Insurance Company (Milbank) on December 9 , 1983. Appellant, Melvin Eagleman, Jr. (Eagleman), a p p e a l s . W e reverse. The i s s u e s a r e : 1. F7as E a g l e m a n ' s notice of appeal timely f i l e d with t h i s Court? 2. Did the District Court have subject matter jurisdiction? Eagleman i s a n e n r o l l e d member o f t h e F o r t Peck S i o u x and A s s i n i b o i n e T r i b e s and r e s i d e s on t h e F o r t Peck R e s e r v a - tion. Eagleman took a 1981 Ford Thunderbird without the permission of the owner, plaintiff's insured, Lawrence F. Blackdog. Eagleman damaged t h e v e h i c l e w i t h i n t h e e x t e r i o r b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e F o r t Peck R e s e r v a t i o n . Milbank paid its insured $7,400 and brought a civil a c t i o n a g a i n s t Eagleman i n D i s t r i c t C o u r t s e e k i n g $7,400 i n damages. Eagleman d i d n o t a p p e a r and a d e f a u l t judgment was entered. I n A p r i l 1 9 8 3 , t h e Department o f , J u s t i c e , Motor V e h i c l e Division, notified Eagleman that his driver's l i c e n s e was suspended f o r f a i l u r e t o s a t i s f y t h e judgment. On September '11, 1 9 8 4 , Eagleman f i l e d a motion t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t it was v o i d u n d e r R u l e 6 0 ( b ) ( 4 ) , M.R.Civ.P. The motion was deemed denied by operation of law on September 21, 1984. O O c t o b e r 26, n 1984, t h e D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t e d a motion f o r an e x t e n s i o n o f t i m e f o r f i l i n g n o t i c e of a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t on a showing o f e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t . Eagleman f i l e d n o t i c e o f a p p e a l on O c t o b e r 26, 1984. Was Eagleman's notice of appeal timely filed with this Court? On September 11, 1984, Eagleman filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. Rule 59 (d), M.R.Civ.P. requires that a hearing on the motion be had within 10 days. Since no hearing was held within 10 days, Eagleman's motion was deemed denied on September 21, 1984. Eagleman filed notice of appeal on October 26, 1984, thirty-five days after his motion was deemed denied. Milbank contends the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Under Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., the time to file a notice of appeal may be extended. In Zell v. Zell (1977), 172 Mont. 496, 499-500, 565 P.2d 311, 313, we discussed excusable neglect and the extension of time to file a notice of appeal. We believe that allowing a party to request such an extension of time before or after the expiration of the original time prescribed by Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., is the better procedure and we adopt this view. This does not, however, give a party an unlimited amount of time to request an extension of time from the district court. Rule 5 provides: "Upon showing of excusable neglect, the district court may extend the time for filing the notice o f appeal by any party for a period not to exceed 30 days from the expiratior o-- the origins 1 time '? =scribed 3 - Rule." this - (Emphasis supplied.) On October 26, 1984, Eagleman was granted an extension of time for filing a notice of appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect. The notice of appeal was filed within the 30-day extension of time authorized by Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P. The appeal was timely filed. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t have s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n ? T h e r e i s no d i s p u t e t h a t Eagleman i s a n e n r o l l e d member of t h e F o r t Peck S i o u x and A s s i n i b o i n e T r i b e s and t h a t t h e accident occurred within t h e e x t e r i o r boundaries of t h e F o r t Peck R e s e r v a t i o n . Subject matter jurisdiction over civil litigation in Montana between I n d i a n s and n o n - I n d i a n s a r i s i n g o u t of con- d u c t on a n I n d i a n r e s e r v a t i o n i s g o v e r n e d by t h e t h r e e - p a r t t e s t o f S t a t e e x r e l . I r o n B e a r v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 162 Mont. 335, 346, 512 P.2d 1292, 1299: B e f o r e a d i s t r i c t c o u r t c a n assume j u r i s - d i c t i o n i n any m a t t e r s u b m i t t e d t o i t , it must f i n d s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n by determining: (1) w h e t h e r t h e f e d e r a l t r e a t i e s and s t a t u t e s a p p l i c a b l e have preempted s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n ; ( 2 ) w h e t h e r t h e e x e r c i s e o f s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n would interfere with ... [ t r i b a l ] self-gov- e r n m e n t ; and ( 3 ) w h e t h e r t h e T r i b a l C o u r t is currently exercising jurisdiction o r has exercised j u r i s d i c t i o n i n such a manner a s t o p r e e m p t s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n . The f i r s t and s e c o n d e l e m e n t s o f t h e t e s t w e r e a d o p t e d f r o m W i l l i a m s v . Lee ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 358 U.S. 217. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s i n t e r p r e t e d t h e s e two e l e m e n t s t o b e d i s - junctive; if either is present, the state lacks subject matter jurisdiction. C o n g r e s s h a s b r o a d power t o r e g u l a t e t r i b a l a f f a i r s u n d e r t h e I n d i a n Commerce C l a u s e , A r t . 1, 58, c l . 3. This congres- s i o n a l a u t h o r i t y and t h e "semi-indepen- d e n t p o s i t i o n " o f I n d i a n t r i b e s have g i v e n r i s e t o two i n d e p e n d e n t b u t r e l a t e d b a r r i e r s t o t h e a s s e r t i o n o f s t a t e regu- latory authority over t r i b a l reservations and members. F i r s t , t h e e x e r c i s e o f such a u t h o r i t y may b e pre-empted by f e d e r a l law. Second, it may u n l a w f u l l y i n f r i n g e "on t h e r i g h t o f r e s e r v a t i o n I n d i a n s t o make t h e i r own l a w s and b e r u l e d by them." W i l l i a m s v. L e e , 358 U.S. 217, 220 ( 1 9 5 9 ) . The two b a r r i e r s a r e i n d e - pendent because e i t h e r , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , can b e a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r h o l d i n g state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by t r i b a l members. White Mountain Apache T r i b e v. B r a c k e r ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 448 U.S. 136, 142-43 (citations omitted). Has s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n been preempted by f e d e r a l t r e a - ties o r relevant statutes? The 1851 T r e a t y o f F o r t Laramie reserved land for the S i o u x and A s s i n i b o i n e T r i b e s . J,and r e s e r v e d by t r i b e s t h r o u g h . t r e a t i e s , a g r e e m e n t s r a t i f i e d by C o n g r e s s , o r e x e c u t i v e o r d e r s was o r i g i n a l l y beyond t h e r e a c h of s t a t e governmental a u t h o r i t y . However, s u b s e q u e n t f e d e r a l law p e r m i t t e d s t a t e s t o assume j u r i s d i c t i o n , w i t h t h e t r i b e ' s consent, over c i v i l causes of action arising within Indian country. Montana has not obtained c i v i l jurisdiction over the Fort Peck Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes under either Public Law 280 or the Civil Rights Act of 1968. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 3 6 0 ( a ) ; 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a). A s we s t a t e d i n Iron Bear: I n Montana, t h e s t a t e assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n a f t e r P u b l i c Law 280 on o n l y o n e r e s e r v a t i o n , [the] Flathead [Reservation] . I t h a s n o t a c t e d concern- ... i n g t h e o t h e r s i x Montana r e s e r v a t i o n s i r o n Rear, -- 162 Mont. a t 342, 512 P.2d a t 1297. Because Montana h a s n o t o b t a i n e d j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r t h e above l a w s and t h e T r i b e s have d e c i d e d t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c - tion i n t h i s area, it may b e a r g u e d t h a t f e d e r a l p r e e m p t i o n is in effect. Because r e c e n t f e d e r a l c a s e s a r e n o t c l e a r , w e c h o o s e n o t t o r u l e on t h e p r e e m p t i o n i s s u e . Would t h e e x e r c i s e o f s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t e r f e r e w i t h tribal self-government? The N i n t h C i r c u i t C o u r t o f A p p e a l s , which u s e s a s i m i l a r t e s t , r e c e n t l y a n a l y z e d i n f r i n g e m e n t o f t r i b a l s o v e r e i g n t y and s t a t e d : A t r i b e ' s i n t e r e s t i n self-government c o u l d b e i m p l i c a t e d i n o n e o f two ways. F i r s t , i f a s t a t e o r f e d e r a l c o u r t re- s o l v e s a d i s p u t e which was w i t h i n t h e province of t h e t r i b a l c o u r t s o r of o t h e r nonjudicial law-applying tribal institu- tions, that court would impinge upon the tribe's right to adjudicate controversies arising within it. Second, if the dis- pute itself calls into question the validity or propriety of an act fairly attributable to the tribe as a govern- mental body, tribal self-government is drawn directly into the controversy. We have recognized that the tribal court is generally the exclusive forum for the adjudication of disputes affecting the interests of both Indians and non-Indians which arise on the reservation ... We emphasize that the Indians in the Fort Belknap community are, and always have been, entitled to assume exclusive juris- diction over civil controversies within the reservation. However, if the dispute itself does not implicate the tribal government and the tribe has decided not to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, it does not follow that the state courts are without power to resolve a contro- versy occurring within the state but on a reservation ... R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Auth.. (9th Cir. cert. denied, U.S. 105 S.Ct. 3476 (1985) (citations omitted). Subchapter 1, 5 107 of the Fort Peck Tribes Comprehen- sive Code Of Justice (1983) defines the extent of the Tribal Court's jurisdiction as follows: The [Tribal] Court shall have jurisdic- tion over any action where one party to the action shall be an Indian, ... and (a) the cause of action arises under the Constitution or laws of the Tribes; or (b) an Indian party to the action re- sides on the Fort Peck Reservation. Likewise, the 1965 Tribal Code stated that the Tribal Court had jurisdiction over all civil actions "where the plaintiff is not a member of the Tribes and the defendant is an Indi- an. " Chap. I, S 2 (b), Fort Peck Tribal Code (1965). The dispute between Milbank and Eagleman, an enrolled member of the tribes, is a civil controversy arising within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. The Fort Peck Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes are entitled to and have assumed exclusive jurisdiction. Under the facts of this case, it would be an infringement of tribal self-government to allow a non-Indian to sue a tribal member in a forum other than one the Fort Peck Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes have established for themselves. The Fort Peck Code further establishes that the Tribal Court is currently authorized to exercise jurisdiction over this type of a case. This meets the third test of -- Iron Bear. We hold that the District Court's exercise of jurisdic- tion interferes with tribal sovereignty and the right to self-government of the Fort Peck Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes. We reverse the judgment of the District Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and direct the court to vacate its judqment against the defendant. We concur: