NO. 93-371
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995
BRUCE GALBREATH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
GOLDEN SUNLIGHT MINES, INC.,
PLACER DOME U.S., INC., and
COMPENSATION ADJUSTERS,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and for the County of Silver Bow,
The Honorable Dale Cox, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Erik B. Thueson and John A. Kutzman,
Thueson and Lamb, Helena, Montana
Michael Cotter, Cotter & Cotter,
Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Donald C. Robinson, Poore, Roth & Robinson,
Butte, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 12, 1995
Decided: February 15, 1995
Filed:
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant Bruce Galbreath appeals from a jury verdict and
judgment of the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County,
finding that: (1) appellant failed to prove that respondent Golden
Sunlight Mine, Inc. ,
(GSM) discharged appellant for filing a
workers1 compensation claim; (2) appellant failed to prove that
respondent Compensation Adjusters violated their obligations to
appellant during the adjustment of his workers' compensation claim;
and (3) appellant failed to prove that he was terminated without
good cause.
We reverse and remand to the District Court for further
proceedings.
While appellant raises several issues on appeal, the following
issue is dispositive of the case:
Did the District Court err in allowing evidence that appellant
was discharged for reasons other than the one set forth in the
discharge letter?
Respondent Golden Sunlight Mines, Inc., employed appellant
Bruce Galbreath as an instrument technician from 1982 until GSM
terminated his employment on September 7, 1989. Following the
on-the-job death of co-worker, Terry Olind, in 1987, appellant and
co-workers, Joe Robertson and Denis Shaw, pressured GSM to address
a variety of alleged work place safety violations. GSM terminated
the employment of Robertson and Shaw at different times in 1988.
On May 22, 1989, appellant injured his left knee at work after
stepping on a ball bearing while climbing down a ladder. Appellant
returned to work the next day after Dr. Reiff of Whitehall examined
his knee. On May 31, 1989, co-worker Mike Gallagher found
appellant lying head down on a stairwell with his legs protruding
through the opening between the top two stairs. There were no
witnesses to the accident which, according to appellant, occurred
after his previously injured left knee buckled, causing him to
fall. GSM's Quick Response Team, accompanied by safety supervisor
Ron Dovall, took appellant to Dr. Reiff, who discovered a bump on
appellant's head, and diagnosed a tender neck and an abnormal
curvature of the cervical spine. After appellant became
disoriented and his pupils began to dilate, Dr. Reiff referred
appellant to St. James Community Hospital where he was examined by
Dr. Pius Baggenstos, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Baggenstos diagnosed a
lump on appellant's head, an acute cervical sprain, and injury to
appellant's left knee. Appellant lost consciousness during the
examination.
From the date of the accident on May 31, 1989, appellant
received his full salary under GSM's short-term disability policy
which provided for full pay up to four months for bona fide medical
absences. Under that policy, GSM reserved the right to request
verification of medical absences. GSM informed appellant that
during short-term disability there was no light-duty work
requirement. During appellant's absence from the mine, he worked
regular shifts at a restaurant he and his wife had recently
purchased. On August 23, 1989, Compensation Adjusters recommended
accepting liability for appellant's May 31, 1989, accident.
On August 4, 1989, Dr. Humberger performed arthroscopic
surgery on appellant's injured left knee to remove debris. On
August 28, 1989, appellant reported to work for the first time
since May 31, 1989, with a release to return to work from Dr.
Reiff. Later that day, GSM's Maintenance Superintendent, Paul
Dale, delivered a letter to appellant explaining that before
appellant could return to work, he was required to submit
unconditional work releases from Dr. Reiff, Dr. Humberger, and the
Ridgeview Clinic, along with a verified letter from each of the
above explaining appellant's absence from work from May 31, 1989,
through August 28, 1989.
In an effort to comply with Dale's request, appellant returned
to work on several occasions and presented Dale with a variety of
medical documentation. On each of those occasions, Dale rejected
appellant's medical documentation and denied appellant's request to
return to work. Appellant was discharged on September 8, 1989, for
failing to provide specific documentation explaining his absence
from work from May 31, 1989, through August 28, 1989.
On May 23, 1990, appellant filed a complaint alleging:
(1) that he had been terminated without good cause under Montana's
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, § 39-2-901, MCA; (2) that
his termination violated § 39-71-317, MCA, which prohibits
employers from terminating workers for filing workers' compensation
claims and requires employers to give job preference to employees
returning to work after an industrial accident; (3) that his
termination and its relationship to his workers' compensation claim
violated Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 33-18-201, MCA;
and (4) that all of the defendants acted fraudulently,
oppressively, and maliciously in violation of Montana's Punitive
Damages Act, 5 27-1-221, MCA.
The jury returned a special verdict finding that appellant was
not terminated for filing a workers1 compensation claim; that
Compensation Adjusters did not violate Montana's Unfair Trade
Practices Act; and that appellant was terminated for good cause.
The District Court entered judgment for respondents on all of
appellant's claims. Thereafter, the District Court denied
appellant's motion for a new trial and a judgment n.0.v. Appellant
appeals.
Did the District Court err in allowing evidence that appellant
was discharged for reasons other than the one set forth in the
discharge letter?
We review evidentiary rulings by the district court to
determine whether the district court abused its discretion. State
v. Parma (l993), 261 Mont. 338, 341, 863 P.2d 378, 380; State v.
Crist (1992), 253 Mont. 442, 445, 833 P.2d 1052, 1054. The
district court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence
is relevant and admissible, and absent a showing of abuse of
discretion, the trial court's determination will not be overturned.
Parma, 863 P.2d at 380; Crist, 833 P.2d at 1054.
GSM discharged appellant for failure to provide specific
documentation explaining his absence from work from May 31, 1989,
through August 28, 1989. Paul Dale, appellant's supervisor and
author of the discharge letter, testified that appellant was
terminated solely for the reason set forth in the discharge letter.
Following CompensationAdjusterTsrecommendation, GSM accepted
liability for appellant's May 31, 1989, accident. Prior to opening
arguments, the court expressed concern in chambers over the fact
that although GSM had accepted liability for appellant's injuries
prior to trial, they intended to show that appellant's May 31,
1989, accident was staged. As a result, the court narrowed the
scope of inquiry about the accident to physical facts surrounding
the accident. The court ordered that expert testimony or opinion
testimony about the accident would be excluded.
Despite its order, the court allowed speculative testimony
suggesting that appellant's May 31, 1989, accident was staged. The
court also allowed GSM to present evidence suggesting that
appellant was discharged for reasons other than the sole reason set
forth in the discharge letter. For example, the court allowed
testimony that appellant had been boating shortly after the May 31,
1989, accident; that appellant appeared to be working full-time at
his restaurant during his absence from work; and that appellant's
injury was not severe enough to prevent him from working at GSM.
GSM argues that this speculative evidence was offered to
demonstrate why Dale requested medical verification, rather than to
suggest additional reasons for appellant's discharge. The issue,
however, was not why GSM requested medical verification, but
whether appellant's discharge was wrongful, given the medical
verification appellant provided to GSM.
In Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hospital (1979), 182 Mont.
414, 597 P.2d 702, we concluded that in a wrongful discharge action
the only reason for discharge the district court could consider was
the reason set forth in the discharge letter. Reasons other than
the reason stated in the discharge letter were irrelevant and
excluded from evidence. Swanson, 597 P.2d at 704. By allowing the
above testimony in the present case to go to the jury, the court,
in effect, permitted the jury to decide whether the discharge was
wrongful based on reasons other than, or in addition to, the sole
reason stated in the discharge letter. Any collateral reasons
suggested by the evidence, other than the sole reason stated in the
discharge letter, were irrelevant, and therefore, inadmissible.
Rule 402, M.R.Evid.; Swanson, 597 P.2d at 704.
We hold that the District Court erred in allowing GSM to offer
evidence suggesting that appellant was discharged for reasons other
than the reason set forth in his discharge letter.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the single
issue of whether appellant was discharged for the reason set forth
in his discharge letter.
Justice
We concur:
Chief Justice
Justice Fred J. Weber dissents as follows:
The majority opinion concludes that the District Court
improperly allowed evidence which suggested that the appellant was
discharged for reasons other than those set forth in the discharge
letter to him. The foundation for this holding is Swanson v. St.
John's Lutheran Hospital (1979), 182 Mont. 414, 597 P.2d 702. It
is true that in Swanson this Court concluded that the only reason
for discharge which the District Court could consider was the
reason set forth in the discharge letter and that reasons other
than those stated in the discharge letter were irrelevant.
However, I contend that Swanson is not appropriate authority for
our case
The distinction from the present case is that in Swanson the
employee had demanded a letter stating the reasons for her
discharge and such a letter had been written and delivered to her.
Swanson specifically applied § 39-2-801,MCA (1979), which states:
Employee to be furnished on demand with reason for
discharge. It is the duty of any person after having
discharged any employee from his service, upon demand bv
such discharqed employee, to furnish him in writinq a
full, succinct, and complete statement of the reason of
his discharqe and if such person refuses so to do within
a reasonable time after such demand, it is unlawful
thereafter for such person to furnish any statement of
the reason of such discharge to any person or in any way
to blacklist or to prevent such discharged person from
procuring employment elsewhere . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
In considering the foregoing statute, Swanson stated:
Under § 41-1311, RCM 1947, now § 39-2-801,MCA, upon such
demand, the employer must furnish to the discharqed
employee a "full, succinct, and complete reason of
discharqe." The letter of August 23, 1977, was the
employer's compliance with that statute. . . . Where, as
in Montana, the purpose of the statute is to prevent
"blacklisting", it is our duty to interpret former § 41-
1311 requiring a "full, succinct, and completeH statement
to mean exactly what it says, Therefore, in the case at
bar, the only reason which could be considered by the
District Court was the reason set forth in the letter of
August 23, 1977, . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Swanson, 182 Mont. at 422, 597 P.2d at 706. In the present case,
there was no request or demand on the part of the appellant for a
statement of the reasons for his discharge. As a result § 39-2-
801, MCA, is not applicable. The only request was made by Golden
Sunlight Mines (GSM) when it requested appellant to furnish
specific medical documentation explaining his absence from work for
a period of several months. When he failed to furnish such
additional medical documentation, he was given his letter of
termination which in pertinent part stated:
You have been asked to provide specific documentation
explaining your absence from work from May 31 to August
28, 1989. We do not have documentation substantiating
this absence and we have reason to believe that not a11
of this period was attributable to illness or injury.
Since you have been unable to furnish this documentation
in a reasonable period, August 25 to September 7 , 1989,
and given your statement on September 7 that you will not
supply any further information, we cannot allow you to
return to work. This being the case, we have no option
but to terminate your employment effective September 8,
1989.
1 conclude that § 39-2-801, MCA, is not applicable in the present
case and as a result Swanson is not authority for the conclusion
reached in the majority opinion. The letter given in the present
case is not in any way comparable to the letter in Swanson which is
required under the code sections pertaining to blacklisting and
protection of discharged employees. The majority opinion has
provided no appropriate legal support for its determination that
the court abused its discretion by permitting testimony of o t h e r
possible reasons f o r the dischaxge.
I therefore dissent from the majority opinion.
February 15, 1995
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
Erik B. Thueson, Esq.
Thueson & Lamb
P.O. Box 535
Helena, MT 59624-0535
Michael Cotter, Esq.
Cotter & Cotter
P.O. Box 3425
Great Falls, MT 59403-3425
Donald C. Robinson, Esq.
Poore, Roth & Robinson
1341 Harrison Ave.
Butte, MT 59701
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA
BY:
Deputy