Davis v. County of Fairfax

Present: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims,
JJ., and Russell and Lacy, S.JJ.

DOLORES DAVIS

v. Record No. 100632 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
June 9, 2011
COUNTY OF FAIRFAX

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court of

Fairfax County erred when it exercised subject matter

jurisdiction over a case that originated in Fairfax County

General District Court, was appealed to the circuit court and

non-suited there, was subsequently re-filed in the general

district court, dismissed, and then appealed to the circuit

court.

I. Facts and Proceedings

In September 2007, Fairfax County ("the County") filed a

petition in the general district court, pursuant to former Code

§ 3.1-796.115(A), 1 seeking an order declaring Dolores Davis

("Davis") to be an unfit pet owner and alleging that Davis had

deprived her animals "of necessary food, drink, shelter or

emergency veterinary treatment." Following a trial, the

general district court entered an order declaring Davis unfit

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After all proceedings in the Fairfax County General
District and Fairfax County Circuit Court, former Title 3.1 was
repealed, revised, and reenacted as Title 3.2. Specifically,
former Code § 3.1-796.115 was amended and reenacted as Code
§ 3.2-6569. See 2008 Acts ch. 860.
to own and care for the 20 animals she kept in her house.

Davis appealed the general district court's judgment to the

circuit court.

Thereafter, in March 2008, the County filed a motion to

nonsuit the case and the circuit court granted the County's

motion by an order dated March 14, 2008. The nonsuit order

stated that the County had to return Davis' animals by 5 p.m.

on March 14, 2008, unless a new petition had been filed by that

time. The County filed a new petition to declare Davis an

unfit pet owner in the general district court that same day.

The general district court subsequently dismissed the petition

on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. The County noted an

appeal to the circuit court.

Davis then filed a motion in the circuit court to enforce

the provisions of the nonsuit order requiring that the County

return Davis' animals to her. The circuit court denied Davis'

motion by order stating that the "circuit [court] has no

original jurisdiction under [Code] § 3.1-796.115," but placed

the case on the docket as an appeal from the general district

court. Davis objected to the circuit court's order and

maintained that "the [general district court] is without

jurisdiction and this case must be heard in the Circuit Court."

Following a bench trial in June 2008, the circuit court

entered an order declaring Davis to be an unfit pet owner.

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Thereafter, the circuit court ordered Davis to reimburse the

County for $51,504.64 in costs it incurred in boarding her

animals during the pendency of the dispute. Davis timely noted

her appeal to this Court, 2 but we decided, citing former Code

§ 3.1-796.115(C), that "[i]t appears that this Court does not

have jurisdiction over this case." Davis v. County of Fairfax,

Record No. 081825 (Oct. 29, 2008). Accordingly, we transferred

Davis' appeal to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals

subsequently granted Davis' petition for appeal.

In an unpublished opinion, a three-judge panel of the

Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's exercise of

jurisdiction over the case. Davis v. County of Fairfax, Record

No. 1697-08-4, slip op. at 13 (Aug. 4, 2009). In so doing, the

panel relied on the Court of Appeals' prior decision in Lewis

v. Culpeper County Dept. of Social Services, 50 Va. App. 160,

647 S.E.2d 511 (2007), which held that when a plaintiff who

prevailed in the district court takes a nonsuit in the

defendant's de novo appeal in circuit court, "the combined

effect of the principles applicable to nonsuits and de novo

appeals is to nullify the entire suit as if it had never

existed in either court." Davis, slip op. at 2 (quoting Lewis,

2
It appears that, because Davis had been unsure which
court had jurisdiction over this appeal when she first filed
her notice of appeal, she filed appeals in both the Court of
Appeals and this Court.

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50 Va. App. at 167, 647 S.E.2d at 514). The Court of Appeals

subsequently granted Davis' petition for a rehearing en banc

and, relying upon Lewis, a majority of the court affirmed the

circuit court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in this

case. Davis v. County of Fairfax, Record No. 1697-08-4, slip

op. at 2 (March 2, 2010).

Davis timely filed her notice of appeal, and we granted an

appeal on the following assignment of error:

1. The Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the
circuit court could exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over a case that originated in the general
district court; was appealed to the circuit court and
non-suited there; re-filed in the general district
court — contrary to the dictates of § 8.01-380—and then
appealed to the circuit court.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

"[A]n issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question

of law which we review de novo." Conyers v. Martial Arts World

of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007).

When the language of a statute is unambiguous,
we are bound by the plain meaning of that
language. Furthermore, we must give effect to
the legislature's intention as expressed by the
language used unless a literal interpretation of
the language would result in a manifest
absurdity. If a statute is subject to more than
one interpretation, we must apply the
interpretation that will carry out the
legislative intent behind the statute.

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Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, "[t]he plain, obvious,

and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any

curious, narrow, or strained construction, and a statute should

never be construed in a way that leads to absurd results."

Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639

(2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

During the relevant time period, former Code § 3.1-796.115

set forth the procedure governing a petition to declare a

person an unfit pet owner. Specifically, former Code § 3.1-

796.115(A) stated that "[u]pon seizing or impounding an animal,

the [investigating official] shall petition the general

district court in the city or county wherein the animal is

seized for a hearing . . . not more than ten business days from

the date of the seizure of the animal." Additionally, former

Code § 3.1-796.115(C) stated that the "procedure for appeal and

trial shall be the same as provided by law for misdemeanors

[and t]he Commonwealth shall be required to prove its case

beyond a reasonable doubt." Accordingly, the County properly

filed its first petition in this case in the general district

court, pursuant to Code § 3.1-796.115. However, Davis

subsequently appealed the general district court's ruling to

the circuit court for a de novo review, and the circuit court

later granted the County a nonsuit in that case. Following the

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nonsuit in the circuit court, the County re-filed its petition

in the general district court. At issue in this case is

whether the County re-filed its petition in the proper court,

following the nonsuit.

Davis argues that the circuit court retained jurisdiction

over the case after the nonsuit order was entered, "so that

when the County elected to re-file its petition, it was limited

to doing so only in the circuit court." As a result, Davis

argues, "the general district court lacked jurisdiction over

the dispute and the County's re-filing of its petition in that

court was a nullity." Consequently, on appeal from the general

district court, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter

the orders that are the subject of this appeal because "the

circuit court's jurisdiction over a case is derivative of the

inferior tribunal's." We agree with Davis.

Code § 8.01-380(A) declares that "[a]fter a nonsuit no new

proceeding on the same cause of action or against the same

party shall be had in any court other than that in which the

nonsuit was taken, unless that court is without jurisdiction,

or not a proper venue, or other good cause is shown."

Therefore, because the nonsuit was taken in the circuit court,

the County was required by Code § 8.01-380(A) to re-file its

petition, following the nonsuit, in the circuit court "unless

that court is without jurisdiction."

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 Code § 17.1-513 defines the jurisdiction of circuit courts

in Virginia. In pertinent part, it declares that circuit

courts "shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases . . . in

which an appeal may . . . be taken from the judgment or

proceedings of any inferior tribunal." (Emphasis added.)

Additionally, circuit courts "shall have original and general

jurisdiction of all civil cases . . . except such cases as are

assigned to some other tribunal." Id. Former Code § 3.1-

796.115(A) "assigned" cases arising under that statute to

general district courts by requiring that investigating

officials "shall petition the general district court in the

city or county wherein the animal is seized for a hearing."

Accordingly, the circuit court did not have original or general

jurisdiction over petitions filed pursuant to former Code

§ 3.1-796.115(A). See Code § 17.1-513. The circuit court did,

however, obtain appellate jurisdiction derivatively from the de

novo appeal taken from the general district court. Id.

Significantly, Code § 16.1-106 declares that

[f]rom any order entered or judgment rendered in
a court not of record in a civil case in which
the matter in controversy is of greater value
than fifty dollars . . . there shall be an appeal
of right . . . to a court of record. Such appeal
shall be to a court of record having jurisdiction
within the territory of the court from which the
appeal is taken and shall be heard de novo.

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(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, circuit courts in Virginia have

no power to remand appeals taken from general district courts

back to the general district court from which the appeal was

taken. Rather, once a circuit court in Virginia acquires

appellate jurisdiction over a case, by way of an appeal of

right from a general district court, it is required to hear the

appeal de novo. See Code §§ 16.1-106 and 17.1-513. Just as

circuit courts cannot remand appeals of right taken from

general district courts back to the general district court from

which the appeal was taken, they do not lose appellate

jurisdiction over an appeal of right taken from a lower court

simply by granting a nonsuit in that particular case. See Code

§§ 16.1-106 and 17.1-513.

In this case, the circuit court obtained appellate

jurisdiction over this suit derivatively from the de novo

appeal taken from the general district court. The circuit

court's subsequent grant of the County's nonsuit did not divest

the circuit court of its appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly,

the circuit court retained appellate jurisdiction to hear this

case after it granted the County's nonsuit and, as a result,

the County was required by Code § 8.01-380 to re-file its

petition in the circuit court. See Code § 8.01-380. However,

the County did not do so.

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 The County improperly re-filed its petition, following the

nonsuit, in the general district court; therefore, the general

district court properly dismissed the re-filed petition for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The County then appealed

to the circuit court for a de novo review and the circuit court

placed the case on its docket. Whether this exercise of

jurisdiction was proper remains to be decided. Because the

circuit court's appellate jurisdiction is derivative of the

general district court's jurisdiction, we hold that the circuit

court did not have jurisdiction to decide the re-filed case on

the merits after the general district court's dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

We held, in Stacy v. Mullins, 185 Va. 837, 40 S.E.2d 265

(1946), and Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644, 40 S.E.2d 260

(1946), that "the jurisdiction of the appellate court on appeal

from the [general district court] is derivative, and if the

[general district court] had no jurisdiction the appellate

court acquires none on appeal." Hoffman v. Stuart, 188 Va.

785, 794, 51 S.E.2d 239, 244 (1949) (emphasis added).

Additionally, we observed in Stacy that

[t]he rule is well settled that, if the court in
which the action is brought has no jurisdiction
of the subject matter, the appellate court will
acquire none by the appeal, and this, too, even
if the appellate court would have jurisdiction of
the subject matter had the action been commenced
there. The reason is, an appeal is a mere

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 continuation of the original case, – a proceeding
in the action. The want of jurisdiction of the
subject matter in the court where the action was
brought, continues in every court to which the
action may be appealed, for the reason that it is
the same action, and an appeal is authorized only
where the court from which the appeal is taken,
in case of the failure to appeal, would have had
authority to enforce its judgment.

185 Va. at 841, 40 S.E.2d at 266 (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Here, the general district court

properly decided that it had no subject matter jurisdiction to

hear the re-filed petition following the nonsuit in the circuit

court. As a result, the circuit court had no appellate

jurisdiction to hear the re-filed case on the merits following

the general district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction

because the circuit court's appellate jurisdiction is

derivative of the general district court's jurisdiction. Id.

It should be noted that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction

to decide this case as it did even though it would have had

jurisdiction to hear the case had the County properly re-filed

its petition in the circuit court following the nonsuit of its

first petition in that court. Id. To the extent that Lewis v.

Culpeper County Dept. of Social Services, 50 Va. App. 160, 647

S.E.2d 511 (2007), is inconsistent with this opinion, it is

expressly overruled.

III. Conclusion

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 We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed

the judgment of the circuit court. Accordingly, we will

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter final

judgment for Davis.

Reversed and final judgment.

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