Logan v. City Council of City of Roanoke

PRESENT: All the Justices

JACQULYN C. LOGAN, ET AL.

v. Record No. 070371 OPINION BY
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
April 18, 2008
CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY
OF ROANOKE, ET AL.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
Charles N. Dorsey, Judge

The primary issue we decide in this appeal is whether Code

§ 15.2-2255 permits a local governing body to delegate to a

planning commission or other agent the authority under a

subdivision ordinance to grant exceptions involving public

improvements. We also consider the issue whether certain

provisions in the Roanoke City Subdivision Ordinance 1 (the

Subdivision Ordinance) provided adequate standards, in

compliance with Code § 15.2-2242(1), for rendering

discretionary decisions granting exceptions under that

Ordinance. Finally, we consider whether neighboring landowners

may seek a declaratory judgment regarding a locality’s

application of a subdivision ordinance.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1
All references to the Roanoke City Subdivision Ordinance
contained in this opinion relate to the Ordinance as it was
written in 2004, because the parties and the circuit court
relied exclusively on this version of the Ordinance when the
case was decided by the circuit court. Since 2004, the
Ordinance has been renumbered and portions have been amended.

1
 In 2004, George Leonard Boone, president of Boone Homes,

Inc., a land development company, began working with officials

from the City of Roanoke (the City) to obtain approval of a

subdivision plat providing for the construction of about 60

single-family homes in southern Roanoke. Boone planned to

build this housing development, known as “Wilton,” on about 50

acres of mountainous land.

Boone worked with R. Brian Townsend, the City’s Director

of Planning, Building, and Economic Development, to obtain

approval of the Wilton subdivision plat. Townsend was the

subdivision agent authorized by the City Council and the City

Planning Commission, under former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-

5(a) 2 and 31-65, 3 to make decisions regarding exceptions to the

Subdivision Ordinance.

In December 2004, Townsend conditionally approved a

portion of the subdivision plat for the Wilton development.

The approved portion of the plat incorporated the following

exceptions to the Subdivision Ordinance requirements: 1) an

exception from the 10% maximum grade requirement for local

streets, as set forth in former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-70,

to allow for a maximum grade of 16% for one local street; 2) an

2
Under current Subdivision Ordinance § 31.1-600, the City
Planning Commission is authorized to elect an agent to
administer and enforce the Ordinance.
3
Subdivision Ordinance § 31.1-210 is the current provision
that permits an agent to grant exceptions to the Ordinance.

2
exception from the minimum requirement for local streets of a

30-foot-wide paved surface, as set forth in former Subdivision

Ordinance § 31-90(b), 4 to permit several streets 22 feet in

width; 3) an exception from the maximum length for cul-de-sac

streets of 600 feet, as set forth in former Subdivision

Ordinance § 31-70, to permit a cul-de-sac street of 1800 feet;

and 4) permission to construct street blocks up to a maximum

length of 1800 feet, a departure from former Subdivision

Ordinance § 31-67, 5 which states that blocks longer than 1200

feet, or less than 360 feet, “may be cause for disapproval of

the preliminary plat.”

Boone requested several of these exceptions in order to

construct an access road, named Wilton Park Drive, leading into

the Wilton development. Under Boone’s plan, Wilton Park Drive

would intersect with Peakwood Drive, an existing main road in a

residential area of the City known as Prospect Hills. To

construct Wilton Park Drive, Boone planned to demolish a house

he owned on a one-acre lot that connects the Wilton property

with Peakwood Drive and construct the entry to Wilton Park

Drive on that lot. The proposed Wilton Park Drive would have a

downward grade of 16% and, like all the proposed roads in the

4
Current Subdivision Ordinance § 31.1-400 provides
requirements for the width of paved streets.
5
Current Subdivision Ordinance § 31.1-301 addresses
interconnected systems of streets and the “maximum street
length between such connections.”

3
Wilton subdivision, would end in a cul-de-sac.

In October 2005, Jacqulyn C. Logan and 15 additional

landowners who own homes on Peakwood Drive near the proposed

Wilton subdivision filed a bill of complaint for declaratory

judgment against the Roanoke City Council, the City Planning

Commission, Townsend, and Boone Homes, Inc. (collectively, the

defendants). Logan and the additional complainants

(collectively, Logan) alleged that Peakwood Drive, a curved

road located on a mountainside, would be “unsafe and

inappropriate” for the additional vehicle traffic that would

result from construction of the Wilton subdivision.

Logan also alleged in the bill of complaint that the

Subdivision Ordinance was both facially invalid and invalid as

applied to the approval of the Wilton subdivision plat. Logan

asserted the following particular claims relevant to this

appeal: 1) former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and -90(b)

were unlawful because they stated less stringent standards for

granting exceptions to the Subdivision Ordinance than the

standards provided in Code § 15.2-2242(1); 2) in violation of

Code § 15.2-2255, the City Council improperly delegated to its

subdivision agent the authority to grant exceptions under the

Subdivision Ordinance involving public improvements; 3) former

Subdivision Ordinance §§ 65 and -90(b) failed to provide

adequate standards to guide the subdivision agent’s decisions

4
whether to grant exceptions under the Ordinance; 4) the

subdivision agent lacked authority under Code §§ 15.2-2242 and

–2255 to grant exceptions relating to public improvements; 5)

the subdivision agent acted arbitrarily and capriciously when

he granted the exceptions; and 6) the approval of plans for

proposed Wilton Park Drive violated former Subdivision

Ordinance § 31-8 6 because the plans would alter the boundaries

of lots in Prospect Hills and would alter Peakwood Drive.

The defendants filed demurrers to the bill of complaint.

The circuit court sustained the demurrers regarding Logan’s

claims one, two, and four, as listed above, and granted Logan

leave to amend those claims.

After Logan filed an amended bill of complaint, the

defendants again filed demurrers. Among other things, the

defendants contended that Logan did not have a private right of

action to challenge enforcement of the Subdivision Ordinance as

applied to the Wilton subdivision plat. The circuit court held

that the amended bill of complaint was not significantly

different from Logan’s original pleading, and again sustained

the demurrers regarding claims one, two, and four.

The case proceeded to a five-day bench trial, in which the

circuit court heard evidence relating to each of the granted

6
The current Subdivision Ordinance does not contain a
provision that specifically addresses boundary line relocation.

5
exceptions. Following the trial, in a letter opinion, the

circuit court dismissed Logan’s remaining claims. The circuit

court held that Logan could seek a declaratory judgment under

Code § 8.01-184 to determine the adequacy of standards for

granting exceptions under the Subdivision Ordinance, and the

propriety of the particular decisions Townsend made concerning

the Wilton subdivision plat. The circuit court concluded that

former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and -90 contained

definite and sufficient standards under Code § 15.2-2242(1) to

guide the subdivision agent in exercising his discretion under

those provisions. The circuit court also held that Logan

failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

subdivision agent acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner

in granting the challenged exceptions.

We awarded Logan this appeal. We also granted the

defendants’ assignments of cross-error, in which they assert

that Logan did not have a right of action to challenge the

subdivision agent’s application of the Subdivision Ordinance in

approving the Wilton subdivision plat.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Delegation of Authority to Subdivision Agent

Logan argues that the City Council was prohibited by Code

§ 15.2-2255 from adopting a provision in its Subdivision

Ordinance that delegated to its subdivision agent the authority

6
to approve exceptions involving public improvements. The

statute provides:

The administration and enforcement of subdivision
regulations insofar as they pertain to public improvements
as authorized in §§ 15.2-2241 through 15.2-2245 shall be
vested in the governing body of the locality in which the
improvements are or will be located.

Except as provided above, the governing body shall be
responsible for administering and enforcing the provisions
of the subdivision regulations through its local planning
commission or otherwise.

Code § 15.2-2255.

Relying on the Dillon Rule of strict construction, Logan

contends that the first paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255 removes

the category of public improvements from the general authority

of a local governing body to delegate matters concerning the

application and enforcement of its subdivision ordinance.

Thus, Logan contends that only a local governing body, not its

designated agent, may grant exceptions pertaining to public

improvements as part of the subdivision plat approval process.

In response, the defendants contend that the first

paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255 addresses situations in which

real property is subject to the subdivision ordinances of both

a county and a municipality. According to the defendants, in

such situations, the administration and enforcement of

subdivision ordinance provisions pertaining to public

improvements shall be vested in the governing body of the

7
locality in which the improvements are located. Thus, the

defendants assert that because approval of the Wilton

subdivision plat did not involve public improvements located in

more than one jurisdiction, this statutory provision did not

prevent the City from delegating to Townsend the authority to

grant exceptions relating to public improvements proposed for

the Wilton subdivision. We agree with the defendants’

arguments.

We examine the language of Code § 15.2-2255 in the context

of related statutes that also address the application and

enforcement of subdivision ordinances. Our consideration of

the various statutes involves a pure question of law, which we

determine de novo on appeal. Miller v. Highland County, 274

Va. 355, 364, 650 S.E.2d 532, 535 (2007); Budd v. Punyanitya,

273 Va. 583, 591, 643 S.E.2d 180, 184 (2007); Boynton v.

Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2006). The

central focus of our analysis is to ascertain and give effect

to the General Assembly’s intent in enacting the provisions

concerning subdivision ordinances adopted by localities. See

Miller, 274 Va. at 364, 650 S.E.2d at 535; Boynton, 271 Va. at

227, 623 S.E.2d at 925; Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va.

544, 547, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2003).

We determine the General Assembly’s intent from the words

employed in the statutes. Miller, 274 Va. at 364, 650 S.E.2d

8
at 535; Crawford v. Haddock, 270 Va. 524, 528, 621 S.E.2d 127,

129 (2005); Horner v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 268 Va. 187, 192,

597 S.E.2d 202, 204 (2004). We may not add words to a statute

or ignore any of the actual statutory language. Purce v.

Patterson, 275 Va. 190, 194, 654 S.E.2d 885, 886 (2008); BBF,

Inc. v. Alstom Power, Inc., 274 Va. 326, 331, 645 S.E.2d 467,

469 (2007). Thus, we presume that every part of a statute has

some effect, and we will not consider any portion meaningless

unless absolutely necessary. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 274 Va.

630, 634, 652 S.E.2d 111, 113 (2007); Level 3 Commcn’s of Va.,

Inc. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 268 Va. 471, 477-78, 604 S.E.2d 71,

74 (2004); Department of Medical Assistance Servs. v. Beverly

Healthcare of Fredericksburg, 268 Va. 278, 285, 601 S.E.2d 604,

608 (2004); Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P’ship, 255 Va. 335, 340-

41, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998). Additionally, because the

several statutes we consider impact the same subject, we

harmonize their provisions whenever possible. Peerless Ins.

Co. v. County of Fairfax, 274 Va. 236, 244, 645 S.E.2d 478, 483

(2007); Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Commonwealth, 270 Va.

423, 439-40, 621 S.E.2d 78, 87 (2005); Capelle v. Orange

County, 269 Va. 60, 65, 607 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2005).

We disagree with Logan’s argument that the first paragraph

of Code § 15.2-2255 is intended to restrict a governing body’s

power to delegate the administration and enforcement of

9
subdivision regulations pertaining to public improvements.

Such a construction would render meaningless the phrase “in

which the improvements are or will be located.”

Instead, we conclude that the first paragraph of the

statute is intended to address situations in which existing or

proposed public improvements may be subject to the subdivision

ordinances of more than one locality. Such circumstances may

arise under the provisions of Code §§ 15.2-2248 and –2249.

Under Code § 15.2-2248, in five specified counties, the

subdivision regulations adopted by a municipality located

within those counties shall apply in certain circumstances

beyond the municipality’s corporate limits into unincorporated

regions of the county, if the municipal ordinance so provides.

However, under Code § 15.2-2249, the subdivision regulations

adopted by the local governing bodies of these five counties

shall apply in all unincorporated areas of those counties,

including those areas over which a municipality may extend the

application of its subdivision ordinance, provided that any

such municipality has been given the opportunity to approve or

disapprove the county’s proposed regulations.

The General Assembly specifically contemplated that

disagreements could arise under these provisions regarding

whether the regulations of a county or a municipality should be

applicable to a given area. To address this problem, Code

10
§ 15.2-2250 permits a municipality or a county, or both these

parties, to petition the circuit court for the county in which

the major part of the disputed territory lies, and the circuit

court “shall hear the matter and enter an appropriate order.”

Id.

Viewed in the context of these statutes, the legislative

intent of Code § 15.2-2255 is plain. We conclude that the

General Assembly intended to make certain that control over the

development of public improvements not be subject to

uncertainty on the part of local officials or to an unresolved

dispute between a county and a municipality. By enacting Code

§ 15.2-2255, the General Assembly specified that with regard to

public improvements authorized by the subdivision ordinance

enabling statutes, the administration and enforcement of

subdivision regulations will be controlled by the governing

body in which the improvements are or will be located.

Accordingly, this provision removes any uncertainty regarding

which jurisdiction shall exercise control over present and

proposed public improvements physically located in a given

jurisdiction.

In view of this statutory purpose, we hold that the first

paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255 does not reflect a legislative

intent to prevent a local governing body from delegating to an

agent the responsibility to administer and enforce subdivision

11
regulations pertaining to public improvements within that

locality. In fact, such delegation is expressly authorized by

the second paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255, subject to the

restrictions imposed by the first paragraph concerning public

improvements that may be within the joint control of more than

one locality.

Our conclusion is not altered by Logan’s argument that the

Dillon Rule of strict construction prohibits this result.

Under the Dillon Rule, municipal corporations and counties

possess and may exercise only those powers expressly granted by

the General Assembly, powers necessarily or fairly implied from

such express powers, and those powers that are essential and

indispensable. Norton v. City of Danville, 268 Va. 402, 408

n.3, 602 S.E.2d 126, 129 n.3 (2004); Arlington Co. v. White,

259 Va. 708, 712, 528 S.E.2d 706, 708 (2000); Board of

Supervisors v. Countryside Inv. Co., 258 Va. 497, 503, 522

S.E.2d 610, 613 (1999); County of Fairfax v. Southern Iron

Works, Inc., 242 Va. 435, 448, 410 S.E.2d 674, 682 (1991).

Here, the City Council’s delegation of authority to its

subdivision agent was expressly authorized by the second

paragraph of Code § 15.2-2255. Therefore, the City did not

violate the Dillon Rule by delegating authority to its

subdivision agent to administer and enforce the provisions of

the Subdivision Ordinance pertaining to public improvements.

12
 B. Adequacy of Subdivision Ordinance Standards

Logan argues that the former Subdivision Ordinance did not

comply with the provisions of Code § 15.2-2242(1), which permit

local governing bodies to adopt procedures for granting

exceptions under their subdivision ordinances. Logan contends

that the former Subdivision Ordinance failed to articulate

standards required by Code § 15.2-2242(1) to guide decisions

regarding the approval of exceptions. According to Logan, the

evaluative factors listed in former Subdivision Ordinance

§§ 31-65 and –90(b) provided little or no guidance for the

granting of exceptions. Logan also contends that the language

in former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-67 regarding block lengths

lacked any substantive standard for permitting an exception

under that section.

Initially, we do not consider Logan’s argument that former

Subdivision Ordinance § 31-67 was facially invalid because it

lacked any standard to guide administrative review of its

provisions. Logan did not make such an allegation in her

amended bill of complaint and, therefore, the issue was not

properly before the circuit court and is not before us in this

appeal. See Board of Supervisors v. Robertson, 266 Va. 525,

538, 587 S.E.2d 570, 578-79 (2003); Jenkins v. Bay House

Assocs., 266 Va. 39, 43, 581 S.E.2d 510, 512 (2003).

Accordingly, we confine our review to Logan’s remaining

13
allegations that former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and –

90(b) were facially invalid.

In considering Logan’s argument, we observe that the

General Assembly has required that all local governing bodies

adopt subdivision ordinances. Code § 15.2-2240. Those

subdivision ordinances must include the provisions specified in

Code § 15.2-2241, and may contain certain optional provisions

set forth in Code § 15.2-2242.

The language of Code § 15.2-2242(1), which details one

such optional provision, states that a subdivision ordinance

may include provisions for “variations in or exceptions to the

general regulations of the subdivision ordinance in cases of

unusual situations or when strict adherence to the general

regulations would result in substantial injustice or hardship.”

Under this authority, the City Council included several

provisions in the former Subdivision Ordinance authorizing the

subdivision agent to grant exceptions to the Ordinance’s

requirements.

When a legislative body delegates its authority to an

administrative agent, that body must prescribe sufficient

standards to guide the administrator in exercising the

delegated authority. Bell v. Dorey Electric Co., 248 Va. 378,

382, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1994); Ours Properties, Inc. v. Ley,

198 Va. 848, 851-53, 96 S.E.2d 754, 756-58 (1957). Therefore,

14
we consider whether former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and –

90(b) prescribe sufficient standards to guide the subdivision

agent’s decision whether to grant exceptions under those

sections.

Former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-65, entitled “General

requirements; exceptions from article,” provided:

The arrangement of lots, character of the subdivision, and
extent, width, grade and location of all streets shall
conform to the officially adopted master plan or parts,
divisions or sections thereof and shall be considered in
their relation to existing and planned streets,
topographical conditions and public convenience and
safety, and in their appropriate relation to the proposed
uses of adjacent land; provided, however, that the agent
may determine that the size or shape of the land,
topography, proposed land use or other special conditions
make compliance with all provisions of this article
impractical and may make exceptions to provisions
contained herein, provided such exceptions are not in
conflict with provisions of other city ordinances.

Because former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-65 did not

define the term “impractical,” we employ the general definition

of that word in considering the adequacy of the stated

standards. See Adams Outdoor Adver., L.P. v. Board of Zoning

Appeals, 274 Va. 189, 196, 645 S.E.2d 271, 275 (2007); Hoffman

Family, L.L.C. v. City of Alexandria, 272 Va. 274, 284, 634

S.E.2d 722, 727 (2006). The word “impractical” is defined as

“incapable of being put into use or effect or of being

accomplished or done successfully or without extreme trouble,

15
hardship, or expense.” See Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 1136 (1993).

We also observe that former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-

90(b) required that local streets have a minimum paved width of

30 feet. However, this section also provided for an exception

to that requirement, stating that “[i]n cases where the cross

slope will not permit a greater width,” the agent may modify

the minimum paved width requirement “in a manner that will

result in the best possible utilization of the land to be

subdivided, giving consideration to the topography of the land

and general character and density of the proposed subdivision.”

Upon our review, we hold that former Subdivision Ordinance

§§ 31-65 and –90(b) prescribed adequate standards for the

subdivision agent’s exercise of delegated authority consistent

with the directive of Code § 15.2-2242(1). The subdivision

agent was required to consider several factors under former

Subdivision Ordinance § 31-65 before granting an exception to

the stated ordinance requirements. That section also

prohibited the agent from granting an exception to an ordinance

requirement if the exception would be in conflict with any

provision of any city ordinance.

Absent such a conflict, former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-

65 permitted the subdivision agent to grant an exception based

on such factors as the size or shape of the parcel, its

16
topography, the proposed land use, or other special conditions

upon determining that compliance with the general subdivision

ordinance requirements would be “impractical.” Under former

Subdivision Ordinance § 31-90(b), the agent could not permit an

exception from the minimum width requirement of 30 feet for

paved local streets unless a situation presented by a “cross

slope” indicated that such an exception was needed. This

section further required that the agent consider the topography

and character of the subdivision to achieve the best

utilization of the land. Thus, we hold that the circuit court

did not err in concluding that these provisions contained

adequate standards to guide the subdivision agent’s decisions

whether to grant the allowable exceptions.

C. Agent’s Application of Subdivision Ordinance

The defendants argue as a matter of cross-error that Logan

did not have a right to file a declaratory judgment action

challenging Townsend’s application of the Subdivision Ordinance

in granting exceptions for the Wilton subdivision. According

to the defendants, our holdings in Shilling v. Jimenez, 268 Va.

202, 597 S.E.2d 206 (2004), and Miller v. Highland County, 274

Va. 355, 650 S.E.2d 532 (2007), require that we dismiss this

portion of Logan’s appeal.

In response, Logan asserts that the Declaratory Judgment

Act, Code §§ 8.01-184 through -191, permits her present

17
challenge to Townsend’s application of the Subdivision

Ordinance. Logan contends that her case may be distinguished

from the proceedings in Shilling, which did not include the

locality as a party defendant but involved a neighboring

landowner’s suit against an adjoining property owner. Logan

further maintains that our decision in Shilling is not

controlling because in that case, we did not address a

subdivision agent’s interpretation of an ordinance or an

agent’s allegedly arbitrary and capricious actions granting

exceptions to that ordinance. We disagree with Logan’s

arguments.

In Shilling, we considered the issue whether the

declaratory judgment statutes may be used to maintain a third-

party challenge to a government action when such challenge is

not authorized by statute. The complainants in Shilling filed

a declaratory judgment action requesting that a circuit court

declare void the creation of a certain “family subdivision”

approved under an ordinance allowing conveyances to members of

a landowner’s immediate family. 268 Va. at 205-06, 597 S.E.2d

at 208. The neighboring landowners alleged that local

officials wrongfully approved the subdivision based on factual

misrepresentations made by the applicant. Id.

The defendants filed demurrers alleging that the local

governing body was the sole entity authorized to enforce the

18
ordinance, and that the complainants could not seek to enforce

the ordinance provisions by employing the remedy of declaratory

judgment. The circuit court sustained the demurrers and

dismissed the bill of complaint with prejudice. Id. at 206,

597 S.E.2d at 208. We affirmed the circuit court’s judgment,

holding that the complainants, who were strangers to the

subdivision approval process, did not have a third-party right

of action to enforce the locality’s application of its

subdivision ordinance in a declaratory judgment suit, because

no statute granted third parties this right. Id. at 208, 597

S.E.2d at 209-10.

Three years after our decision in Shilling, we were asked

in Miller to consider the complainants’ attempted use of the

declaratory judgment statutes to challenge a planning

commission’s determination that that a conditional use permit

was in “substantial accord” with the locality’s comprehensive

plan. 274 Va. at 368-69, 650 S.E.2d at 538; see also Code

§ 15.2-2232. We held that the complainants failed to assert a

valid request for declaratory relief because no statute

specifically authorized such a right of action. Miller, 274

Va. at 371-72, 650 S.E.2d at 540.

We explained that the purpose of the declaratory judgment

statutes is to provide a mechanism for obtaining preventive

relief to resolve controversies involving legal rights, without

19
requiring one party to invade the asserted rights of another in

order to allow an ordinary civil action for damages. Miller,

274 Va. at 370, 650 S.E.2d at 539; Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v.

Mill Two Assocs. P’ship, 259 Va. 685, 693, 529 S.E.2d 318, 323

(2000); Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 592, 318

S.E.2d 407, 413 (1984). We emphasized that our declaratory

judgment statutes “do not create or alter any substantive

rights, or bring any other additional rights into being.”

Miller, 274 Va. at 370, 650 S.E.2d at 539; accord Liberty

Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 211 Va. 414, 419, 177 S.E.2d 519,

522 (1970).

We conclude that the holdings in Shilling and Miller

require dismissal of the part of Logan’s appeal challenging

Townsend’s application of the Subdivision Ordinance to the

proposed Wilton subdivision. Like the complainants in those

two cases, Logan has attempted to use the declaratory judgment

statutes to create a right of appeal to the circuit courts that

does not otherwise exist. Because the declaratory judgment

statutes do not create such rights, and in the absence of

statutory authority granting her a right of appeal to actions

taken under the Subdivision Ordinance, Logan remained a

stranger to the subdivision approval process and was not

authorized to challenge Townsend’s actions under that

20
Ordinance. 7 Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in

concluding that Logan had a third-party right of action to

challenge the City’s approval of the Wilton subdivision plat,

and that this part of Logan’s appeal must be dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on our holdings in this appeal, we will affirm the

part of the circuit court’s judgment concluding that the City

lawfully delegated authority to its subdivision agent to

administer and enforce the provisions of the Subdivision

Ordinance pertaining to public improvements. We also will

affirm the part of the circuit court’s judgment holding that

former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and –90(b) provided

adequate standards to guide the subdivision agent’s exercise of

discretion in granting exceptions allowed under those Ordinance

provisions. We will enter final judgment in favor of the

defendants on these parts of the circuit court’s judgment.

7
We observe that, in one of her assignments of error,
Logan challenged the circuit court’s “ruling that [former] City
Code § 31-8 permitted Townsend to approve a change to the
boundaries of a lot, even though the purpose and effect of the
change was to add a new intersection to, and thus physically
alter, Peakwood Drive.” Logan did not assign error, however,
on the separate basis that approval of the changes to Peakwood
Drive violated Code § 15.2-2275, which, among other things,
prohibits a locality from allowing under its subdivision
ordinance the alteration of a boundary line of a lot when that
action “involve[s] the relocation or alteration of streets,
alleys, easements for public passage, or other public areas.”
Therefore, we do not consider the impact of Code § 15.2-2275 on
the actions relating to Peakwood Drive taken pursuant to the
former Subdivision Ordinance.

21
 We will reverse the part of the circuit court’s judgment

holding that Logan was entitled to seek a declaratory judgment

regarding the subdivision agent’s application of the former

Subdivision Ordinance to the proposed Wilton subdivision, and

we will enter final judgment in favor of the defendants on this

part of the circuit court’s judgment. Accordingly, we also

will vacate the part of the circuit court’s judgment regarding

the subdivision agent’s application of the former Subdivision

Ordinance, and we will dismiss the portion of Logan’s appeal

addressing that part of the circuit court’s judgment.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part,
vacated in part, dismissed in part,
and final judgment.

22