Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons and
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J.
DEMETRIUS COVIL OPINION BY
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL
v. Record No. 040036 November 5, 2004
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
This appeal involves the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the grand larceny conviction of a person found in
possession of recently stolen property who was known not to be
the original thief. Pursuant to familiar principles, the
evidence will be summarized in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.
On April 8, 2002, Tanya M. Bray rented a red Oldsmobile
Alero from a car rental company in Virginia Beach. On the 14th
of that month, she left her workplace in Portsmouth at
approximately 7:30 a.m., entered the rental car and started
the engine. A man unknown to her approached the car and took
it from her at gunpoint.
Two days later, at 6:10 p.m., Detective T. McAndrew of
the Portsmouth police was on routine patrol when he saw
Demetrius Covil, whom he knew from previous encounters,
driving a red Alero eastbound on Duke Street. Knowing that
Covil’s driver’s permit was suspended, McAndrew followed him.
Covil made a right turn and then stopped voluntarily. Learning
that the Alero had been reported stolen, McAndrew arrested
Covil and charged him with grand larceny of the vehicle.
Covil was subsequently indicted for that offense under Code
§ 18.2-95, tried at a bench trial, and was convicted.
Tanya Bray was unable to identify the original thief from
a photo lineup that included Covil’s picture and testified at
trial that Covil “doesn’t look like him”. She stated on cross-
examination that she had never seen Covil before. In oral
argument at the bar of this Court, the Attorney General
conceded that Covil was not the person who took the Alero from
Tanya Bray on April 14th.
Covil, a convicted felon, testified at trial that he had
asked a friend of his mother to find him a rental car in which
he and his girlfriend could drive to King’s Dominion “on
Saturday.” As a result of this contact, he testified, two men
unknown to him came up to him and gave him the keys to the
Alero in exchange for $50.00. He further testified that he did
not know the way to King’s Dominion, but was relying on
another friend, named “Twin,” who was “locked up” at the time
of trial, to drive him there. Covil did not give the date of
this transaction, but April 16, 2002, the date on which he was
arrested in possession of the stolen car, fell on a Tuesday.
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found
Covil’s testimony incredible, stating, “I just don’t believe
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his story. I think it’s got too many holes in it”. Covil was
convicted of grand larceny and sentenced to one year and seven
months incarceration. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished
opinion, affirmed the conviction.
For well over a century, Virginia law has made the crime
of receiving stolen goods a species of larceny. Code § 18.2-
108, like its statutory predecessors, provides:
If any person buy or receive from another person, or aid
in concealing, any stolen goods or other thing, knowing
the same to have been stolen, he shall be deemed guilty
of larceny thereof, and may be proceeded against,
although the principal offender be not convicted.
We have therefore long held that a person indicted for
simple larceny may be tried, convicted and punished for that
offense merely upon proof that property was stolen by some
other person and received by the accused, knowing it to have
been stolen. Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 475, 488, 124
S.E. 237, 241 (1924); Price v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21
Gratt.) 846, 853 (1872).* In the present case, it is undisputed
that the property was stolen by another person, that its value
was sufficient to meet the requirements of grand larceny under
Code § 18.2-95, and that Covil received the property and had
*
Formerly, Code § 18.2-111 contained a provision
permitting the accused to demand from the Commonwealth a
written statement specifying the particular statute upon which
the prosecution would rely in seeking a conviction of larceny.
That provision was deleted by 1994 Acts, Ch. 555.
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it in his exclusive possession on the second day after the
theft. Thus, the dispositive question is whether the
Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to support a finding of
guilty knowledge on Covil’s part. Stated differently, if the
case were tried to a jury, would the evidence have been
sufficient to submit to the jury the factual issue whether
Covil knew the car was stolen property?
In Roberts v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 264, 270, 337 S.E.2d
255, 259 (1985), we said:
It is true, of course, that an essential element of the
offense of receiving stolen property is guilty knowledge.
It is also true that no witness testified directly that
the defendant knew the property in question was stolen.
But the element of guilty knowledge may be supplied by
circumstantial evidence, including the circumstance that
the accused was in possession of recently stolen
property.
(Citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Another circumstance proper for consideration by the
trier of fact is the explanation, or lack of it, given by the
accused. Because proof of possession of recently stolen goods
establishes a prima facie case that the defendant received
them with guilty knowledge, the burden is cast upon him to go
forward with evidence in explanation. Roberts, 230 Va. at 271,
337 S.E.2d at 260.
Covil was not, of course, required to testify but he
voluntarily did so and gave an account that the trier of fact
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rejected as inherently incredible. The inference of guilty
knowledge arising from an accused’s possession of recently
stolen property may be repelled by a credible explanation, but
the trier of fact is under no obligation to accept an account
it finds unworthy of belief. In cases of this kind, when a
defendant’s “hypothesis of innocence” is rejected as
unreasonable, evidence of his possession of recently stolen
goods is sufficient to support a conviction. Roberts, 230 Va.
at 272, 337 S.E.2d at 260; Westcott v. Commonwealth, 216 Va.
123, 127, 216 S.E.2d 60, 64 (1975). Further, a fact-finder,
having rejected a defendant’s attempted explanation as untrue,
may draw the reasonable inference that his explanation was
made falsely in an effort to conceal his guilt. Emmett v.
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 364, 372, 569 S.E.2d 39, 45 (2002),
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 929 (2003); Carter v. Commonwealth, 223
Va. 528, 532, 290 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1982); Toler v.
Commonwealth, 188 Va. 774, 782, 51 S.E.2d 210, 214 (1949). A
false or evasive account is a circumstance, similar to flight
from a crime scene, that a fact-finder may properly consider
as evidence of guilty knowledge.
Because these circumstances were properly considered by
the trial court and were sufficient to support the conviction,
we will affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Affirmed.
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