Present: All the Justices
HERMAN OPENZO COOK
v. Record No. 031830 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
June 10, 2004
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal, we consider whether, under Code § 16.1-
271, the juvenile and domestic relations district court lacks
jurisdiction over a juvenile who has previously been certified
to the circuit court and indicted by a grand jury as an adult
on charges that later are nolle prosequied.
I. Facts and Proceedings Below
Herman Openzo Cook (“Cook”) was tried and convicted in
the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond as an adult on
charges of attempted murder, use of a firearm in the
commission of an attempted murder, robbery, and use of a
firearm in the commission of a robbery. At the time the acts
resulting in the convictions were committed, Cook was 17 years
old.
Prior to trial, Cook moved the circuit court to dismiss
the indictments against him. He argued that because he had
not been afforded a transfer hearing prior to his transfer to
the circuit court and indictment by a grand jury, the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction over his offenses as a juvenile. He
acknowledged that three prior charges against him had been
certified to the circuit court and thereafter nolle
prosequied, but maintained that the juvenile and domestic
relations district court was not divested of jurisdiction over
future charges. The trial court denied Cook’s motion to
dismiss the indictments. The Court of Appeals affirmed his
convictions. We awarded Cook an appeal.
II. Analysis
Code § 16.1-271, specifies in relevant part that:
The trial or treatment of a juvenile as an
adult pursuant to the provisions of this
chapter shall preclude the juvenile court from
taking jurisdiction of such juvenile for
subsequent offenses committed by that juvenile.
Any juvenile who is tried and convicted in
a circuit court as an adult under the
provisions of this article shall be considered
and treated as an adult in any criminal
proceeding resulting from any alleged future
criminal acts and any pending allegations of
delinquency which have not been disposed of by
the juvenile court at the time of the criminal
conviction.
. . . The provisions of this article
regarding a transfer hearing shall not be
applicable to such juveniles.
The language of this statute could scarcely be more
clear. Under Code § 16.1-271, a juvenile need not be
convicted as an adult to be tried as an adult for all
subsequent offenses without a transfer hearing in the juvenile
court. The juvenile court loses jurisdiction over the
juvenile upon future charges if he goes to trial or is treated
as an adult by the court system. The word “treatment” cannot
2
be interpreted as merely synonymous to the word “trial;” if it
were, the inclusion of the word "treatment" in the statute
would be redundant. Words in a statute should be interpreted,
if possible, to avoid rendering words superfluous. McLean
Bank v. Nelson, 232 Va. 420, 427, 350 S.E.2d 651, 656 (1986);
Gallagher v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 666, 669, 139 S.E.2d 37, 39
(1964); Tilton v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 774, 784, 85 S.E.2d
368, 374 (1955).
“Treatment” is a much broader concept than “trial.”
“Treatment” is defined as "conduct or behavior towards another
party.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2435
(1993). By certifying Cook as an adult, then indicting him
using a grand jury in the same manner that a grand jury would
be used to indict an adult, the Commonwealth and its judicial
system have engaged in conduct toward Cook that is the same
conduct they would have engaged in if Cook had actually been
an adult. Therefore, Cook has been treated as an adult for
the purposes of Code § 16.1-271.
The effect of a nolle prosequi is to discontinue the
prosecution relative to the charges. See, e.g., Harris v.
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 576, 585, 520 S.E.2d 825, 830 (1999).
That the indictments were eventually nolle prosequied does not
erase the fact that Cook was treated as an adult for those
proceedings.
3
If there could be any doubt about the plain meaning of
Code § 16.1-271, it most assuredly is resolved by the sequence
of statutory amendments and subsequent judicial
interpretations. In Burfoot v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 38,
43, 473 S.E.2d 724, 727 (1996), the Court of Appeals
considered the application of Code § 16.1-269 which was in
effect at the time of Burfoot's trial. The Court held:
In light of the specific statutory procedures
applicable to the prosecution of a juvenile for
a crime and the jurisdictional prerequisite of
a valid juvenile transfer hearing, we hold that
a nolle prosequi terminates the prosecution of
a juvenile and that the only way to initiate a
new prosecution is to file a second petition in
the juvenile and domestic relations district
court.
Id. The Court of Appeals noted that Code § 16.1-269 had been
repealed in 1994 and was "replaced by Code §§ 16.1-269.1 to
16.1-269.6," Id. at 43 n.2, 473 S.E.2d at 727 n.2. Code
§ 16.1-271 was also amended in 1994. Of particular
significance was the removal of the word "not" from § 16.1-
271. See 1994 Va. Acts ch. 564. Before the amendment, the
statute stated that prior trial or treatment "shall not"
divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction for subsequent
offenses. Code § 16.1-271 (1990 Supp.) Noting the effect of
the statutory change, the court observed:
Under the new statute, the juvenile and
domestic relations district court loses
jurisdiction for all time over a juvenile
4
defendant when the Commonwealth is authorized
by the Circuit Court to seek an indictment.
Thus, if the Commonwealth enters a nolle
prosequi of that indictment, the Circuit Court
retains jurisdiction over the juvenile.
Id. at 44 n.2, 473 S.E.2d at 727 n.2. In 1996, after the
published decision in Burfoot, the General Assembly further
amended Code § 16.1-269.1 to provide in subsection (E) that
"[i]f an indictment is terminated by nolle prosequi, the
Commonwealth may reinstate the proceeding by seeking a
subsequent indictment." 1996 Va. Acts chs. 755, 914 (adding
new subsections (C) through (E)).
Thereafter, in Broadnax v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 808,
815, 485 S.E. 2d 666, 669 (1997), the Court of Appeals further
observed:
The intent and effect of the legislature's
deletion of the word "not" in the first
paragraph of Code § 16.1-271 by the 1994
amendment could not be clearer. The language
indicates, without question, that the
legislature intended this amendment to divest
the juvenile court of jurisdiction over a
juvenile once the juvenile has been previously
tried or treated as an adult under this
chapter. Further, the language is mandatory:
The juvenile court ”shall" be precluded from
exercising jurisdiction of any "such juvenile
for subsequent offenses committed by that
juvenile." See Code § 16.1-271 (emphasis
added). These provisions are not ambiguous,
and must be given their plain, obvious, and
rational meaning.
Despite the weight of prior legislative amendment and judicial
interpretation, Cook argues that to interpret the statute in
5
this manner would produce an “absurd result.” Cook maintains
that an
innocent juvenile defendant will be forever
prosecuted as an adult for any alleged criminal
offenses committed by him as a juvenile. He will
be stripped of the unique substantive rights he
would otherwise possess as a juvenile, as well as
being deprived of the special services and
experience of the juvenile court system.
He cites Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494,
496 (2001), to support his argument that this interpretation
of the statute is improper.
While Cook may correctly identify the effect of the
statute, Cummings does not stand for the proposition that a
court may ignore the plain meaning of a statute that produces
a result that may appear to be unwise.* Instead, our case law
uses the phrase “absurd result” to describe situations in
which the law would be internally inconsistent or otherwise
*
See Valley Acceptance Corp. v. Glasby, 230 Va. 422, 431,
337 S.E.2d 291, 296 (1985)(rejecting an interpretation of the
Consumer Finance Act, Code § 6.1-247, that would allow a
lender to escape the Act by doing exactly what it forbids);
Lawrence Transfer & Storage Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals,
229 Va. 568, 572, 331 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1985) (upholding a
literal interpretation of a statute requiring notice to
“abutting landowners” of proposed zoning ordinance amendments,
when those amendments apply to 25 or fewer parcels of land,
even though “some abutting property is distant from the area
to be changed.”); Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 929-30, 172
S.E. 445, 447 (1934)(declining to hold “absurd” a clear and
unambiguous statute providing for state institutionalization
of insane persons within four months of the legal
determination that they are insane even if he or she is
already receiving treatment at a private institution).
6
incapable of operation. Here, it is entirely possible to
carry out the law as written in unambiguous terms in a manner
consistent with the General Assembly’s apparent intent. Thus,
we cannot say that it would produce an “absurd result” to
interpret and apply Code § 16.1-271 as written. We decline
Cook's invitation to substitute the court's judgment for that
of the General Assembly.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, we hold that the circuit court
properly exercised jurisdiction over Cook, and the judgment of
the Court of Appeals will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
7