Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, 1 Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz,
and Kinser, JJ.
DENNIS JACKSON MOORE
v. Record No. 990776 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
March 3, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the
provisions of Code § 16.1-269.1(E) cured a defect in felony
proceedings in a juvenile and domestic relations district court
caused by the Commonwealth's failure to notify the defendant's
biological father of the proceedings pursuant to the
requirements of former Code §§ 16.1-263 and -264. Code § 16.1-
269.1(E) states, in material part: "An indictment in the
circuit court cures any error or defect in any proceeding held
in the juvenile court except with respect to the juvenile's
age." In deciding this issue, we also consider the impact, if
any, of Commonwealth v. Baker, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999)
(per curiam), aff'g 28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (1998), on
the present appeal.
On July 27, 1996, Dennis Jackson Moore (the defendant) shot
and killed Vance Michael Horne, Jr., in a parking lot at a
1
Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision of
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on
February 2, 2000.
recreational facility in Henrico County. The shooting occurred
after the defendant approached Horne's companion, Jonathan
Bradley Cooper, held a gun to Cooper's back, and demanded a neck
chain that Cooper was wearing. Cooper gave the chain to the
defendant, who nevertheless shot Horne in the head and fled from
the scene.
On October 15, 1996, the Commonwealth issued four juvenile
petitions against the defendant, age 17, in the Henrico County
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the juvenile
court). The petitions charged the defendant with the murder of
Horne, the robbery of Cooper, and two counts of use of a firearm
in the commission of a felony. The four petitions were served
on the defendant, his mother, Darlene Moore, and his stepfather,
Howard Moore. The defendant had lived with his mother and
stepfather for about 16 years, but had not been adopted by his
stepfather. The defendant's biological father, Dennis Fleming,
was not given notice of the initiation of proceedings in the
juvenile court.
The defendant's mother and stepfather attended all the
proceedings in the juvenile court. The record does not show
that the defendant's biological father was present at any of
those proceedings. The juvenile court held a preliminary
hearing under Code §§ 16.1-269.1(B) and (C), and certified the
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four felony charges to the grand jury of the circuit court
pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(D).
The defendant was indicted by the grand jury on the four
felony charges. The defendant did not challenge the circuit
court's jurisdiction or raise an objection to the proceedings
based on the lack of notice to his biological father in the
juvenile court. The defendant was tried by a jury and convicted
of all four offenses. The circuit court sentenced the defendant
to a term of 60 years' imprisonment for murder, with 20 years
suspended, a term of 20 years' imprisonment for robbery, with 15
years suspended, and a total of eight years' imprisonment on the
two firearm convictions.
The defendant appealed his convictions to the Court of
Appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the
admissibility of a statement he made to the police. He did not
argue that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try his case
or assert error based on the lack of notice to his biological
father in the juvenile court. A panel of the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's judgment in an unpublished opinion.
Moore v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1088-97-2 (March 16, 1999).
The defendant filed a petition for appeal in this Court, in
which he alleged a purported jurisdictional defect in his
convictions. He argued that, under our decision in Baker, the
circuit court's judgment was void because the Commonwealth
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failed to provide notice to his biological father of the
proceedings in juvenile court. We awarded the defendant this
appeal on the sole issue whether the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to try him on the four charged offenses.
The defendant contends that the Commonwealth's failure to
comply with the notice requirements of former Code §§ 16.1-243
and –264 deprived both the juvenile court and the circuit court
of subject matter jurisdiction over his case. He argues that
Code § 16.1-269.1(E) applies only when the circuit court has
obtained jurisdiction over the charges by virtue of "valid"
proceedings in the juvenile court. He asserts that the
preliminary hearing in the juvenile court was invalid because of
the Commonwealth's failure to comply with the statutory notice
requirements and, thus, that the indictments in the circuit
court were void and could not be cured by the provisions of Code
§ 16.1-269.1(E). We disagree with the defendant's arguments.
The term "subject matter jurisdiction" refers to the power
granted to the courts by constitution or statute to hear
specified classes of cases. Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365,
371, 514 S.E.2d 153, 156 (1999); Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186
Va. 765, 772, 43 S.E.2d 890, 894 (1947). Code § 16.1-241 grants
the juvenile court "exclusive original jurisdiction" over "all
cases, matters and proceedings" concerning a juvenile who is
alleged to have been delinquent. The classes of offenses
4
committed by the defendant are included within this grant of
jurisdiction.
With certain exceptions that are not pertinent here, Code
§ 19.2-239 grants the circuit court "exclusive original
jurisdiction for the trial of all . . . indictments . . . for
offenses committed within their respective circuits."
Indictments for murder, robbery, and use of a firearm are
encompassed within this statutory grant of authority. Thus, the
circuit court also had subject matter jurisdiction over the
classes of offenses committed by the defendant.
A court's authority to exercise its subject matter
jurisdiction over a case may be restricted by a failure to
comply with statutory requirements that are mandatory in nature
and, thus, are prerequisite to a court's lawful exercise of that
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 425,
428, 192 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1972); Gregory v. Peyton, 208 Va. 157,
159-60, 156 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1967); Peyton v. French, 207 Va.
73, 80, 147 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1966). In Baker, for the reasons
stated by the Court of Appeals, we affirmed the Court of
Appeals' judgment voiding circuit court convictions of a
juvenile because the Commonwealth had failed to comply with the
mandatory notice requirements of former Code §§ 16.1-263 and –
264. 258 Va. at 2, 516 S.E.2d at 220. The Court of Appeals
held that a "plain reading of Code §§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264
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manifests legislative intent that both parents be notified and
dispenses with this requirement only when the trial judge has
certified on the record that the identity of a parent is not
reasonably ascertainable." Baker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App.
at 312, 504 S.E.2d at 397.
The trial court's judgment in Baker was void because the
notice of initiation of juvenile proceedings was not served on a
required party, the juvenile's biological father. Id. Thus,
although the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over
the felony indictments before it, the court lacked authority to
exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over those offenses
because the Commonwealth failed to comply with the mandatory
notice requirements of former Code §§ 16.1-263 and –264.
Although the juvenile proceedings in the present case
suffered from the same type of notice defect that occurred in
Baker, we conclude that Baker is inapposite to a resolution of
the present appeal. The offenses at issue in Baker were
committed before July 1, 1996. See 28 Va. App. at 308-09, 504
S.E.2d at 395. Thus, the provisions of Code § 16.1-269.1(E),
which apply only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1996,
were not before us in Baker. 2 See 1996 Va. Acts ch. 755, cl. 7,
and ch. 914, cl. 7.
2
We also note that in Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. ___,
___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2000) (decided today), which did not
6
Since the defendant committed the four charged offenses
after July 1, 1996, the provisions of Code § 16.1-269.1(E) are
applicable to the resolution of his case. As previously noted,
that section provides in relevant part: "An indictment in the
circuit court cures any error or defect in any proceeding held
in the juvenile court except with respect to the juvenile's
age." Under the plain language of this statute, an indictment
by a grand jury cures any defect or error, except one regarding
a juvenile's age, which has occurred in any juvenile court
proceeding.
The Commonwealth's failure to notify the defendant's
biological father of the initiation of juvenile court
proceedings, as required by former Code §§ 16.1-263 and –264,
created a defect in those proceedings. Baker, 28 Va. App. at
313, 504 S.E.2d at 398. However, under Code § 16.1-269.1(E),
that defect was cured when the grand jury returned indictments
against the defendant on the offenses certified to it by the
juvenile court. This curative statutory provision permitted the
involve the defendant here, the offenses at issue were committed
before July 1, 1996. We held that the Commonwealth's failure to
give notice of the initiation of juvenile court proceedings to
the juvenile's father, as required by former Code §§ 16.1-263
and -264, was not subject to waiver by the juvenile's failure to
object to this defect in the proceedings. Id. at ___, ___
S.E.2d at ___. We also held that the provisions of Code § 16.1-
269.6(E) did not effect a waiver of this defect. Id. at ___,
___ S.E.2d at ___.
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circuit court to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction and to
try the defendant on the offenses set forth in the indictments. 3
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals. 4
Affirmed.
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins, concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority in this
case. However, I write separately to reiterate my belief that
the notice requirement at issue is not a prerequisite for the
juvenile court’s exercise of its subject matter jurisdiction.
Moore v. Commonwealth, Record No. 990665, 259 Va. ___, ___
S.E.2d ___ (2000) (this day decided) (Kinser, J., dissenting);
see also Turner v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 666, 667, 222 S.E.2d
517, 518 (1976) (holding that mandatory requirement of written
notice was not jurisdictional).
3
Since Baker is inapposite to the present case, we reject
the defendant's additional contention that the Court of Appeals
was required to reverse his convictions, sua sponte, after the
Court's decision in Baker.
4
We do not address the defendant's contention that the
Commonwealth's failure to comply with the notice requirements of
former Code §§ 16.1-263 and -264 denied him due process, because
the defendant failed to raise this objection in the trial court.
Rule 5:25; see Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 393, 464
S.E.2d 131, 139 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996).
8