COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Clements and Senior Judge Willis
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
VICKI LEE SHREVE
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1598-03-4 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
DECEMBER 14, 2004
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PAGE COUNTY
John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge
Seth I. Howard (Joseph R. Winston, Special Appellate Counsel;
Public Defender Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Vicki Lee Shreve was convicted in a bench trial of driving without a valid license, in
violation of Code § 46.2-300. On appeal, Shreve contends the evidence was insufficient, as a matter
of law, to prove that her suspended license was not a “valid” license as contemplated by Code
§ 46.2-300. Finding no error, we affirm the conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
The record before us includes, in lieu of a transcript, a written statement of facts, made a part
of the record pursuant to Rule 5A:8. As set forth in that statement of facts, on September 9, 2002,
Police Officer R.B. Dean received a report that Shreve was driving on a suspended license, traveling
toward the Town of Stanley. Officer Dean stopped Shreve’s vehicle in Page County. Shreve
admitted that she had previously been stopped by the police and knew her license was suspended.
Officer Dean charged Shreve with driving on a suspended license, in violation of Code § 46.2-301.
Shreve was subsequently convicted in general district court of driving without a valid license, in
violation of Code § 46.2-300. She appealed her conviction to the circuit court.
At trial, the Commonwealth’s evidence consisted of Officer Dean’s testimony and a
certified copy of Shreve’s Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) driving record transcript, which
was admitted into evidence. The DMV record reflected that, on March 22, 1999, DMV issued
Shreve a driver’s license with an expiration date of November 30, 2002. The record further
revealed that, on May 1, 2002, DMV suspended Shreve’s license effective May 16, 2002, for a “non
motor vehicle related” reason and that Shreve accepted notice of the order of suspension on May 6,
2002.
Shreve did not appear at trial, nor did her attorney present any evidence on her behalf. The
Commonwealth argued that Shreve’s license was “invalid.” The trial court found Shreve guilty of
driving without a valid license, in violation of Code § 46.2-300.
Thereafter, Shreve filed a motion to set aside her conviction, arguing that a suspension of a
driver’s license does not render the license invalid and that her license was valid until its expiration
date of November 30, 2002. The trial court denied Shreve’s motion and entered a final judgment of
conviction.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The sole issue in this appeal is whether Shreve’s action of driving on a suspended license
was sufficient, as a matter of law, to prove she was operating a motor vehicle with a license that was
not “valid” as contemplated by Code § 46.2-300.1 Because this is a question of law involving the
1
By order dated March 29, 2004, a three-judge panel of this Court denied Shreve’s
petition for appeal with regard to her claim that the trial court lacked authority to convict her of
driving without a license in violation of Code § 46.2-300 because that offense did not constitute a
lesser-included offense of driving on a suspended or revoked driver’s license in violation of Code
§ 46.2-301, the offense charged in the summons. That issue, therefore, is not now before us.
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interpretation of Code § 46.2-300, we review the trial court’s judgment de novo. See Sink v.
Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 655, 658, 507 S.E.2d 670, 671 (1998) (noting that, “although the trial
court’s findings of historical fact are binding on appeal unless plainly wrong, we review the trial
court’s statutory interpretations and legal conclusions de novo”).
Code § 46.2-300 provides:
No person . . . shall drive any motor vehicle on any highway
in the Commonwealth until such person has applied for a driver’s
license, as provided in this article, satisfactorily passed the
examination required by § 46.2-325, and obtained a driver’s license,
nor unless the license is valid.
(Emphasis added.)
Shreve maintains, on appeal, that the Commonwealth failed to prove that her driver’s license
was not “valid” under Code § 46.2-300 at the time of the alleged offense on September 9, 2002.
She argues that, having obtained her driver’s license by making a lawful application and passing the
required examination, her license remained “valid” until November 30, 2002, its expiration date.
The “suspension” of her license, her argument continues, was merely a temporary withdrawal of the
privilege to drive and did not, unlike a revocation, require reapplication at the end of the suspension
period to be reinstated.2 Thus, she concludes, notwithstanding the suspension of her privilege to
drive, her license was still “valid” on September 9, 2002, and she could not, therefore, be found
guilty of violating Code § 46.2-300.
In support of her argument that, even though it was suspended, her license was still valid
under Code § 46.2-300 because she had obtained it via a lawful application and successful
2
Code § 46.2-100 defines “suspend” or “suspension” as meaning “that the document or
privilege suspended has been temporarily withdrawn, but may be reinstated following the period
of suspension unless it has expired prior to the end of the period of suspension.” The same
statute defines “revoke” or “revocation” as meaning “that the document or privilege revoked is
not subject to renewal or restoration except through reapplication after the expiration of the
period of revocation.”
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examination, Shreve relies on the Supreme Court’s statement in Edenton v. Commonwealth, 227
Va. 413, 417, 316 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1984), that “[t]he gravamen of the misdemeanor [offense of
driving without a valid operator’s license] . . . is the act of operating a motor vehicle by a driver who
has not obtained a valid operator’s license by making a lawful application and passing the required
examination.” Shreve’s reliance on that statement is misplaced, however, because the Supreme
Court’s inquiry in Edenton was limited to determining whether a defendant indicted for driving after
having been adjudged an habitual offender could be convicted instead of driving without a valid
operator’s license. Id. at 415, 316 S.E.2d at 737-38. Analyzing a substantially similar statutory
predecessor of Code § 46.2-300, the Court held that a defendant could not be so convicted because
driving without a valid license was not a lesser-included offense of driving after having been
adjudged an habitual offender. Id. at 417-18, 316 S.E.2d at 738. In reaching that conclusion, the
Court focused on the distinctive element of the driving-without-a-valid-license offense—the act of
driving without a valid operator’s license—rather than on the question of what constituted a “valid”
license. Thus, we conclude that the Supreme Court did not undertake to define the term “valid
operator’s license” in Edenton and, thus, its statement therein regarding the “gravamen” of the
driving-without-a-valid-license offense does not control the resolution of the inquiry in this case.
Turning to the statutory-interpretation issue presented in this case, we are mindful of the
following familiar principles:
It is one of the fundamental rules of construction of statutes
that the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from a view of
the whole and every part of the statute taken and compared together,
giving to every word and every part of the statute, if possible, its due
effect and meaning, and to the words used their ordinary and popular
meaning, unless it plainly appears that they were used in some other
sense. If the intention of the legislature can be thus discovered, it is
not permissible to add to or subtract from the words used in the
statute.
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Posey v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 551, 553, 96 S.E. 771, 771 (1918). Additionally, “it is a cardinal
principle of law that penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the [Commonwealth] . . . .
Such a statute cannot be extended by implication, or be made to include cases which are not within
the letter and spirit of the statute.” Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 122, 116 S.E.2d 99, 103
(1960). Nevertheless, “we will not apply ‘an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute’
that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein.” Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va.
573, 581, 562 S.E.2d 139, 144 (2002) (quoting Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250
S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979)). “We must also assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it
used when it enacted the relevant statute, and we are bound by those words as we interpret the
statute.” Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990).
Moreover,
[i]t would be absurd to conclude that the legislature would say the
same thing twice in one statutory provision. . . . The rules of
statutory interpretation argue against reading any legislative
enactment in a manner that will make a portion of it useless,
repetitious, or absurd. On the contrary, it is well established that
every act of the legislature should be read so as to give reasonable
effect to every word and to promote the ability of the enactment to
remedy the mischief at which it is directed.
Clark v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 673, 683, 472 S.E.2d 663, 667-68 (1996), aff’d on reh’g en
banc, 24 Va. App. 253, 481 S.E.2d 495 (1997).
These principles support the conclusion that the legislature intended to recognize separate
violations of Code § 46.2-300 for (1) driving after failing to apply for a driver’s license,
satisfactorily pass the examination, and obtain the license and (2) driving without a valid license.
Code § 46.2-300 prohibits a person from driving on the highways of Virginia “until” the acts of
applying for a license, passing an examination, and obtaining the license are accomplished. In
addition, the statute prohibits a person from driving on the highways of Virginia “unless the license
is valid.” In drafting the statute, the legislature separated the two prohibitions with a comma
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followed by the disjunctive word “nor.” We have noted that, pursuant to the rules of grammar,
“phrases separated by a comma and [a] disjunctive . . . are independent.” Smoot v. Commonwealth,
37 Va. App. 495, 501, 559 S.E.2d 409, 412 (2002). The disjunctive serves to connect the two parts
of the sentence but also to keep them separate and independent. See id. Accordingly, the phrase
prohibiting driving without a valid license is separate and independent from the phrase prohibiting
driving after failing to apply for a driver’s license, satisfactorily pass the examination, and obtain the
license. “Each phrase therefore[] specifies a separate and distinct proscription that may constitute a
violation of . . . the statute.” Garcia v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 184, 191-92, 578 S.E.2d 97,
100 (2003). Hence, we reject Shreve’s argument that the only ground for convicting her of
violating Code § 46.2-300 required findings that she had not applied for a driver’s license, not
satisfactorily passed the examination, and not obtained the license.
We also reject Shreve’s argument that driving on a “suspended” license did not constitute
driving without a “valid” license. Although Shreve had been issued a driver’s license by DMV with
an expiration date of November 30, 2002, on the date of the offense, that license was suspended,
meaning that her license or privilege to drive on the highways of the Commonwealth had been
“temporarily withdrawn.” Code § 46.2-100. Thus, Shreve’s suspended license did not authorize
her to operate a motor vehicle on the highway at the time of the offense. Id. Although the Code
does not provide a definition of what constitutes a “valid” license under Code § 46.2-300, Black’s
Law Dictionary 1586 (8th ed. 2004) defines “valid” as “[l]egally sufficient; binding.” See Moyer v.
Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 8, 35, 531 S.E.2d 580, 593 (2000) (en banc) (noting that if the Code
of Virginia does not provide a statutory definition we may look to the dictionary definition to
determine legislative intent). Thus, a driver’s license is not “valid” under Code § 46.2-300 unless it
is legally sufficient to meet its intended purpose, namely, authorizing the operator of the motor
vehicle to drive on the highways of Virginia.
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Because Shreve’s suspended license was not legally sufficient to authorize her to drive a
motor vehicle on the highways of the Commonwealth on September 9, 2002, her suspended license
did not constitute a valid license. To conclude otherwise would yield an absurd result. See Councill
v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 610, 614, 560 S.E.2d 472, 473 (2002) (noting that a statute should
not be construed in a way which leads to absurd results).
For these reasons, we hold that the Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Shreve was guilty of violating Code § 46.2-300, and we affirm her
conviction.
Affirmed.
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