COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Frank and Humphreys
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
JOHN MAURCELLE LAW
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0209-02-1 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
NOVEMBER 12, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
Bruce H. Kushner, Judge
Richard L. Kreger (Kreger & McBride, on
briefs), for appellant.
Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney
General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
John Maurcelle Law appeals his conviction, after a bench
trial, for bribery of a witness in violation of Code
§ 18.2-441.1. Law contends his conduct did not establish a
violation of the statute. For the following reasons, we reverse
the judgment of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 5, 2001, Celestine Riddick and her daughter, Nakia
Sykes, attended a preliminary hearing at the Chesapeake Juvenile
and Domestic Relations District Court, for a sexual assault case
in which Sykes was the victim. Riddick and Sykes waited in the
lobby, outside the courtroom, prior to the hearing. While they
were waiting, and just before the hearing began, Law, a family
friend of Riddick, approached her and began to engage in
conversation. Law asked Riddick whether Sykes was her daughter
and asked Riddick "what [had] happened with the case that [they]
were sitting out there for." Although she had not been
subpoenaed to testify at the hearing, Riddick told Law she "was
not at liberty to discuss the case with him." Law then stated,
"[I will] [g]ive you $500 to squash [the case], to keep the
white man out of it." After overhearing Law's proposal, Sykes
immediately informed the Commonwealth's attorney of the
conversation.
The preliminary hearing began shortly thereafter. Riddick
was sworn in as a potential witness for the Commonwealth, but
she did not testify during the hearing.
Following the hearing, the judge questioned Law about his
conversation with Riddick. Law denied that the conversation
occurred and denied knowing Riddick.
Law was subsequently indicted for "feloniously giv[ing],
offer[ing] or promis[ing] money or a thing of value to another
with the intent to prevent such person from testifying in a
civil or criminal proceeding or to cause such person to testify
falsely, in violation of Code § 18.2-441.1." During his trial,
Law conceded that he knew Riddick, but denied having made the
statement at issue. He testified that he claimed not to know
Riddick, when questioned after the preliminary hearing, because
he was "afraid."
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After the Commonwealth's evidence, and again at the close
of all the evidence, Law raised a motion to strike contending
the Commonwealth had failed to establish that Riddick was a
witness and/or that Law, by his statement, intended to induce
her to testify falsely or to absent herself from the proceeding.
The Commonwealth argued that Riddick was a potential witness and
that the language used by Law, to "squash the case," was an
attempt to persuade both Riddick and her daughter not to testify
in order "to squash the charges." The trial court held:
the Court is convinced the intent was clear
of Mr. Law, that the testimony of Ms.
Riddick could have been required to confirm
the age of her daughter as a minor, and as a
consequence, I find that the evidence is
sufficient to find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court then convicted Law of the charge.
Prior to sentencing, Law filed a motion to set aside the
conviction "upon the grounds that the evidence failed to support
a conviction of the offense under the statute as a matter of
law." During the sentencing hearing, the court heard arguments
on the motion and denied it. The trial court then sentenced Law
to serve five years in prison, with four years suspended.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Law contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motions to strike and his motion to set aside the
conviction. Specifically, Law argues the trial court erred in
finding the evidence sufficient, as a matter of law, to convict
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him of bribery of a witness pursuant to Code § 18.2-441.1. We
agree.
We first note that challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence require the appellate court to "view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all
reasonable inferences fairly deducible from the evidence."
Cooper v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 643, 646, 525 S.E.2d 72, 73
(2000) (en banc); Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 424, 410
S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991). The court must "discard the evidence of
the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and
regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the
Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn
therefrom." Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348, 494
S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998); Derr, 242 Va. at 424, 410 S.E.2d at 668.
The reviewing court must accept the findings of the trial court
unless the findings lack evidentiary support or are plainly
wrong. McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487
S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc).
Code § 18.2-441.1 provides as follows:
If any person give, offer, or promise to
give any money or other thing of value to
anyone with intent to prevent such person
from testifying as a witness in any civil or
criminal proceeding or with intent to cause
that person to testify falsely, he shall be
guilty of a Class 6 felony.
The issue in this appeal is one of first impression in Virginia.
Indeed, no appellate court in Virginia has previously considered a
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conviction under this statute. Thus, we must initially determine
the reach of the statute, before we consider whether the trial
court correctly held that Law's conduct fell within that reach.
It is well settled that "[w]hen the language of a statute is
plain and unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that
language. We must determine the intent of the General Assembly
from the words contained in the statute, unless a literal
construction of the statute would yield an absurd result." Shelor
Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 479, 544 S.E.2d 345, 348 (2001)
(citations omitted). Indeed, when determining the boundaries of
such a statute, "[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a
statute is always preferred to any curious, narrow or strained
construction . . . ." Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836,
839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992).
Furthermore, the rules of statutory construction require that
courts strictly construe criminal statutes against the
Commonwealth and "in favor of an accused's liberty." Waldrop v.
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 210, 214-15, 495 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1998)
(citing Harward v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 363, 365, 330 S.E.2d
89, 90 (1985)). Criminal statutes should support a criminal
prosecution "only in those cases clearly falling within the
language of the statute," Branch, 14 Va. App. at 839, 419 S.E.2d
at 424, and before punishing an individual for violating a
criminal statute, "his case must be plainly and unmistakably
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within the statute." United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628
(1890).
So viewed, the plain language of Code § 18.2-441.1 prohibits
only two specific forms of conduct. The statute prohibits an
individual from: 1) offering money or another object of value to a
person with the intent to prevent that person from "testifying as
a witness" in a matter; and 2) offering money or another object of
value to a person with the intent to influence that person to
testify falsely.
Thus, to establish a violation, the plain language of the
statute does not require that the offeree be an actual witness, as
suggested by the appellant, Law. It mandates only that the
offeror intend to prevent the offeree from testifying as a
witness; or if the offeree does testify, that the offeror intend
to persuade the offeree to testify falsely. Accordingly,
Riddick's status as an actual witness is of no relevance under the
statute. Instead, the analysis turns upon Law's subjective intent
at the time he made the offer to Riddick.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the evidence bearing on Law's intent established
that Law approached Riddick outside of the courtroom, just before
the preliminary hearing, that he asked her about her relationship
to Sykes, that he asked her about the status of the case, and that
he offered her $500 to "squash it, to keep the white man out of
it." The Commonwealth argues that Law's statement meant "dismiss"
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the case. 1 The Commonwealth further contends that Law's words, in
conjunction with these circumstances, established his intent to
persuade Riddick not to testify, or to testify falsely.
However, there is no evidence in this record that the term
"squash" has special meaning or constitutes "street language"
equating to a request to refuse to testify or to do so falsely.
While we have held that "[s]lang expressions . . . are well known
and matters of common knowledge," such expressions cannot be
interpreted beyond their obvious meaning, without evidence
justifying such an interpretation. See Branche v. Commonwealth,
25 Va. App. 480, 491, 489 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1997). To do so would
require speculation as to the speaker's subjective intent. See
Littlejohn v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 401, 415, 482 S.E.2d 853,
860 (1997) ("Convictions cannot rest upon speculation and
conjecture."). Thus, even accepting the Commonwealth's argument
that Law's slang expression constituted a request to dismiss the
charge, neither the statement, nor the surrounding circumstances,
demonstrated anything more than that he offered Riddick money in
an attempt to persuade her to dismiss the case.
Further, as the Commonwealth concedes on appeal, Law did not
specifically ask Riddick to refuse to testify, nor did he ask her
to testify falsely. No evidence suggested Law contemplated that
1
Likewise, the Commonwealth argued before the trial court
that Law's phrase, "squash the case," was "jargon [or] slang,"
meaning "drop [the charge]. It means do not prosecute."
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Riddick would have to refuse to testify, or testify falsely, in
order to "squash [the case]." Indeed, assuming without deciding
that "squash it" meant "dismiss" as the Commonwealth argues, no
evidence established that Law had any special knowledge of the
stage of the proceedings and/or the legal issues involved, nor did
his conduct in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances
suggest that he intended for Riddick to "squash it" by any
particular means.
As the Commonwealth conceded during oral argument, had Law's
words to Riddick been, "I'll give you $500 to ask the prosecutor
to dismiss the case," no violation of the statute would have
occurred. However, because Law used a slang or colloquial
expression to convey his intent, the Commonwealth contends one can
assume this was not his intent and that instead, his intent was to
prevent Riddick from testifying or to persuade her to testify
falsely. Yet, as stated above, absent speculation, no evidence in
this record justifies such an assumption.
Therefore, however inappropriate Law's conduct might have
been, the evidence here failed to establish, as a matter of law,
that his conduct violated the plain language of Code § 18.2-441.1.
For this reason, we find that the trial court's judgment in this
matter was plainly wrong, and we reverse the decision of the trial
court and dismiss the indictment.
Reversed and dismissed.
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