COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Koontz, Elder and Fitzpatrick
HARVEY EARL DRIGGS
v. Record No. 2408-93-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
JUDGE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
CITY OF MARTINSVILLE JULY 11, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE
Frank I. Richardson, Jr., Judge
Wm. Roscoe Reynolds (Stone, Worthy, Reynolds & Joyce,
on brief), for appellant.
J. Randolph Smith, Jr., Commonwealth's Attorney, for
appellee.
Harvey Earl Driggs (Driggs) appeals his conviction for
driving under the influence, a second or subsequent offense
within a ten-year period pursuant to Code § 18.2-266. Driggs
asserts that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a
copy of a prior conviction order for driving under the influence
on the ground that the order was attested improperly. Finding no
error, we affirm.
At trial, the Commonwealth offered an attested copy of
Driggs' previous conviction for DUI from the Circuit Court of
Roanoke County. The clerk's attestation stamp on the document
appeared as follows:
STE: STEVEN A MCGRAW, CLERK
COURT, ROA KE COUNTY, VA.
/s/ Rebecca Fay Mahone
Deputy Clerk
Driggs objected to the admission of the document on the
ground that it was hearsay and not in compliance with Code
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
§ 8.01-389. Driggs argued that the stamp on the document failed
to indicate that it was prepared by the clerk of the court
wherein the original was maintained. On appeal, Driggs reasoned
that without such authentication the document was not a proper
copy teste, thus it was inadmissible.
We hold that Owens v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 309, 391
S.E.2d 605 (1990), controls on these facts. In Owens, the
Commonwealth introduced into evidence a certified copy of a prior
robbery conviction. The certification merely identified the
attesting officer as "clerk" without identifying the court of his
jurisdiction. Owens argued that the copy was not authenticated
as required under Code § 8.01-389 because a proper certification
required proof of proper jurisdiction. We held that no
additional authentication was needed and stated, "the underlying
rationale which justifies admitting facts contained in official
records as an exception to the hearsay rule is that the concern
for reliability is largely obviated because the nature and source
of the evidence enhance the prospect of its trustworthiness."
Id. at 311, 391 S.E.2d at 607 (citation omitted).
The stamp in the present case conveyed the same information
as the stamp in Owens. Although the stamp on Driggs' prior
conviction order was partially incomplete, the information
imparted was adequate to satisfy the requirements of Code
§ 8.01-389.
For these reasons, we affirm Driggs' conviction.
Affirmed.
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