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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCAP-12-0000789
14-FEB-2014
10:03 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
LLOYD Y. ASATO,
Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD, STATE OF HAWAI#I,
Respondent/Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
SCAP-12-0000789
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CAAP-12-0000789, CIV. NO. 11-1-0173)
February 14, 2014
ACOBA, McKENNA, AND POLLACK, JJ.; WITH RECKTENWALD, C.J.,
DISSENTING, WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J., JOINS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.
We hold that Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-
Appellant Lloyd Y. Asato (Asato) had standing to bring a claim
challenging the validity of Hawai#i Administrative Rule (HAR) §
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3-122-66 (2008), based on his status as an “interested person”
pursuant to Hawai#i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-7 (1993)1, and in
order to satisfy the “needs of justice.” See Life of the Land v.
Land Use Comm’n., 63 Haw. 166, 176, 623 P.2d 431, 441 (1981). We
also decide that HAR § 3-122-66 (2003)2 is invalid because it
exceeds the scope of authority given by the legislature to
Respondent/Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellee State of Hawai#i
Procurement Policy Board (the Board). See HRS § 91-7(b) (“The
court shall declare the rule invalid if it finds that it . . .
exceeds the statutory authority of the agency[.]”). Finally, the
court did not err in declining to invalidate all contracts issued
under HAR § 3-122-66, as requested by Asato.
I.
A.
On January 25, 2011, Asato filed a Complaint asserting
1
HRS § 91-7 provides as follows:
§ 91-7. Declaratory judgment on validity of rules. (a) Any
interested person may obtain a judicial declaration as to
the validity of an agency rule as provided in subsection (b)
herein by bringing an action against the agency in the
circuit court of the county in which petitioner resides or
has its principal place of business. The action may be
maintained whether or not petitioner has first requested the
agency to pass upon the validity of the rule in question.
(b) The court shall declare the rules invalid if it
finds that it violates constitutional or statutory
provisions, or exceeds the statutory authority of the
agency, or was adopted without compliance with the statutory
rulemaking procedures.
(Emphases added.)
2
The full text of HAR § 3-122-66 is set forth infra.
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two causes of action, one for declaratory relief (declaratory
action) and one for injunctive relief (injunctive action). In
his Complaint, Asato maintained that he brought the Complaint
pursuant to HRS § 91-7 and that he “also had the necessary
standing to prosecute this action under Federal Electric Corp. v.
Fasi [(Federal Electric)], 56 Haw. 57, 62, 527 P.2d 1284, 1289
(1974) and Iuli v. Fasi [(Iuli)], 62 Haw. 180, 186, 613 P.2d 653,
657 (1980)” as a taxpayer.
The Complaint asserted that HAR § 3-122-663 “is and has
always been contrary to the ‘minimum of three persons’
3
HAR § 3-122-66 provides in relevant part as follows:
§ 3-122-66 Waiver to Requirement for Procurement of Professional
Services.
(a) If the names of less than three qualified persons are
submitted pursuant to section 103D-304(g), HRS, the head of
the purchasing agency may determine that:
(1) Negotiations under section 103D-304(h), HRS, may be
conducted provided that:
(A) The prices submitted are fair and reasonable; and
(B) Other prospective offerors had reasonable opportunity to
respond; or there is not adequate time to resolicit through
public notice statements of qualifications and expressions
of interest;
(2) The offers may be rejected pursuant to subchapter 11 and
new statements of qualifications and expressions of interest
may be solicited if the conditions in paragraph (1) (A) and
(B) are not met;
(3) The proposed procurement may be cancelled; or
(4) An alternative procurement method may be conducted to
include but not be limited to direct negotiations with other
potential offerors if the head of the purchasing agency
determines in writing that the need for the service
continues, but that either the price of the offers received
are not fair and reasonable or that the qualifications of
the offerors are not adequate to meet the procurement needs,
and there is no time for resolicitation, or resolicitation
would likely be futile.
(Emphases added.)
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requirement [in] HRS § 103D-304(g)4 and is therefore invalid, and
4
HRS § 103D-304 (Supp. 2010) provides in relevant part as follows:
§ 103D-304 Procurement of professional services
(a) Professional services shall be procured in accordance
with sections 103D-302, 103D-303, 103D-305, 103D-306, or
103D-307, or this section; provided that design professional
services furnished by licensees under chapter 464 shall be
procured pursuant to this section or section 103D-307.
Contracts for professional services shall be awarded on the
basis of demonstrated competence and qualification for the
type of services required, and at fair and reasonable
prices.
(b) At a minimum, before the beginning of each fiscal year,
the head of each purchasing agency shall publish a notice
inviting persons engaged in providing professional services
which the agency anticipates needing in the next fiscal
year, to submit current statements of qualifications and
expressions of interest to the agency. . . .
(c) The head of the purchasing agency shall designate a
review committee consisting of a minimum of three persons
with sufficient education, training, and licenses or
credentials for each type of professional service which may
be required. . . .
The committee shall review and evaluate all submissions and
other pertinent information, including references and
reports, and prepare a list of qualified persons to provide
these services. . . .
(d) Whenever during the course of the fiscal year the agency
needs a particular professional service, the head of the
purchasing agency shall designate a selection committee to
evaluate the statements of qualification and performance
data of those persons on the list prepared pursuant to
subsection (c) along with any other pertinent information,
including references and reports. The selection committee
shall be comprised of a minimum of three persons with
sufficient education, training, and licenses or credentials
in the area of the services required. . . .
(e) The selection criteria employed in descending order of
importance shall be:
(1) Experience and professional qualifications relevant to
the project type;
(2) Past performance on projects of similar scope for public
agencies or private industry, including corrective actions
and other responses to notices of deficiencies;
(3) Capacity to accomplish the work in the required time;
and
(4) Any additional criteria determined in writing by the
selection committee to be relevant to the purchasing
agency's needs or necessary and appropriate to ensure full,
(continued...)
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must be declared void ab initio and permanently enjoined from all
further use.” Further, the Complaint alleged that “[a]ccording
to internet listings of contract awards on the State Procurement
Office website[,] . . . the previous City and County of Honolulu
Administration has awarded at least twenty six (26) professional
service contracts for architects and engineers or for other
professionals with less than three (3) persons on the list
submitted to the selection committee” and that “[a]ll contracts
4
(...continued)
open, and fair competition for professional services
contracts.
(f) The selection committee shall evaluate the submissions
of persons on the list prepared pursuant to subsection (c)
and any other pertinent information which may be available
to the agency, against the selection criteria. . . .
(g) The selection committee shall rank a minimum of three
persons based on the selection criteria and send the ranking
to the head of the purchasing agency. . . .
(h) The head of the purchasing agency or designee shall
negotiate a contract with the first ranked person, including
a rate of compensation which is fair and reasonable,
established in writing, and based upon the estimated value,
scope, complexity, and nature of the services to be
rendered. If a satisfactory contract cannot be negotiated
with the first ranked person, negotiations with that person
shall be formally terminated and negotiations with the
second ranked person on the list shall commence. The
contract file shall include documentation from the head of
the purchasing agency, or designee, to support selection of
other than the first ranked or next ranked person. Failing
accord with the second ranked person, negotiations with the
next ranked person on the list shall commence. If a contract
at a fair and reasonable price cannot be negotiated, the
selection committee may be asked to submit a minimum of
three additional persons for the head of the purchasing
agency to resume negotiations in the same manner provided in
this subsection. Negotiations shall be conducted
confidentially.
(Emphases added.)
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that have been issued based on HAR § 3-122-66 are void ab
initio.” Therefore, Asato’s declaratory action requested that
“the court declare as a matter of law that HAR § 3-122-66 has
never been valid and has always been ultra vires because it is
contrary to and violates the “minimum of three persons
requirement in HRS § 103D-304(g)[.]”
Correlatively, Asato’s injunctive action requested that
“all existing contracts in which HAR § 3-122-66 was used in
violation of the ‘minimum of three persons’ requirement in HRS §
103D-304(g) be rescinded as being void ab initio.” Asato also
asked that “a preliminary injunction, and after hearing, a
permanent injunction be entered enjoining and restraining [the
Board] and all its agents, servants, and employees, and all
others acting in concert with them, including but not limited to
the administrator of the State Procurement Office, and all of his
agents, servants[,] and employees, and all chief procurement
officers and their agents, servants and employees in the state
and county governments from utilizing HAR § 3-122-66 in the
procurement of professional services under HRS § 103D-304.”
On January 10, 2012, Asato filed a motion for summary
judgment. Asato again contended that “HAR § 3-122-66 conflicts
with HRS § 103D-304(g) and should be struck down[.]” Again,
Asato asked the court to “declare that HAR § 3-122-66 has never
been valid and has always been ultra vires and is void ab initio,
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enjoin its current and future use and declare that every
government contract issued under the invalid authority of HAR §
3-122-66 is void ab initio.”
On March 30, 2012, the Board filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment. The Board argued that HAR § 3-122-66 was
authorized by HRS § 103D-102(b)(4)(L),5 and therefore “HAR § 3-
5
HRS § 103D-102 (Supp. 2010) provides in relevant part as follows
§ 103D-102 Application of this chapter
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), this chapter shall not
apply to contracts by governmental bodies:
. . .
(4) To procure the following goods or services which are
available from multiple sources but for which procurement by
competitive means is either not practicable or not
advantageous to the State:
(A) Services of expert witnesses for potential and actual
litigation of legal matters involving the State, its
agencies, and its officers and employees, including
administrative quasi-judicial proceedings;
(B) Works of art for museum or public display;
(C) Research and reference materials including books, maps,
periodicals, and pamphlets, which are published in print,
video, audio, magnetic, or electronic form;
(D) Meats and foodstuffs for the Kalaupapa settlement;
(E) Opponents for athletic contests;
(F) Utility services whose rates or prices are fixed by
regulatory processes or agencies;
(G) Performances, including entertainment, speeches, and
cultural and artistic presentations;
(H) Goods and services for commercial resale by the State;
(I) Services of printers, rating agencies, support
facilities, fiscal and paying agents, and registrars for the
issuance and sale of the State's or counties’ bonds;
(J) Services of attorneys employed or retained to advise,
represent, or provide any other legal service to the State
or any of its agencies, on matters arising under laws of
another state or foreign country, or in an action brought in
another state, federal, or foreign jurisdiction, when
substantially all legal services are expected to be
performed outside this State;
(K) Financing agreements under chapter 37D; and
(L) Any other goods or services which the policy board
(continued...)
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122-66 is a valid rule.” According to the Board, Asato did not
have standing as a taxpayer because he did not demonstrate that
he had suffered a pecuniary loss from the enactment of HAR § 3-
122-66, and Asato did not have standing under HRS § 91-7 because
“HRS § 91-7 limits relief to claims from ‘interested persons’ who
can show an actual or threatened injury.” (Citing Richard v.
Metcalf, 82 Haw. 249, 253, 921 P.2d 169, 173 (1996).) Finally,
the Board maintained that Asato could not challenge specific
contracts awarded under HAR § 3-122-66 because “[c]hallenges to
the award of procurement contracts are governed exclusively by
the Procurement Code.” (Citing HRS § 103D-704.)
B.
On June 8, 2012, the circuit court of the first circuit
(the court)6 issued an order granting Asato’s motion for summary
judgment. As to Asato’s standing, the court concluded that Asato
was an “interested person” under HRS § 91-7 because he “seeks to
obtain a judicial declaration,” and “has brought an action
against the agency in circuit court and is asking us to determine
whether or not this rule is valid or invalid as it violates
5
(...continued)
determines by rules or the chief procurement officer
determines in writing is available from multiple sources but
for which procurement by competitive means is either not
practicable or not advantageous to the State[.]
(Emphases added.)
6
The Honorable Karl K. Sakamoto presided.
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statutory provisions or exceeds statutory authority.” The court
also held that the “three-part test of injury in fact” set forth
in Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawai#i 474, 918 P.3d 1130 (1996) “would
have been met here.”
The court explained that the first prong of the test
was met because Asato demonstrated that the Board used HAR § 3-
122-66 to “exempt certain procurements from requirements of HRS §
103D-304, where [Asato] assert[ed] that the administrative rule
is inconsistent with the statute.” The second prong was met
“because the actual or threatened injury to [Asato], as a
taxpayer, is directly traceable to [the Board’s] actions,
especially in concerning integrity of contracts using taxpayer
funds.” Finally, the third prong was met because “a favorable
decision would require [the board] to follow the statutory
mandates of HRS § 103D-304, and would result or render [sic] HAR
§ 3-122-66 invalid, which is the direct object of [Asato’s]
lawsuit.”
As to the validity of HAR § 3-122-66, the court
explained that “[HRS §] 103D-102(b)(4) lists 11 very specific
goods and services exempted from the ambit of 103D,” and
therefore “subsection (L) . . . must be read by its plain and
obvious meaning -- which is that the policy board must determine
by rule, or [the] chief procurement officer must determine in
writing, specific classes of goods or services which are
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available from multiple services, but for which procurement by
competitive means is either not practicable nor advantageous to
the State[;]” but “HAR § 3-122-66 does not do any such thing.”
Moreover, the court concluded that HAR § 3-122-66 could not be
justified by the need to “fill a gap left in HRS § 103D-304,”
because “[t]he plain language of section 304 does not leave any
such gaps[.]” Therefore, the court held that “that HAR §
3-122-66 is invalid[.]”
However, the court “declin[ed] to declare any contracts
exempted under HAR § 3-122-66 void prior to the date that its
order is filed,” because “the plain reading of standing in HRS §
91-7 is that the court shall declare the rule invalid and that is
all the court does.”
Finally, the court ruled on Asato’s request for
attorney’s fees pursuant to the private attorney general
doctrine. It held that all three factors of the private attorney
general doctrine, set forth infra, were met, and awarded Asato
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
C.
On August 15, 2012, the court entered a judgment in
favor of Asato and against the Board. Then, on September 4,
2012, the court issued its order awarding attorney’s fees and
costs.
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D.
Both Asato and the Board appealed the court’s August 15,
2012 judgment. The Board also appealed the court’s September 4,
2012 order awarding attorney’s fees and costs. On June 27, 2013,
Asato filed an application for transfer of the appeal from the
Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) to this court. This court
granted a discretionary transfer on August 1, 2013, pursuant to
HRS § 602-58(b) (Supp. 2012)7. The parties had already filed
briefs with the ICA.
II.
A.
In its Opening Brief, the Board argued, inter alia,
that (1) Asato did not have standing as a taxpayer because he
failed to meet any of the three requirements for taxpayer
standing set forth in Iuli, (2) the court erred in concluding
that Asato had standing under HRS § 91-7 because Asato did not
suffer injury in fact, and (3) that the court erred in concluding
that HAR § 3-122-66 was invalid, because the Board was authorized
7
HRS § 602-58(b) provides as follows:
(b) the supreme court, in a manner and within the time
provided by the rules of the court, may grant an application
to transfer any case within the jurisdiction fo the
intermediate appellate court to the supreme court upon the
grounds that the case involves:
(1) A question of first impression or a novel legal
question; or
(2) Issues upon which there is an inconsistency in the
decisions of the intermediate appellate court or of
the supreme court.
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to adopt HAR § 3-122-66 under HRS § 103D-102(b)(4)(L).
B.
1.
Asato filed a cross-appeal, arguing inter alia that the
court erred in refusing to grant his requested relief of (1)
“declar[ing] as a matter of law that HAR § 3-122-66 has never
been valid and has always been void ab initio[,]”8 (2)
“declar[ing] that every government contract issued under the
invalid authority of HAR § 3-122-66 is void ab initio,” and (3)
“preliminarily and permanently enjoin[ing] and restrain[ing] the
[Board] . . . from using HAR § 3-122-66.”
2.
In its Answering Brief on cross-appeal, the Board asserted
that “[a] declaration of invalidity is all that is required by HRS §
91-7,” and therefore the court did not err in “refusing to also
declare the Rule void ab initio or ‘always . . . ultra vires.’”
(Emphasis in original.) In the alternative, the Board contended
that “even if Asato’s position were correct,” he was not entitled to
the “voiding of all government contracts entered into pursuant to
the Rule.”
8
To reiterate, the court’s order concluded that “HAR § 3-122-66 is
invalid, pursuant to the statutory authority under HRS § 91-7.” Asato
construes the court’s order as ruling that “HAR § 3-122-66 was invalid as of
the date of entry of its order.” Asato does not explain why it was relevant
that the court declined to rule that HAR § 3-122-66 “has never been valid;”
however, this argument is apparently linked to his contention that the court
should have invalidated each contract issued under HAR § 3-122-66.
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The Board explained that, first, “while HRS § 91-7
allows a circuit court to hear attacks on a rule’s validity, it
‘does not give the circuit court jurisdiction to hear a challenge
to the application of a rule.’” (Quoting Puana v. Sunn, 69 Haw.
187, 189, 737 P.3d 867, 869 (1987).) (Emphasis in original.)
Second, according to the Board, “voiding the contracts would
clearly be improper because the parties to the contracts are not
parties to this case,” and “the ‘absence of interested parties
can be raised at any time even by a reviewing court on its own
motion.’” (Quoting Marvin v. Pfleuger, 127 Hawai#i 490, 503, 280
P.3d 88, 101 (2012).) (Emphasis in original.)
As to Asato’s argument that he was entitled to an
injunction, the Board asserted that Asato waived any argument
that he was entitled to an injunction because Asato’s Opening
Brief did not “mention [] the standards required to obtain an
injunction or [] attempt to argue that Asato met such standards.”
Additionally, the Board noted that Asato “did not even file a
motion for a preliminary or permanent injunction.” The Board
explained that “‘[a]n injunction is an extraordinary remedy’
which is used when a problem cannot ‘be adequately redressed by
an action at law.’” (Quoting Morgan v. Planning Dep’t, County of
Kaua#i, 104 Hawai#i 173, 188, 86 P.3d 982, 997 (2004).) (Emphasis
added.) Here, “[b]ecause the [court] declared that [HAR § 3-122-
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66] was invalid, an injunction would have been superfluous even
if Asato had properly requested one.”
3.
In his Reply Brief, Asato argued that “injunctive
relief is an appropriate and necessary remedy to stop a
government agency’s statutory violation,” and that “[n]o Hawai#i
court has said an injunction is unnecessary to restrain a
violation of a statute.” Additionally, according to Asato, he
had standing as a taxpayer to challenge the individual contracts
issued under HAR § 3-122-66, in addition to his challenge based
on HRS § 91-7. Also, Asato contended that the Board failed to
raise the issue of absent indispensable parties before the court
and that “the identification and disposition of affected
government contracts could take place on remand or in a separate
proceeding[.]” (Citing Haiku Plantations Ass’n v. Lono, 56 Haw.
96, 103, 529 P.2d 1, 6 (1974).) Finally, Asato maintained that
the Board’s indispensable parties argument also fails because
“illegal, and hence, void, contracts are not enforceable against
the government agency where the agency violated the procurement
law or a public policy.”
III.
A.
Asato is entitled to standing in this case pursuant to
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HRS § 91-7.9 See Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 176, 623 P.2d at
441. As related, Asato’s action was brought pursuant to HRS §
91-7, which allows “[a]ny interested person” to obtain “a
judicial declaration as to the validity of an agency rule.” The
court determined that Asato had standing under HRS § 91-7.10 The
9
Inasmuch as we find standing based on HRS § 91-7, we need not
reach the claims raised on taxpayer standing or HRS § 632-1. It is said,
“[m]any states have liberalized taxpayer standing . . . and allow taxpayer
suits against any improper expenditure without need to show special injury to
the plaintiff.” Akau v. Olohana Corp., 65 Haw. 383, 387, 652 P.2d 1130, 1133
(1989). The ability to challenge illegal public expenditures is “based upon .
. . the taxpayer’s equitable ownership of such funds and his liability to
replenish the public treasury for deficiencies caused by the
misappropriation.” Hawai#i’s Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, 282,
768 P.3d 1293, 1298 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court has
recognized that in “special situations,” such as where the State awards
government contracts involving “patently improper and defective bidding
procedures,” a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate actual pecuniary harm
because the harm to taxpayers “could be presumed.” Iuli, 62 Haw. at 185-86,
613 P.3d at 657; see also Federal Electric, 56 Haw. at 62, 527 P.2d at 1290;
Mottl v. Miyahira, 95 Hawai#i 381, 391 n.13, 23 P.3d 716, 727 n.13 (2001).
10
Although the court did not decide the taxpayer standing issue, it
may be noted that the dissent contends that the “special situation” discussed
in Iuli and Federal Electric is not presented here because (1) “HAR § 3-122-66
[] is not an ‘innovative procedure without the benefit of definitive
guidelines,’” dissenting opinion at 28 (quoting Federal Electric, 56 Haw. at
66, 527 P.2d at 1291), (2) unlike in the instant case, in Federal Electric,
the City awarded a contract to a bidder whose bid exceeded the plaintiff by
more the $90,000, dissenting opinion at 28, and (3) Federal Electric and Iuli
were “decided at a time when there was no express provision allowing for a
judicial action by disappointed bidders.” Dissenting opinion at 26-28.
Respectfully, the foregoing is incorrect. First, to reiterate,
Iuli recognized that harm may be presumed in all cases involving “patently
improper or defective bidding procedures,” irrespective of whether those
procedures were “innovative.” Iuli, 62. Haw. at 185-86, 613 P.3d at 657.
Second, Federal Electric did not rely on the fact that the plaintiff was the
lowest bidder. The issue in Federal Electric was not that the plaintiff’s bid
was the lowest bid, but rather that due to indefinite specifications, it could
not be determined whether the plaintiff was in fact the lowest bidder.
Federal Electric, 56 Haw. at 62, 527 P.3d at 1289. Third, the lack of any
express provision allowing for suit by a disappointed bidder was irrelevant
inasmuch as the law granted disappointed bidders standing to sue irrespective
of their standing as taxpayers. Id.; see also, e.g., In re Air Terminal
Servs., 47 Haw. 499, 510-12, 393 P.2d 60, 68 (1964) (holding that a
disappointed bidder who was not a taxpayer had standing to argue that it had a
“clear legal right to be awarded the contract”). Thus, the requirements
imposed by the dissent on taxpayer standing in this area are inconsistent with
(continued...)
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analysis as to HRS § 91-7 in this opinion differs from that of
the court, in that Asato is not required to satisfy the three-
part injury in fact test in order to obtain standing as an
“interested person”.
B.
This court has considered what is required to become
“[a]ny interested person” under HRS § 91-7 in two prior cases.
In Life of the Land, the plaintiffs challenged the legality of
procedures followed by the Land Use Commission in boundary
review. Id. at 177, 623 P.2d at 441. The Land Use Commission
asserted that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated standing to
seek judicial relief. Id. at 171, 623 P.2d at 437-38.
In rejecting the Land Use Commission’s argument, this
court articulated the general principle that “we have not been
inclined to foreclose challenges to administrative determinations
through restrictive applications of standing requirements, and
see no sound reason for doing so here.” Id. at 171, 623 P.2d at
438. Life of the Land further took note of the “expansive trend
in defining injury for standing purposes,” as articulated in In
re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Haw. 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975):
“We note that the trend in American jurisprudence as
evidenced by recent decisions of this court and courts
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(...continued)
our precedent.
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across the land, has been to broaden the class of persons that
have standing to challenge agency action. The United States
Supreme Court has clearly indicated that standing cannot be
confined only to those who allege economic harm, nor can it be
denied to others simply because many persons share the same
purported injury . . . .”
Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 175, 623 P.2d at 440 (emphasis
added) (quoting In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Haw. at 256 n.1, 535
P.2d at 1105 n.1). This court further observed that
“‘[c]omplexities about standing are barriers to justice; in
removing the barriers the emphasis should be on the needs of
justice.’” Id. at 174 n.8, 623 P.2d at 439 n.8 (quoting E.
Diamond Head Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 52 Haw. 518, 523
n.5, 470 P.2d 796, 799 n.5 (1971)). “Our touchstone[,]” Life of
the Land concluded, therefore “remains ‘the needs of justice.’”
Id. at 176, 623 P.2d at 441.
Having articulated the standing doctrine thus, Life of
the Land surmised that the plaintiff organization and its members
had a “‘stake’ in the outcome of the alleged controversy adequate
to invoke judicial intervention, even though they [were] neither
owners nor adjoining owners of land reclassified by the Land Use
Commission . . . .” Id. at 177, 623 P.2d at 441. In applying
HRS § 91-7, this court determined that because the plaintiffs had
interests that “may have been adversely affected, they
undoubtedly [were] ‘interested persons[,]’” for purposes of HRS §
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91-7.11 Id. at 177-78, 623 P.2d at 441. It also noted that
plaintiffs had been deemed “aggrieved persons” in a prior case
and thus were undoubtedly “interested persons.” Id. at 178, 623
P.2d at 441.
In Richard, this court seemingly adopted a more
stringent standing requirement for “[a]ny interested person” than
was necessarily required in Life of the Land. Instead of
concluding simply that the plaintiffs had interests that “may
have been adversely affected,” Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 177-
78, 623 P.2d at 441, Richard required that the plaintiffs
demonstrate an “injury in fact.” Richard, 82 Hawai#i at 253-54,
921 P.2d at 173-74. However, it is not clear how Richard reached
this conclusion. Richard states that it was relying on Bush,
which, according to Richard, “applied the ‘injury in fact’ test
to determine the standing of a party who had filed a declaratory
judgment action under HRS § 91-7.” Richard, 82 Hawai#i at 253,
11
The dissent notes that this statement is “not at odds with the
application of the injury in fact test.” Dissenting opinion at 17. Although
not “at odds” with the injury in fact test, Life of the Land did not
explicitly require that all three prongs of the injury in fact test be
satisfied in its discussion of standing under HRS § 91-7. See 63 Haw. at 177-
78, 623 P.2d at 441. The dissent further states that “nothing in Life of the
Land suggests that a plaintiff need not demonstrate injury in fact in order to
have standing under HRS § 91-7[,]” dissenting opinion at 18-19, yet, nothing
in Life of the Land requires that a plaintiff demonstrate injury in fact
either. Indeed, were the criteria for “[a]ny interested person” the same as
the injury in fact test for an “aggrieved” person, this court would have
simply said so in Life of the Land, since the plaintiffs had already been
designated as “aggrieved” persons, having met the injury in fact test. That
the standing threshold for “interested person[s]” was not the same is
manifested by that fact, and the extended discussion concerning “interested
person[s]” in Life of the Land.
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921 P.2d at 173. However, Bush does not mention either HRS § 91-
7 or “[a]ny interested person”, or provide any analysis on why
the injury in fact test should apply to “[a]ny interested
person[s].” See Bush, 81 Hawai#i at 479, 918 P.2d at 1135.
Thus, it was not evident why “[a]ny interested person”
must meet the injury in fact test under Richard, when, in Life of
the Land, this court stated that a plaintiff who has interests
that “may have been adversely affected,” is “[a]ny interested
person.” Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 177-78, 623 P.2d at 441
(emphasis added). Accordingly, in the absence of supportive
reasoning, it is difficult to accord governing impact to this
aspect of Richard,12 particularly where the plain language of HRS
§ 91-7 and the legislative history of that statute require a
different result that is in accord with Life of the Land.
C.
In the context of HRS § 91-7, “[a]ny” means “one
selected without restriction.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 53 (10th ed. 1993). “Interested” is defined as “being
affected or involved[.]” Id. at 610. “Persons” is defined in
HRS § 91-1 (1993) broadly as “individuals, partnerships,
corporations, associations, or public or private organizations of
any character other than agencies.” Therefore, “[b]ased on the
12
Richard is overruled to the extent that it may conflict with the
decision herein.
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plain language of [HRS § 91-7], then, [any] interested person[ is
one who is, without restriction] ‘affected’ by or ‘involved’”
with the validity of an agency rule. AlohaCare v. Ito, 126
Hawai#i 326, 360, 271 P.3d 621, 655 (2012) (Acoba, J., concurring
and dissenting). This is consistent with the holding in Life of
the Land that a plaintiff who has interests that “may have been
adversely affected,” is an “interested person.”13 63 Haw. at
177-78, 623 P.2d at 441. Under the circumstances of this case,
Asato qualifies as an “interested person” because, as a taxpayer
challenging a specific public bidding procedure, he may be
affected by the validity of a regulation that allegedly allowed
an illegal expenditure of public funds.14 See e.g., Hawai#i’s
Thousand Friends, 70 Haw. at 282, 768 P.3d at 1298.
13
The dissent argues that where the legislature has intended “any
person” to be able to bring suit, it has used the term “any person”.
Dissenting opinion at 22-23. See, e.g., HRS § 91-12. However, Asato is not
simply “[a]ny person”, but a taxpayer who may be affected by the illegality of
a bidding procedure. Also, by the same token, the term “[a]ny interested
person” does not by its plain language require that an individual have met the
injury in fact test.
14
The dissent states that “Asato made no showing that he was either
personally ‘affected’ by or ‘involved’ with HAR § 3-122-66.” Dissenting
opinion at 21. However, Asato is affected as a taxpayer, in challenging the
validity of a specific bidding procedure in the procurement context. In that
specific situation, our taxpayer cases indicate harm may be presumed. See nn.
9 and 10, supra. By stating that the majority “fails to point to any
allegation made by Asato that he was personally affected by or involved with
HAR § 3-122-66[,]” dissenting opinion at 21-22 (emphasis added), the dissent
appears to be arguing that Asato could not meet the injury in fact test;
however, we hold that that test does not apply for the reasons set forth supra
and infra. For the same reasons, Asato’s complaint was sufficient to
withstand summary judgment. See dissenting opinion at 11 n.2.
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D.
Furthermore, in adopting HRS § 91-7, the legislature
deviated from the MSAPA with respect to who may be “[a]ny
interested person.” See Model State Administrative Procedure
Act, 1961 Act (U.L.A.) § 7. The MSAPA section setting out a
procedure for declaratory judgments as to the validity or
applicability of rules provides, as its first sentence, that:
“The validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an
action for declaratory judgment in the [court], if it is alleged
that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or
impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal
rights or privileges of the plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis added).
In contrast, the first sentence of HRS § 91-7(a) provides, to
reiterate, that “[a]ny interested person may obtain a judicial
declaration as to the validity of an agency rule . . . .”
In explaining this departure from the MSAPA, the House
Judiciary Committee stated that “[y]our Committee is of the
opinion that this section will allow an interested person to seek
judicial review on the validity of a rule for the reasons
enumerated therein regardless of whether there is an actual case
or controversy.” H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 8, in 1961 House
Journal, at 658 (emphasis added). The three-part injury test
serves as Hawai#i’s counterpart to the Article III “cases and
controversies” requirement. See Bush, 81 Hawai#i at 479, 918
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P.2d at 1135; Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 172, 623 P.2d at 438.
See also Mottl, 95 Hawai#i at 396, 23 P.3d at 731 (Acoba, J.,
concurring, joined by Ramil, J.) (“Our analogue of ‘article III’
jurisdictional requirements is the three-part injury test.”).
However, courts of this state are not bound by the U.S.
Constitution’s Article III, § 2 “cases or controversies”
requirement. See Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 171-72, 623 P.2d
at 438.
Accordingly, where the legislative history of HRS § 91-
7 indicates that no “actual case or controversy” is required, see
1961 House Journal, at 658, the legislature obviously intended to
liberalize standing requirements.15 As a result, this court
should not mandate that the three-part injury test is necessary
to bring an action pursuant to HRS § 91-7.
E.
Moreover, it is well-established that the requirements
to be “[a]ny interested person” are less than those to be an
“aggrieved person” in HRS chapter 91.16 See AlohaCare, 126
Hawai#i at 344, 271 P.3d at 640; Richard, 82 Hawai#i at 253, 921
15
This is also evidenced by the language of HRS § 91-7(a), which
states that “[t]he action may be maintained whether or not petitioner has
first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule in question.”
16
HRS 91-14 (Supp. 2004) uses the term “person aggrieved”. That
section provides for judicial review for “[a]ny person aggrieved by a final
decision and order in a contested case or by a preliminary ruling of the
nature that deferral of review pending entry of a subsequent final decision
would deprive appellant of adequate relief . . . .” HRS § 91-14(a).
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P.2d at 173; Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 177-78, 623 P.2d at
441. Indeed, by using the term “[a]ny interested person” rather
than “aggrieved [person]”, the legislature established a “broader
platform” for “persons” bringing actions under HRS § 91-7. Cf.
AlohaCare, 126 Hawai#i at 362, 271 P.3d at 657 (Acoba, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (noting that in the context of HRS §
91-8 (1993), “[a]ny interested person” should be construed
differently from an HRS § 91-14 “aggrieved person”).
Under our case law, an “aggrieved person” is one who
has suffered an injury in fact, see E & J Lounge Operating Co. v.
Liquor Comm’n of City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 118 Hawai#i 320, 346
n.35, 189 P.3d 432, 458 n.35 (2008), and therefore, the term
“[a]ny interested person” is one who is subject to less stringent
standing requirements. Based on the plain language of HRS § 91-
7, the legislative history, and the differences between an
“interested person” and a “person aggrieved” in Chapter 91, an
“interested person” need not show injury in fact in order to
bring an action pursuant to HRS § 91-7.
Also, our courts have “broadened standing in actions
challenging administrative decisions[,]” Mottl, 95 Hawai#i at
391, 23 P.3d at 726, and “in cases of public interest under our
jurisdiction[,]” Bush, 81 Hawai#i at 479, 918 P.2d at 1130. As
was held in Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 837 P.2d 1247
(1992), “[t]his court has adopted a broad view of what
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constitutes a ‘personal stake’ in cases in which the rights of
the public might otherwise be denied hearing in a judicial form.”
73 Haw. at 593, 837 P.2d at 1257 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Life of the Land, explained that “standing
requirements should not be barriers to justice.” 63 Hawai#i at
174, 623 P.2d 431. In this case, to deny Asato standing as an
“interested person” would be to effectively erect a barrier to
justice by preventing judicial review of the validity of HAR § 3-
122-66. 17
One of the reasons stated for imposing the injury in
fact requirement is to deny standing in cases where the litigant
“‘seek[s] to do no more than vindicate [his or her] own value
preferences through the judicial process[.]’” Richard, 82
Hawai#i at 253, 921 P.2d at 174 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972)). Instead, the litigant here sought a
declaratory judgment as to the validity of a regulation. This
type of action cannot be said to be one that vindicates Asato’s
own value preferences through the judicial process, because if
17
The dissent states that we “impl[y] that standing under Life of
the Land is so expansive that the injury in fact requirement no longer applies
under HRS § 91-7.” Dissenting opinion at 17. To the contrary, we simply
articulate the principles in Life of the Land indicating what “[a]ny
interested person” means under HRS § 91-7. Although the dissent would mandate
the same injury in fact requirement, applicable to “aggrieved person[s],” in
contested cases under HRS § 91-14 for “[a]ny interested person[s]” in claims
brought under HRS § 91-7, it sets forth no reasons why the injury in fact test
applied to aggrieved persons should be mandated for “[a]ny interested person”
in the context of dissimilar actions and remedies under HRS § 91-7. See State
v. Fields, 67 Haw. 268, 274, 686 P.2d 1379, 1385 (1984) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
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the regulation is indeed invalid, then the action brought by
Asato will actually serve to uphold the legislature’s intent in
the government procurement area.
F.
As noted, HAR § 3-122-66 allowed for the Board to,
under certain circumstances, procure professional services where
less than three potential qualified persons had been identified,
HAR § 3-122-66(a), in contrast with HRS § 103D-304(g) which
required that “[t]he selection committee shall rank a minimum of
three persons based on the selection criteria and send the
ranking to the head of the purchasing agency.” In bringing an
action to determine whether the promulgation of HAR § 3-122-66
exceeded the scope of the Board’s authority outlined in the
procurement code, Asato therefore sought to effectuate the
purposes behind the procurement code, and accordingly, the public
interest. See CARL Corp. v. State, Dep’t of Educ., 85 Hawai#i
431, 455, 946 P.2d 1, 25 (1997) (noting that “[i]t is certainly
in the public interest that the [State] abide by the procurement
rules it has set for itself”).
When the legislature enacted the current procurement
code, HRS chapter 103D in 1993, it set out a number of intended
purposes in the preamble to the act, among which were:
(4) Ensuring the fair and equitable treatment of all persons
who deal with the procurement system of the State and
counties;
(5) Providing increased economy in procurement activities
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and maximizing to the fullest extent practicable the
purchasing value of public funds;
(6) Fostering effective broad-based competition within the
free enterprise system;
(7) Providing safeguards for the maintenance of a
procurement system of quality and integrity; and
(8) Increasing public confidence in the procedures followed
in public procurement.
1993 Haw. 1st Special Sess. Laws Act 8, § 1 at 38-39. A
challenge to the validity of a particular regulation as outside
the scope of the procurement code protects the principles under
which the HRS chapter 103D was enacted. Specifically, Asato’s
complaint contended that “[c]ontracts issued in circumvention of
the ‘minimum of three persons’ requirement [in] HRS § 103D-304(g)
violate . . . the long established public policies . . .
including ‘[p]roviding increased economy in procurement
activities and maximizing to the fullest extent practicable the
purchasing value of public funds.’” (Quoting HRS § 103-304(g).)
Inasmuch as Asato sought to sustain the objectives of the
procurement code, his action was “a case of public interest,”
Bush, 81 Hawai#i at 479, 918 P.2d at 1130, and therefore relaxed
standing requirements would apply.18 Therefore, Asato has
18
Additionally, a determination that Asato has standing to challenge
the regulation herein is consistent with the principle of separation of
powers. It has been explained that “[w]ithout judicial review, there would be
no ‘check’ on the propriety of the agency’s actions under the law and the
agency could be left to decide the legality of its own actions.” Alakai Na
Keiki, Inc. v. Matayoshi, 127 Hawai#i 263, 277, 277 P.3d 988, 1002 (2012)
(citing McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 777 P.2d 91, 107 (Cal. 1989).
Consequently, “if the legislature delegates judicial power to an
administrative agency and precludes judicial review of the legality of the
agency’s own actions, a separation of powers issue would arise.” Id. HRS §
91-7 allows for judicial review of the validity of agency rules. However, if
judicially-imposed standing limitations preclude review of administrative
(continued...)
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standing to challenge the validity of HAR § 3-122-66, under HRS §
91-7, as mandated by “the needs of justice.” Life of the Land,
63 Haw. at 176, 623 P.2d at 441.
G.
The dissent asserts that “until today, it has been well
settled that a plaintiff must satisfy the three-part injury in
order to have standing under HRS § 91-7[,]” dissenting opinion at
16, and that we abandon long standing precedent in reaching a
different conclusion. Id. Respectfully, based on the previous
cases, the standing issue is squarely presented in this case and
previously was not “well settled.” In the discussion of standing
in the context of HRS § 91-7, this court never actually applied
the three-part injury in fact test in Life of the Land or
indicated that it must be applied in order for a plaintiff to be
an “interested person.” 63 Haw. at 177-78, 623 P.2d at 441.
While the plaintiffs in that case clearly would have satisfied
the test, because they had already been deemed “aggrieved
persons,” this court did not require in Life of the Land that
plaintiffs allege an injury in fact in order to achieve HRS § 91-
7 standing. Id. In Richard, as noted, no reasoning was
proffered as to why an “interested person” must meet the injury
18
(...continued)
rules, then the judiciary will be prevented from considering the legality of
agency actions, in contravention of the doctrine of separation of powers.
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in fact test, despite the fact that it was the first case to
articulate that requirement. 82 Hawai#i at 253-54, 921 P.2d at
173-74. Instead, Richard may have erroneously assumed that the
issue had already been resolved in Bush. Id. at 253, 921 P.2d at
173. Thus, the issue of HRS § 91-7 standing was far from “well
settled.”
Of course, the doctrine of stare decisis must not be
treated lightly. See State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai#i 200, 206, 29
P.3d 919, 925 (2001). However, under these circumstances, we
seek to address an issue that was not well-supported or well-
settled, and in doing so, review an ancillary holding of Richard,
which in any event, was not necessarily intended to set precedent
in this area. No reasoned or comprehensive discussion of the
meaning of the phrase “[a]ny interested person,” or the
legislative history of HRS § 91-7, including its source in the
MSAPA, has been had in any of our cases. Standing is a
prudential doctrine, see Citizens for Protection of North Kohala
Coastline v. County of Hawai#i, 91 Hawai#i 94, 100, 979 P.2d 1120,
1126 (1999), and where no prudential reasons have ever been set
forth in support of a particular standing requirement, review of
that requirement is warranted, as we do so here.
IV.
We conclude that HAR § 3-122-66 manifestly exceeds the
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scope of the authority granted to the Board by the legislature.
To reiterate, HRS § 91-7(b) provides that “[t]he court shall
declare the rule invalid if it finds that it . . . exceeds the
statutory authority of the agency[.]” The court in this case
correctly determined that “HAR § 3-122-66, as a rule allowing
waiver of HRS § 103D-304(g), contradicts or conflicts with the
statute it attempts to implement.”
In connection with the rule-making authority of
administrative agencies,
“a public administrative agency possesses only such rule-
making authority as is delegated to it by a state
legislature and may only exercise this power within the
framework of the statute under which it is conferred.
Administrative rules and regulations which exceed the scope
of the statutory enactment they were devised to implement
are invalid and must be struck down.”
Haole v. State, 111 Hawai#i 144, 152, 140 P.3d 377, 385 (2006)
(quoting Stop H-3 Ass’n v. State Dep’t of Transp., 68 Haw. 154,
161, 706 P.2d 446, 451 (1985)) (other citations omitted).
Moreover, “an administrative agency can only wield powers
expressly or implicitly granted to it by statute.” Id. (quoting
Morgan, 104 Hawai#i at 179-80, 86 P.3d at 988-89). Thus, the
authority of the Board is delineated by the statutory authority
given to it by the legislature. See Puana, 69 Haw. at 189, 737
P.2d at 870 (holding that an agency’s authority “is limited to
enacting rules which carry out and further the purposes of the
legislation”).
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Of course, an administrative agency may also exercise
its authority through implied powers not expressly granted,
inasmuch as “the legislature cannot foresee all the problems
incidental to carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the
agency.” Haole, 111 Haw. at 152, 140 P.3d at 385 (citation
omitted). However, such implied powers are limited to those
“reasonably necessary to carry out the powers expressly granted.”
Id. (citation omitted).
Moreover, “[i]t is axiomatic that an administrative rule
cannot contradict or conflict with the statute it attempts to
implement.” Agsalud v. Blalack, 67 Haw. 588, 591, 699 P.2d 17, 19
(1985) (citations omitted); see Hyatt Corp. v. Honolulu Liquor
Comm’n, 69 Haw. 238, 241, 738 P.2d 1205, 1206-07 (1987). A rule
that conflicts with an enabling statute must be declared invalid
as outside the scope of the agency’s authority. See Tamashiro v.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 112 Hawai#i 388, 427, 146 P.3d 103, 142
(2006) (holding that where the agency’s rule conflicted with HRS
chapter 91, it exceeded the agency’s authority).
The question in this case, then, is whether, in
promulgating HAR § 3-122-66 the Board was either (1) exercising
the statutory authority granted to it by the legislature, or (2)
exercising its implied power “reasonably necessary to carry out
the powers expressly granted.” Haole, 111 Haw. at 152, 140 P.3d
at 385. If not, then the regulation must be struck down.
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A.
1.
First to be addressed is whether there is a conflict
between the regulation and the procurement code. As explained,
the court found that there was a conflict between HAR § 3-122-66
and HRS § 103D-304, inasmuch as HAR § 3-122-66 allows a waiver of
HRS § 103D-304(g).
The plain language of the relevant statute, HRS § 103D-
304(g) provides that: “The selection committee shall rank a
minimum of three persons based on the selection criteria and send
the ranking to the head of the purchasing agency.” (Emphasis
added.) Where the word “shall” is used in statutes, it is
“‘generally imperative or mandatory.’” Leslie v. Bd. of Appeals
of Cnty. of Hawai#i, 109 Hawai#i 384, 393, 126 P.3d 1071, 1081
(2006) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990)).
Thus, HRS § 103D-304(g) unambiguously requires that in every
situation, the selection committee rank “a minimum of three
persons.”
The challenged regulation, HAR § 3-122-66(a)(1), on the
other hand, provides that:
(a) If the names of less than three qualified persons are
submitted pursuant to section 103D-304(g), HRS, the head of
the purchasing agency may determine that:
(1) Negotiations under section 103D-304(h), HRS,
may be conducted provided that:
(A) The prices submitted are fair and
reasonable; and
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(B) Other prospective offerors had
reasonable opportunity to respond; or
there is not adequate time to resolicit
through public notice statements of
qualifications and expressions of
interest.
(Emphasis added.) By its language, then, this regulation
provides for procurement procedures that may take place with
“less than three qualified persons” under certain circumstances.
HRS § 103D-202 (Supp. 1997)19 gives the Board the “authority and
responsibility to adopt rules, consistent with this chapter,
governing the procurement, management, control, and disposal of
any and all goods, services, and construction.” (Emphasis
added.) HAR § 3-122-66 “exceed[s] the scope” of the Board’s
authority to promulgate rules pursuant to HRS § 103D-202, because
the rule provides for procurement to take place in a situation
19
HRS § 103D-202 provides in full as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the [Board]
shall have the authority and responsibility to adopt rules,
consistent with this chapter, governing the procurement,
management, control, and disposal of any and all goods,
services, and construction. All rules shall be adopted in
accordance with chapter 91; provided that the [Board] shall
have the power to issue interim rules by procurement
directives, which shall be except from the public notice,
public hearing, and gubernatorial approval requirements of
chapter 91. The interim rules shall be effective for not
more than eighteen months. The [Board] shall consider and
decide matters of policy within the scope of this chapter
including those referred to by a chief procurement officer.
The [Board] shall have the power to audit and monitor the
implementation of its rules and the requirements of this
chapter, but shall not exercise authority over the award or
administration of any particular contract, or over any
dispute, claim, or litigation pertaining thereto.
(Emphases added.)
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that the statute, by its plain language, would not allow, and
thus is not consistent with HRS § 103D-304(g).
Specifically, where there are less than three qualified
persons that can be considered for a professional services
contract, the statute, by use of the word “shall” would disallow
the procedures set forth in HAR § 3-122-66 to continue. HRS §
103D-304(g). The regulation, however, would permit procurement
procedures to continue and allow for negotiations and award,
despite that fact that less than three qualified persons were
submitted for consideration by the head of the purchasing agency.
HAR § 3-122-66. Manifestly, this regulation is in excess of the
limitations in HRS § 103D-304(g), and thus the Board did not have
the authority to promulgate such a rule under its general rule-
making authority set forth in HRS § 103D-202. The Board, then,
exceeded the bounds of the “rule-making authority as [was]
delegated to it by the state legislature,” Haole, 111 Hawai#i at
152, 140 P.3d at 385, because the rule conflicts with HRS § 103D-
304(g).
This case is similar in some respects to Capua v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 117 Hawai#i 439, 184 P.3d 191 (2008). In
Capua, this court considered whether a regulation promulgated by
the director of the Labor and Industrial Relations (director) was
inconsistent with a statute. 117 Hawai#i at 441, 184 P.3d at
193. The regulation deemed that an employee waived the right to
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certain vocational rehabilitation benefits when that employee had
been awarded permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits. Id. at
447, 184 P.3d at 199. The relevant statute stated that “‘[t]he
director shall refer employees who may have or have suffered
permanent disability as a result of work injuries . . . for such
physical and vocational rehabilitation services as are
feasible[,]’” and that “‘[t]he eligibility of any injured
employee to receive other benefits under this chapter shall in no
way be affected by the employee’s entrance upon a course of
physical or vocational rehabilitation as herein provided.’” Id.
at 446, 184 P.3d at 198 (some emphasis omitted) (quoting HRS §
386-25 (1993)).
Capua concluded that, by its use of the mandatory term
“shall”, the statute mandated the director to refer an employee
for vocational rehabilitation, including employees who had been
awarded PPD benefits, contrary to the regulation. Id. Thus,
Capua determined that the regulation was inconsistent with the
statute, and therefore beyond the authority of the director to
promulgate. Id. at 448, 184 P.3d at 200.
The same situation is presented by the instant case,
where the statute requires that there “shall” be a minimum of
three qualified persons considered, and the regulation, in
contradiction, allows for a procedure whereby less than three
qualified persons may be considered. As such, the regulation in
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the instant case is plainly outside the express rule-making
powers granted to the Board.
2.
HAR § 3-122-66 is also outside the scope of the implied
powers of the Board, because it directly conflicts with the
procurement code. Where a regulation conflicts with a statute,
the regulation cannot be said to be “reasonably necessary to
carry out the powers” expressly granted to the administrative
agency. Puana, 68 Haw. at 189, 737 P.2d at 870.
Moreover, although “the legislature cannot foresee all
the problems incidental to carrying out the duties and
responsibilities of the agency[,]” id. (citation omitted), as
will be explained infra, the legislature in this instance
apparently did foresee the possibility that there would be less
than three qualified persons for consideration.
B.
In addition to the conflict between the plain language
of the statute and regulation at issue, the legislative history
of HRS § 103D-304 further supports the conclusion that HAR § 3-
122-66 is invalid because it “exceed[s] the scope of the
statutory enactment [it was] devised to implement . . . .”
Haole, 111 Hawai#i at 152, 140 P.3d at 385. The requirement set
forth by the legislature that there be a minimum of three persons
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identified by the selection committee was enacted to establish a
base number for the procurement process when “professional
services” contracts are at issue.
“Professional services” means those services within the
scope of the practice of architecture, landscape
architecture, professional engineering, land surveying, real
property appraisal, law, medicine, accounting, dentistry,
public finance bond underwriting, public finance bond
investment banking, or any other practice defined as
professional by the laws of this State or the professional
and scientific occupation series contained in the United
States Office of Personnel Management’s Qualifications
Standards Handbook.
HRS § 103D-104 (Supp. 2011).
As noted, the current version of the Procurement Code
was enacted in 1993. See 1993 Haw. 1st Special Sess. Laws Act 8,
§ 1 at 37-38. Prior to 1993, the Procurement Code, at HRS
Chapter 103, did not differentiate between the procurement of
“professional services” and the procurement of other types of
goods and services. See HRS Chapter 89 (1985 Repl.) The
legislature’s 1993 revisions to the HRS included a section
specifically on the procurement of “professional services.” See
1993 Haw. 1st Special Sess. Laws Act 8, § 2 at 49. This section,
HRS § 103D-304, as set forth by the legislature in 1993, stated
as follows:
(e) . . . . Unless fewer than three submissions have
been received, the screening committee shall conduct
discussions with at least three persons regarding the
services which are required and the services they are able
to provide. . . . . The committee shall provide the head of
the purchasing agency with the names of the three persons
who the committee concludes is the most qualified to provide
the services required for the project, with a summary of
each of their qualifications.
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(f) The head of the purchasing agency shall evaluate
the summary of qualifications for each of the three persons
provided by the screening committee and may conduct
additional discussions with any of them.
See id. at 50 (emphasis added).
In 1995, the legislature amended HRS § 103D-304 to
delete the phrase, emphasized above, stating that “[u]nless fewer
than three submissions have been received, the screening
committee shall conduct discussions with at least three persons
. . . .” 1995 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 178, § 10 at 301-02. In 1997,
the language “a minimum of three persons” was added to HRS §
103D-304, in reference to the number of qualified persons that
needed to be evaluated, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 21, § 1 at 26,
and in 2003, the phrase “minimum of three persons” was moved to
its current location, in subsection (g) of the statute. 2003
Haw. Sess. Laws Act 52 § 5, at 78-79. Finally, in 2004, HRS §
103D-304(g) was amended again, leaving the “minimum of three
persons” language intact. 2004 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 216, § 1 at
984.
Accordingly, in 1993, the legislature contemplated a
situation in which there could be less than three initial
submissions to the preliminary screening committee (later termed
the “selection committee”). However, this language was deleted
in 1995, and thereafter there was no longer a provision allowing
for less than three persons to be considered in connection with
professional services procurements. The relevant Conference
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Committee Report from 1995 states that the legislature amended
the Procurement Code by “[c]larifying that agencies may publish
more than one notice inviting persons engaged in providing
professional services to submit current statements of
qualifications and expressions of interest, and may publish
additional notices if previously unanticipated needs for
professional services arise.” Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 38, in 1995
House Journal, at 969. Therefore, in connection with requiring
no less than three persons to be considered, the legislature
expanded the notice provisions inviting professional services
persons to submit qualifications. See id. This legislative
history indicates that the legislature did consider the situation
where there may be less then three qualified persons who could be
identified for these types of procurements, and decided that the
solution was to expand the invitation process to obtain more
qualified professionals.
Relatedly, the 1995 revisions were aimed at the
evaluation process via confidential discussions as well as the
allowance for less than three submissions to the screening
committee for consideration. See 1995 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 178, §
10 at 302. As constituted prior to 1995, then-subsection (e) of
HRS § 103D-304 was in conflict with itself. It provided that the
screening committee had to conduct confidential communications
with at least three persons regarding their services, “[u]nless
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fewer than three submissions [had] been received.” Id. But, two
sentences later, it required that the screening committee
“provide the head of the purchasing agency with the names of the
three persons who the committee concludes is [sic] the most
qualified to provide the services required for the project[.]”
Id. The conflict arises because it is not clear how, where less
than three submissions had been received, the screening committee
could provide the head of the purchasing agency with “the names
of the three persons” who were most qualified.
Pursuant to the 1995 revisions, the legislature altered
the procedure so that the screening committee could conduct
confidential discussions with any person submitted to it, and
also resolved the conflict in the pre-1995 statute by deleting
the provision contemplating a situation where “fewer than three”
submissions had been received by the screening committee. See
id. The alternative way the legislature could have resolved the
conflict would have been by allowing the screening committee to
submit the names of less than three persons to the head of the
purchasing agency where the screening committee itself had
received less than three submissions. Instead, the legislature
deleted any reference to a situation where the screening
committee might be presented with “fewer than three” submissions.
Id.
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Inasmuch as the legislature specifically required that
there be a “minimum of three persons” considered, the Board was
unquestionably acting outside the scope of its authority when it
promulgated HAR § 3-122-66, because it acted in conflict with the
legislature’s purpose to ensure that there were three persons
considered. Here, by overriding the solution to a problem that
the legislature had already considered, the Board, in effect,
implemented a legislative solution. It is not the role of
administrative agencies to legislate outside the ken of their
statutorily prescribed role. HAR § 3-122-66 thus exceeds the
Board’s express powers and any implied powers that the Board may
excercise. As discussed, because HAR § 3-122-66 directly
conflicts with HRS § 103D-304(g), it cannot be justified under
the general rule-making authority of the Board, set forth in HRS
§ 103D-202. HRS § 103D-202 provides only that the Board shall
adopt rules “consistent with [HRS Chapter 103D.]” HAR § 3-122-66
is not consistent with HRS Chapter 103D.
Also, it is not for this court to second-guess the
legislature’s intention when it set forth the specifics of the
procurement process over a number of years and through numerous
legislative amendments to the Procurement Code. It appears that
that issue raised by HAR § 13-122-66 was in fact contemplated by
the legislature, which in turn declined to provide for the
remedial solution proffered by the Board. “‘[N]either the courts
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nor the administrative agencies are empowered to rewrite statutes
to suit their notions of sound public policy where the
legislature has clearly and unambiguously spoken.’” State v.
Harada, 98 Hawai#i 18, 50, 41 P.3d 174, 206 (2002) (Acoba, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (quoting 1 N. Singer, Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 3.06, at 55 (5th ed. 1992-94)). As
such, the statutory scheme must be upheld, requiring that the
regulation be invalidated. See Haole, 111 Hawai#i at 152, 140
P.3d at 385.
V.
For the reasons described above, the statute and the
legislative history demonstrates, the issue here was specifically
contemplated and addressed by the legislature. There is no “gap”
to be filled by the administrative agency.
A.
First, the statutory mandate at issue in this case,
that there be a “minimum of three persons” ranked by the
selection committee, HRS § 103D-304(g), is in connection with the
procurement of “professional services” only. “Professional
services” includes recognized specialities where there are likely
to be three qualified persons available and willing to provide
“services within the scope of the practice of architecture,
landscape architecture, professional engineering, land surveying,
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real property appraisal, law, medicine, accounting, dentistry,”
etc.
Second, even if there are less than three qualified
persons available for a particular service, there are other
options available, including resolicitation, for example. Thus,
as explained, when the legislature amended HRS § 103D-304 as part
of Act 178 in 1995, expressly deleting the language “[u]nless
fewer than three submissions have been received,” it noted that
Act 178 also “[c]larifi[ed] that agencies may publish more than
one notice inviting persons engaged in professional services to
submit current statements of qualifications and expressions of
interest, and may publish additional notices if previously
unanticipated needs for professional services arise.” Conf.
Comm. Rep. No. 38, in 1995 House Journal, at 969. HRS § 103D-
304(b) provides that additional notices shall be given if, inter
alia, “[t]he response to the initial notice is inadequate[,]” or
“[n]ew needs for professional services arise.” Further, in the
event that subsequent solicitation proves futile, or time does
not allow for subsequent solicitation, the procuring entity may
need to redefine the scope of the services sought.
Third, there are provisions in the Procurement Code
that allow for the procurement of services in an emergency, HRS §
103D-307 (1993), or where the amount of the contract would be
considered a “small purchase” pursuant to HRS § 103D-305 (Supp.
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2009). See HRS § 103D-304(j) (allowing contracts under a certain
monetary amount to be negotiated “with at least two persons on
the list of qualified persons”). Thus, in either of these
situations, the procuring entity has options for procurement
processes that do not run afoul of HRS § 103D-304(g).
Taking all of these factors into consideration, the
statute would not lead to legally absurd results. State and
county governments would not be precluded from procuring
professional services such as architects and engineers where they
can resolicit services, where they are able to redefine the scope
of the work to obtain three qualified persons, where the
procurement meets the statutory limits for a “small purchase”
procurement, HRS § 103D-305, and where the procurement is an
emergency procurement as described in HRS § 103D-307.
Consequently, the legislature obviously accounted for those
instances where three qualified persons might not be available.
By doing so, the legislature manifested its adherence
to the proposition that in the absence of these exceptions, that
no award be made unless three qualified bidders are considered.
The wisdom of that determination is committed to the legislature.
See County of Kauai v. Baptiste, 115 Hawai#i 15, 60, 165 P.3d
916, 961 (2007) (Acoba, J., dissenting, joined by Duffy, J.)
(“[N]ot all wisdom resides in the judiciary. In our democracy,
governance is a tripartite function.”). The legislature has
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clearly spoken, by virtue of the express language and legislative
history of HRS § 103D-304. Accordingly, the qualifications on
the state’s and local government’s ability to procure
professional services do not produce an erroneous result.
B.
Where the regulation provides for procedures outside
those authorized by the legislature, it necessarily follows that
there is harm to the public. Where a contract award may be based
on a consideration of less than the minimum number of “qualified
persons” required by the statute, there may be an unwarranted
basis for a review committee to determine that less than three
persons is permissible.
As currently constituted, the text requiring three
qualified persons effectuates the legislative purposes behind the
Procurement Code, including “[p]roviding increased economy in
procurement activities and maximizing to the fullest extent
practicable the purchasing value of public funds,” and
“[f]ostering effective broad-based competition within the free
enterprise system[.]” 1993 Haw. 1st Special Sess. Laws Act 8, §
1 at 38-39. By mandating that there be “a minimum of three
persons” ranked in all professional services procurement not
otherwise exempted from HRS § 103D-304, the Procurement Code
ensures that the procuring entity is incentivized to obtain the
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widest possible range of qualified persons for a particular
project.
C.
Lastly, the Board alleges that HAR § 3-122-66 was
adopted in accordance with its authority under HRS § 103D-
102(b)(4)(L). As noted previously, HRS § 103D-102(b)(4) provides
that
(b) “[Chapter 103D] shall not apply to contracts by
government bodies:
. . . .
(4) To procure the following goods or services which are
available from multiple sources but for which procurement by
competitive means is either not practicable or not
advantageous to the State:
(A) Services of expert witnesses . . .
(B) Works of art for museum or public display;
(C) Research and reference materials including books,
maps, periodicals, and pamphlets . . .
(D) Meats and foodstuffs for the Kalaupapa settlement;
(E) Opponents for athletic contests;
(F) Utility services whose rates or prices are
fixed by regulatory processes or agencies;
(G) Performances, including entertainment, speeches,
and cultural and artistic presentations;
(H) Goods and services for commercial resale by
the State;
(I) Services of printers, rating agencies, support
facilities, fiscal and paying agents, and registrars
for the issuance and sale of the State’s or counties’
bonds;
(J) Services of attorneys employed or retained to
advise, represent or provide any other legal services
to the State or any of its agencies, on matters
arising under laws of another state or foreign
country, or in an action brought in another state,
federal, or foreign jurisdiction, when substantially
all legal services are expected to be performed
outside this State;
(K) Financing agreements under chapter 37D; and
(L) Any other goods or services which the policy board
determines by rules or the chief procurement officer
determines in writing is available from multiple
source but for which procurement by competitive means
is either not practicable or not advantageous to the
State[.]
(Emphases added.)
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However, it is plain that applying the canon of
statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, HAR § 3-122-66
cannot be reconciled under HRS § 103D-102(b)(4)(L). “The
doctrine of ejusdem generis states that ‘where general words
follow specific words in a statute, those general words are
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.’” Singleton
v. Liquor Comm’n of Hawai#i, 111 Hawai#i 234, 242 n.14, 140 P.3d
1014, 1022 n.14 (2006) (quoting Peterson v. Hawaii Elec. Light
Co., 85 Hawai#i 322, 328, 944 P.2d 1265, 1271 (1997) (other
citation omitted)).
Subsection (L) is meant to identify particular goods or
services exempt from the requirements of the Procurement Code.
The general words “[a]ny other goods or services” in subsection
(L) must, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, be construed in
connection with the list of items (A) through (K) preceding it.
Items (A) through (K) enumerate specific types of goods or
services, for example, works of art, research and reference
materials, out-of-state attorney services, printers, and
performances. See HRS § 103D-102(b)(4)(A) - (K). The Board
would construe (L) not to exempt types of goods or services, but
instead to provide an exemption when a particular factual
situation is posited -- specifically, where less than three
qualified persons are identified under HRS § 103D-304. This
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would give the general words “[a]ny other goods or services” in
HRS § 103D-102 (b)(4)(L) a meaning dissimilar to the specific
exemptions enumerated at HRS § 103D-102(b)(4)(A) - (K), and
therefore would be inconsistent with established principles of
statutory construction. Accordingly, the factual situation of
less than three qualified persons under the Board’s rule HAR § 3-
122-66, cannot be rationalized as an unenumerated exception
within the scope of HRS § 103D-102(b)(4).
Also, HRS § 103D-102(b)(4)(L) provides an exemption
only for “[a]ny other goods or services which the policy board
determines by rules or the chief procurement officer determines
in writing is available from multiple sources but for which
procurement by competitive means is either not practicable or not
advantageous to the State[.]” Id. (emphasis added). The
“rule[]” providing an exemption for these other goods and
services is HAR § 3-120-4 (2011),20 which specifically includes
20
HAR § 3-120-4 provides, in relevant part:
§ 3-120-4. Procurements exempt from chapter 103D, HRS.
(a) Notwithstanding the intent of chapter 103D, HRS, to
require governmental bodies to procure their goods and
services through competitive bidding, it is acknowledged
that there may be situations where procurement by
competitive means is either not practicable or not
advantageous to the State.
(b) Exhibit A titled “Procurements Exempt From Chapter 103D,
HRS” dated 03/17/2011, is located at the end of this
chapter. This exhibit provides a list of goods and services
which the procurement policy board has determined to be
exempt from chapter 103D, HRS, because although such goods
(continued...)
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an Exhibit listing the specific goods and services that the Board
has deemed exempt from HRS chapter 103D, “because although such
goods and services may be ‘available from multiple sources,’
their ‘procurement by competitive means would be either not
practicable or not advantageous to the State.’” HAR § 3-120-4
(quoting HRS § 103D-102(b)(4)). The Exhibit referenced in HAR §
3-120-4 includes services such as “[b]urial services” and
“[c]ourt reporter services”, but does not include “professional
services” as defined in HRS § 103D-104. HAR § 3-122-66, in
contrast, does not reference any language from HRS § 103D-
102(b)(4), and focuses, again, on the number of qualified persons
available rather than the type of good or service being procured.
Thus, it is plain that HAR § 3-120-4, and not HAR § 3-122-66, is
the Board’s rule by which it exempts goods or services not
already enumerated in HRS § 103D-102(b)(4).
HAR § 3-122-66 is also inconsistent with HRS § 103D-
102(b)(4)(L), because HAR § 3-122-66 does not require that the
“chief procurement officer determines in writing”, HRS § 103D-
102(b)(4)(L), that the specific good or service is exempt from
HRS Chapter 103D.
20
(...continued)
and services may be available from multiple sources, their
procurement by competitive means would be either not
practicable or not advantageous to the State.
(Emphasis added.)
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Rather, HAR § 3-122-66 allows the “head of the purchasing agency”
to determine that negotiations may be conducted “[i]f the names
of less then three qualified persons are submitted . . . .”
Therefore, for numerous reasons, HRS § 103D-102(b)(4)(L) cannot
serve as a basis on which to justify the Board’s promulgation of
HAR § 3-122-66, which is outside the scope of the Board’s
authority.
VI.
Finally, the court did not err with respect to the
points of error raised by Asato on cross-appeal. First, the
court did not err in refusing to declare that HAR § 3-122-66 “has
never been valid and has always been ultra vires and void ab
initio.” Instead, the court correctly complied with the language
of HRS § 91-7 and declared the statute invalid. Second, the
court did not err in “refusing to declare that every government
contract issued under the invalid authority of HAR § 3-122-66 is
void ab initio,” inasmuch as the validity of those contracts was
not before the court.21 Third, the court did not err in refusing
to grant a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting use
of HAR § 3-122-66 because the legal remedy of declaring HAR § 3-
21
The principles, as addressed herein, pertain to the universal
procurement of all professional services contracts and not to any particular
contract or “project.”
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122-66 invalid constituted an adequate legal remedy rendering an
injunction unnecessary.22
A.
As to Asato’s first point of error on cross-appeal,
Asato’s argument regarding the validity of HAR § 3-122-66 was
apparently linked to his contention that the court should have
declared every award issued under HAR § 3-122-66 invalid,
inasmuch as Asato maintained that the contracts were “void ab
initio” because HAR § 3-122-66 “has never been valid.” However,
as explained infra, the court correctly declined to declare every
contract issued under HAR § 3-122-66 invalid.
The court’s ruling was consistent with HRS § 91-7. HRS
§ 91-7 states that “the court shall declare the rule invalid if
it finds that it violates . . . statutory provisions, or exceeds
the statutory authority of the agency.” (Emphasis added.) In
consonance with the plain meaning of HRS § 91-7, the court
declared that “HAR § 3-122-66 is invalid, pursuant to the
22
Asato’s Opening Brief also raised, as additional points of error
(4) that “the attorney general and [the Board] improperly contended and
participated in the enactment and perpetuation of HAR § 3-122-66[,]” (5) that
“the attorney general and [the Board] have disregarded and violated their
public trust responsibilities,” and (6) that “the attorney general and [the
Board] [should] be judicially barred or estopped from asserting the issues in
its appeal[.]” However, these are not truly “points of error” inasmuch as
they do not state an “alleged error committed by the court[.]” Hawai#i Rules
of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(4)(i). Moreover, Asato apparently concedes
that these issues were “not argued before the [court].” See State v. Moses,
102 Hawai#i 449, 456, 77 P.3d 940, 947 (2003) (“As a general rule, if a party
does not raise an argument at trial, that argument will be deemed to have been
waived on appeal[.]”). Thus, these contentions of error are not discussed
further.
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statutory authority under HRS § 91-7.” (Emphasis added.) Asato
points to nothing in the language or legislative history of HRS §
91-7 requiring the court to declare that a rule “has never been
valid,” instead of ruling that the rule “is invalid.” Hence, the
court satisfied the statutory mandate of HRS § 91-7.
B.
1.
As to Asato’s second point of error on cross-appeal,
the court did not err in refusing to rule that every government
contract issued under HAR § 3-122-66 was void ab initio. In his
Complaint, Asato requested a declaratory judgment that HAR § 3-
122-66 was invalid pursuant to HRS § 91-7 and HRS § 632-1 and
also requested that “all existing contracts in which HAR § 3-122-
66 was used . . . be rescinded as being void ab initio.”
However, Asato did not cite any authority allowing the court to
rescind all contracts authorized under HAR § 3-122-66.
Similarly, Asato brought his motion for summary
judgment under, inter alia, HRS § 91-7 and HRS § 632-1, and
maintained that “[t]here are no genuine disputes of material fact
as to the meaning of the ‘minimum of three persons’ requirement
in HRS § 103D-304(g) and the . . . inconsistency of HAR § 3-122-
66 which nullifies the ‘minimum of three persons requirement.”
In his memorandum in support of his motion, Asato again requested
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that the court “declare that every government contract issued
under the invalid authority of HAR § 3-122-66 is void ab initio.”
However, Asato did not cite any authority allowing the court to
declare every government contract invalid.23
2.
As an initial matter, it is unclear whether Asato’s
request that the court rule that every contract awarded under HAR
§ 3-122-66 is invalid is brought under his declaratory action or
his injunctive action. In any event, first, Asato’s request for
declaratory judgment did not permit the court to invalidate each
contract awarded under HAR § 3-122-66. HRS § 91-7 only allows
parties to “obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity of
an agency rule.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, this court has
explained that “HRS § 91–7 does not give the circuit court
jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the application of a rule”
but instead allows for “attacks on a rule’s validity.” Puana, 69
Haw. at 189, 737 P.2d at 869 (emphasis added). In awarding
contracts pursuant to HAR § 3-122-66, agencies “applied” that
23
In Asato’s memorandum, he stated that “all contracts issued under
the invalid authority of HAR § 3-122-66 are [] void ab initio,” and cited to
Exhibits 1 and 4. Exhibit 1 was a copy of Asato’s complaint, which identified
26 contracts that Asato believed were issued under HAR § 3-122-66. Exhibit 4
was a copy of a “Department of Transportation procurement award for
Architecture and Engineering professional services,” showing that the
“selection list for th[e] contract did not have the ‘minimum of three persons
required by HRS § 103D-304(g).” Asato also attached as Exhibit 19 the Board’s
Answers to Interrogatories, which admitted that at least 11 of the 26
contracts identified in Asato’s complaint “were procurements awarded pursuant
to HAR § 3-122-66.”
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rule. Hence, Asato’s challenge to every contract awarded under
HAR § 3-122-66 could not be brought under HRS § 91-7.
Additionally, in an action brought under HRS § 632-1,
it must be demonstrated that “antagonistic claims are present
between the parties involved which indicate imminent and
inevitable litigation,” or “a party asserts a legal relation,
status, right, or privilege in which the party has a concrete
interest and that there is a challenge or denial of the asserted
relation, status, right, or privilege by an adversary party who
also has or asserts a concrete interest therein.” HRS § 632-1.
In other words, “‘the question is whether the facts alleged,
under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant a declaratory
judgment.’” Kaho#ohanohano v. State, 114 Hawai#i 302, 332, 162
P.3d 696, 726 (2007) (Acoba, J., concurring) (quoting United
Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646 v. Yogi, 101 Hawai#i 46, 57, 62
P.3d 189, 200 (2002)) (emphasis added). Absent any rendition of
the circumstances surrounding each contract, it cannot be
determined from the allegations whether there is a “substantial
controversy” as to a particular contract that is “of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant a declaratory judgment.” Id.
Hence, a declaratory judgment generally declaring that all the
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contracts issued under HAR § 3-122-66 are invalidated cannot be
issued pursuant to HRS § 632-1.
Finally, the court could not have invalidated every
contract awarded under HAR § 3-122-66 as “ancillary relief” under
either HRS § 91-7 or HRS § 632-3.24 HRS § 632-3 provides that
“[f]urther relief based on a declaratory judgment may be granted
whenever necessary or proper, after reasonable notice and
hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been
adjudicated by the judgment.” (Emphasis added.) Here, however,
the recipients of contracts awarded under HAR § 3-122-66 were not
made parties to the case, and therefore their rights have not
been “adjudicated by the judgment.” Consequently, the court
24
In his Reply Brief, Asato cited Costa v. Sunn, 5 Haw. App. 419,
697 P.2d 43 (1985) for the proposition that “the court's authority to grant
ancillary relief under § 91–7 is coextensive with its authority under HRS
Chapter 632.” However, Asato made no further argument as to why “ancillary
relief” in appropriate in this case.
In Costa, the plaintiff challenged new rules for public assistance
programs promulgated by the Department of Social Services and Housing (DSSH).
5 Haw. App. at 420, 697 P.2d at 45. The plaintiff brought a class action on
behalf of “all residents of the State of Hawai#i and members of their public
assistance households who were, or will be, adversely affected by [new
rules].” Id. at 422, 697 P.2d at 46. In addition to invalidating the new
rules, the court ordered DSSH to reinstate the old rules and “reinstate all
recipients or applicants who may have had their benefits reduced, terminated,
or denied” pursuant to the new rules. The court held that these action were
valid under the court’s authority to grant “ancillary relief.” Id. at 425,
697 P.2d at 48.
However, Costa cited HRS § 632-3 as authority for granting
“ancillary relief.” Id. at 425, 697 P.2d at 48. As explained infra, under
HRS § 632-3 ancillary relief is only available against parties whose rights
have been adjudicated. Inasmuch as Costa was a class action, all of the
parties were before the court and thus their rights were adjudicated. Here,
in contrast, Asato has requested relief against parties who are not before the
court. Hence, Costa is inapposite.
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could not have invalidated those contracts on the basis of
“ancillary relief.”
In his Reply Brief, Asato argued for the first time
that, in addition to supporting his standing to sue as a
taxpayer, Lucas and Federal Electric served as a basis to
invalidate the contracts awarded under HAR § 3-122-66. According
to Asato, those cases demonstrate that, following a suit by a
taxpayer, courts have a “continuing obligation to invalidate
unlawful . . . government contracts.” However, as the Board
points out, generally the parties to the contract must be made
parties to a suit in which the contract is challenged. See Haiku
Plantations Ass’n v. Lono, 56 Haw. 96, 102, 529 P.2d 1, 5 (1974)
(“This court cannot undertake to hear and determine questions
affecting the interests of these absent persons unless they are
made parties and have had an opportunity to come into court.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).25 Moreover, any contract
remedies must be tailored to the facts of each case. See Air
Terminal Servs., 47 Haw. at 509, 393 P.2d at 67 (explaining the
25
Asato apparently argues that, based on Haiku Plantations, if all
of the government contracts were invalidated, “the identification and
disposition of affected government contracts could take place on remand or in
a separate proceeding.” However, in Haiku Plantations, the court “reverse[d]
and vacate[d]” the portions of a declaratory judgment that were adverse to the
parties not before the court, and stated that further adjudication could be
had “in a future proceeding in which all of those having an interest are made
parties before the court.” 56 Haw. at 102, 529 P.2d at 6. Plainly, then,
under Haiku Plantations it would be inappropriate to make any determination
regarding the validity of government contracts when the parties to those
contracts are not before the court.
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“unavailability of mandamus to attack a public contract when the
contract has not only been executed but possession has been taken
and the concessionaire is operating under it”).26 Thus, neither
case cited by Asato would permit the court to simply declare all
the contracts invalid under the circumstances here.27
C.
As to Asato’s third point of error on cross-appeal, it
has been explained that “courts generally will refuse to grant
injunctive relief unless plaintiff demonstrates that there is no
adequate legal remedy[.]” Wright and Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2944; see also Punohu v. Sunn, 66 Haw. 485, 487,
666 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1983) (holding that injunctive relief was
inappropriate because “the same relief can be obtained through an
application for a stay in the administrative appeal under Chapter
91,” and therefore “there is no lack of an adequate remedy at law
26
In Air Terminal Servs., this court indicated that the disappointed
bidder should have sought injunctive relief because the contract had already
been issued. See Air Terminal Servs., 47 Haw. at 509, 393 P.2d at 67
(rejecting the disappointed bidder’s argument that “the case should be treated
the same as an injunctive suit”). However, this court explained that because
the recipient of the contract had been dismissed from the suit with prejudice,
and the disappointed bidder had failed to amend the complaint to state a claim
for injunctive relief against the recipient of the contract, the action must
be treated as a mandamus action, and that mandamus was not available “where
the performance of the contract has proceeded as far as it has here.” Id. at
506, 510, 393 P.2d at 66, 68. Thus, under Air Terminal Servs., it is apparent
that the recipient of the contract is a necessary party in a challenge to void
a contract that has already been awarded and partially performed.
27
Inasmuch as the parties to the contracts awarded are not before
the court, see discussion supra, we do not discuss Asato’s contention that the
parties who have already performed work on the contracts issued under HAR § 3-
122-66 are not entitled to any compensation on such contracts because the
contracts are void and against public policy.
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available to the appellees”). Here, Asato requested injunctions
restraining the Board from “using HAR § 3-122-66 in the
procurement of professional services under HRS § 103D-304[.]”
However, by declaring HAR § 3-122-66 invalid, the court
effectively ruled that HAR § 3-122-66 “is void and cannot be
enforced.” Hyatt Corp., 69 Haw. at 240, 738 P.2d at 1206.
Hence, the court’s ruling effectively prohibits the Board from
using HAR § 3-122-66 in the procurement of professional services.
In other words, the remedy provided by the court accomplished the
same purpose as Asato’s requested injunctions. Consequently,
there was “an adequate remedy at law,” and injunctive relief was
not appropriate.
VII.
Inasmuch as we hold that Asato prevailed on his HRS §
91-7 challenge to the validity of HAR § 3-122-66, we must decide
whether the court properly granted attorney’s fees and costs
pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine.
The private attorney general doctrine is an equitable
doctrine and an exception to the traditional “American Rule” that
each party must pay its own litigation expenses. See Honolulu
Const. & Draying Co. v. State, Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 130
Hawai#i 306, 308, 310 P.3d 301, 303 (2013).
Courts applying the doctrine consider three basic factors:
(1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy
vindicated by the litigation, (2) the necessity for private
enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the
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plaintiff, and (3) the number of people standing to benefit
from the decision.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Sierra Club v. Dep’t of
Transp. of State of Hawai#i, 120 Hawai#i 181, 218, 202 P.3d 1226,
1263 (2009) (Sierra Club II)) (other citation omitted).
The court’s determination as to the private attorney
general doctrine is reviewed “under the abuse of discretion
standard,” however, “we review de novo whether the trial court
disregarded rules or principles of law that arise in deciding
whether or not a party satisfies the three factors of the private
attorney general doctrine.” Id. at 313, 310 P.3d at 308. In
determining whether Asato was in fact entitled to fees, we need
not address all three factors, inasmuch as we conclude that Asato
is unable to satisfy the third prong of the doctrine.
As to the third criterion, “the number of people
standing to benefit from the decision,” Sierra Club, 120 Hawai#i
at 218, 202 P.3d at 1263 (citations omitted), the court
determined that “proper enforcement of the procurement code via
enforcement through HRS § 103D-304 is of benefit to all citizens
of the state.” The Board contends, on the other hand, that “even
if invalidation of the [r]ule could benefit someone in some
theoretical case, there is no showing that even a handful of
people, let alone many people, would benefit.”
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This court has found that the third prong of the
private attorney general doctrine has been satisfied where
plaintiffs have vindicated causes that included procedural rights
related to environmental review, see Sierra Club v. Dept. of
Transp., 115 Hawai#i 299, 304, 167 P.3d 292, 297 (2007) (Sierra
Club I), Native Hawaiian cultural rights, Maui Tomorrow, 110
Hawai#i at 245, 131 P.3d at 528, and historic preservation,
Honolulu Const. & Draying Co., 130 Hawai#i at 319, 310 P.3d at
314. We have recognized that the third prong of the doctrine had
been met where “all of the citizens of the state, present and
future, stood to benefit from the decision.” In re Water Use
Permit Applications, 96 Hawai#i 27, 31, 25 P.3d 802, 806 (2001)
(Waiahole II) (citing In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94
Hawai#i 97, 98, 9 P.3d 409, 510 (2000) (Waiahole I) (recognizing
the “ultimate importance of these matters to the present and
future generations of our state”)). In connection with equitable
rationales underlying the doctrine, we have also explained that
the types of causes to which the private attorney general
doctrine is applicable, “do not involve the fortunes of a single
individual to the extent necessary to encourage their private
vindication in the courts.” Honolulu Const. & Draying Co., 130
Hawai#i at 319, 310 P.3d at 914 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Waiahole II, 96 Hawai#i at 30, 25 P.3d at 802 (quoting Serrano v.
Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1313-14 (Cal. 1977))).
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In the instant case, the specific holding would apply
in future cases where there are fewer than three qualified
bidders for professional services contracts pursuant to HRS §
103D-304(g). Asato argued, however, that all taxpayers will
benefit from this action because they are entitled to expect
“that all public funds will be spent lawfully and prudently[.]”
But, there may be, for example, providers of
professional services who would be individually affected or
involved sufficiently to encourage them to bring a suit
challenging the validity of a regulation promulgated pursuant to
the Procurement Code. See Waiahole II, 96 Hawai#i at 30, 25 P.3d
at 802. Thus, under the circumstances, this case does not meet
the third criterion of the private attorney general doctrine, and
accordingly Asato is not entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.
VIII.
Subject to the reasons set forth above, the court’s
August 15, 2012 judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part,
and the court’s September 4, 2012 order awarding attorney’s fees
and costs is reversed.
Arthur Y. Park and /s/ Simeon R. Acoba, Jr.
John C. McLaren,
for petitioner /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
Marissa H.I. Luning, /s/ Richard W. Pollack
for respondent
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