Mar 25 2014, 6:23 am
FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
CYNTHIA L. GARWOOD MARCEL KATZ
Lafayette, Indiana Law Offices of Marcel Katz
Lafayette, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MARJORIE O. LESLEY, )
)
Appellant-Respondent/Cross-Appellee, )
)
vs. ) No. 79A02-1305-DR-472
)
ROBERT T. LESLEY, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner/Cross-Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE TIPPECANOE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Thomas H. Busch, Judge
Cause No. 79D02-1008-DR-264
March 25, 2014
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Marjorie O. Lesley (“Wife”) and Robert T. Lesley (“Husband”) obtained a divorce. In
the final dissolution decree, the trial court found that Wife did not present sufficient evidence
to establish that she was entitled to incapacity maintenance, but indicated that it would
reevaluate the issue if the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) determined that she was
disabled. Subsequently, the SSA found that Wife was disabled, and she filed a petition with
the trial court to revisit the issue of incapacity maintenance. The trial court then issued an
order finding that Wife was entitled to rehabilitative maintenance from the time of the
dissolution until the emancipation of the parties’ youngest child. Wife filed a motion to
correct error, arguing that the trial court erred in granting her rehabilitative maintenance
rather than incapacity maintenance. The trial court denied her motion.
Wife appeals the denial of her motion to correct error, arguing that the trial court erred
in finding that she was entitled to rehabilitative maintenance rather than incapacity
maintenance. Husband cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court did not have the authority to
reevaluate its original decision not to grant Wife maintenance. We conclude that the Indiana
Code requires the trial court to make a maintenance determination at the time that the final
dissolution decree is entered. We further conclude that because the trial court found in the
final dissolution decree that Wife failed to carry her burden to show that she was
incapacitated, it did not have the authority to revisit the issue based upon a postdissolution
decision from the SSA. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order
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granting Wife maintenance and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion,
including all necessary recalculations.
Facts and Procedural History
Husband and Wife were married in December 1991, and had two children: T.L. born
in August 1992, and M.L., born in November 1993. Husband has been employed as a
registered nurse since 1993. Wife worked at Subaru Indiana Automotive for eighteen years.
By October 2009, Wife had been diagnosed with lupus, fibromyalgia, degenerative disc
disease, irritable bowel syndrome, depression, and anxiety disorder. In October 2009, Wife
went on short-term disability with her employer and then long-term disability. Wife filed an
application for disability insurance benefits with the SSA. Her application was denied, and
she appealed.
In August 2010, Husband filed a petition for marriage dissolution. Wife filed a
counterpetition, asking for incapacity maintenance. The trial court held a hearing on the
petitions, and in May 2011, issued a dissolution decree, which provided in relevant part,
10. The Court is unable to conclude from the evidence presented
whether the Wife is entitled to receive maintenance from the Husband under
Indiana Law. To-date, the Wife’s request for Social Security Disability
benefits, based on her medical records, and her claims of inability to maintain
employment due to her medical condition, have been denied by the [SSA]
which has had an opportunity to review all of the medical records relevant to
Wife’s case and make a determination based on those records. Further, the
Wife testified that her own physician had concluded in April 2010 that the
Wife was physically and medically able to return to work, which opinion when
expressed to her employer, formed the basis for the denial of any further
disability benefits [] which she had been receiving from her employer. No
medical evidence has been presented on the Wife’s behalf to support her
request for determination that she is medically physically unable to be
employed.
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11. Upon a determination by the Social Security Administration that
the Wife is disabled, the Court will re-evaluate issues of child support,
maintenance, and educational expenses, retroactively.
Appellant’s App. at 26-27.
Wife filed a motion to correct error, arguing in relevant part that the trial court erred in
failing to award incapacity maintenance. The trial court issued an order granting in part and
denying in part Wife’s motion to correct error, which in relevant part denied her motion as to
incapacity maintenance and entered a corrected dissolution decree, which reiterated
paragraphs 10 and 11 above.
In November 2011, the SSA issued its ruling on Wife’s appeal of the denial of
disability benefits, determining that she had been disabled from October 26, 2009, to
November 21, 2011. The SSA recommended a disability review in two years, as medical
improvement was expected with appropriate treatment.
In May 2012, Wife filed a petition for retroactive reevaluation of maintenance and
child support, to which she attached the SSA’s determination that she was disabled. Husband
filed a response to Wife’s petition and a petition for modification of child support and
property division.
In December 2012, the trial court held a hearing on all pending matters. Husband
argued that the trial court had already determined in the dissolution decree that Wife was not
entitled to incapacity maintenance and that it did not have the authority to reevaluate the
issue. In January 2013, the trial court issued an order, which provided in relevant part:
6. The Court finds that [Wife] is entitled to rehabilitative maintenance
from the period of dissolution until the date of [M.L.’s] majority. The Court
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finds that the three years between the date of her disability and [M.L.’s]
majority is sufficient time for [Wife] to have obtained adequate retraining to
obtain employment within her physical capabilities.
7. The Court finds that maintenance shall be calculated as if [Wife] was an
additional child requiring support, but in no event greater than $500.00 per
month.
Id. at 11. The trial court found that T.L. reached the age of majority on July 1, 2012, and
M.L. reached the age of majority on November 15, 2012. The trial court recalculated the
support and maintenance that Husband owed Wife from May 6, 2011 through November 15,
2012.
Wife filed a motion to correct error, arguing in relevant part that the trial court erred in
awarding her rehabilitative maintenance when she was actually entitled to incapacity
maintenance because the SSA had found that (1) Wife was disabled; (2) suffers from lupus,
fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, depression, and anxiety; (3) the demands of her past
relevant work exceed her residual functioning capacity; (4) she is unable to perform any work
related to her vocational work history; and (5) the national economy did not contain a
significant number of jobs that she could perform for her to obtain employment with her
disabilities. Id. at 62-63. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Wife’s motion to correct
error regarding rehabilitative maintenance.
Discussion and Decision
Wife appeals the trial court’s decision to award her rehabilitative maintenance rather
than incapacity maintenance. Husband cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court did not have
the statutory authority, as a matter of law, to reevaluate its decision not to grant Wife
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postdissolution maintenance when it issued the dissolution decree. This is a question of first
impression. Based on the statutory framework governing dissolution and maintenance, we
agree with Husband.
Our goal in statutory interpretation is to ascertain, give effect to, and implement the
legislature’s intent as expressed in the plain language of its statutes. State v. Prater, 922
N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. “The first rule of statutory construction
is that ‘[w]ords and phrases shall be taken in their plain, or ordinary and usual, sense.’” Id.
(quoting Ind. Code § 1-1-4-1(1)) (alteration in Prater). “The Court presumes that the
legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent
with the statute’s underlying policy and goals.” Cubel v. Cubel, 876 N.E.2d 1117, 1120 (Ind.
2007).
Indiana Code Title 31, Article 15 governs the dissolution of marriage. Indiana Code
Section 31-15-2-16(b) provides that a “dissolution decree is final when entered, subject to the
right of appeal.” (Emphasis added.) Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-1 provides that the “court
may order maintenance in final dissolution of marriage decrees entered under IC 31-15-2-
16.” (Emphasis added.) The parties may provide for maintenance in settlement agreements,
but in the absence of such an agreement, a trial court may award only “three, quite limited”
varieties of postdissolution maintenance: spousal incapacity maintenance, caregiver
maintenance, and rehabilitative maintenance. Dewbrew v. Dewbrew, 849 N.E.2d 636, 644
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-2 provides,
(1) If the court finds a spouse to be physically or mentally incapacitated
to the extent that the ability of the incapacitated spouse to support himself or
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herself is materially affected, the court may find that maintenance for the
spouse is necessary during the period of incapacity, subject to further order of
the court.
(2) If the court finds that:
(A) a spouse lacks sufficient property, including marital property
apportioned to the spouse, to provide for the spouse’s needs; and
(B) the spouse is the custodian of a child whose physical or mental
incapacity requires the custodian to forgo employment;
the court may find that maintenance is necessary for the spouse in an amount
and for a period of time that the court considers appropriate.
(3) After considering:
(A) the educational level of each spouse at the time of marriage and at
the time the action is commenced;
(B) whether an interruption in the education, training, or employment of
a spouse who is seeking maintenance occurred during the marriage as a
result of homemaking or child care responsibilities, or both;
(C) the earning capacity of each spouse, including educational
background, training, employment skills, work experience, and length
of presence in or absence from the job market; and
(D) the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the spouse who is seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment;
a court may find that rehabilitative maintenance for the spouse seeking
maintenance is necessary in an amount and for a period of time that the court
considers appropriate, but not to exceed three (3) years from the date of the
final decree.
(Emphases added.) Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-3 provides that an award of maintenance
may be modified if certain conditions are met:
Provisions of an order with respect to maintenance ordered under section 1 of
this chapter … may be modified or revoked. Except as provided in IC 31-16-
8-2, [which governs modification of support orders providing medical support
for a child] modification may be made only:
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(1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as
to make the terms unreasonable.
Reading these statutes together, it is clear that a trial court is to determine whether a
spouse is entitled to maintenance at the time the dissolution decree is entered. Ind. Code §§
31-15-7-1, -2. Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-2(1) and (2) require the court to make certain
findings, before it considers whether maintenance is necessary. The spouse seeking
maintenance has the burden of proving that he or she is entitled to maintenance. Matzat v.
Matzat, 854 N.E.2d 918, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). If, at the time of dissolution, the trial
court finds that a spouse has not satisfied the statutory criteria entitling him or her to
maintenance, then that is the end of the matter. The dissolution decree is final. Ind. Code §
31-15-2-16(b). There is no statutory authority for the trial court to reevaluate, postpone, or
defer its determination of whether a spouse meets the statutory criteria in Indiana Code
Section 31-15-7-2 based on a decision or act of an outside entity that occurs after the final
dissolution decree has been entered. If, at the time of dissolution, the trial court finds that a
spouse has met the burden to establish the statutory criteria in Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-
2, then the trial court “may” find that maintenance is necessary. The trial court’s power to
award spousal maintenance is not mandatory but is wholly within the trial court’s discretion.
Clokey v. Bosley Clokey, 956 N.E.2d 714, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). If the trial court finds in
the final dissolution decree that spousal maintenance is necessary, then the trial court retains
statutory authority to modify or revoke maintenance. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-3.
Turning to the facts at hand, Wife requested incapacity maintenance pursuant to
Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-2(1). It was her burden to prove that she was physically or
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mentally incapacitated to the extent that her ability to support herself was materially affected.
However, she failed to carry her burden. The trial court concluded that the evidence
presented did not support a finding that Wife was entitled to receive maintenance from
Husband and that “[n]o medical evidence has been presented on the Wife’s behalf to support
her request for determination that she is medically physically unable to be employed.”
Appellant’s App. at 26. In the final dissolution decree, the trial court found that Wife’s
evidence was insufficient to establish that she was physically or mentally incapacitated to the
extent that her ability to support herself was materially affected, and that determination is
final. As a matter of law, the trial court could not retain authority to reevaluate, postpone, or
defer that determination based on a subsequent decision from the SSA. Accordingly, we
reverse the trial court’s award of rehabilitative maintenance to Wife and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion, including all necessary recalculations.
Reversed and remanded.
NAJAM, J., concurs.
BAKER, J., concurs with separate opinion.
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MARJORIE O. LESLEY, )
)
Appellant-Respondent/Cross-Appellee, )
)
vs. ) No. 79A02-1305-DR-472
)
ROBERT T. LESLEY, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner/Cross-Appellant. )
)
BAKER, Judge, concurring.
I agree with the majority that the issue of spousal maintenance could not be revisited
once the trial court entered the final dissolution decree. However, I write separately to
explain how the trial court’s intent could have been properly effected.
Here, in the May 2011 decree, the trial court noted that Wife “obtained a degree in
Occupational Leadership.” Appellant’s App. p. 39. The trial court also noted that Wife had
not attempted to secure other employment and seemed dismissive of testimony that Wife
could not find work that she could perform on a regular basis. Id. at 39-40. Therefore, I
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believe that the trial court attempted to reserve its right to reevaluate maintenance upon a
determination by the Social Security Administration that Wife was disabled because it
wanted access to the amount that Wife would receive in monthly benefits.
In the trial court’s order on Wife’s petition for maintenance, it ordered that Wife’s
weekly Social Security disability payments of $425 be used as her weekly income for child
support calculations. Id. at 11. Additionally, the trial court found that Wife was only
entitled to three years of rehabilitative maintenance. Id.
Taking the decree and subsequent order together, it appears that rehabilitative
maintenance is what the trial court continuously intended. That said, the better approach
would have been for the trial court to have continued the May 2011 hearing until after there
was a determination regarding Wife’s Social Security disability payments. I believe that the
trial court attempted to reserve its rights to reevaluate maintenance upon a determination by
the Social Security Administration because it wanted to know the amount that Wife would
receive in monthly benefits. However, as the majority points out, the trial court forfeited
such a reservation by entering the final decree when it did. Thus, while I concur with the
majority, I write separately to discourage similar situations in the future.
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