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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: STEVEN WHITERS, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
APPEAL OF: STEVEN WHITERS,
No. 1754 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order May 1, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-MD-0012916-2011
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 17, 2016
Appellant Steven Whiters appeals from the order entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which validated a settlement
agreement in response to Appellant’s motion for the return of property. We
affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Appellant, his
wife (Cassandra Wise), and their three adult sons (Lennard, Ramon, and
Michael Whiters) lived in a large home at 5864 Woodbine Avenue in
Philadelphia. On January 5, 2010, police officers went to the house with an
arrest warrant for Lennard, and in searching the house for him, the police
discovered nine live marijuana plants, as well as high intensity heat lamps
and video recording equipment, in the basement.
The police secured a search warrant for the premises, and upon
execution of the search warrant, the police seized eight firearms from the
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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locked closet in Appellant’s and his wife’s bedroom. The police found no
other contraband in the couple’s bedroom.
The police arrested and filed various charges against Appellant, his
wife, and their three sons. On December 12, 2011, Appellant filed a
counseled petition seeking the return of his property, i.e., the firearms, and
the petition was held pending trial.
On July 16, 2013, Appellant, his wife, and their three sons proceeded
to a bench trial, and they were acquitted of all charges. On May 1, 2014,
the trial court approved a settlement agreement between Appellant, who
was represented by counsel, and the Commonwealth, which provided in
relevant part the following:
[I]t is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED that the firearms
listed on [the relevant] property receipts . . . be liquidated.1
The above firearms, along with any ammunition, are to be
turned over to Locks’ Gun Exchange for liquidation, which is
located at 6700 Rowland Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
The guns are to be released only to John Locks, agent of
Locks’ Gun Exchange. Said firearm and ammunition may not
be sold, assigned, optioned, given, bequeathed or transferred in
any manner to [Appellant], Cassandra Wise, Robert Snead or
anyone acting on her behalf. The net proceeds of the sale of the
above firearm[s] are to be turned over to [Appellant]. Locks’
may contact the District Attorney’s Office to receive
authorization to sell firearms to a particular individual. The
individual may or may not receive approval to purchase the
firearms. Verification of said transaction will be done by the
District Attorney’s Office.
If it is found that any of the individuals listed above or a
party acting on their behalf purchase or attempt to purchase the
firearms covered by this Order, this agreement is null and void.
All firearms will then be relinquished to the Commonwealth for
destruction. Any cost incurred by the Commonwealth and/or
Locks Gun Exchange will be the responsibility of [Appellant].
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1
[Appellant] opposes liquidation, however in light of the fact
that the Court ordered the same he is agreeable to the above
arrangement so that he may recoup the monetary value of the
firearms.
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Trial Court Order, filed 5/1/14, at 1-2 (emphasis and footnote in original).
Appellant filed a timely, counseled notice of appeal, and all Pa.R.A.P.
1925 requirements have been met.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in ordering that Appellant’s
firearms be liquidated. More specifically, he alleges the following:
Instantly, [A]ppellant first contends that the firearms in
controversy are not contraband per se, such that there [sic]
mere possession is unlawful. Second[ ], he personally[ ] is not
prohibited from possessing firearms[.] Third, [A]ppellant
contends that in spite of the fact that he resides with his wife. . .
who is prohibited from possessing firearms he should not be
precluded as a member of the prohibited person’s
household from meeting the burden of proof necessary for
return of his firearms that were seized from their residence.
Appellant[,] who belongs to a gun club and possessed the
subject firearms as family heirlooms[,] is a marksman that
secured the firearms in gun cases under lock in the closet of
their marital bedroom. Appellant should be allowed to recover
the firearms and store them some place other than where the
prohibited person resides.
Appellant’s Brief at 11 (citation to transcript omitted) (bold in original).
Initially, we note that Appellant’s argument (that for various reasons
the trial court should have ruled he be allowed to recover the firearms and
store them some place other than where his wife resides) overlooks the fact
that he entered into a court-approved settlement agreement with the
Commonwealth whereby he agreed to relinquish the firearms for liquidation
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purposes and, in exchange, the Commonwealth agreed to turn over to
Appellant the net proceeds of the sale.
We have held that return of property actions are civil in nature, but
are also quasi-criminal in character. See Commonwealth v. Landy, 362
A.2d 999 (Pa.Super. 1976). Principles of contract law ordinarily govern the
enforceability of settlement agreements. Mazzella v. Koken, 559 Pa. 216,
739 A.2d 531 (1999). Contract interpretation is a question of law and, thus,
our standard of review is de novo. Ruby v. Abington Memorial Hosp., 50
A.3d 128, 132 (Pa.Super. 2012).
“Where a settlement agreement contains all of the requisites of a valid
contract, a court must enforce the terms of the agreement.” Mastrioni–
Mucker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 976 A.2d 510, 518 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation
omitted). “Under ordinary contract law, contracts are enforceable when
parties reach [a] mutual agreement, exchange consideration[,] and have set
forth terms of their bargain with sufficient clarity.” Biddle v.
Johnsonbaugh, 664 A.2d 159, 163 (Pa.Super. 1995) (citation omitted). A
binding agreement exists where all parties come to a “meeting of the minds”
on all essential terms of the agreement. Mastrioni–Mucker, 976 A.2d at
518. Judicial policy favors the settlement of law suits and in the absence of
fraud and mistake the courts will enforce an agreement to settle a legal
dispute. See id.
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Here, as indicated supra, Appellant entered into a settlement
agreement. In examining its plain terms, contrary to Appellant’s current
appellate argument, there is no indication the parties intended for Appellant
to retain and store the firearms some place other than where his wife
resides. Thus, we find no merit to Appellant’s first argument.
This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant alternatively
argues that the footnote in the alleged settlement agreement reveals there
was no “meeting of the minds” on an essential element, i.e., liquidation of
the firearms, and therefore, the alleged settlement agreement is not a valid
contract.
As indicated supra, the settlement agreement contains the following
footnote: “[Appellant] opposes liquidation, however in light of the fact that
the Court ordered the same he is agreeable to the above arrangement so
that he may recoup the monetary value of the firearms.” Trial Court Order,
filed 5/1/14, at 1 n.1.
In examining the settlement agreement, including the subject
footnote, the trial court concluded there was a “meeting of the minds” so as
to form a legally binding contract requiring enforcement of its terms,
including liquidation of the firearms. As the trial court noted:
Nothing in the [footnote] states that trickery or chicanery was
involved in resolving the issues between the parties. Nothing is
raised regarding the voluntariness of the agreement and it is
also presumed that everyone entered into the agreement
knowingly. While [Appellant] may have opposed liquidation or
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forfeiture, he agreed to this disposition and as such was bound
by the terms entered into by his attorney.
Trial Court Opinion, filed 2/27/15, at 3.
While Appellant may have been unhappy with the sale of his firearms,
the totality of the settlement agreement reveals he understood that
liquidation was going to occur and he was “agreeable.” Thus, we conclude
there was a “meeting of the minds,” whereby both parties mutually assented
to the same thing, i.e., liquidation of the firearms, and Appellant is bound by
the terms of the settlement agreement. See Prieto Corp. v.
Gambone Const. Co., 100 A.3d 602 (Pa.Super. 2014) (explaining the
“meeting of the minds” necessary for a valid contract).
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/17/2016
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