IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 15–1827
Filed November 18, 2016
SHAWN ALLEN JAMES,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B.
Hanson, Judge.
An inmate seeks reversal of a district court order denying
recalculation of earned-time credit. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
REVERSED; CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Shawn Allen James, pro se, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
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PER CURIAM.
Shawn Allen James, an offender incarcerated under the control of
the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC), challenges its calculation of
his earned-time credit. The same legal issue is presented in Breeden v.
Iowa Department of Corrections, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2016), decided
today. Our holding in Breeden is dispositive and requires that James’s
earned-time credit be recalculated at the rate of 1.2 days for each day of
good conduct. Id. at ___.
James was convicted of attempted murder and terrorism with
intent in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.11 and 708.6 in August of
2000. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of incarceration not to
exceed twenty-five years. Pursuant to Iowa Code section 902.7 (2001), 1 a
mandatory minimum sentence of five years for each offense was also
imposed. James was a juvenile when he committed the offenses.
Attempted murder is a crime listed in Iowa Code section 902.12 that
requires offenders to serve a mandatory minimum term of seven-tenths,
or seventy percent, of their sentence before being eligible for parole or
work release. The IDOC calculated James’s earned-time accumulation
according to Iowa Code section 903A.2(1) (2001), which provides,
For purposes of calculating the amount of time by which an
inmate’s sentence may be reduced, inmates shall be grouped
into the following two sentence categories:
a. Category “A” sentences are those sentences which
are not subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time
of fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement under
section 902.12. . . . An inmate of an institution under the
1Iowa Code section 902.7 provides that if a person is found guilty of a forcible
felony “and that the person represented the person was in the immediate possession
and control of a dangerous weapon, displayed a dangerous weapon in a threatening
manner, or was armed with a dangerous weapon while participating in the forcible
felony,” the person must serve a minimum of five years before being eligible for parole.
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control of the department of corrections who is serving a
category “A” sentence is eligible for a reduction of sentence
equal to one and two-tenths days for each day the inmate
demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily participates in
any program or placement status identified by the director to
earn the reduction. . . .
....
b. Category “B” sentences are those sentences which
are subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time of
fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement under
section 902.12. An inmate . . . under the control of the
department of corrections who is serving a category “B”
sentence is eligible for a reduction of sentence equal to
fifteen eighty-fifths of a day for each day of good conduct by
the inmate.
The IDOC classified James’s sentence as category “B” and computed his
earned time at a rate of fifteen eighty-fifths of a day per each day served.
James filed a motion to correct his sentence following this court’s
decision in State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014) (holding automatic
mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile offenders constitute cruel
and unusual punishment under the Iowa Constitution). On March 13,
2015, the Iowa District Court for Polk County resentenced James to an
indeterminate term not to exceed twenty-five years, without the
mandatory minimum under section 902.12. 2 The sentencing order did
not designate an earned-time accumulation rate, but it provided,
Any term of incarceration imposed may be reduced from the
maximum sentence because of statutory earned time, work
credits and program credits. Defendant may be eligible for
parole before the sentence is discharged subject to statutory
restrictions or sentence reductions.
The IDOC continued to calculate James’s earned-time accumulation at
fifteen eighty-fifths of a day per each day served (category “B”), rather
2The district court retained the requirement that James serve a minimum of five
years for each offense under Iowa Code section 902.7. However, at the time of the
resentencing, these minimums had already been served.
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than the faster 1.2 days per day served (category “A”). As such, James’s
tentative discharge date (TDD), the earliest date he could discharge his
sentence, assuming he had all potential earned time, remained
January 25, 2023.
James wrote to Offender Services complaining of the calculation,
stating, “As of 3-13-15 my 902.12 [mandatory minimum] has been
removed from my sentence and I now request that in accordance with my
new sentencing order that I be re-classified from Category ‘b’ sentence to
Category ‘A’ sentence.” Tamia Salviati, IDOC records officer, responded
by letter on April 6, 2015:
The DOC is aware of your concerns. However, the
decision in the Lyle case did not change the underlying
nature of the sentence for which you were convicted. The
decision only eliminated the minimum sentence component.
The requirements under 903A.2(1)(b), Category B are
still subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time of
15% of the total sentence of confinement under 902.12. An
inmate of an institution under the control of the DOC who is
serving a category B sentence is eligible for a reduction of
sentence equal to fifteen eighty-fifths of a day for each day of
good conduct. There is no language in your sentencing order
that alters the nature of the conviction under 903A.2(1)(b).
Only the minimum sentence was changed.
Therefore, do not expect a change in your TDD.
On April 13, 2015, James filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal
sentence in the Iowa District Court for Polk County. The district court
denied the motion on April 23, finding that James was not challenging
the sentencing order, but instead was challenging the IDOC’s
“calculation of the time he [was] required to serve under that Court
Order.” The district court stated the correct form of relief was an
application for postconviction relief under Iowa Code section 822.2(e) or
(f) (2015).
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On May 4, James filed a pro se application for postconviction relief.
On May 14, he filed a brief in support of his application and a motion for
summary disposition, asserting the IDOC’s calculation of his sentence
violated Lyle, the text of sections 902.12 and 903A.2, and the Due
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. See Iowa Code § 822.6
(allowing summary disposition in postconviction relief actions).
Specifically, James alleged his entire sentence should be recalculated as
category “A” because his mandatory minimum had been removed. If
James’s sentence had been calculated under category “A,” he alleged he
would be eligible for discharge.
The State filed a resistance and cross-motion for summary
judgment on June 1, arguing it was the conviction for a crime listed in
section 902.12—and not the mandatory minimum imposed by that
section—that controlled the earned-time accrual rate. The State asserted
that Lyle did not alter the methods of calculating earned time because
Lyle only addressed mandatory minimum sentence requirements, not
“earned time accrual rate or any other matter related to the actual length
of the sentence of juvenile offenders.” At the hearing on August 21, all
parties agreed the facts were not in dispute and the issue to be
determined was one of law.
On October 19, the district court granted the State’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissed James’s application for postconviction
relief. The district court relied on an earlier case from Polk County,
Breeden v. Iowa Department of Corrections, No. CVCV049065 (Iowa Dist.
Ct. May 11, 2015). The district court found that the IDOC correctly
classified James’s sentence as category “B” and that such classification
did not offend Lyle, sections 903A.2 and 902.12, or the Iowa
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Constitution. James filed a notice of appeal on November 6, and we
retained the appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
Postconviction proceedings, including summary dismissals, are
reviewed for errors at law. Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa
2011). The district court’s interpretation of a statute is reviewed for
errors at law. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2000)
(en banc). To the extent James’s claim raises constitutional issues, our
review is de novo. Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012).
III. Disposition.
Based on our holding today in Breeden, we reverse and vacate the
district court’s ruling and remand this case for entry of an order directing
the IDOC to recalculate James’s sentence at the category “A” rate for all
his time served. ___ N.W.2d at ___.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED
WITH DIRECTIONS.
This opinion shall not be published.