State v. Lazaro Ozuna

2017 WI 64

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2015AP1877-CR
COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Lazaro Ozuna,
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at 369 Wis. 2d 224, 880 N.W.2d 183
(2016 – Unpublished)

OPINION FILED: June 22, 2017
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: January 11, 2017

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Walworth
JUDGE: Kristine E. Drettwan

JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED: A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON,
J.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
and oral argument by Alisha McKay, assistant state public
defender, with whom on the briefs was Colleen Marion, assistant
state public defender.

For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief and oral
argument by Scott E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general, with
whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.

An amici curiae brief was filed on behalf of Legal Action
of Wisconsin, Inc. by Kori L. Ashley, Christine Donahoe, Susan
Lund, Sheila Sullivan, and Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc.,
Milwaukee.

2
 2017 WI 64
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2015AP1877-CR
(L.C. No. 2013CM458)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
FILED
v.
JUN 22, 2017
Lazaro Ozuna,
Diane M. Fremgen
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. Clerk of Supreme Court

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed.

¶1 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. We review an unpublished
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Ozuna, No.

2015AP1877-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. April 13,

2016), affirming the Walworth County circuit court's order1

denying expungement of the defendant's misdemeanor convictions.

¶2 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and

hold that the circuit court properly concluded that the

defendant was not entitled to expungement. We do so because the

1
The Honorable Kristine E. Drettwan, presiding.
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

defendant did not meet the statutory requirements for

expungement. Specifically, in order to be entitled to

expungement, a probationer must "satisf[y] the conditions of

probation." Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) (2013-14).2 In this

case, when the Department of Corrections ("DOC") notified the

circuit court that the defendant had completed probationary

supervision, it simultaneously notified the court that the

defendant had violated the court's expressly ordered condition

that he neither possess nor consume alcohol. Consequently, the

circuit court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to

expungement, and the court of appeals affirmed. We affirm the

decision of the court of appeals.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 On November 20, 2013, the Walworth County district

attorney's office charged Lazaro Ozuna with one count of

criminal damage to property contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.01(1)

(2011-2012) and one count of disorderly conduct contrary to Wis.

Stat. § 947.01(1) (2011-2012), both misdemeanors. Ozuna was 17
years old at the time these charges were filed.

¶4 On May 27, 2014, the circuit court held a plea and

sentencing hearing,3 at which Ozuna pled guilty to both counts.

The court accepted Ozuna's guilty plea and imposed a sentence of

120 days' incarceration, but the court stayed the sentence and

2
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.
3
The Honorable James L. Carlson, presiding.

2
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

placed Ozuna on a period of probationary supervision for 12

months. As one of the conditions of his probation, the court

ordered Ozuna "[n]ot to possess or consume alcohol, illegal

drugs or paraphernalia."

¶5 The court further determined that Ozuna's conviction

was eligible for expungement under Wis. Stat. § 973.015 so long

as Ozuna satisfied the conditions of probation. The court

stated, "I will allow expungement if there is no violation of

probation . . . ." The court asked Ozuna if he understood that

he would have to comply with the conditions of probation and

that the convictions "could be on your record unless you

complete the sentence[4] successfully and get it expunged; do you

understand that?" Ozuna answered, "Yes, sir."

¶6 Ozuna was placed on probation under the supervision of

DOC for a term of 12 months. After Ozuna was discharged from

probation, DOC filed a form with the circuit court on June 5,

2015, entitled "Verification of Satisfaction of Probation

Conditions for Expungement." On that form, the probation agent
had marked a box labeled "The offender has successfully

completed his/her probation." Further down on the form,

4
We note that probationary supervision, commonly referred
to as "probation," is not itself a sentence; rather, it is an
alternative to sentencing. State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 647,
594 N.W.2d 772 (1999). However, the expungement statute defines
the "successful completion of the sentence" so as to encompass
probation. See Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b). Probation is
therefore considered a "sentence" for purposes of the
expungement statute. State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶36, 353
Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811.

3
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

however, the agent had marked the box labeled, "All court

ordered conditions have not been met." The agent inserted the

following explanation: "[Ozuna] [f]ailed to comply with the no

alcohol condition. Lake Geneva PD went to Harbor Shores Hotel

for noise complaint. Mr. Ozaro [sic] cited for underage

drinking (102 pbt [sic]) and marijuana odor in the halls."

¶7 On June 12, 2015, the circuit court entered an order

denying expungement of Ozuna's record. The order noted that

Ozuna had failed to fulfill the obligations of his probation.

Ozuna appealed the circuit court's order, and the court of

appeals affirmed the circuit court. The court of appeals

concluded that "Ozuna was entitled to expungement only if he

successfully completed his sentence. Ozuna did not do so

because he did not satisfy the conditions of probation." Ozuna,

unpublished slip op., ¶11. The court of appeals noted that the

"State claims——and the DOC form confirms——that Ozuna violated

the no alcohol condition of his probation. Nowhere in the

briefs does Ozuna contest this crucial fact." Id., ¶9. For
these reasons, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's

order denying expungement.

¶8 Ozuna petitioned this court for review, which we

granted on September 15, 2016.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 This case requires us to interpret the expungement

statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.015, which is a question of statutory

interpretation that we review de novo. State v. Hemp, 2014 WI
129, ¶12, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811. The application of a
4
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

statute to undisputed facts is also a question of law for our

independent review, benefiting from the analyses of the circuit

court and court of appeals. State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55,

¶32, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611.

III. DISCUSSION

¶10 We begin by setting forth the relevant statutory

requirements for expungement and discussing the circuit court's

authority to deny expungement. We then apply these principles

to the facts of this case, and we hold that, because Ozuna did

not satisfy the conditions of probation, the circuit court

properly denied expungement of his conviction. Finally, we

address Ozuna's procedural due process argument, and we conclude

that Ozuna's rights were not violated in this case.

A. A Probationer Must Satisfy the Conditions of Probation In

Order To Be Entitled to Expungement

¶11 The Wisconsin statutes empower a circuit court to

order certain criminal offenses to be expunged from a person's

record, if the offender was younger than 25 at the time of the
commission of the offense.5 The overarching legislative purpose

5
Section 973.015(1m)(a)1. provides, in relevant part, that

when a person is under the age of 25 at the time of
the commission of an offense . . . for which the
maximum period of imprisonment is 6 years or less, the
court may order at the time of sentencing that the
record be expunged upon successful completion of the
sentence if the court determines the person will
benefit and society will not be harmed by this
disposition.

5
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

of the expungement statute is to provide "a break to young

offenders who demonstrate the ability to comply with the law."

Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶20 (quoting State v. Leitner, 2002 WI

77, ¶38, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341). A circuit court may

order expungement "if the court determines the person will

benefit and society will not be harmed by this disposition."

Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a)1. Under the statutory scheme, the

determination of a defendant's eligibility for expungement must

be made at the time of sentencing. State v. Matasek, 2014 WI

27, ¶45, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811.

¶12 If the circuit court determines that the defendant is

eligible for expungement under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a), "the

plain language of the statute indicates that once the defendant

successfully completes his sentence, he has earned, and is

automatically entitled to, expungement." Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320,

¶23.6 The statute provides a three-part definition of what it

means to "successfully complete the sentence" for purposes of

earning expungement: "A person has successfully completed the

6
The statute provides, in relevant part, that

A person has successfully completed the sentence if
the person has not been convicted of a subsequent
offense and, if on probation, the probation has not
been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the
conditions of probation. Upon successful completion
of the sentence the detaining or probationary
authority shall issue a certificate of discharge which
shall be forwarded to the court of record and which
shall have the effect of expunging the record.

Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b).

6
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

sentence if [1] the person has not been convicted of a

subsequent offense and, if on probation, [2] the probation has

not been revoked and [3] the probationer has satisfied the

conditions of probation." § 973.015(1m)(b) (emphasis added).

"If a probationer satisfies these three criteria, he has earned

expungement, and is automatically entitled to expungement of the

underlying charge." Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶23.

¶13 We emphasize that, in order to be entitled to

expungement, the probationer must meet all three of the

statutory criteria, including satisfying "all the conditions of

probation." Id., ¶22. Because the three criteria are distinct,

we reject Ozuna's notion that a probationer has "satisfied the

conditions of probation" under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b)

simply because his probation was not revoked. Whether a

probationer's conduct was adequate to avoid revocation is a

question separate and distinct from whether the probationer "has

satisfied all the conditions of probation."7 Hemp, 359

Wis. 2d 320, ¶22. To "satisfy" a condition or obligation is to
meet or fulfill it, not merely to avoid the penalty for

violating it. See Satisfy, Webster's Third New International

Dictionary 2017 (2002) ("to conform to (accepted criteria or

requirements): fulfill, meet"). Therefore, the mere fact that a

7
Revocation is a discretionary decision. When a violation
of probation occurs, DOC regulations permit the agent to counsel
the probationer, issue a warning, or choose another alternative
to revocation. See Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 331.03(2)(b) (July
2013).

7
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

probationer has completed the term of probationary supervision

without revocation does not necessarily establish that the

probationer has also satisfied the conditions of probation.

B. The Court May Deny Expungement if a Probationer Does Not

Satisfy the Conditions of Probation

¶14 Although the expungement statute puts the onus on DOC

to determine whether a probationer has satisfied the conditions

of probation and to notify the court when that occurs,8 a court

has no duty to expunge a probationer's record if the probationer

has not satisfied the conditions of probation. This is so

because a person's statutory entitlement to expungement depends

not on whether the court receives a particular notice from DOC,

but on whether the probationer meets all of the statutory

criteria for the "successful completion of the sentence." See

Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) (providing that only "[u]pon

successful completion of the sentence" shall a DOC-forwarded

certificate of discharge "have the effect of expunging the

8
As we recognized in State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, 359
Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811, a probationer who has met all the
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) and is therefore
entitled to expungement has no duty to notify the court of that
fact; that duty rests with DOC as the probationary authority.
See id., ¶30. DOC policy is in accord with this understanding.
Its Electronic Case Reference Manual requires that, "[w]ithin 10
days following the discharge date, the agent shall forward
information to the court indicating whether or not the eligible
offender has successfully completed probation." Wisconsin DOC
Electronic Case Reference Manual, Procedures Prior to Discharge:
Expungement, § .04 (effective May 1, 2015) (available at
http://doc.helpdocsonline.com/case-closing/transition/status-
change).

8
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

record"). In Hemp, we held that Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b)

provides for a "self-executing" expungement process, in which

"the detaining or probationary authority must forward the

certificate of discharge to the court of record upon the

individual defendant's successful completion of his sentence and

at that point the process of expungement is self-executing."

Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶25 (emphasis added). The terms of the

statute provide that this self-executing process is triggered

only "[u]pon successful completion of the sentence," as the

statute defines that term in § 973.015(1m)(b). "In construing

or interpreting a statute the court is not at liberty to

disregard the plain, clear words of the statute." State v.

Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Therefore, under the expungement

statute, it is proper for the circuit court to deny expungement

if a defendant has not met all three criteria for the

"successful completion of the sentence" under Wis. Stat.

§ 973.015(1m)(b), including satisfying the conditions of
probation.9

9
We note that, in this instance, Ozuna does not contest the
factual determination that he consumed alcohol while on
probation, thereby violating one of the conditions of his
probation. This case is therefore not the proper vehicle in
which to set forth the procedures a court is to follow when such
factual matters are disputed. See State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91,
¶62 n.19, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410 (noting that this
court "does not issue advisory opinions or address hypothetical
facts"). We note our confidence in the ability of our circuit
courts to resolve such matters fairly, a confidence informed by
our knowledge that they routinely do just that.

9
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

¶15 This conclusion is not in conflict with our holding in

Hemp. Although we stated in Hemp that expungement occurs

automatically when DOC "forwards a certificate of discharge to

the court of record," Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶36, we were

resting on the premise that satisfaction of the conditions of

probation is an indispensable prerequisite to a defendant's

entitlement to expungement. Id., ¶¶22-23. It was because "Hemp

satisfied all the conditions of probation," we explained, that

his "successful completion of probation automatically entitled

him to expungement of his conviction." Id., ¶24. Therefore,

Hemp reinforces our understanding that a probationer's

entitlement to expungement turns on whether the probationer "has

satisfied the conditions of probation," as is required by Wis.

Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b).

¶16 In Hemp, DOC forwarded Hemp's certificate of discharge

to the court, and there was no dispute that Hemp had

successfully completed probation as defined in Wis. Stat.

§ 973.015(1m)(b). "The record clearly indicates Hemp
successfully completed probation," we concluded, because Hemp

was not convicted of any subsequent offense while on probation,

his probation was not revoked, and "Hemp satisfied all the

conditions of probation." Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶24. In such

a scenario, expungement was "required by statute" and the clerk

of the circuit court accordingly had a duty to expunge the

record upon receiving a copy of the certificate of discharge

from DOC. Id., ¶33 n.11 (quoting SCR 72.06). But Hemp does not
control a case where DOC informs the circuit court that the
10
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

probationer violated the court-ordered conditions of probation.

In such a case, where one of the statutory requirements for the

"successful completion of the sentence" under § 973.015(1m)(b)

has not been met, the probationer has no entitlement to

expungement and the self-executing process we described in Hemp

does not occur.

¶17 Our emphasis on the language of the statute is also in

accord with our interpretation of the probation statutes in an

analogous context. In State ex rel. Greer v. Wiedenhoeft, 2014

WI 19, 353 Wis. 2d 307, 845 N.W.2d 373, where DOC issued a

certificate of discharge from probation before the term of

probation had expired, we held that such certificate did not

have the effect of discharging the probationer. Id., ¶¶41, 51.

The statutes provide that a certificate of discharge is issued

"[w]hen the period of probation for a probationer has expired,"

Wis. Stat. § 973.09(5), but the defendant relied on two court of

appeals decisions which suggested that the issuance of a

certificate was the controlling event that effectuated
discharge. Id., ¶42. We rejected this argument, explaining

that "[n]either decision stands for the proposition that an

erroneously issued discharge certificate can defeat a valid

sentence imposed by a circuit court." Id. The certificate

could not trump the statute. Similarly, in the expungement

context, the simple fact that DOC forwards a certificate of

discharge or other form to the circuit court does not, by

itself, establish an entitlement to expungement if the record

11
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

demonstrates that the probationer has not met the prerequisites

under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b).

C. The Circuit Court Properly Denied Expungement

¶18 Here, there was never any dispute about the underlying

facts in the record. DOC submitted a form to the court which

showed that Ozuna had violated one of the court-ordered

conditions of his probation. On the form, the probation agent

checked a box marked "All court ordered conditions have not been

met." The agent noted the nature of the violation, namely, that

Ozuna "[f]ailed to comply with the no alcohol condition,"

because he was "cited for underage drinking." Ozuna has never

made any suggestion that that he did not, in fact, engage in

this conduct during the term of probation.

¶19 These facts demonstrate that Ozuna did not meet the

criteria for expungement, because he did not "satisf[y] the

conditions of probation." Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b).

According to his probation agent, Ozuna engaged in underage

drinking in spite of the circuit court's command to refrain from
consuming alcohol. Based on this clear violation of one of the

court-ordered conditions of probation, Ozuna did not satisfy the

12
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

conditions of probation. Therefore, the circuit court properly

denied expungement of Ozuna's record.10

¶20 Ozuna disagrees, arguing that the "fact that [his]

agent forwarded the Verification Form to the circuit court

communicates her determination that [he] met the requirements"

for expungement. However, looking beyond the title of the form

("Verification of Satisfaction of Probation Conditions for

Expungement") to its substance reveals that DOC determined Ozuna

had violated one of the court-ordered conditions of probation.

Although we held in Hemp that a court has no discretion to deny

expungement if a probationer "successfully completed probation

and his probationary authority forwarded his certificate to the

court of record," Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶41 (emphasis added),

there was no dispute in Hemp that the probationer had, in fact,

met the statutory requirements for the successful completion of

probation, including satisfying all the conditions of probation,

id., ¶24. Nothing in Hemp dictates that the mere receipt of a

form from DOC stating that the probationer "successfully
completed" probation automatically entitles the probationer to

expungement where, as here, the very same form contains a

contradictory determination by DOC that the probationer violated

10
It appears that Ozuna also failed to satisfy the monetary
conditions of probation, and he argues that it would violate
equal protection "to deny expungement to probationers who cannot
afford to satisfy monetary conditions during supervision." We
need not reach this argument, because we conclude that Ozuna's
undisputed violation of the no-alcohol condition was sufficient
to establish that he was not entitled to expungement.

13
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

one of the court-ordered conditions of probation. Because Ozuna

did not satisfy the court-ordered condition that he abstain from

alcohol while on probation, his reliance on Hemp is unavailing.

D. Ozuna's Due Process Rights Were Not Violated

¶21 Finally, we turn to Ozuna's argument that the circuit

court deprived him of his constitutional right to procedural due

process by denying expungement without notice and an opportunity

to be heard. We conclude that Ozuna's due process rights were

not violated.

¶22 "The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution

prohibit government actions that deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law." Aicher ex

rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶80, 237

Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849. The first step in a procedural due

process analysis is to "examine whether the person has

established that a constitutionally protected property or

liberty interest is at issue." Id.
¶23 Where a liberty interest has been "initially

recognized and protected by state law, . . . the procedural

guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State

seeks to remove or significantly alter that protected status."

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710–11 (1976). We note that

"[r]eputation by itself is neither liberty nor property within

the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth

amendment." Weber v. City of Cedarburg, 129 Wis. 2d 57, 73, 384
N.W.2d 333 (1986). Rather, "a person's reputation is protected
14
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

by procedural due process only when damage to the reputation is

accompanied by the alteration or elimination of a right or

status previously recognized by state law." Stipetich v.

Grosshans, 2000 WI App 100, ¶24, 235 Wis. 2d 69, 612 N.W.2d 346.

"In such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to

refute the charge . . . ." Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v.

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). "The purpose of such notice and

hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his

name." Id. at 573 n.12.

¶24 Here, Ozuna argues that he had a protected liberty

interest in expungement of his record because the circuit court

ordered, at the time of Ozuna's sentencing, that his conviction

was eligible for expungement. The expungement statute, Ozuna

argues, "creates a substantive right under state law" to have

the stigma of a criminal conviction removed. He relies on our

statement in Hemp that "once the defendant successfully

completes his sentence, he has earned, and is automatically

entitled to, expungement." Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶23. Ozuna
further argues that he was deprived of this right without due

process of law, because the circuit court did not provide him

with notice and an opportunity to be heard before it denied

expungement. Ozuna analogizes a denial of expungement to a

revocation of probation. This court has recognized that due

process requires an evidentiary hearing before the State may

revoke probation, State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540,

548, 185 N.W.2d 306 (1971), and Ozuna argues that the same rule
should apply to a denial of expungement.
15
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

¶25 We disagree with Ozuna and hold that he did not have a

protected liberty interest in expungement in this case. The

reason that a probationer has a protected liberty interest in

remaining on probation is because the probationer has already

been granted a conditional right to freedom. See Johnson, 50

Wis. 2d at 548 ("After one has gained the conditional freedom of

a probationer . . . the state cannot summarily revoke such

status . . . .") (emphasis added). By contrast, Ozuna cannot

claim that he gained any entitlement to expungement, because the

record shows that he did not meet the statutory criteria for

"successful completion of the sentence" under Wis. Stat.

§ 973.015(1m)(b), which include satisfying all the conditions of

probation. See Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶22.

¶26 Ozuna suggests that the circuit court should have held

a hearing before denying expungement, but he has not pointed us

to any relevant factual dispute that such a hearing could have

resolved. He has never questioned DOC's determination that he

violated the no-alcohol condition by engaging in underage
drinking during his period of probation. Because Ozuna was not

entitled to expungement based on his failure to satisfy the no-

alcohol condition, we also conclude that there was no violation

of due process in this case, because Ozuna does not challenge

the underlying facts. See Conn. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe,

538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) ("Plaintiffs who assert a right to a

hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts

they seek to establish in that hearing are relevant under the
statutory scheme."); Stipetich, 235 Wis. 2d 69, ¶25 (affirming
16
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

dismissal of a due process claim on summary judgment where the

petitioner "did not produce sufficient evidence to allow a fact-

finder to conclude that she had been deprived of a

constitutionally protected property or liberty interest").

¶27 Because Ozuna did not satisfy the conditions of his

probation, he never earned the expungement for which he was

otherwise eligible. Therefore, Ozuna was not deprived of any

right or status which he previously possessed under state law.

Absent facts permitting a conclusion that Ozuna was entitled to

expungement under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b), his reputational

interest in hoping to obtain expungement is not, by itself, a

protected liberty interest. See Weber, 129 Wis. 2d at 73.

¶28 For these reasons, we conclude that Ozuna's due

process rights were not violated.

IV. CONCLUSION

¶29 We hold that the circuit court properly denied

expungement in this case, because Ozuna did not meet the

statutory requirements to be entitled to expungement. The
statutory requirements for expungement include the requirement

that the probationer has satisfied the conditions of probation.

Here, DOC notified the circuit court that Ozuna did not meet all

the conditions of probation because Ozuna violated the circuit

court's expressly ordered condition to not possess or consume

alcohol during the term of probation. Therefore, based on this

notification from DOC, the circuit court properly denied

expungement. Further, because Ozuna never met the requirements
to be entitled to expungement, the circuit court's denial of
17
 No. 2015AP1877-CR

expungement did not violate his right to the due process of law.

We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is

affirmed.

18
 No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

¶30 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). The majority

bends over backwards to reach its conclusion. Not only does its

analysis undermine the purpose of the expunction statute, it

also sub silencio overrules recent precedent. Ultimately,

because the implications of its holding are yet unclear, it sows

the seeds of confusion for circuit courts and litigants alike.

And for what?

¶31 Since the circumstances leading to this case arose,

the form in question has been modified to eliminate the

potential for confusion.1 Due to these revisions, those

circumstances will not again be presented. Thus, it is hard to

imagine what benefit can be gained by the uncertainties and

problems that inevitably will be wrought by the majority's sub

silencio overruling of our clear precedent.

¶32 I determine that the more prudent course is to take an

approach that is consistent with the purpose of the statute and

1
This case arose because of an unclear form utilized by the
Department of Corrections to notify the circuit court that the
defendant had completed his probation. The form had multiple
boxes for the probation agent to choose from—boxes indicating
whether the offender had or had not successfully completed his
probation and boxes indicating whether certain terms of
probation had been met.

Here, the probation agent checked the boxes labeled "The
offender has successfully completed his/her probation" and "All
court-ordered conditions have not been met." Based on those
seemingly inconsistent markings, the circuit court determined
that the defendant had not satisfied the terms of his probation
and denied expunction. The old form has now been modified to
include only two boxes: one indicating that the offender has
successfully completed probation and one indicating that the
offender was not successful.

1
 No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

our recent precedent. Under that approach, youthful offenders

can be deemed to have successfully completed their sentences

when they sufficiently comply with the terms of probation.

¶33 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

I

¶34 The focus of this case is Wisconsin's expunction

statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.015. It permits the expunction of an

offender's criminal record if the offender meets various

criteria, including successful completion of probation:

. . . when a person is under the age of 25 at the
time of the commission of an offense for which the
person has been found guilty in a court for violation
of a law for which the maximum period of imprisonment
is 6 years or less, the court may order at the time of
sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful
completion of the sentence if the court determines the
person will benefit and society will not be harmed by
this disposition.
Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a)(1).

¶35 "[S]uccessful completion" is defined in Wis. Stat.

§ 973.015(1m)(b). It requires an offender to have "satisfied

the conditions of probation":

A person has successfully completed the sentence if
the person has not been convicted of a subsequent
offense and, if on probation, the probation has not
been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the
conditions of probation.

¶36 Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) anticipates that a

certificate of discharge will issue upon successful completion

of probation and that the certificate "shall have the effect of
expunging the record":

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Upon successful completion of the sentence the
detaining or probationary authority shall issue a
certificate of discharge which shall be forwarded to
the court of record and which shall have the effect of
expunging the record . . . .
¶37 The majority reads this language in a manner that

severely limits an offender's ability to utilize the statute.

In doing so, it undermines the statute's purpose, overrules

recent precedent sub silencio, and creates confusion. I address

each in turn.

A

¶38 It is well established that the purpose of Wis. Stat.

§ 973.015 is "'to provide a break to young offenders who

demonstrate the ability to comply with the law' and to

'provide[] a means by which trial courts may, in appropriate

cases, shield youthful offenders from some of the harsh

consequences of criminal convictions.'" State v. Matasek, 2014

WI 27, ¶42, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811 (quoting State v.

Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶38, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341).

¶39 This is a laudable purpose given the extreme

consequences a criminal conviction can have on an individual.

As Legal Action of Wisconsin's amicus brief observes, the

consequences of a criminal conviction are both wide-ranging and

long lasting:

The American Bar Association (ABA) has identified over
38,000 statutes and regulations that impose collateral
consequences on people convicted of crimes. Over half
of these laws deny employment opportunities . . . .An
offense history that once would have languished in the
practical obscurity of an old court file, has now
become a permanent and highly stigmatized part of an
individual’s public history.

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Amicus Br. 2. The negative impact a criminal record can have on

employment is particularly troubling as "[r]esearch consistently

shows that finding quality steady employment is one of the

strongest predictors of desistance from crime." Devah Pager,

Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 Wis. L.

Rev. 617, 647.2

¶40 Thus, expunction offers not only a substantial benefit

to an offender and society, it also "offers young offenders a

fresh start without the burden of a criminal record and a second

chance at becoming law-abiding and productive members of the

community." State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶19, 359 Wis. 2d 320,

856 N.W.2d 811. It comes as no surprise then that the history

of the expunction statute "show[s] a consistent legislative

effort to expand the availability of expungement to include a

broader category of youthful offenders." Id., ¶20.

¶41 With this background, Wis. Stat. § 973.015 should be

liberally construed to provide expunction. See Marquez v.

Mercedes-Benz United States, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶23 n.19, 341
Wis. 2d 119, 815 N.W.2d 314 (citing Hughes v. Chrysler Motors

Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 983, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996)) ("remedial

2
Other collateral consequences stemming from a criminal
record include the denial of government issued licenses or
permits, ineligibility for public services and public programs,
and the elimination or impairment of civil rights. See
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Collateral%20Co
nsequences%20of%20Conviction%20Act ("the numbers and complexity
of these consequences have mushroomed and the U.S. prison
population has grown . . . There is a real concern on a societal
level that collateral consequences may impose such harsh burdens
on convicted persons that they will be unable to reintegrate
into society.").

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 No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

statutes should be liberally construed to advance the remedy the

legislature intended to provide.").

¶42 Yet, the majority interprets the expunction statute in

a manner that severely limits an offender's ability to utilize

it. Although it correctly states that an offender must "satisfy

all the conditions of probation," it seemingly adopts the

State's position that the offender's perfect compliance is

required in order to be entitled to expunction. Majority Op.,

¶13. In doing so, the majority completely ignores Ozuna's

argument that the word "satisfy" has been defined to mean "[t]o

meet or be sufficient for (a requirement)." See Satisfy, The

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (5th ed.

2017)..

¶43 The majority's approach undermines the statute's

purpose and the legislature's intent to reach a broader category

of youthful offenders. Probationers must adhere to such a

myriad of conditions that requiring perfection effectively

removes the possibility of expunction. For example, there are
the standard rules of community supervision that probationers

must follow.3 These rules range from obtaining approval prior to

borrowing money or making a purchase on credit, to reporting for

scheduled and unscheduled appointments.

¶44 Under the majority approach, an offender would be

denied expunction for missing a single unscheduled appointment

due to such unavoidable circumstances as an inability to find a

3
See http://doc.wi.gov/community-resources/Rules-of-
Community-Supervision/standard-rules-of-supervision-english.

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 No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

babysitter, getting stuck in traffic, or being unable to leave

work. That result is unreasonable and completely at odds with

the purpose of the expunction statute.

B

¶45 In addition to undermining the statute's purpose, the

majority's opinion also sub silencio overturns recent precedent.

¶46 A scant three years ago, this court considered how an

offender obtains expunction. Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320. In Hemp,

the circuit court had determined at sentencing that the

defendant was eligible for expunction conditioned upon

successful completion of probation. Id., ¶5. After the

defendant completed probation he received a certificate of

discharge from the Department of Corrections. Id., ¶6. The

circuit court, however, denied his petition for expunction

because it was "tardy". Id., ¶9.

¶47 This court examined whether Wis. Stat. § 973.015

placed any burden on the defendant to petition the circuit court

for expunction within a specific timeframe and concluded that
the duty rested on the detaining or probationary authority, not

the defendant. Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶25. We further

concluded that "once the detaining or probationary authority

forwards the certificate of discharge to the court of record,

expungement has been effectuated." Id., ¶29; see also id., ¶25

("the detaining or probationary authority must forward the

certificate of discharge to the court of record upon the

individual defendant's successful completion of his sentence and
at that point the process of expungement is self-executing.");

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 No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

id., ¶32 ("the forwarding of the certificate of discharge to the

circuit court is what triggers expungement").

¶48 In explaining the holding, this court specifically

rejected the notion that a certificate of discharge must be

approved by the circuit court prior to a grant of expunction.

Id., ¶36. We recognized that any inference necessitating

circuit court approval would be "impos[ing] additional

requirements that are contrary to the statute's plain language."

Id. We repeatedly emphasized that the circuit court's role with

respect to expunction was limited to its decision at sentencing.

Id., ¶¶39, 40, 42. Thereafter, the determination of whether a

probationer had successfully completed probation was effectively

left to those in the best position to evaluate it: the probation

agents.

¶49 The majority now reinserts the circuit court into the

process of effectuating expunction. It declares that "a

person's statutory entitlement to expungement depends not on

whether the court receives a particular notice from the DOC
. . . " and that "it is proper for a circuit court to deny

expungement if a defendant has not met all three criteria for

the 'successful completion of the sentence . . . .'" Majority

Op., ¶14.

¶50 These declarations cannot be squared with the holdings

in Hemp. A certificate of discharge cannot be the trigger for

automatically effectuating expunction if the circuit court has

the option to review it and make an independent determination on
the matter. Under the majority's analysis, expunction is no

7
 No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

longer automatic or self-executing as Hemp mandated. Further,

no longer is it the probation agent that exclusively determines

whether an offender has successfully completed probation. By

reintroducing the circuit court into the expunction process

after the DOC has issued its certificate of discharge, the

majority unequivocally, yet sub silencio, overrules Hemp, 359

Wis. 2d 320.4

C

¶51 In overruling Hemp, the majority creates confusion for

circuit courts and litigants alike.

¶52 It is now unclear what will happen when a certificate

of discharge is issued. Will it trigger expunction——as the

plain language of the statute requires? See Wis. Stat.

§ 973.015(1m)(b) ("a certificate of discharge which shall be

forwarded to the court of record and which shall have the effect

of expunging the record . . . ." (emphasis added)).

¶53 Or will the court opt to review it——in clear violation

of the Hemp holding? See Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶32 ("the
forwarding of the certificate of discharge to the circuit court

4
Recently, 2017 A.B. 331 was introduced in the Wisconsin
Legislature to amend Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m). The proposed
legislation would allow for the filing of a petition for
expunction with the sentencing court after completion of the
sentence. The Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) analysis
explains: "Current law specifies that the expungement order
must be made only at sentencing and then the record is expunged
when the person completes his or her sentence." The LRB's
description of current law is in accord with the plain meaning
interpretation set forth in this dissent and underscores that
the majority is indeed sub silencio overruling Hemp.

8
 No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

is what triggers expungement"); id., ¶29 ("once the detaining or

probationary authority forwards the certificate of discharge to

the court of record, expungement has been effectuated."); id.,

¶25 ("the detaining or probationary authority must forward the

certificate of discharge to the court of record upon the

individual defendant's successful completion of his sentence and

at that point the process of expungement is self-executing.").

¶54 What criteria will the court use to decide whether to

review the certificate of discharge? What procedures will a

court follow if it decides to review a certificate of discharge?

¶55 Also left unanswered is what happens if there is a

factual debate over whether the offender has satisfied the terms

of probation. Must the court hold a hearing? Will the offender

have a chance to appear and argue the case? What is the impact

of this disarray?

¶56 Rather than providing guidance, the majority leaves a

void. It suggests that because Ozuna is not contesting the

facts, this case "is not the proper vehicle in which to set
forth the procedures a court is to follow when such factual

matters are disputed." Majority op., ¶14 n.9. It further

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 No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

expresses its "confidence" in the circuit court's ability "to

resolve such matters fairly." Id.5

¶57 The majority's confidence provides cold comfort for a

youthful offender hoping to get a second chance through

expunction.

¶58 Because the most likely result of the majority's

decision is that circuit courts will adopt ad hoc procedures, an

offender's chance at expunction could come down to which court

receives the offender's certificate of discharge. This poses a

whole host of future due process concerns. By creating an

opportunity for circuit courts to review whether the terms of

probation have been met, and failing to provide any guidance on

how to do so, the majority creates more problems than it has

solved, leaving confusion in its wake.

II

5
We previously declined the opportunity to revamp our
supreme court rule on expunction. On June 30, 2009, the Board of
Governors of the State Bar of Wisconsin filed a rules petition
seeking changes to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) Ch. 72 (Retention
and Maintenance of Court Record). The petition also asked this
court to amend SCR 72.06 (Expunction). After public hearing and
further discussion the court took no action on the petition, in
part because it was aware that the Wisconsin State Legislature
was then planning to establish a committee to study the issue of
expunction. In ensuing years, a number of legislative proposals
have been introduced to address the issue, but none has advanced
to fruition. Ultimately, this court voted to dismiss the
petition and await further legislative action. For a more
detailed history of the petition, see S.Ct. Order 09-07 (issued
July 19, 2016).

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 No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

¶59 Contrary to the majority, I would interpret the

expunction statute in a manner consistent with its remedial

purpose. See State v. Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 470, 646

N.W.2d 341 (2002). ("A cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is

that an interpretation supporting the purpose of the statute is

favored over an interpretation that will defeat the manifest

objective of the statute.").

¶60 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of

the statute. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cty.,

2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. Where the

language is ambiguous, a court may consult extrinsic sources,

such as the statute's purpose and legislative history, to

discern a statute's meaning. Id., ¶48.

¶61 Here, both litigants present reasonable meanings for

the words "satisfied the conditions of probation." The State

contends that it means perfect compliance with the terms of

probation, while Ozuna pointed to a dictionary definition of

"satisfy" that reads "[t]o meet or be sufficient for (a
requirement)". Satisfy, The American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language, (5th ed. 2017) (emphasis added). Thus, the

statute is ambiguous. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47 ("a statute

is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably

well-informed persons in two or more senses.").6

6
This court has previously recognized statutory ambiguity
created by use of the word "satisfy". Abitz v. Abitz, 155
Wis. 2d 161, 172 455 N.W.2d 609 (1990) (referring to "the
ambiguous word 'satisfy' in sec. 766.55(2)(c), Stats.").

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 No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

¶62 As discussed above, the purpose of the expunction

statute is well established. It is a remedial statute meant "to

provide a break to young offenders who demonstrate the ability

to comply with the law," which the legislature has consistently

sought to expand. Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶38; see also Hemp,

359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶20. Accordingly, using the definition of

"satisfy" that permits expunction when an offender has

"sufficiently" complied with the terms of probation is more

consistent with the purpose of the statute than using a

definition that would limit expunction to offenders with have

"perfect" compliance.

¶63 A definition of "satisfy" that is based on sufficiency

instead of perfection is also supported by the statute's

legislative history.

¶64 In 1983 the legislature amended the definition for

"successful completion of a sentence" provided in Wis. Stat.

§ 973.015(1m)(b). The initial draft of the amendment stated

that in order for a probationer to successfully complete a
sentence, the probationer "must not violate any conditions of

probation." Drafting file for 1983 Wis. Act 519, Legislative

Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. This language was replaced with

the current language stating that to successfully complete a

sentence, a probationer "must also satisfy the conditions of

probation." It appears the legislature expressly considered

requiring perfect compliance with the terms of probation and

rejected it.

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 No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

¶65 I turn now to apply the definition of "satisfy" based

on sufficiency to the case at hand. Although the form from the

Department of Corrections indicates that Ozuna violated the term

of probation prohibiting any alcohol use (it noted a single

citation for underage drinking), no significant violations were

reported. Indeed, the Department of Corrections indicated that

Ozuna's compliance with the terms of probation was sufficient by

checking the box labeled "the offender has successfully

completed his/her probation." Accordingly, I conclude that

Ozuna successfully completed his sentence.

¶66 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.015 provides that when an

offender has successfully completed his sentence, and the

probation authority has forwarded a certificate of discharge to

the court, it shall have the effect of expunging the offender's

record.7 Here, because Ozuna successfully completed probation,

expunction should have been granted automatically when the DOC's

verification was received by the court. Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320,

¶29. Therefore, the court of appeals should be reversed.
III

¶67 In sum, the majority opinion makes no sense to me.

It defies:

7
In this case the Department of Corrections (DOC) issued a
Verification Form, rather than a certificate of discharge. That
is because the DOC does not issue certificates of discharge to
misdemeanants. See Wis. Admin. Code DOC § 328.16(2).
Nevertheless, the DOC is required to notify the court of a
probationer's successful completion of sentence. Wis. Stat.
§ 973.09(5)(c). It does so through the Verification Form, which
serves as the functional equivalent of a certificate of
discharge for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 973.015.

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 No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb

 the purpose of the statue;

 the statutory directive that where a certificate
of discharge has issued it "shall have the effect
of expunging the record . . . ." Wis. Stat.
§ 973.015(1m)(b);

 a reasonable interpretation of the word
"satisfies" that is more consistent with the
statute's purpose and legislative history;

 our clear and recent precedent; and

 reality (the majority's apparent demand for
absolute perfection is unmoored from the reality
of the lives of many youthful offenders).

¶68 It is unclear to me why the majority has bent over

backwards to reach its confusing conclusion. What is clear,

however, is just how devastating the majority opinion is to the

health of our justice system and to the lives of many youthful

offenders.

¶69 With the stroke of a pen, the majority has inexorably

altered the trajectory of those lives. They will forever wear

the scarlet letter of convicted criminal and, together with

their families, face a future of collateral consequences for

their youthful convictions.

¶70 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully

dissent.

¶71 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S.

ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.

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1