MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 20 2017, 10:38 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeremy K. Nix Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Huntington, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
A.H., December 20, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
90A04-1705-JV-1038
v. Appeal from the Wells Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kenton W.
Appellee-Plaintiff Kiracofe, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
90C01-1305-JD-23
May, Judge.
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[1] A.H. appeals the trial court’s entry of a dispositional order that placed him in
the Department of Correction. A.H. claims the court abused its discretion
because Pierceton Woods Academy, where A.H. was already placed, “was the
least restrictive setting available,” (Br. of Appellant at 8), and his family could
engage in therapy while he was there. Because the evidence in the record
supports the trial court’s decision being within its broad discretion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In May 2013, the State filed a petition alleging thirteen-year-old A.H. was a
delinquent for committing five counts of touching that would constitute Class B
misdemeanor battery 1 if committed by an adult. Specifically, the State alleged
A.H. touched the leg, butt, or breast of five female middle school students
during school. The juvenile court found support for three of those allegations
and adjudicated A.H. a delinquent based thereon.
[3] In June 2013, following its adjudication, the juvenile court placed A.H. on
probation for eighteen months. In November 2013, the State filed a petition to
modify that disposition. 2 In March 2014, a motion for emergency change of
A.H.’s residence was filed, and the court granted that motion on April 3, 2014. 3
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.
2
The Chronological Case Summary (“CCS”) indicates the court ruled on that petition in December 2013,
but does not indicate how the court ruled. (See App. Vol. II at 4.)
3
The CCS does not indicate where A.H. was moved or why. Nor does the record contain a petition or order
regarding this move.
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On April 16, 2014, the court changed A.H.’s address to “George Junior
Republic.” (App. Vol. II at 5.) Then, in June 2014, another emergency motion
for change of residence was filed, but the record before us does not indicate
what action the court took in response thereto. The trial court held
dispositional review hearings thereafter, but the record before us does not
indicate what the court found or ordered.
[4] On June 9, 2016, another emergency change of residence motion was filed,
asking the court to move A.H. from “Resolute” to Pierceton Woods Academy
because of a “lack of progress.” (Id. at 35.) A few days later, the court ordered
A.H. moved to Pierceton Woods Academy, where he was to receive treatment
that should last between nine and twelve months. The treatment required A.H.
to disclose all sexual touching and demonstrate by lie detector test that he had
disclosed all sexual touching. A.H. failed two polygraph tests and, therefore,
could not advance in the treatment, so the court held another review hearing to
determine whether A.H. should remain at Pierceton Woods. After that
hearing, the court moved A.H. from Pierceton Woods to the Department of
Correction.
Discussion and Decision
[5] We initially note that “the purpose of the juvenile process is vastly different
from the criminal justice system.” R.H. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010). The goal of juvenile proceedings is “rehabilitation so that the youth
will not become a criminal as an adult.” Id. (emphasis in original). To
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facilitate this goal, juvenile courts have a number of options available for
juvenile placement: “from a private home in the community, a licensed foster
home, a local juvenile detention center, to State institutions[.]” Jordan v. State,
512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987).
[6] To assist juvenile courts in selecting amongst available placement alternatives,
the Indiana Legislature has provided guidance regarding the option to be
selected for any particular child:
If consistent with the safety of the community and the best
interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional
decree that:
(1) is:
(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most
appropriate setting available; and
(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best
interest and special needs of the child;
(2) least interferes with family autonomy;
(3) is least disruptive of family life;
(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the
child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and
(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the
child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.
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Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6. Within those parameters, a juvenile court has
discretion in choosing the disposition appropriate for each juvenile delinquent,
D.E. v. State, 962 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), and we review its
disposition for an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 97. An abuse of discretion
occurs if the court’s decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before it, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions
to be drawn therefrom.” Id.
[7] A.H. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by not keeping him at
Pierceton Woods, because he had rapport with his therapist, he and his parents
were able to engage in family therapy, and it was closer to his home. While we
appreciate the facts A.H. cites, those facts cannot, amidst the other facts in the
record, demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the juvenile court.
[8] Brian Barnes, A.H.’s case manager at Pierceton Woods, testified that although
A.H. has good rapport with this therapist and continues to disclose times when
he has inappropriately touched others, the therapeutic team has “concern
[about] the pace at which [A.H. is] going.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 6.) A.H. has been in
the program eleven months, and the very soonest he could finish is five months
away, which puts him well past the nine to twelve months typically required for
this sex-offender treatment. Delay is occurring because A.H. has not yet
disclosed all inappropriate touching, A.H. is not completing therapeutic
workbook assignments without prompting, and A.H. continues to touch others
inappropriately even while in the treatment program at Pierceton Woods.
Barnes also testified the therapeutic team “does not forecast [A.H.] will
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significantly benefit from more time [at Pierceton Woods], but we’re still
willing to continue services.” (Id. at 16.)
[9] After argument of counsel and comments from A.H. and his parents, the trial
court explained:
I think, at this point – I just don’t know that there’s – there’s not
much we can do, and so – um – you know, I’ve just – we – I’ve
waited, we’ve – we’ve – it’s – we’re past that point. I’m going to
– more of a concerning [sic] to me is that you continue to
perpetrate new places – new things – here, despite all the
counseling, all the therapy. Um – you know, as [the prosecutor]
stated, if you do this when you’re an adult in a few months here –
um – there are criminal consequences, but at this point, I don’t
know that the Court has any other – any other – uh – options at
this point. As [the prosecutor said] – I have three options:
continue to do what we’re doing, which, so far, I – I think has
not been successful; do nothing, get you off the program, which I
have concerns about considering the incre – you know, more
offenses while you’ve been in therapy; or Department of
Corrections. And I’m – I’m choosing the option of the
Department of Corrections today.
(Id. at 25.)
[10] As the trial court noted, by the time of the hearing, based on the delinquency
adjudication from 2013, A.H. had been in the juvenile system for forty-three
months. During that time, the court had moved him to progressively more
restrictive placements, and yet A.H., by his own admissions, continued to touch
people inappropriately. He had been at Pierceton Woods for eleven months,
but was not progressing with sexual offender treatment because he either could
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not or would not disclose all the inappropriate touching that had occurred
either by or against him, and the treatment team there did not believe A.H. was
likely to make more progress. As the goal of the juvenile system is to
rehabilitate youth so they do not become criminals as adults, and as A.H. was
nearing his eighteenth birthday without any of his placements dissuading him
from continuing to touch others inappropriately, we cannot say the court
abused its discretion by modifying A.H.’s placement to a more restrictive
environment. See, e.g., D.E., 962 N.E.2d at 97 (no abuse of discretion in
placement of juvenile at DOC where less-restrictive dispositions had been
unsuccessful).
Conclusion
[11] The evidence in the record demonstrates the trial court was within its discretion
to determine the Department of Correction was the least restrictive setting that
was appropriate for A.H. Accordingly, we affirm.
[12] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
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