02/13/2018
DA 16-0579
Case Number: DA 16-0579
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2018 MT 22N
IN THE MATTER OF:
C.G.,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DI 16-39A
Honorable Amy Eddy, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Moses Okeyo, Assistant Appellate
Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Ryan Aikin, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Ed Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney, Caitlin Overland, Deputy County
Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 17, 2018
Decided: February 13, 2018
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 C.G. appeals from an order of the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County,
involuntarily committing her to a community treatment facility for up to five days. We
affirm.
¶3 C.G.’s commitment followed an incident in July 2016, where C.G. swam
approximately 100 yards out into Lake McDonald in Glacier National Park and refused to
return to shore. At the time, C.G., age 24, lived in a recreational vehicle with Birch
Bergeson (Bergeson), her boyfriend, and her three young children, ages five, one and
one-half, and four months. Law enforcement in a boat rescued C.G. from the water. C.G.
appeared to be disoriented and struggled to provide her children’s names when asked. Law
enforcement transported C.G. to Pathways Behavioral Health Center (Pathways).
¶4 Subsequently, the State filed a petition seeking C.G.’s involuntary commitment to
the Montana State Hospital (MSH) for a period not to exceed three months. The State’s
petition alleged C.G. suffers from a mental disorder and requires commitment. Five days
after the State filed its petition, the District Court held an adjudicatory hearing. At the
hearing, several witnesses testified. Bergeson testified on C.G.’s behalf. Bergeson testified
that C.G. is a great mother, but is “stressed” and suffered a “meltdown” when she swam
2
out into the lake. Bergeson implied that C.G. may be suffering from postpartum
depression. C.G. testified that she went swimming in the lake simply because she was hot
and that law enforcement did not need to rescue her. C.G. also testified that she suffers
from post-traumatic stress disorder and being confined at Pathways away from her children
is “torture.”
¶5 Dr. Todd Shumard (Shumard), a psychiatrist at Pathways, testified that C.G. has
schizoaffective disorder and is labile, or emotionally unstable. Shumard reviewed C.G.’s
mental health history and saw that she was admitted to Pathways as a teenager because of
mood instability and delusional, magical thinking. Shumard testified about C.G.’s
behavior during her current admission at Pathways. According to Shumard, C.G. was
reluctant to eat or bathe, was threatening toward others, got too close to others, and grabbed
her therapist’s face. Shumard testified that C.G. was taking one type of medication, but
not the other recommended types, and her mental health was improving. At the time of the
hearing, Shumard testified that he did not believe C.G. “could adequately manage herself
without some outside help.” Shumard recognized C.G. struggled at Pathways because she
was separated from her children, but expressed concern about her safety and ability to care
for herself if she were released. Shumard testified that C.G. would benefit from a few more
days away from her children, but that a lengthy commitment to MSH would likely
exacerbate her mental health issues.
¶6 Following the adjudicatory hearing, the District Court concluded C.G., because of
her schizoaffective disorder, could not provide for her own health and safety and was a
threat to herself and others. The District Court determined that placing C.G. in a
3
community environment was the least restrictive option. The District Court ordered C.G.’s
commitment to Pathways for no more than five days.
¶7 On appeal, C.G. argues the District Court erred by concluding, under
§ 53-21-126(1)(a), (c), MCA, that she was unable to provide for her own basic needs and
was in imminent threat of injuring herself or others. If, during its consideration of a petition
for involuntary commitment, a court determines that the respondent is suffering from a
mental disorder, “the court shall then determine whether the respondent requires
commitment.” Section 53-21-126(1), MCA. In making its determination, the court shall
consider:
(a) whether the respondent, because of a mental disorder, is substantially
unable to provide for the respondent’s own basic needs of food, clothing,
shelter, health, or safety;
. . .
(c) whether, because of a mental disorder, there is an imminent threat of
injury to the respondent or to others because of the respondent’s acts or
omissions; . . . .
Section 53-21-126(1)(a), (c), MCA. Further, “Imminent threat of self-inflicted injury or
injury to others must be proved by overt acts or omissions, sufficiently recent in time as to
be material and relevant as to the respondent’s present condition.” Section 53-21-126(2),
MCA.
¶8 Here, evidence established that C.G. swam into a lake and refused to return, which
resulted in her rescue and initial placement at Pathways. The District Court concluded
C.G. swimming a long distance into a lake and refusing to return represented her intention
to cause herself injury. C.G.’s boyfriend testified that by “swimming into McDonald Lake,
4
and, you know, being kind of nonresponsive,” C.G. had a “little bit of a meltdown.”
Evidence of this incident demonstrated the recent “overt act” contemplated by
§ 53-21-126(2), MCA, and attributable to C.G.’s mental disorder. Shumard testified that,
based on her behavior at Pathways, C.G. could not provide for her own basic needs. This
evidence supports the District Court’s conclusions that C.G. could not provide for her own
health and safety and that there was an imminent threat of injury requiring her commitment.
The District Court did not err in involuntarily committing C.G. under § 53-21-126(1)(a),
(c), MCA.
¶9 Additionally, C.G. argues the District Court relied on inadmissible hearsay in
making its determinations. Specifically, C.G. argues Shumard’s testimony was not based
on personal knowledge, but a review of her admission records. Evidence inadmissible for
one purpose may be admissible for another. In re C.K., 2017 MT 69, ¶ 18, 387 Mont. 127,
391 P.3d 735 (citing M. R. Evid. 105). If information is reasonably relied upon by experts
in the expert’s field, “an expert may base his or her opinion or inference on otherwise
inadmissible evidence or facts not in evidence.” In re C.K., ¶ 18 (citing M. R. Evid. 703).
The evidence relied upon by an expert in forming his or her opinion is admitted for the
limited purpose of “aid[ing] the finder of fact in assessing the credibility and reliability of
the expert’s opinion,” not as “substantive evidence of the matter asserted therein.” In re
C.K., ¶ 21. Here, Shumard’s opinion that C.G. could not adequately care for herself
without help was based in part on his review of her admission records. We conclude that
the District Court appropriately considered Shumard’s opinion for the limited purpose of
determining whether C.G. required commitment.
5
¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents
no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent
or modify existing precedent.
¶11 Affirmed.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We Concur:
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
6