FOURTH DIVISION
DILLARD, C. J.,
DOYLE, P. J., and MERCIER, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 19, 2018
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A18A0182. KING v. THE STATE.
DILLARD, Chief Judge.
Following trial, a jury convicted Demarc King on one count of aggravated child
molestation and one count of sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of child
molestation. King now appeals his convictions and the denial of his motion for new
trial, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior conviction,
improperly commenting on the evidence, in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57, while
limiting the scope of his closing argument, and stating that a child cannot consent to
sexual conduct in its instruction to the jury regarding the offense of sexual battery.
For the reasons set forth infra, we hold that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of King’s prior conviction. Accordingly, we reverse his convictions and remand the
case for a new trial.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,1 the evidence shows
that in March 2011, King, his wife, their six-year-old daughter, M. K., and their four-
year-old daughter, K. K., moved from Illinois to live with King’s sister and her
twelve-year-old daughter, A. K., in Lithonia, Georgia. On July 1, 2011, King’s wife
returned home from work and saw that King was in their bedroom with A. K.,
watching funny videos on a laptop computer. Thinking nothing of it, she went to the
bathroom and began taking a shower. Once his wife was in the shower, King tried to
pull down A. K.’s pants and touch her vagina. A. K. immediately moved away, but
King tried again to pull down her pants and touch her. At that point, A. K. yelled at
King to stop and fled to her mother’s bedroom, despite knowing that her mother was
at work. King followed her and threatened to get her in trouble if she told anyone.
Nevertheless, as soon as her aunt (King’s wife) finished her shower, A. K., visibly
upset and crying, told her about King’s actions.
Following A. K.’s outcry, King’s wife confronted him. And although King
denied doing anything inappropriate, his wife was not persuaded. Consequently, she
1
See, e.g., Powell v. State, 310 Ga. App. 144, 144 (712 SE2d 139) (2011)
(“When reviewing a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, and the defendant no
longer enjoys the presumption of innocence.” (punctuation omitted)).
2
took her niece and two daughters and left the house to go to the home of another
relative. During that drive, King’s wife asked all three girls if anyone had ever tried
to hurt them. M. K. responded that she would get in trouble if she answered. But after
her mother assured her that she would not get in trouble, M. K. responded that her
father, King, put his penis in her mouth on several separate occasions and warned her
not to tell anyone about it. Shortly after M. K.’s disclosure, King’s wife informed his
sister about A. K. and M. K.’s revelations. King’s sister then reported her brother’s
actions to the police. And a few months later, after both A. K. and M. K. recounted
King’s actions to child-advocacy workers during forensic interviews, the police
arrested him.
Subsequently, the State charged King, via indictment, with one count of
aggravated child molestation, based on the allegation that he placed his penis in M.
K.’s mouth, and one count of child molestation, based on the allegation that he
touched A. K.’s vagina. Approximately a month before trial, the State filed a notice
of its intent to present evidence of King’s prior bad act, ostensibly under OCGA §§
24-4-404 (b), 24-4-413, and 24-4-414. Specifically, the State sought to admit
evidence that King pleaded guilty in an Illinois court to the crime of aggravated
criminal sexual abuse. King filed a response, and in a hearing held just prior to jury
3
selection, the trial court ruled that the evidence of King’s prior conviction was
admissible.
The case then proceeded to trial, during which the aforementioned evidence
was presented. In addition, King presented evidence that a few years before the
subject incident, A. K. accused her father of inappropriately touching her but the
police eventually closed the investigation due to lack of evidence. Nevertheless, at
the trial’s conclusion, the jury found King guilty of the aggravated-child-molestation
charge and of sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of the child-molestation
charge. Thereafter, King obtained new counsel and filed a motion for new trial, which
the trial court denied. This appeal follows.2
1. King contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior
Illinois conviction under OCGA §§ 24-4-413 and 24-4-414. Specifically, he argues
that the trial court erred by failing to conduct the balancing test set forth in OCGA §
2
Although King has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, we have
reviewed the record and find the evidence sufficient to enable a jury to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that King was guilty of the crimes of which he was
convicted. See West v. State, 339 Ga. App. 279, 281 (1) (793 SE2d 180) (2016)
(holding that child victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to authorize a guilty
verdict on sexual-battery charge); Hill v. State, 331 Ga. App. 280, 283 (1) (b) (769
SE2d 179) (2015) (holding that victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to support
defendant’s conviction for aggravated child molestation); see generally Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
4
24-4-403 and by ultimately admitting evidence of allegations that the State failed to
prove constituted a crime under Georgia law. We agree the State failed to prove that
the allegations for which King was convicted in Illinois constituted an offense under
OCGA §§ 24-4-413 or 24-4-414 in Georgia, and thus, the trial court erred in
admitting the prior conviction.
As an initial matter, we note—and both the State and King acknowledge—that
because this case was tried after January 1, 2013, our new Evidence Code applies.3
Turning to the statutes at issue, OCGA § 24-4-413 (a) provides: “In a criminal
proceeding in which the accused is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence
of the accused’s commission of another offense of sexual assault shall be admissible
and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”
Similarly, OCGA § 24-4-414 (a) provides: “In a criminal proceeding in which the
accused is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the accused’s
commission of another offense of child molestation shall be admissible and may be
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” Thus, OCGA §§ 24-
4-413 (“Rule 413”) and 24-4-414 (“Rule 414”) “are the more specific statutes that
3
See Ga. L. 2011, pp. 99, 214, § 101 (providing that Georgia’s new Evidence
Code applies “to any motion made or hearing or trial commenced on or after” January
1, 2013).
5
supersede the provisions of Rule 404 (b) in sexual assault and child molestation
cases.”4 Importantly, Rules 413 and 414 create “a rule of inclusion, with a strong
presumption in favor of admissibility, and the State can seek to admit evidence under
these provisions for any relevant purpose, including propensity.”5 And a trial court’s
decision to admit other acts evidence “will be overturned only [when] there is a clear
abuse of discretion.”6
In this matter, as previously mentioned, the State filed notice of its intent to
present evidence that King pleaded guilty in an Illinois court to the crime of
4
Robinson v. State, 342 Ga. App. 624, 633-34 (4) (a) (805 SE2d 103) (2017)
(punctuation omitted); see Dixon v. State, 341 Ga. App. 255, 258 (1) (800 SE2d 11)
(2017) (noting that Rule 413 and Rule 414 “supersede the provisions of OCGA §
24-4-404 (b) in sexual assault and child molestation cases”).
5
Robinson, 342 Ga. App. at 634 (4) (a) (punctuation omitted); see Dixon, 341
Ga. App. at 258 (1) (acknowledging that Rules 413 and 414 “create a ‘rule of
inclusion, with a strong presumption in favor of admissibility as each provides that
such evidence ‘shall be admissible’” (punctuation omitted)); see also State v. Frost,
297 Ga. 296, 300-01 (773 SE2d 700) (2015) (holding that OCGA § 24-4-417,
applying to DUI cases is a “rule of inclusion,” with a stronger presumption of
admissibility than OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) as it provides that such evidence “shall be
admissible”); Ronald L. Carlson & Michael Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence 214
(5th ed. 2016) (noting that Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, which OCGA §§
24-4-413 and 24-4-414 closely track, “create presumptions in favor of admission of
the defendant’s other sexual offenses in sex crimes prosecutions”).
6
Robinson, 342 Ga. App. at 634 (4) (a) (punctuation omitted); accord Steele
v. State, 337 Ga. App. 562, 565-66 (3) (788 SE2d 145) (2016).
6
aggravated criminal sexual abuse, under former Illinois statute,7 720 ILCS 5/12-16
(d), which provides: “A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that
person commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who is
at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age and the person is at least 5 years
older than the victim.” Then, at the pretrial hearing on the issue, the State provided
the trial court with what it alleged was the factual background to King’s guilty plea.
Specifically, the State claimed that in 2006, a 15-year-old friend of King’s wife
dropped off some food at his apartment, and while she was there, King pushed her
onto a bed and forced her to have sexual intercourse. Subsequently, the victim
reported the incident to the police, and King ultimately pleaded guilty to aggravated
sexual abuse. And based on these facts, the State argued that King’s guilty plea and
conviction were presumptively admissible under Rules 413 and 414.
In response, King’s trial counsel asserted that Rule 413 applied to different
offenses than Rule 414, and he thus argued that because King was currently facing
child-molestation charges, the Illinois conviction, which was more analogous to a
sexual-assault offense, was not sufficiently similar. Counsel then further argued that
7
In 2011, this statute was renumbered as 720 ILCS 5/11-1.60 (d). See P.A. 96-
1551, Art. 2, § 5 (effective July 1, 2011).
7
the trial court should apply a balancing test and exclude it from evidence. In further
support of this contention, King’s trial counsel disputed the State’s claim that the
Illinois victim was 15 years old and asserted that she was 16 years old, which in
Georgia is the age of majority. Continuing, trial counsel argued that if the incident
had occurred in Georgia “it would not have been any type of child case” because
“[s]he would have been the age of majority.” But the trial court was not persuaded.
And explaining why it did not agree that the prior conviction and the charged
offenses were not similar, it noted:
I will not accept that distinction. Sexual assault is sexual assault.
Whether it is called child molestation, or rape, or aggravated sodomy,
it is a sexual offense. I would believe that as far as your motion for
similar transactions, it is admissible under both provisions. Balancing
out, it is clearly similar in nature as the case that we have before the
Court, and presumptively, it should be admitted under the second
provision. So your motion to prevent that similar transaction evidence
not to be presented is denied.
Later, during the same pretrial hearing, the trial court asked the State how it intended
to present the evidence of prior bad acts, and the State replied that it expected the
victim and the lead detective in the Illinois case to testify. But just before the State
rested, it informed the Court that it would present this evidence solely by introducing
8
and publishing a certified copy of King’s indictment and conviction. King again
objected, but the trial court denied it, and the evidence was admitted via these
documents.
As noted supra, King argues that the trial court erred by admitting his prior
conviction without conducting the balancing test set forth in OCGA § 24-4-403 and
by admitting evidence of allegations that the State failed to prove constituted a crime
under Georgia law.8 King is correct that evidence admissible under OCGA § 24-4-
414 (a) may be excluded under Rule 403 if “the trial court concludes that its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury.”9 But pretermitting whether the trial court conducted
8
In its appellate brief, the State argues that King failed to object after the trial
court ruled that his prior conviction was admissible and, therefore, the court’s ruling
is subject only to review for plain error. See Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 326 (781
SE2d 772) (2016) (explaining that, under the new Evidence Code, evidentiary rulings
are subject to plain-error review when a defendant did not object to such rulings at
trial). But the trial court ruled definitively at the pretrial hearing that the prior
conviction would be admissible, and “[o]nce the court makes a definitive ruling on
the record admitting or excluding any evidence, either at or before trial, a party need
not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve such claim of error for appeal.”
Anthony v. State, 298 Ga. 827, 831-832 (4) (785 SE2d 277) (2016) (punctuation
omitted); see OCGA § 24-1-103 (a).
9
Jackson v. State, 342 Ga. App. 689, 692 (805 SE2d 457) (2017) (punctuation
omitted); see State v. McPherson, 341 Ga. App. 871, 874 (800 SE2d 389) (2017)
(holding that evidence admissible under Rules 413 and 414 may be excluded if the
9
such a balancing test here, we agree that King’s prior conviction was erroneously
admitted because the State failed to prove the allegations supporting that conviction
constituted an offense under OCGA §§ 24-4-413 or 24-4-414.
In defining what constitutes an offense under OCGA § 24-4-413 (a), OCGA
§ 24-4-413 (d) provides:
As used in this Code section, the term “offense of sexual assault” means
any conduct or attempt or conspiracy to engage in:
(1) Conduct that would be a violation of Code Section 16-6-1
[rape], 16-6-2 [aggravated sodomy], 16-6-3 [statutory rape], 16-6-5.1
[sexual assault], 16-6-22 [incest], 16-6-22.1 [sexual battery], or
16-6-22.2 [aggravated sexual battery];
(2) Any crime that involves contact, without consent, between any
part of the accused’s body or an object and the genitals or anus of
another person;
trial court concludes its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury); see also OCGA §
24-4-403 (“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.”).
10
(3) Any crime that involves contact, without consent, between the
genitals or anus of the accused and any part of another person’s body;
or
(4) Any crime that involves deriving sexual pleasure or
gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain
on another person.
And other than the offenses of statutory rape and incest, the commonality of the
offenses defined by this subsection is lack of consent.
Similarly, defining what constitutes an offense under OCGA § 24-4-414 (a),
OCGA § 24-4-414 (d) provides:
As used in this Code section, the term “offense of child molestation”
means any conduct or attempt or conspiracy to engage in:
(1) Conduct that would be a violation of Code Section 16-6-4
[child molestation], 16-6-5 [enticing a child], 16-12-100 [sexual
exploitation of children], 16-12-100.2 [computer child pornography], or
16-12-100.3 [obscene telephone contact with a child];
(2) Any crime that involves contact between any part of the
accused’s body or an object and the genitals or anus of a child;
(3) Any crime that involves contact between the genitals or anus
of the accused and any part of the body of a child; or
11
(4) Any crime that involves deriving sexual pleasure or
gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain
on a child.
The obvious commonality linking the offenses defined in this subsection is that the
victim is a child, i.e., without the ability to consent.
In this matter, as discussed supra, the State presented evidence that King
pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse under former Illinois statute, 720
ILCS 5/12-16 (d), which provides: “A person commits aggravated criminal sexual
abuse if that person commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a
victim who is at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age and the person is at
least 5 years older than the victim.” But rather than presenting any testimony to
establish the factual basis for King’s guilty plea, the State only introduced the
indictment, which charged the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse by
alleging that King “committed an act of sexual penetration with [the victim], who was
at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age, said act involving the penis of the
defendant and the vagina of [the victim], and defendant Demarc King was at least 5
years older than [the victim].” Importantly, the State presented no evidence during
trial as to the specific age of the Illinois victim, providing instead only the alleged age
12
range via the indictment. This failure is problematic because while in Illinois
engaging in the act, as alleged in the indictment, with a 16-year-old victim is a crime,
it is not a crime in Georgia. Indeed, the age of consent in Georgia is 16.10
Consequently, generally speaking, it is not a crime in Georgia to “have physical
sexual contact with a willing participant who is 16 years of age or older.”11 And no
language in the count of the Illinois indictment to which King pleaded guilty alleges
lack of consent by the victim. Thus, the State failed to show that the Illinois victim
was a minor under Georgia law or that King engaged in sexual intercourse with her
without her consent. As a result, the State failed to prove that King’s prior conviction
constituted evidence of his “commission of another offense”12 under the plain
meaning of either OCGA §§ 24-4-413 or 24-4-414.13
10
See Chase v. State, 285 Ga. 693, 696 (2) (681 SE2d 116) (2009); accord
Disabato v. State, 303 Ga. App. 68, 70 (1) (692 SE2d 701) (2010).
11
Chase, 285 Ga. at 696 (2).
12
See OCGA §§ 24-4-413 (a), 24-4-414 (a) (emphasis supplied).
13
See United States v. McGarity, 669 F3d 1218, 1244 (V) (B) (11th Cir. 2012)
(holding that admission of evidence under FRE 414 requires that the accused be
charged with an offense of child molestation and that the other act also be defined as
an offense of child molestation); United States v. Rogers, 587 F3d 816, 819-20 (II)
(7th Cir. 2009) (noting that two criteria must be satisfied to apply FRE 413: first, the
defendant must be accused of an offense of sexual assault, and second, the prior act
13
Furthermore, although the State’s notice of its intent to present evidence of
other bad acts referenced OCGA § 24-4-404 (b), in addition to §§ 24-4-413 and 24-4-
414, ultimately, the State did not seek to admit King’s prior conviction under Rule
404 (b), which provides that
“[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including,
but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”14
And the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that in order for evidence to be
admissible under this Code section,
the State must make a showing that: (1) evidence of extrinsic, or other,
acts is relevant to an issue other than a defendant’s character; (2) the
must be an offense of sexual assault); United States v. Blue Bird, 372 F3d 989, 992
(II) (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that in order for evidence of bad conduct to be
admissible under FRE 413, such evidence must fit into one of the offenses listed in
that rule), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Pirani, 406 F3d
545, 555 (III) (8th Cir. 2005). As Georgia’s new evidence rules mirror their federal
counterparts, our appellate courts “look for guidance to the decisions of the federal
appellate courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh
Circuit, interpreting the federal rules in question.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 185
(2) (a) (787 SE2d 221) (2016).
14
See OCGA § 24-4-404 (b).
14
probative value of the other acts evidence is not substantially
outweighed by its unfair prejudice, i.e., the evidence must satisfy the
requirements of Rule 403; and (3) there is sufficient proof so that the
jury could find that the defendant committed the act in question.15
But here, during the pretrial hearing, rather than showing that the evidence was
admissible for purposes other than proving King’s character, the State argued solely
that King’s Illinois conviction was presumably admissible under OCGA §§ 24-4-413
and 24-4-414. Indeed, the trial court agreed that King’s prior conviction was
“presumptively” admissible under those two provisions. Thus, we decline to consider
whether King’s prior conviction would have been admissible under Rule 404 (b).16
15
State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 158-59 (1) (773 SE2d 170) (2015) (citation
omitted); accord Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69-70 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016); Green
v. State, 339 Ga. App. 263, 265 (1) (793 SE2d 156) (2016).
16
See Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533, 541-42 (III) (A) (807 SE2d 899) (2017)
(declining to consider whether prior bad acts evidence was admissible to show intent
under Rule 404 (b) when trial court did not specifically consider that issue below).
Despite the fact that we need not consider whether King’s prior conviction was
potentially admissible under Rule 404 (b), we are certainly aware of our case
authority, as cited in note 4, supra, holding that because Rules 413 and 414 are the
more specific statutes regarding admission of prior acts of sexual assault and child
molestation, they supersede the provisions of OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) in such cases
with regard to the admission of propensity evidence. See Dixon, 341 Ga. App. at 258
(1) (noting that Rules 413 and 414 supersede Rule 404 (b) in sexual assault and child
molestation cases); Dority v. State, 335 Ga. App. 83, 95 (holding that Rule 414 “is the
more specific statute regarding admission of prior acts of child molestation and is
15
Needless to say, this does not end our inquiry. Having now determined that,
under these specific circumstances, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of
King’s prior Illinois conviction, “in order to serve as a basis for reversing [King’s]
convictions, the trial court’s evidentiary error must have affected his substantial
rights, i.e., it was not harmless.”17 In Georgia,
the standard for weighing nonconstitutional error in criminal cases is
known as the “highly probable test,” i.e., that it is highly probable that
the error did not contribute to the judgment. Under that test, a reversal
is not required if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming in that there is
no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different in
the absence of this error.18
therefore controlling over [Rule 404 (b)]”); see also United States v. Brimm, 608 Fed.
Appx. 795, 798 (I) (B) (11th Cir. 2015) (“[FRCP] Rules 413 and 414 permit the
introduction of propensity evidence and thus contain exceptions to Rule 404 (b)’s
general ban on propensity evidence in “sexual assault” and “child molestation”
cases.”) (citations omitted).
17
Gaskin v. State, 334 Ga. App. 758, 763 (1) (b) (780 SE2d 426) (2015); see
OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (“Error shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.”).
18
Gaskin, 334 Ga. App. at 763-64 (1) (b) (punctuation omitted); see Jones v.
State, 301 Ga. 544, 551 (3) (802 SE2d 234) (2017) (“The test for determining
nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not
contribute to the verdict.” (punctuation omitted)).
16
And here, the State’s evidence at trial consisted of testimony from the two victims
that King sexually abused and of those persons to whom they recounted their
allegations of sexual abuse. There was no physical evidence presented by the State
to support the charges. Additionally, when confronted by his wife, King denied the
allegations, and he presented evidence at trial that A. K. previously alleged that her
father inappropriately touched her but that the police suspended their investigation
due to insufficient evidence. Given these particular circumstances, although the
evidence was certainly sufficient to support King’s convictions,19 we cannot say it
was overwhelming or, importantly, that King’s prior conviction definitively did not
enter into the jury’s evaluation of the case. Consequently, we cannot say that it is
highly probable this improperly admitted evidence did not contribute to the jury’s
19
See supra note 2.
17
verdict.20 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of King’s motion for new
trial.
2. King also contends that the trial court erred by improperly commenting on
the evidence, in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57, while limiting the scope of his closing
argument. Although we believe it is speculative at best as to whether this issue will
reoccur in King’s new trial, we will nonetheless briefly address it.
OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1) provides that “[i]t is error for any judge, during any
phase of any criminal case, to express or intimate to the jury the judge’s opinion as
to whether a fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.”
And in this matter, during closing arguments, King’s trial counsel discussed the
circumstances surrounding A. K.’s earlier allegation that her father had touched her
20
See Gaskin, 334 Ga. App. at 764-65 (1) (b) (holding that trial court’s
erroneous admission of evidence of defendant’s prior arrests was not harmless in
prosecution for child molestation in light of the fact that jury was presented with
conflicting witness testimony and there was no medical evidence to support charges);
see also Brooks v. State, 298 Ga. 722, 727-28 (2) (783 SE2d 895) (2016) (holding
that because evidence against defendant in murder prosecution was sufficient but not
overwhelming, erroneous admission of prior murder under Rule 404 (b) was
extremely prejudicial and precluded conclusion that it was highly probable its
admission did not contribute to the verdict); Amey v. State, 331 Ga. App. 244, 253 (1)
(d) (770 SE2d 321) (2015) (holding that error in admitting evidence of prior
attempted robbery, under Rule 404 (b), in defendant’s trial for armed robbery was not
harmless because other crime evidence was inherently prejudicial, and the evidence
against defendant was not overwhelming).
18
inappropriately, and within that context, he argued that A. K.’s half-sister had taught
her how to lie. Upon counsel’s third assertion of this argument, the State objected,
positing that there was no factual basis for such an argument. When King’s trial
counsel responded that his argument was a reasonable conclusion drawn from the
evidence, the trial court asserted, “I can’t buy it. There is no evidence of it, so — I
sustain the objection.”
On appeal, King contends that the trial court’s statement amounted to an
improper comment on A. K.’s credibility. The State counters, inter alia, that the trial
court was properly explaining its reasoning for sustaining the State’s objection.21
Based upon our review of the record, it is not entirely clear what it is exactly that the
trial court “can’t buy.” But it is certainly not implausible to read the comment and
subsequent sustaining of the State’s objection as “[intimating] the court’s opinion that
21
See Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 748 (3) (784 SE2d 759) (2016) (“[W]e have
previously determined that remarks of a judge assigning a reason for his ruling are
neither an expression of opinion nor a comment on the evidence.” (punctuation
omitted)).
19
[A. K.’s] testimony was believable.”22 Accordingly, we caution the trial court against
any future use of similar language.
3. King further contends that the trial court erred in charging that a child cannot
consent to sexual conduct in its instruction to the jury regarding the offense of sexual
battery. And because it is possible that at retrial the trial court will again instruct the
jury on sexual battery, we will briefly address this issue as well.
OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (b) provides: “A person commits the offense of sexual
battery when he or she intentionally makes physical contact with the intimate parts
of the body of another person without the consent of that person.” And our Supreme
Court has held that although a trial court’s jury instruction that an underage victim
is not legally capable of consenting to “sexual conduct” was on its face an accurate
statement of the law, such statement did not belong in a jury instruction regarding
sexual battery because sexual battery as defined in our Code does not necessarily
22
Wilson v. State, 325 Ga. App. 859, 861 (1) (755 SE2d 253) (2014)
(punctuation omitted); see Callaham v. State, 305 Ga. App. 626, 627-28 (700 SE2d
624) (2010) (holding that trial court’s question and comment to defendant concerning
why victim’s neighbor, who was not related to anyone in the case, would testify that
defendant was the shooter violated OCGA § 17-8-57 because it intimated court’s
opinion that testimony was believable).
20
involve sexual conduct.23 The Court therefore concluded, “[i]nsofar as the jury
instruction suggested that an underage victim is not capable of consenting to the
contact constituting sexual battery, the instruction was misleading and thus
erroneous.”24 Furthermore, because such instruction “effectively relieved the State of
its burden to prove an essential element of the crime of sexual battery, the instruction
cannot be said to have been harmless.”25
Here, in its initial charge to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury on the
sexual battery as follows:
A lesser included offense of child molestation, that is Count Two
of the Indictment, a person commits the sexual battery when a person
intentionally makes physical contact with the primary genital area of
another person, of a female, without the consent of the other person.
A child under the age of 16 is unable to consent to illegal, illicit
intercourse, and the law conclusively presumes intercourse is against her
will, although that is not being alleged in this case.
23
Watson v. State, 297 Ga. 718, 720-21 (2) (777 SE2d 677) (2015); accord
Duncan v. State, 342 Ga. App. 530, 540-41 (6) (804 SE2d 156) (2017).
24
Watson, 297 Ga. at 721 (2).
25
Id.
21
But shortly after the jury began its deliberations, it requested that the trial court provide
the charge as to molestation again. The court did so and then also recharged as to
sexual battery, stating:
Now, sexual battery, which is only to be considered as to Count
Two. A person commits — as a lesser included offense of Count Two. A
person commits sexual battery when that person intentionally makes
physical contact with the primary genital area, anus, groin, inner thigh, or
buttock of another person, of a female, without — in this case of a female,
without the consent of the other person.
The next day, while the jury continued its deliberations, it requested that the trial court
provide written instructions on the offenses of child molestation and sexual battery.
The court denied this request but orally charged the jury again on these offenses, and,
similar to the second time it did so, it made no reference to an underage victim’s
inability to consent.
King argues that the trial court’s jury instruction as to sexual battery
erroneously suggested that an underage victim is not capable of consenting to the
contact constituting sexual battery. But although the trial court in its initial charge did
state that an underage person could not consent to sexual intercourse, it added that such
was not being alleged in King’s case. Subsequently, the court twice reinstructed the
22
jury that sexual battery required the State to prove lack of consent and made no
mention of an underage victim’s inability to consent to sexual conduct. Given these
particular circumstances, the trial court’s instructions, when considered as a whole,26
properly instructed the jury on the law.27 Nonetheless, on retrial, the better practice
would be for the trial court to avoid altogether—as it did in its second and third time
instructing the jury on this issue—noting a minor’s inability to consent to sexual
conduct in the context of a sexual-battery charge.
For all these reasons, we reverse King’s convictions and remand this case for
retrial in a manner consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed. Doyle, P. J., and Mercier, J., concur.
26
See Daniels v. State, 302 Ga. 90, 105 (7) (805 SE2d 80) (2017) (noting that
“jury instructions are read and considered as a whole in determining whether there is
error” (punctuation omitted)); Johnson v. State, 341 Ga. App. 425, 431 (2) (801 SE2d
294) (2017) (“Jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in
determining whether the charges contained error.” (punctuation omitted)).
27
See State v. Crist, 341 Ga. App. 411, 416-17 (801 SE2d 545) (2017) (holding
a trial court’s jury instruction that omitted lack of consent element as to sexual battery
was not plain error in light of the fact the trial court read the indictment, which
included all the elements of sexual battery, and provided the jury with written
instructions, which did so as well).
23