FILED
May 05 2020, 8:51 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Dillon Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Dove & Dillon, P.C. Attorney General
North Vernon, Indiana Sierra A. Murray
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
John Yeager, May 5, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-121
v. Appeal from the
Jefferson Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff Donald J. Mote, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
39C01-1911-F3-1322
Vaidik, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] The State charged John Yeager with four Level 3 felony offenses, alleging that
he battered the two-year-old son of his girlfriend. After the trial court set bail at
$250,000 cash only, Yeager filed a motion to reduce his bail. Although the
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pretrial director recommended that Yeager be released to pretrial supervision
with the added condition of electronic monitoring and Yeager presented
evidence that he had no criminal history besides underage drinking, lived in the
area his whole life, lived in the same house (which he was buying) for twelve
years, had a job to which he could return, and had a good relationship with his
family (who also lived in the area and was supportive of him), the court denied
his motion. Yeager now appeals.
[2] Because Yeager presented evidence of substantial mitigating factors showing
that he recognizes the court’s authority to bring him to trial and there is no
evidence that Yeager poses a risk to the physical safety of the victim or the
community, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Yeager’s motion to reduce his $250,000 cash-only bail. We therefore reverse
the trial court and remand with instructions that Yeager be released to pretrial
supervision with the added condition of electronic monitoring.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On November 14, 2019, the State charged Yeager with Level 3 felony
aggravated battery, Level 3 felony battery on a child less than fourteen years
old, Level 3 felony domestic battery, and Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent,
accusing him of battering J.G., the two-year-old son of his girlfriend. The trial
court issued a warrant for Yeager’s arrest and ordered that he be held without
bail until his initial hearing.
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[4] The initial hearing was held on November 18. According to the Jefferson
County Pretrial Assessment Report filed that day, Yeager’s Indiana Risk
Assessment Score (IRAS) was “0 (Low).” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 40. The
Jefferson County Pretrial Director recommended that Yeager “be released to
pretrial supervision with the added condition of electronic monitoring.” Id.
The trial court, however, set Yeager’s bail at “$250,000 cash only.” Id. at 55.
The court also issued a no-contact order for J.G. Id. at 48-49.
[5] The next day, Yeager filed a motion to reduce his bail. At the bail-reduction
hearing held on December 30, Yeager, who was thirty-five years old, testified
that he had lived in Jefferson County and neighboring Jennings County his
“entire life” and that he had lived in the same house in Madison (Jefferson
County) for twelve or thirteen years. Tr. p. 10. Yeager said he was buying the
house. Yeager said he had a good relationship with his parents, who were
married and lived in Jennings County, and his sister (his only sibling), who was
living in his house while he was incarcerated. In addition, Yeager testified that
he worked at McCubbin Motors in Madison before he was arrested and that his
job was still available for him if he was released on bail. Yeager said the only
other time he had been in trouble with the law was for underage drinking when
he was twenty years old. According to Yeager, he never missed a court hearing
and paid a fine. Yeager agreed with the issuance of the no-contact order and
said there was no reason for him to have contact with J.G. or his family.
Yeager told the court that he would like to be released on bail so he could work
to pay for his defense counsel and hire an expert. Yeager said if the court
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ordered him to be on electronic monitoring, he could pay that cost. Finally,
Yeager’s mother testified that she and her husband would make sure that
Yeager attended his court hearings. The State did not dispute any of this
evidence. Instead, the State presented photographs of the injuries to J.G.,
evidence that medical staff believed J.G.’s injuries were non-accidental, and
evidence that J.G. was in Yeager’s care at the time of his injuries.
[6] The trial court denied Yeager’s motion to reduce his bail because (1) the nature
and gravity of the alleged offenses was “serious,” and Yeager faced a sentence
up to thirty-two years1 and (2) it was not “confident public safety c[ould] be
reasonably assured if [Yeager’s] bail were to be reduced.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. II pp. 100-01.
[7] Yeager now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Yeager appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to reduce bail. The amount
and manner of executing bail is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court and is reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion. Perry v. State, 541
N.E.2d 913, 919 (Ind. 1989); Sneed v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1260 (Ind. Ct.
1
The trial court arrived at thirty-two years by running the sentences consecutively. In doing so, the court did
not take into account “double jeopardy concerns under Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999).”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 100. We believe that there may be double-jeopardy considerations at play and
therefore have doubts that Yeager’s maximum sentence is thirty-two years.
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App. 2011). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.
Sneed, 946 N.E.2d at 1257.
[9] Yeager argues that “the bail as set was excessive. The trial court’s decision
refusing to lower it and fashion a reasonable method for posting was an abuse
of discretion.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. The Indiana Constitution prohibits
excessive bail. Ind. Const. art. 1, § 16. “A decision upon the question of
excessiveness must be based upon two basic and related considerations: (1) The
object of bail itself, and (2) the financial ability of the accused to provide the
required amount of bail.” Samm v. State, 893 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008) (quotation omitted). “The object of bail is not to effect punishment in
advance of conviction.” Id. “Rather, it is to ensure the presence of the accused
when required without the hardship of incarceration before guilt has been
proved and while the presumption of innocence is to be given effect.” Id.
[10] Indiana Code section 35-33-8-5 governs the modification of bail and provides in
part:
(a) Upon a showing of good cause, the state or the defendant
may be granted an alteration or revocation of bail by application
to the court before which the proceeding is pending. . . .
*****
(c) When the defendant presents additional evidence of
substantial mitigating factors, based on the factors set forth in
[Indiana Code section 35-33-8-4(b)], which reasonably suggests
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that the defendant recognizes the court’s authority to bring the
defendant to trial, the court may reduce bail. However, the court
may not reduce bail if the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the factors described in IC 35-40-6-6(1)(A) and IC
35-40-6-6(1)(B) exist or that the defendant otherwise poses a risk
to the physical safety of another person or the community.
Section 35-33-8-4(b) sets forth these factors:
(1) the length and character of the defendant’s residence in the
community;
(2) the defendant’s employment status and history and the
defendant’s ability to give bail;
(3) the defendant’s family ties and relationships;
(4) the defendant’s character, reputation, habits, and mental
condition;
(5) the defendant’s criminal or juvenile record, insofar as it
demonstrates instability and a disdain for the court’s authority to
bring the defendant to trial;
(6) the defendant’s previous record in not responding to court
appearances when required or with respect to flight to avoid
criminal prosecution;
(7) the nature and gravity of the offense and the potential penalty
faced, insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk of
nonappearance;
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(8) the source of funds or property to be used to post bail or to
pay a premium, insofar as it affects the risk of nonappearance;
(9) that the defendant is a foreign national who is unlawfully
present in the United States under federal immigration law; and
(10) any other factors, including any evidence of instability and a
disdain for authority, which might indicate that the defendant
might not recognize and adhere to the authority of the court to
bring the defendant to trial.
[11] Here, Yeager presented evidence of substantial mitigating factors showing that
he “recognizes the court’s authority to bring [him] to trial,” as required by
Section 35-33-8-5(c). Yeager has no criminal history besides underage drinking
and has never failed to appear at a court proceeding. In addition, Yeager has
lived in the Jefferson County/Jennings County area his entire life and in the
same house for twelve years. Yeager had a steady job to which he could return
and was paying for his house. Yeager’s family also lives in the same area and is
supportive of him. Although Yeager faces four Level 3 felony charges for
allegedly battering a two-year-old (and a potentially lengthy sentence if he is
convicted), this does not mean that Yeager presents a risk of not appearing.
Indeed, the Jefferson County Pretrial Director found no risk.
[12] As for the trial court’s finding that Yeager poses a risk to the physical safety of
J.G. and the community, Yeager claims that the fact that he “has merely been
accused, cannot constitute clear and convincing evidence that he is a danger to
the alleged victim or the community.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 7. We agree.
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As Yeager points out, besides the accusations themselves, no evidence was
presented “as to how he could possibly constitute a threat to anyone.” Id. The
only evidence the State cites in its brief to show that Yeager is a danger to J.G.
and the community is J.G.’s injuries. See Appellee’s Br. p. 11. But this violates
the presumption of innocence to which Yeager is entitled. See Samm, 893
N.E.2d at 766. Again, the Jefferson County Pretrial Director recommended
that Yeager be released to pretrial supervision with the added condition of
electronic monitoring. Without any evidence to show that Yeager is a danger,
we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Yeager’s
motion to reduce his $250,000 cash-only bond. We therefore reverse the trial
court and remand with instructions that Yeager be released to pretrial
supervision with the added condition of electronic monitoring. See Ind. Code §
35-33-8-11(a). The no-contact order shall remain in place. See Ind. Code § 35-
33-8.3.6.
[13] We note this result is consistent with the new evidence-based risk-assessment
system that Indiana has adopted. Effective January 1, 2020, Indiana Criminal
Rule 26(A) and (B) provides:
(A) If an arrestee does not present a substantial risk of flight or
danger to themselves or others, the court should release the
arrestee without money bail or surety subject to such
restrictions and conditions as determined by the court except
when:
(1) The arrestee is charged with murder or treason.
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(2) The arrestee is on pre-trial release not related to the
incident that is the basis for the present arrest.
(3) The arrestee is on probation, parole or other
community supervision.
(B) In determining whether an arrestee presents a substantial risk
of flight or danger to self or other persons or to the public, the
court should utilize the results of an evidence-based risk
assessment approved by the Indiana Office of Court Services, and
such other information as the court finds relevant. The court is
not required to administer an assessment prior to releasing an
arrestee if administering the assessment will delay the arrestee’s
release.[2]
(Emphasis added). See also Ind. Code §§ 35-33-8-3.8, 0.5. According to the
executive director of the Indiana Office of Court Services, which oversaw the
development of the new evidence-based risk-assessment system, “Under
Criminal Rule 26, counties will use the IRAS Pretrial Assessment Tool to assess
risk of failure during the pretrial period.” Mary Kay Hudson, Smart on Crime:
Stakeholders Attend Pretrial Summit, Indiana Court Times, Dec. 20, 2019,
http://indianacourts.us/times/2019/12/smart-on-crime-stakeholders-attend-
pretrial-summit/[https://perma.cc/36L8-24JC]. The purpose of this new
system is “maximizing public safety, maximizing court appearance, and
maximizing pretrial release.” Ind. Office of Court Servs., About,
2
Indiana Criminal Rule 26(A) and (B) went into effect in 2016 for eleven counties that were selected to pilot
the pretrial services program. Jefferson County was one of these counties.
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https://www.in.gov/judiciary/iocs/3900.htm [https://perma.cc/BP54-
DQRA].
[14] Notwithstanding Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), this opinion is effective
immediately, and the trial court need not await a certification of this opinion by
the Clerk of Courts before releasing Yeager to pretrial supervision with the
added condition of electronic monitoring. See Ind. Appellate Rule 1 (“The
Court may, upon the motion of a party or the Court’s own motion, permit
deviation from these Rules.”); see also Town of Ellettsville v. Despirito, 87 N.E.3d
9, 12 (Ind. 2017) (making opinion effective immediately notwithstanding
Appellate Rule 65).
[15] Reversed and remanded.
May, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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