Munoz v. Bulley & Andrews, LLC

2022 IL 127067

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 127067)

DONOVAN MUNOZ, Appellant, v. BULLEY & ANDREWS, LLC, Appellee.

Opinion filed January 21, 2022.

JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Garman, Theis, Neville, Michael J.
Burke, and Overstreet concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 In this appeal, we address whether the exclusive remedy provisions under
sections 5(a) and 11 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/5(a),
11 (West 2016)) extend to a general contractor who paid workers’ compensation
insurance premiums and benefits for a subcontractor and its employees. Plaintiff,
Donovan Munoz, filed suit against defendant and general contractor, Bulley &
Andrews, LLC (Bulley & Andrews), for injuries he sustained in 2016 while an
 employee of defendant’s subcontractor, Bulley & Andrews Concrete Restoration,
LLC (Bulley Concrete).

¶2 The circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s lawsuit on defendant’s motion to dismiss
pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2016)). The circuit court of Cook County found that defendant
was immune from the lawsuit under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 2021 IL App (1st)
200254. We allowed plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff.
Oct. 1, 2020). We hold that, under the facts of this case, the exclusive remedy
provisions under sections 5(a) and 11 of the Act do not extend to a general
contractor who is not the employee’s immediate employer. We reverse the
judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court and remand for further
proceedings.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant, Bulley & Andrews, is a corporation and the sole owner of Bulley
Concrete. In March 2015, RAR2-222 South Riverside, LLC (RAR2-222), entered
into an agreement with Bulley & Andrews to serve as the general contractor for a
project located at 222 South Riverside in Chicago. Article 11, section 11.1 of the
agreement required Bulley & Andrews, in relevant part, to

“purchase from and maintain in a company or companies lawfully authorized
to do business in the jurisdiction in which the Project is located such insurance
as will protect the Contractor from claims set forth below which may arise out
of or result from the Contractor’s operations and completed operations under
the Contract and for which the Contractor may be legally liable, whether such
operations be by the Contractor or by a Subcontractor or by anyone directly or
indirectly employed by any of them, or by anyone for those acts any of them
may be liable.

.1 Claims under workers’ compensation, disability benefit and other
similar employee benefit acts that are applicable to the Work to be
performed;

-2-
 .2 Claims for damages because of bodily injury, occupational sickness
or disease, or death of the Contractor’s employees;

.3 Claims for damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, or
death of any person other than the Contractor’s employees;

.4 Claims for damages insured by usual personal injury liability
coverage.”

¶5 Bulley Concrete is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bulley & Andrews. Bulley
Concrete was previously known as Takao Nagai Concrete Restoration (Takao
Nagai). Bulley & Andrews bought Takao Nagai in 2010 and continued operating
the company under the Takao Nagai name until approximately 2015. Bulley &
Andrews and Bulley Concrete are operated as separate corporations. Each company
has its own distinct federal tax identification number. The companies file separate
federal and state income tax returns. The companies have different presidents and
employ different workers. Bulley Concrete employs approximately 100 laborers,
caulkers, and concrete finishers. Bulley & Andrews employs approximately 500
carpenters and laborers.

¶6 As part of the scope of the work for the project, Bulley & Andrews performed
much of the concrete work itself, but no language to this effect was included in its
contract with RAR2-222. Bully & Andrews used Bulley Concrete and its
employees for the concrete work on the project. Bulley & Andrews executed
contracts with other subcontractors for work on the project but did not enter into
any such contract with Bulley Concrete.

¶7 Plaintiff, Donovan Munoz, was employed as a construction worker by Bulley
Concrete. Plaintiff was injured on December 4, 2016, at the 222 South Riverside
construction site while employed by Bulley Concrete. On that date, plaintiff signed
in on a Bulley Concrete time sheet, and Bulley Concrete paid his wages. During the
2016 calendar year, Bulley Concrete withheld and paid federal and Illinois income
taxes, Medicare, and Social Security taxes on behalf of plaintiff.

¶8 Prior to December 4, 2016, Bulley Concrete workers poured concrete at the 222
South Riverside construction site and covered the wet concrete with blankets to
prevent it from freezing while it cured. On December 4, 2016, plaintiff was directed

-3-
 by his employer, Bulley Concrete, to go to the 222 South Riverside project to pull
the blankets off the fresh concrete to permit workers from another subcontractor to
perform additional work on the concrete. While attempting to pull the blankets from
the concrete, plaintiff injured his back.

¶9 Plaintiff filed a claim with the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission
against Bulley Concrete. Plaintiff incurred medical bills of $76,046.34 to treat his
injury. He was also paid $2157.71 in temporary disability benefits. At the time of
the occurrence, Bulley Concrete was an insured under a workers’ compensation
policy issued by Arch Insurance Company. Bulley & Andrews and other
subsidiaries and affiliates of the company were insured under the same policy.
Bulley & Andrews paid the premiums for the insurance. The policy provided for a
$250,000 deductible for every claim.

¶ 10 On April 11, 2019, plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Bulley &
Andrews, RAR2-222, and the management company that operated 222 S.
Riverside, Behringer Harvard South Riverside, LLC (Behringer). Plaintiff alleged
that Bulley & Andrews, in its capacity as general contractor, “retained control over
the safety of the construction site, supervision of the work at the construction site,
and control of the means and methods of the work on the construction site to ensure
that all work was performed safely by all subcontractors, including [plaintiff’s]
employer.” Plaintiff further alleged that Bulley & Andrews breached its duty of
care by failing to use its retained control to stop plaintiff’s employer, Bulley
Concrete, from using unsafe equipment; by permitting an unsafe condition to be
created through the use of worn, unfit, and defective concrete blankets; and by
failing “to regulate and limit the hours worked by laborers, including plaintiff, thus
making him more susceptible to injuring himself through repetitive lifting of heavy
objects and construction materials.”

¶ 11 Bulley & Andrews moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section
2-619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2016)). Bulley & Andrews
contended that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions
of the Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2016)). Bulley & Andrews argued that it
had a preexisting legal obligation to pay for plaintiff’s workers’ compensation
benefits and that it did so by paying more than $76,000 of his medical bills.

-4-
¶ 12 On December 27, 2019, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, finding
that Bulley & Andrews was legally obligated under its contract with RAR2-222 to
pay for the workers’ compensation insurance and benefits that plaintiff received.
The circuit court’s order found there was no just reason to delay the enforcement
or appeal of its order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). 1
The appellate court affirmed. 2021 IL App (1st) 200254.

¶ 13 We allowed plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct.
1, 2020). We also allowed the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to file an
amicus curiae brief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 The parties to this appeal dispute whether the circuit court properly granted the
motion of Bulley & Andrews to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code (735
ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2016)). Plaintiff argues that, because Bulley Concrete
was his employer, the exclusive remedy provisions under sections 5(a) and 11 of
the Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2016)) did not bar him from suing Bulley &
Andrews. Thus, according to plaintiff, the circuit court improperly granted the
section 2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss.

¶ 16 Bulley & Andrews submits that the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act
apply to bar plaintiff’s cause of action because it was legally obligated under the
contract with RAR2-222 to insure the project in all aspects, including workers’
compensation coverage for its employees and those of its wholly owned
subsidiaries such as Bulley Concrete. Accordingly, Bulley & Andrews argues that
the circuit court properly dismissed plaintiff’s cause of action.

¶ 17 A. Standard of Review

¶ 18 This appeal involves a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code
(735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2016)). This court recently reiterated that

1
Defendants RAR2-222 and Behringer did not move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint against
them, and the case continues as to those defendants.

-5-
 “ ‘[t]he purpose of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss is to dispose of issues of
law and easily proved issues of fact at the outset of litigation.’ [Citation.]
Section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code permits involuntary dismissal where ‘the claim
asserted against [the] defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding
the legal effect of or defeating the claim.’ [Citation.]” Valerio v. Moore
Landscapes, LLC, 2021 IL 126139, ¶ 19.

¶ 19 In ruling on a section 2-619 motion, a court “ ‘must interpret all pleadings and
supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’ ” Id.
¶ 20 (quoting In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 189 (1997)). A court
must therefore accept as true all well-pleaded facts of the complaint and inferences
that may be reasonably drawn in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. A ruling on a section 2-
619 motion to dismiss presents an issue of law that we review de novo. Id.

¶ 20 This appeal also raises an issue of statutory interpretation of sections 5(a) and
11 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2016)). We review issues of statutory
construction de novo. Valerio, 2021 IL 126139, ¶ 20. Finally, this appeal raises an
issue of construction of the contract between Bulley & Andrews and RAR2-222.
Construction of a contract also presents a question of law that we review de novo.
Id.

¶ 21 B. Workers’ Compensation Act

¶ 22 This appeal requires us to consider whether plaintiff’s cause of action against
Bulley & Andrews is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act. 820 ILCS
305/5(a), 11 (West 2016). Our primary goal in interpreting the Act is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Cassens Transport Co. v. Industrial
Comm’n, 218 Ill. 2d 519, 524 (2006). The most reliable indicator of legislative
intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary
meaning. Taylor v. Pekin Insurance Co., 231 Ill. 2d 390, 395 (2008). “It is well
settled that courts cannot depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into
it exceptions, limitation[s], or conditions not expressed by the legislature.” In re
Haley D., 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 73.

¶ 23 The Act “is designed to provide financial protection to workers for accidental
injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.” Meerbrey v. Marshall

-6-
Field & Co., 139 Ill. 2d 455, 462 (1990). The purpose of workers’ compensation is
to place upon the industry the costs of industrial accidents. Id. at 469. The Act
establishes a system of liability without fault by which the employer exchanges
traditional common-law defenses for the prohibition of common-law suits against
it. 820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2016); Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d
274, 296 (2007). The exclusive remedy provisions are part of the quid pro quo that
balances the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers. Meerbrey, 139 Ill.
2d at 462. The exclusive remedy provisions are provided for in sections 5(a) and
11 of the Act. Section 5(a) of the Act states, in relevant part:

“No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer, his
insurer, his broker, any service organization that is wholly owned by the
employer, his insurer or his broker and that provides safety service, advice or
recommendations for the employer or the agents or employees of any of them
for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his
duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is
available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act, to any
one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his
estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury.” 820
ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2016).

Section 11 of the Act provides, in relevant part:

“The compensation herein provided, together with the provisions of this Act,
shall be the measure of the responsibility of any employer engaged in any of
the enterprises or businesses enumerated in section 3 of this Act, or of any
employer who is not engaged in any such enterprises or businesses, but who has
elected to provide and pay compensation for accidental injuries sustained by
any employee arising out of and in the course of the employment according to
the provisions of this Act ***.” Id. § 11. 2

2
We note that sections 5(a) and 11 of the Act were amended by Public Act 101-6, § 5 (eff. May
17, 2019). The amendment added section 1.2, exempting certain civil actions from the exclusive
remedy provisions of sections 5(a) and 11. See 820 ILCS 305/1.2 (West 2020). The subject of this
amendment is not at issue in this appeal.

-7-
¶ 24 There is no dispute that on December 4, 2016, plaintiff was an employee under
the Act and that he was injured in the course of employment. Rather, the dispute in
this appeal concerns whether Bulley & Andrews, who was not plaintiff’s direct
employer, enjoys the immunity afforded by the exclusive remedy provisions of the
Act.

¶ 25 The term “employer” is defined in section 1(a) of the Act, as

“2. Every person, firm, public or private corporation *** who has any
person in service or under any contract for hire, express or implied, oral or
written, and who is engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses enumerated
in Section 3 of this Act, or who at or prior to the time of the accident to the
employee for which compensation under this Act may be claimed, has in the
manner provided in this Act elected to become subject to the provisions of this
Act, and who has not, prior to such accident, effected a withdrawal of such
election in the manner provided in this Act.

3. Any one engaging in any business or enterprise referred to in subsections
1 and 2 of Section 3 of this Act who undertakes to do any work enumerated
therein, is liable to pay compensation to his own immediate employees in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, and in addition thereto if he directly
or indirectly engages any contractor whether principal or sub-contractor to do
any such work, he is liable to pay compensation to the employees of any such
contractor or sub-contractor unless such contractor or sub-contractor has
insured, in any company or association authorized under the laws of this State
to insure the liability to pay compensation under this Act, or guaranteed his
liability to pay such compensation. ***

In the event any such person pays compensation under this subsection he
may recover the amount thereof from the contractor or sub-contractor, if any,
and in the event the contractor pays compensation under this subsection he may
recover the amount thereof from the sub-contractor, if any.

This subsection does not apply in any case where the accident occurs
elsewhere than on, in or about the immediate premises on which the principal
has contracted that the work be done.” Id. § 1(a)(2), (3).

-8-
¶ 26 This court previously addressed this very issue in Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal
Co., 65 Ill. 2d 437 (1976). Laffoon involved three consolidated appeals by injured
workers employed by different subcontractors that did not provide them with
workers’ compensation insurance. In each instance, the general contractor that
hired the uninsured subcontractor was required to pay compensation benefits to the
injured employee under section 1(a)(3) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48,
¶ 138.1(a)(3)). Laffoon, 65 Ill. 2d at 440. The workers later sued the general
contractors under the structural work statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48, ¶ 60
et seq.). Laffoon, 65 Ill. 2d at 441. One of the general contractors moved for
summary judgment, and two of the general contractors moved to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ causes of action. The general contractors claimed that, by paying the
injured workers benefits under the Act, they were entitled to the same immunity
conferred on employers by section 5(a). The trial courts agreed with the general
contractors and granted summary judgment in favor of one of the general
contractors and granted the motions to dismiss in favor of the other two general
contractors. Id. at 441-43.

¶ 27 On appeal before this court, the general contractors maintained that section 5(a)
of the Act provided them with immunity from an action for damages by an
employee of an uninsured subcontractor when they were required to pay
compensation benefits to the employee under section 1(a)(3) of the Act. Id. at 443.
The workers claimed that section 5(a) was intended to provide immunity only to
the employer of the injured employee. Id. This court rejected the general
contractors’ argument and held that only an injured worker’s direct employer can
claim immunity. Id. at 447. We specifically held:

“[W]e must interpret section 5(a) as conferring immunity upon employers only
from common law or statutory actions for damages by their immediate
employees. To hold otherwise in light of the present factual situations would be
violative of the injured employee’s right to due process and equal protection of
the laws.” Id.

¶ 28 As this court made clear in Laffoon, immunity does not hinge on the payment
of benefits. Rather, under the plain language of section 5(a), immunity is conferred
only on immediate employers of an injured worker. Id. Here, there is no dispute

-9-
 that Bulley & Andrews was not plaintiff’s immediate employer. Therefore, plaintiff
is not barred from suing Bulley & Andrews by sections 5(a) and 11 of the Act.

¶ 29 The fact that plaintiff’s immediate employer, Bulley Concrete, was a subsidiary
of Bulley & Andrews is of no import. If a parent company and its subsidiary are
operated as separate entities, only the entity that was the immediate employer of
the injured worker is entitled to section 5(a) immunity. See Forsythe, 224 Ill. 2d at
297-98. In this case, there is no dispute that Bulley & Andrews and Bulley Concrete
were operated as separate and distinct entities. Each company had separate tax
identification numbers, executives, project superintendents, and workers.
Accordingly, Bulley & Andrews is not entitled to immunity under the Act.

¶ 30 Although the appellate court acknowledged that the case at bar is factually
similar to Laffoon, it declined to follow our holding. 2021 IL App (1st) 200254,
¶ 23. The appellate court concluded that Ioerger v. Halverson Construction Co.,
232 Ill. 2d 196 (2008), created a new test for immunity based on whether an entity
paid compensation benefits to an injured worker pursuant to a preexisting legal
obligation. 2021 IL App (1st) 200254, ¶¶ 22-23. The appellate court found that the
contract between Bulley & Andrews and RAR2-222 provided the requisite legal
obligation. Id.

¶ 31 In Ioerger, two companies formed a joint venture to perform a bridge repair
project. Ioerger, 232 Ill. 2d at 198. Under the joint venture agreement, one entity,
Midwest Foundation Corporation (Midwest) was responsible for performing all
labor on the project. The joint venture, however, was obligated to reimburse
Midwest for all labor costs, including premiums for workers’ compensation
insurance. Id. at 199. Three Midwest employees were injured, and one employee
was killed, in an accident on the project. Id. at 199-200. The injured workers and
the estate of the decedent received compensation benefits from Midwest’s workers’
compensation insurer. Id. at 200. The surviving employees and the estate of the
decedent filed a civil action against the joint venture itself; the other co-venturer,
Halverson Construction Company, Inc. (Halverson); and various other defendants.
Id. Halverson and the joint venture each moved for summary judgment, claiming
immunity under sections 5(a) and 11 of the Act. Id. at 200-01. The trial court agreed
and granted the summary judgment motions. Id. at 201. The appellate court

- 10 -
 reversed (Ioerger v. Halverson Construction Co., 377 Ill. App. 3d 223 (2007)).
Ioerger, 232 Ill. 2d at 201.

¶ 32 On appeal to this court, we addressed the specific issue of “whether the
immunity afforded to an employer by the exclusive remedy provisions of the
Workers’ Compensation Act *** extends to the employer’s co-venturer in a joint
venture and to the joint venture itself.” Id. at 198. We examined the express terms
of the Act and noted that the exclusive remedy provisions extend to the employer
and other specified entities, including agents of the employer. Id. at 201-02. As to
the joint venture itself, we found that, under Illinois law, joint ventures are governed
by partnership principles. Id. at 202. Thus, the joint venture was not a separate legal
entity under partnership law, and it was inseparable from its constituent entities. Id.
at 202-03. We therefore concluded that, if each member of the joint venture was
immunized, it necessarily followed that the joint venture itself was shielded by the
exclusive remedy provisions of the Act. Id. at 203.

¶ 33 A secondary reason to our holding in Ioerger was the existence of an agreement
between the joint venture and the direct employer of the workers that required the
joint venture to reimburse the employer for all labor costs, including workers’
compensation insurance premiums. Id. at 203-04. Accordingly, we concluded that
granting the joint venture immunity was appropriate “[b]ecause the Joint Venture
bore the expense of the workers’ compensation premiums and was thus responsible
for making workers’ compensation benefits available to plaintiffs,” and “it was
entitled to avail itself of the Act’s exclusive remedy provisions.” Id. at 204.

¶ 34 Ioerger did not abrogate Laffoon. Ioerger did not discuss Laffoon because
Ioerger concerned the specific and completely different issue of whether a joint
venture is an agent of its members for purposes of immunity under section 5(a),
which specifically provides that agents of an employer are also entitled to
immunity. Section 5(a) of the Act plainly lists the specific entities entitled to
immunity. Those entities include the employer of the injured worker, agents of the
employer, the employer’s insurer and broker, and “any service organization that is
wholly owned by the employer, his insurer or his broker and that provides safety
service, advice or recommendations for the employer or the agents or employees of
any of them.” 820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2016).

- 11 -
¶ 35 Section 5(a) of the Act includes no category granting nonemployers of the
injured worker the ability to acquire immunity by either paying workers’
compensation insurance premiums on behalf of the injured worker’s direct
employer or compensation benefits directly, as Bulley & Andrews did here. Nor
does the Act make any provision for an entity that is legally distinct from the
immediate employer to insulate itself against liability for its negligence by paying
workers’ compensation insurance premiums or benefits on behalf of the immediate
employer of an injured worker. See Burge v. Exelon Generation Co., 2015 IL App
(2d) 141090, ¶ 14. To recognize a means by which immunity may be purchased by
a general contractor who is not the injured worker’s immediate employer would be
contrary to the intended purpose of the Act. Id.

¶ 36 Moreover, while the Act bars an employee from bringing a civil suit directly
against his or her employer, it does not limit the employee’s recovery from a third-
party general contractor. See 820 ILCS 305/5(a), (b) (West 2016). The “injured
employee may also have a cause of action against a third party to the employment
relationship, such as a general contractor, whose negligence allegedly caused or
contributed to the employee’s injuries.” Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Insurance
Co. of New York, 224 Ill. 2d 550, 557 (2007). Section 5(b) of the Act explicitly
provides:

“Where the injury or death for which compensation is payable under this Act
was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages on the
part of some person other than his employer to pay damages, then legal
proceedings may be taken against such other person to recover damages
notwithstanding such employer’s payment of or liability to pay compensation
under this Act. In such case, however, if the action against such other person is
brought by the injured employee or his personal representative and judgment is
obtained and paid, or settlement is made with such other person, either with or
without suit, then from the amount received by such employee or personal
representative there shall be paid to the employer the amount of compensation
paid or to be paid by him to such employee or personal representative including
amounts paid or to be paid pursuant to paragraph (a) of Section 8 of this Act.”
820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 2016).

- 12 -
 As such, the Act accords with the principle that the ultimate loss from wrongdoing
should fall upon the wrongdoer as long as it is not the “employer.” In re Estate of
Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 332 (2000).

¶ 37 Our decision in Ioerger was, therefore, clearly limited to the specific factual
situation involving a joint venture and the existence of an agreement between the
joint venture and the direct employer of the workers that required the joint venture
to reimburse the employer for all labor costs, including workers’ compensation
insurance premiums. Ioerger differs in material facts and is clearly distinguishable
from the facts of this case.

¶ 38 Here, Bulley & Andrews was not in a joint venture with plaintiff’s immediate
employer, Bulley Concrete, and had no legal obligation to provide workers’
compensation insurance for Bulley Concrete. The evidence in this case is that
Bulley & Andrews and Bulley Concrete operated as distinct business entities. There
was no written contract between Bulley & Andrews and Bulley Concrete that
required Bulley & Andrews to provide workers’ compensation insurance or
benefits to Bulley Concrete employees. We conclude that Bulley & Andrews was
not, therefore, an agent entitled to avail itself of the Act’s exclusive remedy
provisions.

¶ 39 Further, even if Bulley & Andrews had met the agency requirements of the Act,
we reject Bulley & Andrews’s argument that it had a preexisting legal obligation
under its agreement with RAR2-222 to provide workers’ compensation insurance
for the construction project. We note that Bulley Concrete was not a party to this
agreement and, therefore, had no right to enforce any alleged obligation of Bulley
& Andrews. Moreover, the agreement did not provide for Bulley & Andrews to
purchase workers’ compensation insurance for Bulley Concrete or provide
workers’ compensation insurance for any of its employees or for any subcontractor
it used for the project. The agreement only provided that Bulley & Andrews would
purchase insurance that would “protect [Bulley & Andrews] from claims *** which
may arise out of or result from [Bulley & Andrews] operations and completed
operations under the Contract and for which [Bulley & Andrews] may be legally
liable whether such operations be by [Bulley & Andrews] or by a Subcontractor,”
including workers’ compensation claims. The contract provision is, therefore,
inapplicable to this case. Thus, not only was Bulley & Andrews not an agent

- 13 -
 entitled to avail itself of the Act’s exclusive remedy provisions, Bulley & Andrews
had no legal obligation to provide workers’ compensation insurance for Bulley
Concrete employees. We reiterate, the Act includes no category granting
nonemployers and legally distinct entities the ability to acquire immunity and
insulate against liability for negligence by paying workers’ compensation insurance
premiums or benefits on behalf of an injured worker’s direct employer.

¶ 40 The appellate court and the circuit court here erroneously declined to follow our
holding in Laffoon. We, therefore, reverse the judgments of the lower courts and
remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.

¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 42 We hold that the exclusive remedy provisions under sections 5(a) and 11 of the
Act do not extend to a general contractor who is not the employee’s immediate
employer. We reverse the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court and
remand for further proceedings.

¶ 43 Judgments reversed.

¶ 44 Cause remanded.

- 14 -