Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C h i e f J u s ti c e J u s t ic e s
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED JULY 31, 2003
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE,
Plaintiff,
and No. 120213
HEATHER SCHULZ, JEFFREY SCHULZ;
MARY LOWE, GEORGE LOWE; ERIC
HANPETER, LAURA HANPETER; FRANK
CORONA, MARCELLA CORONA; DAVID
MALMIN, LEE ANN MALMIN; JOHN
MILLER, DEBRA MILLER; TOM
CONWELL, EVY CONWELL; MARY BETH
YAKIMA, DAN YAKIMA; RICHARD LEE,
PATTY LEE; BETH PETERSON, RICK
PETERSON; JOHN BUCHANAN; KEN
BUCHANAN; LARRY GREGORY, NANCY
GREGORY; K. MAUREEN WYNALEK,
JAMES WYNALEK; HAROLD W. BULGER
and SANDRA A. BULGER.
Intervening-Plaintiffs,
Appellants,
v
NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
SUPERINTENDENT OF NORTHVILLE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, and NORTHVILLE
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE COURT
TAYLOR, J.
We granted leave to appeal to determine whether local
school districts, which are required to submit building plans
to the state superintendent of public instruction for approval
pursuant to MCL 380.1263(3), must also comply with township
zoning and planning ordinances pursuant to the Township Zoning
Act, MCL 125.271 et seq., and the township planning act, MCL
125.321 et seq. We conclude that because the text of MCL
380.1263(3) grants the state superintendent sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over local school district construction and site
plans, it immunizes school districts from local zoning
ordinances affecting those functions. However, a majority
declines to address whether this is an impermissible
delegation of legislative power because the state
superintendent is not a party to this suit.
Accordingly, a majority affirms in part and vacates in
part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
Before beginning construction of a new high school in
Northville Township, the Northville Board of Education met
with township officials to discuss the effect of local zoning
ordinances on its site plan. Although somewhat productive,
conflicts remained and the township sought to enjoin
2
construction.1 The trial court denied a stay, but allowed
nearby landowners to intervene as plaintiffs. After
discovery, the township and intervening plaintiffs moved for
summary disposition. The circuit court denied the motion on
the basis of the text of MCL 380.1263(3), which grants sole
and exclusive jurisdiction over school site plans to the state
superintendent.
The intervenors appealed, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that the text of the revised school code,
MCL 380.1263(3), conveys a clear intention to grant “sole and
exclusive jurisdiction” over site plans to the state
superintendent. The Court also rejected intervenors’ claim
that the Legislature unconstitutionally delegated legislative
authority to the state superintendent, concluding that the
statute provides sufficient construction and design
standards.2
We granted intervenors’ application for leave to appeal.3
1
After reviewing defendant’s site plans, the township
provided over ninety zoning-related recommendations.
Defendant school district addressed each concern and complied
with all but a handful of recommendations.
2
Although the township also appealed separately, it then
settled with the school district and that appeal was
dismissed.
3
467 Mich 896 (2002).
3
II
We review de novo decisions on summary-disposition
motions. Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611, 614; 647 NW2d
508 (2002). Similarly, we review de novo questions of
statutory interpretation. In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 413; 596
NW2d 164 (1999).
III
To determine whether local school districts are subject
to township zoning and planning ordinances, we must examine
the authority of the school district to develop school
construction and site plans, with the approval of the state
superintendent, under MCL 380.1263(3).
MCL 380.1263(3) states:
The board of a school district shall not
design or build a school building to be used for
instructional or noninstructional school purposes
or design and implement the design for a school
site unless the design or construction is in
compliance with [MCL 388.851 to 388.855a]. The
superintendent of public instruction has sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval
of plans and specifications for the construction,
reconstruction, or remodeling of school buildings
used for instructional or noninstructional school
purposes and of site plans for those school
buildings. [MCL 380.1263(3) (emphasis supplied).]
Of importance is that this subsection vests design and
construction oversight authority over the district’s decision
in the state superintendent, who has “sole and exclusive
jurisdiction . . . .”
4
The first step in construing a statute is to discern
legislative intent. To do this requires review of the
statutory text adopted by the Legislature. House Speaker v
State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d 539
(1993). If unambiguous, the Legislature will be presumed to
have intended the meaning expressed, and the courts enforce
that meaning without further judicial construction or
interpretation. Grievance Administrator v Underwood, 462 Mich
188, 193-194; 612 NW2d 116 (2000). These rules control the
disposition of this matter.
We determine that the statute here is unambiguous. It
grants sole and exclusive jurisdiction to the state
superintendent to review and approve plans and specifications
of school buildings and site plans for those buildings. Thus,
what the state superintendent approves is immune from the
provisions of local zoning ordinances.
In Dearden v Detroit, 403 Mich 257, 264; 269 NW2d 139
(1978), a case concerning the authority of the Department of
Corrections to locate prisons without regard to local zoning,
in which the department was given exclusive jurisdiction
concerning location, we found the words “exclusive
jurisdiction” indicative that the department had, not
surprisingly, exclusive jurisdiction. In later cases,
apprehensive that this may have suggested a need for
5
“talismanic words,” and that a court, not finding any, might
conclude that the state agency was not immune from local
zoning, we indicated in Burt Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources,
459 Mich 659, 669; 593 NW2d 534 (1999), that even in the
absence of talismanic words the state agency may be immune if
the Legislature’s intent to immunize was otherwise clear. The
thrust of this was that a court should look to the intent of
the Legislature and not just do a word search. We recently
discussed this again in Pittsfield Charter Twp v Washtenaw Co,
468 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2003). We now come full circle.
The fact that the Legislature does not have to use talismanic
words does not mean that, if it does, they are to be
disregarded. That is, Burt Twp, et al., should correctly be
understood as recognizing an enlarged target for the
Legislature, but it should not be read to say a bull’s eye no
longer counts. With that in mind, as explained below, we
conclude that “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” means, again
we hope not surprisingly, sole and exclusive jurisdiction.
We find the dictionary definitions dispositive. “Sole”
means “[b]eing the only one; existing or functioning without
another or others; only.” The American Heritage Dictionary of
the English Language (1981). Similarly, “exclusive” is
defined as “not divided or shared with others [or] single or
independent; sole.” Id. The Legislature’s choice of
6
modifiers reflects its intention to unambiguously vest
“jurisdiction,” i.e., “the general power to exercise
authority,” in the state superintendent. Black’s Law
Dictionary (7th ed).
This leaves to be determined the definition of “site
plan.” The dictionary defines “site” as “The place where
something was, is, or is to be located,” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language (1982), or similarly,
“[T]he area or exact plot of ground on which anything is, has
been, or is to be located . . . .” Random House Webster’s
College Dictionary (1997). “Plan” is defined as “A detailed
scheme, program, or method worked out beforehand for the
accomplishment of an object . . . . A proposed or tentative
project or goal . . . .” The American Heritage Dictionary of
the English Language (1982). Thus, it is apparent that the
meaning of “site plan,” with no qualifying modifiers, is the
plan for everything on the property, i.e., the entire project.
This definition is consistent not only with the common
understanding of the phrase but also with the Legislature’s
use of the term “site plan” in both the Township Zoning Act
and the township planning act. The Township Zoning Act states
that the proposal for the individual “site plan” of a property
owner or user must be “in compliance with local ordinances and
state and federal statutes.” MCL 125.286e(1). If it is, the
7
township zoning authorities have the duty to approve it.
Similarly, in the township planning act, the site plan must
“comply with the [township’s basic development] plan adopted
under this section.” MCL 125.326(4). If the site plan does
comply, it is to be approved by the planning authorities.
Thus, in both these acts the site plan, i.e., what is to be
undertaken on the site, is presented to the appropriate zoning
and planning authorities and, if consistent with the ordinance
and plan, it is to be approved.
In a fashion similar to the procedure followed by
individuals who wish to have their site plans approved by the
zoning and planning authorities discussed above, the school
district, under MCL 380.1263(3), must present its site plan to
the state superintendent for approval. Just as the township
zoning authorities have duties to accept or reject the
individual homeowner’s site plan, so the state superintendent
has similar duties to “review and approv[e]” the school
district’s site plans.
This understanding of MCL 380.1263(3) makes clear that
the state superintendent’s power is unaffected by any zoning
or planning rules or ordinances regarding what goes on within
the site itself. While this may appear to be an extensive
grant of authority, it is, in our view, no more so than, and
indeed of a piece with, the authority given to the ultimate
8
reviewing authorities by the Township Zoning Act and the
township planning act.
We also note that this interpretation is in harmony with
the general structure of MCL 380.1263(3), in which the state
superintendent is given distinct duties regarding both
construction and site plans. Because the state superintendent
must approve construction plans and, as a separate matter,
approve site plans, we are led to the conclusion that the
Legislature considered these two types of plans as not being
identical. Thus, we conclude that it was the Legislature’s
view that “site plans” would not be coterminous with
“construction plans.” Our interpretation of the statute is
consistent with this.
Further, it is important that neither the Township Zoning
Act nor the township planning act by its terms requires school
district compliance with zoning ordinances. Intervening
plaintiffs correctly note that MCL 125.273 and 125.327(2)(a)
clarify that township zoning ordinances and plans should be
drafted to accommodate a community’s educational needs.
However, it does not necessarily follow that local school
districts must comply with all township land-use controls
prescribed by ordinance.4
4
Intervening plaintiffs also assert that the Legislature,
by not expressly exempting school districts from zoning
(continued...)
9
Intervenors further argue that “site plans” cannot extend
beyond the construction of school buildings because the state
superintendent’s agents testified in the matter that they have
no published standards for site design and do not review site
plans for land-use matters. This argument has no merit. The
purported failure to act on the part of the state
superintendent’s agents is not indicative of the Legislature’s
intent and cannot control the meaning of the statutes at
issue. The intervenors’ claim in this regard would be better
understood as precipitating challenges to the administration
of the statute rather than its meaning.
After considering all the above arguments and applying
Dearden, it is our view that the Legislature clearly evidenced
an intention to grant “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” over
school construction and site plans to the state
superintendent, thereby immunizing local districts from
township zoning ordinances as they affect the content of the
site plan itself. MCL 380.1263(3). Because nothing in either
(...continued)
regulations, as it had regarding certain gas and oil
operations and electric transmission lines, should be held to
have not intended to exempt school districts from zoning. MCL
125.271(1). However, as we noted in Pittsfield Charter Twp v
Washtenaw Co, slip op at 13, this reads too much into these
existing exceptions, which, by the nature and timing of their
enactment, were the Legislature’s attempt to coordinate other
statutes with the Township Zoning Act, not to identify the
only possible exceptions to a township’s zoning authority.
10
the Township Zoning Act or the township planning act suggests
an intent to usurp the state superintendent’s “sole and
exclusive jurisdiction” over design, construction, and siting
requirements, we must conclude that local school districts for
their site plans must seek only the state superintendent’s
approval and need not have the approval of township zoning and
planning authorities.
IV
Intervening plaintiffs also argue that this act is
unconstitutional because it is an impermissible delegation of
legislative power to the state superintendent. For us to
address whether this statute effects an impermissible
delegation of legislative authority, it would have been
necessary for the state superintendent to have been joined as
a party pursuant to MCR 2.205(A). Because this did not take
place, the issue is not properly before us and we decline to
address the matter further. Similarly, the matter was not
properly presented to the Court of Appeals and that Court’s
opinion, to the extent that it considered this issue, must be
vacated.
V
As we read Justice Cavanagh’s opinion, he agrees with us
that MCL 380.1263(3) granted the state superintendent
authority superseding township zoning ordinances for what goes
11
on within the site itself. He would go further however,
understanding the statute to mean that
there is no reason to presume the state
superintendent’s review power over local school
districts is necessarily limited to activities
contained within the site itself. (Post at 4).
Thus, he concludes that
it would be inappropriate to suggest that, even in
some limited fashion local school districts should
be subject to township zoning authorities. (Post
at 5).
Justice Weaver concurs with our approach to the authority
of the superintendent stating that
the text of MCL 380.1263(3) evidences a legislative
intent to subject local school districts to the
authority of the superintendent of public
instruction, thus immunizing districts from
township zoning ordinances. (Post at 2).
Thus a clear majority of the Court agrees that the
authority of the state superintendent pursuant to MCL
380.1263(3) is at least as broad as set forth in this opinion.
Justice Markman disagrees with us. Under Justice
Markman’s interpretation of MCL 380.1263(3) the words “sole
and exclusive jurisdiction” do not convey that the
jurisdiction is sole and exclusive. His view, we believe, is
inconsistent with the Legislature’s grant of “sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval” of the
site plans as well as, were it the majority, an effective
overruling of the line of cases commencing with Dearden and
12
including Burt Twp, Byrne v Michigan, 463 Mich 652; 624 NW2d
906 (2001), and most recently, Pittsfield Twp.5
As for plaintiffs’ claim that MCL 380.1263(3) is
unconstitutional because it is an inappropriate delegation of
legislative power to the state superintendent, Justice
Markman, while otherwise dissenting as we have mentioned,
concurs with our position that to reach this issue the state
superintendent should have been joined as a party. Justice
Cavanagh, in his concurrence, only briefly addresses this
issue without stating a preference for its resolution.
5
Moreover, with respect to Justice Markman’s concern that
unfortunate consequences may flow from the state
superintendent having such power, we do not share his
apprehensions. Regarding the prospect of a school district
recommending, and the state superintendent approving, plans
that are in conflict with a community’s interests, it is, of
course, possible, but seems unlikely when one recalls that the
local school district, the generator of the site plan, is
controlled by a locally elected board. We believe they, as
other unnamed elected officials in whom Justice Markman seems
to have more confidence, can be expected to be sensitive to
the local community interests. If they are not, there are the
usual political remedies. In any event, assuming this is
insufficiently reassuring, we fail to see why, as a general
matter, these elected officials would be inherently less
sensitive to local concerns than would be an appointive (that
is, unelected) zoning board or planning commission. Further,
reinforcing our conclusion in this regard is the fact that the
state superintendent serves at the pleasure of yet another
elected body, the State Board of Education. Thus, we believe
the statute, as we have construed it, will produce fewer
discordant outcomes with local wishes than can be expected
under Justice Markman’s approach. If, however, this is not
the case, it is within the Legislature’s power to simply
change the process to have ultimate authority rest with
appointed zoning boards and planning authorities.
13
Justice Weaver, however, reaches the delegation question and
finds no improper delegation. Accordingly, with others
joining this plurality, a clear majority of the Court agrees
that the failure to join the state superintendent as a party
precludes us from resolving the claim that MCL 380.1263(3) is
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
VI
In the present case, the Legislature vested “sole and
exclusive jurisdiction” over school construction and site
plans in the state superintendent of public instruction, who
has the approval authority for school construction and site
plans submitted by the local school districts. This
unambiguous language, when viewed in light of the zoning
authority granted to townships in the township zoning and
planning acts, indicates an intention to immunize school
districts from local ordinances as they affect the content of
a school site plan. Further, the issue of delegation of
legislative authority to the state superintendent is not
properly before us, and a majority declines to consider it.
For these reasons, with others joining this plurality, the
Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing
the intervening plaintiffs’ appeal after the denial of their
motion for summary disposition and the Court vacates those
portions of the opinion of the Court of Appeals that address
14
the issue of delegation of legislative authority to the state
superintendent of public instruction.
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr
15
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE,
Plaintiff,
and No. 120213
HEATHER SCHULZ, JEFFREY SCHULZ;
MARY LOWE, GEORGE LOWE; ERIC
HANPETER, LAURA HANPETER; FRANK
CORONA, MARCELLA CORONA; DAVID
MALMIN, LEE ANN MALMIN; JOHN
MILLER, DEBRA MILLER; TOM
CONWELL, EVY CONWELL; MARY BETH
YAKIMA, DAN YAKIMA; RICHARD LEE,
PATTY LEE; BETH PETERSON, RICK
PETERSON; JOHN BUCHANAN; KEN
BUCHANAN; LARRY GREGORY, NANCY
GREGORY; K. MAUREEN WYNALEK,
JAMES WYNALEK; HAROLD W. BULGER
and SANDRA A. BULGER.
Intervening-Plaintiffs,
Appellants,
v
NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
SUPERINTENDENT OF NORTHVILLE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, and NORTHVILLE
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).
I agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that an
evaluation of MCL 380.1263(3)1 indicates a legislative intent
to subject local school districts to the authority of the
state superintendent, thereby immunizing districts from
township zoning ordinances. However, I must concur in the
result only.
Above all, I am troubled by the lead opinion’s suggestion
that the state superintendent’s power to review a local school
district’s site plan is limited to “what goes on within the
site itself.” Ante at 7. In drafting MCL 380.1263(3), the
Legislature indicated no such restriction on the
superintendent’s authority. As the lead opinion clearly
states, the statute provides the state superintendent with
“sole and exclusive jurisdiction” over “site plans.” MCL
380.1263(3).
This interpretation accords with the events leading up to
the statute’s revision. In response to several Court of
1
Portions of the school construction code, MCL 388.851
et seq., have been revised by 2002 PA 628. Without amending
the grant in MCL 380.1263(3) of “sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over . . . site plans” to the superintendent of
public instruction, the act transfers the authority to enforce
construction codes from one state entity, the superintendent,
to the Department of Consumer and Industry Services. Because
this case arose before 2002 PA 628 was enacted, we need not
decide whether the revisions alter the scope of the
superintendent’s authority.
2
Appeals cases mandating local school district compliance with
township ordinances,2 the Legislature amended subsection
1263(3) and extended state oversight authority to include
“site plans for those school buildings.” 1990 PA 159.
Interpreting the 1990 amendment in a manner that gives a
distinct meaning to “site plans” requires an acknowledgment
that “site plans” contain data other than that strictly
necessary for “the construction of . . . school buildings
. . . .”
Further, although the term “site plans” is not defined in
the revised school code, the Legislature’s practice of
employing the term in zoning statutes suggests its utility as
a tool to measure compliance with land-use regulations.3
2
Lutheran High School Ass’n v Farmington Hills, 146 Mich
App 641; 381 NW2d 417 (1985) (subjecting private school to
local zoning ordinances); Cody Park Ass’n v Royal Oak School
Dist, 116 Mich App 103; 321 NW2d 855 (1982) (holding that the
power of a school district to acquire property did not exempt
it from local zoning ordinances).
3
MCL 125.286e(1) provides:
As used in this section, "site plan" includes
the documents and drawings required by the zoning
ordinance to insure that a proposed land use or
activity is in compliance with local ordinances and
state and federal statutes.
See also MCL 125.326.
Unlike the lead opinion, I disagree that the American
Heritage Dictionary should be used to define “site plan.” As
noted above, the phrase is a term of art in the fields of,
inter alia, zoning, construction, and planning, i.e., a “site
(continued...)
3
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the superintendent’s
exclusive jurisdiction over site plans would include the
authority to review and approve land-use controls for the
promotion of community health, safety, and welfare. See,
e.g., MCL 125.271(1) (“the township board of an organized
township in this state may provide by zoning ordinance . . .
to promote public health, safety, and welfare.”). Therefore,
while we require no “talismanic words,” the legislative grant
of “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” unambiguously indicates
a legislative intent to vest comprehensive and undivided
control over both school construction plans and site plans in
the state superintendent, which includes land-use oversight
authority. From this broad grant of power, there is no reason
to presume the state superintendent’s review power over local
school districts is necessarily limited to activities
contained within the site itself.
In this case, for example, plaintiff requested a “traffic
impact study to evaluate peak hour movement.” Certainly, the
relevant traffic patterns with which the township was
3
(...continued)
plan” refers to the specifications required for the task
assigned. See MCL 8.3a (“technical words and phrases . . .
shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar
and appropriate meaning”). See also Production Credit Ass’n
of Lansing v Dep’t of Treasury, 404 Mich 301, 312; 273 NW2d 10
(1978) (“terms of art” should be interpreted “in accordance
with the experience and understanding of those who would be
expected to use and interpret the act”).
4
concerned included activities not contained exclusively within
the site itself. Although accommodations for such concerns
would normally be (and were) included within the site plan, §
1263(3) indicates no particular land-based limit to the state
superintendent’s oversight authority, as the lead opinion
suggests. Rather, the state superintendent has “sole and
exclusive jurisdiction” over “site plans,” which reasonably
includes the authority to review land-use controls designed
for zoning purposes. MCL 380.1263(3). Given that this
textual indicator of legislative intent, it would be
inappropriate to suggest that, even in some limited fashion,
local school districts should be subject to township zoning
authorities.
Further, the lead opinion comments upon the “standards”
to which the state superintendent must submit itself and the
adequacy with which state agents are able to enforce those
standards in part III, ante at 9, but continues by refusing to
reach the merits of plaintiff’s delegation-of-power claim in
part IV. Because of the lead opinion’s position regarding
plaintiff’s failure to join the superintendent as a party and
its refusal to rule on the adequacy of the standards delegated
by the Legislature, I would, had I chosen to join the lead
opinion’s position, refrain from all unnecessary commentary in
part III.
5
In sum, while I agree that Dearden v Detroit, 403 Mich
257; 269 NW2d 139 (1978), requires the rejection of
plaintiffs’ claim in light of the “sole and exclusive
authority” granted to the state superintendent in MCL
380.1263(3), I respectfully concur in the result only for the
reasons noted above.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
6
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE,
Plaintiff,
and No. 120213
HEATHER SCHULZ, JEFFREY SCHULZ;
MARY LOWE, GEORGE LOWE; ERIC
HANPETER, LAURA HANPETER; FRANK
CORONA, MARCELLA CORONA; DAVID
MALMIN, LEE ANN MALMIN; JOHN
MILLER, DEBRA MILLER; TOM
CONWELL, EVY CONWELL; MARY BETH
YAKIMA, DAN YAKIMA; RICHARD LEE,
PATTY LEE; BETH PETERSON, RICK
PETERSON; JOHN BUCHANAN; KEN
BUCHANAN; LARRY GREGORY, NANCY
GREGORY; K. MAUREEN WYNALEK,
JAMES WYNALEK; HAROLD W. BULGER
and SANDRA A. BULGER.
Intervening-Plaintiffs,
Appellants,
v
NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
SUPERINTENDENT OF NORTHVILLE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, and NORTHVILLE
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________________
WEAVER, J. (concurring in result).
I concur in the result of the lead opinion because the
text of MCL 380.1263(3) evidences a legislative intent to
subject local school districts to the authority of the state
superintendent of public instruction, thus immunizing
districts from township zoning ordinances.1 This conclusion
is consistent with the general understanding of the term “site
plan,” as that term is used in the Township Zoning Act, MCL
125.271 et seq.,2 as well as the general understanding of the
phrase “sole and exclusive jurisdiction.”
I write separately because not persuasive is the lead
opinion‘s position that it is “necessary” to join the state
1
MCL 380.1263(3) provides:
The board of a school district shall not
design or build a school building to be used for
instructional or noninstructional school purposes
or design and implement the design for a school
site unless the design or construction is in
compliance with [MCL 388.851 to 388.855a]. The
superintendent of public instruction has sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval
of plans and specifications for the construction,
reconstruction, or remodeling of school buildings
used for instructional or noninstructional school
purposes and of site plans for those school
buildings. [Emphasis added.]
2
The Township Zoning Act provides:
As used in this section, “site plan” includes
the documents and drawings required by the zoning
ordinance to insure that a proposed land use or
activity is in compliance with local ordinances and
state and federal statutes. [MCL 125.286e(1).]
2
superintendent as a party before addressing the intervening
plaintiffs’ argument concerning the improper delegation of
legislative authority.3 Rather, applying the guidelines
articulated in Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich
299; 240 NW2d 206 (1976),4 I would conclude that the act does
3
MCR 2.205(A) states that “persons having such interests
in the subject matter of an action that their presence in the
action is essential to permit the court to render complete
relief must be made parties . . . .” The superintendent’s
presence is not essential to permit the Court to render
complete relief on the issue concerning the constitutionality
of the statute, where the conclusion is that the statute is
constitutional and the superintendent would not be arguing
against the constitutionality of the statute. Additionally,
I note that none of the parties moved to join the
superintendent at any stage of the proceedings, and the
Attorney General declined to file a brief amicus curiae on the
superintendent’s behalf, despite this Court’s invitation to do
so. This Court’s grant order stated:
Leave to file briefs amici curiae is granted.
The Attorney General is invited to file a brief
amicus curiae on behalf of the Superintendent of
Public Instruction. [467 Mich 896 (2002).]
Moreover, were the superintendent a party whose presence
was essential under MCR 2.205, MCR 2.207 authorizes the Court
to add parties at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal.
2 Dean & Longhofer, Michigan Court Rules Practice, p 97. See
also Henkel v Henkel, 282 Mich 473, 488; 276 NW 522 (1937)
(“And, ordinarily, if the proper parties plaintiff are not
joined, this court will direct the joinder of the proper
parties plaintiff on appeal.” [Citations omitted.]).
4
The rule concerning delegation states:
“The legislature cannot delegate its power to
make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things
upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its
own action depend. To deny this would be to stop
the wheels of government.” [Seaman, supra at 308,
(continued...)
3
not constitute an impermissible delegation of legislative
authority because the Revised School Code provides sufficient
standards to guide the superintendent’s discretion.
For these reasons, I concur in the result of the lead
opinion.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
4
(...continued)
quoting Locke’s Appeal, 72 Pa 491, 498-499 (1873).]
Seaman offers the following criteria for determining
whether a statute provides sufficient standards: (1) the act
in question must be read as a whole when determining whether
the provision at issue provides sufficient standards, (2) “the
standard should be ‘as reasonably precise as the subject
matter requires or permits’”, (quoting Osius v St Clair
Shores, 344 Mich 693, 698; 75 NW2d 25 [1956])and (3) when
possible, the statute must be construed in a manner that
renders it valid rather than invalid. Id. at 309.
4
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE,
Plaintiff,
and No. 120213
HEATHER SCHULZ, JEFFREY SCHULZ;
MARY LOWE, GEORGE LOWE; ERIC
HANPETER, LAURA HANPETER; FRANK
CORONA, MARCELLA CORONA; DAVID
MALMIN, LEE ANN MALMIN; JOHN
MILLER, DEBRA MILLER; TOM
CONWELL, EVY CONWELL; MARY BETH
YAKIMA, DAN YAKIMA; RICHARD LEE,
PATTY LEE; BETH PETERSON, RICK
PETERSON; JOHN BUCHANAN; KEN
BUCHANAN; LARRY GREGORY, NANCY
GREGORY; K. MAUREEN WYNALEK,
JAMES WYNALEK; HAROLD W. BULGER
and SANDRA A. BULGER,
Intervening-Plaintiffs,
Appellants,
v
NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
SUPERINTENDENT OF NORTHVILLE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, and NORTHVILLE
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. A majority of the Court affirms
in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, concluding that
MCL 380.1263(3) evidences a legislative intent to immunize
school districts from local zoning ordinances that affect the
content of school site plans. I disagree with the majority’s
conclusion that the language in this statute according the
state superintendent of public instruction (superintendent)
“sole and exclusive jurisdiction” to review and approve “site
plans” for school buildings permits the superintendent to
determine what may be placed on a site without regard to local
zoning ordinances. Because, in my judgment, there is no clear
legislative intent in MCL 380.1263(3) to exempt school
districts from local zoning ordinances, I would reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I. THE DEARDEN TEST AND RELEVANT CASES
As this Court indicated in Dearden v Detroit, 403 Mich
257, 264; 269 NW2d 139 (1978), “legislative intent, where it
can be discerned, is the test for determining whether a
governmental unit is immune from the provisions of local
zoning ordinances.” In Dearden, this Court considered a
statute granting the Department of Corrections “exclusive
jurisdiction” over penal institutions, MCL 791.204, and
determined that the statutory scheme demonstrated a
2
legislative intent to grant the department immunity from local
zoning ordinances in the establishment of state penal
institutions. Dearden, supra at 265-267.
Subsequently, in Burt Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources,
459 Mich 659; 593 NW2d 534 (1999), this Court concluded that
the Department of Natural Resources was required to comply
with a local zoning ordinance when constructing a public boat
launch. Although the Legislature granted the department
“power and jurisdiction over the management, control, and
disposition of all land under the public domain, except for
those lands . . . that are managed by other state agencies,”
MCL 324.503(1), other statutes granted the township extensive
regulatory authority over land use, including waterfront land
use. We noted that the burden was on the department to
demonstrate a “clear legislative intent” to exempt the
department from the township’s zoning ordinances. Nothing in
the statutes in that case indicated a “clear expression” of
legislative intent to grant the department exclusive
jurisdiction or to exempt the department from the township’s
zoning ordinance. Burt Twp, supra at 668.
More recently, in Byrne v Michigan, 463 Mich 652, 660-61;
624 NW2d 906 (2001), this Court concluded that the Legislature
clearly expressed its intent to grant the Michigan State
Police exclusive authority, not subject to any local zoning
3
ordinances, over the siting and construction of a
communications tower. The statute at issue there, MCL
28.282(2), specifically required that the local zoning
authority be notified of the site selected and set out a
procedure to be followed in the event that the selected site
failed to comply with local zoning, with the result that if
any dispute could not be resolved, the department could
proceed with construction.1 Thus, the statute amounted to a
“clear expression” of the Legislature’s intent to invest the
state police with full authority over the construction of the
tower. Id. at 661.
II. ANALYSIS
For the following reasons, which will be discussed in
more detail below, I do not believe that MCL 380.1263(3)
1
MCL 28.282(2) provides:
In siting the buildings and equipment
necessary to implement the Michigan public safety
communications system, the director of the
department of state police shall locate the system,
a local unit of government with zoning authority
shall be notified of a site selected in their
jurisdiction and the requirements necessary for a
site. If the selected site does not comply with
zoning, the local unit shall have 30 days from the
date of notification to grant a special use permit
or propose an equivalent site. If the local unit
does not grant a special use permit within the 30
day period, or a proposed alternate site does not
meet the siting requirements, the department may
proceed with construction.
4
evidences a legislative intent, much less a “clear”
legislative intent, Burt, supra at 666, to equate the state
superintendent’s authority over school site plans with the
general power to act as a statewide zoning official. First,
authority over site plans is wholly distinct from authority
over zoning and land-use matters. Second, MCL 380.1263(3)
fails to reference zoning, an inexplicable failure if the
purpose of this provision was to confer zoning authority upon
a public official. Third, the Township Zoning Act, MCL
125.321 et seq., sets forth a contrary understanding of the
zoning and land-use authority of local officials. As a
result, under the test set out in Dearden, in which this Court
declined to adopt a rule that state agencies have inherent
immunity from local zoning ordinances, there is no evidence of
a “clear legislative intent,” Burt, supra at 666, to provide
the superintendent with zoning authority and thereby immunize
school districts from township zoning ordinances.
A. SITE PLAN AUTHORITY DISTINCT FROM ZONING AUTHORITY
Determining whether the Legislature intended to exempt
local school districts from township zoning affecting site
plans for schools requires an examination of the relevant
portion of the Revised School Code, MCL 380.1263(3), which
provides:
The board of a school district shall not
design or build a school building to be used for
5
instructional or noninstructional school purposes
or design and implement the design for a school
site unless the design or construction is in
compliance with [MCL 388.851 to 388.855a, the
construction of school buildings act]. The
superintendent of public instruction has sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval
of plans and specifications for the construction,
reconstruction, or remodeling of school buildings
used for instructional or noninstructional school
purposes and of site plans for those school
buildings.
As the lead opinion recognizes, this provision requires local
school boards to comply with the construction of school
buildings act and grants the state superintendent “sole and
exclusive jurisdiction” to review and approve “plans and
specifications for the construction, reconstruction, or
remodeling of school buildings” and “site plans for those
school buildings.”
I agree with the lead opinion that the references in MCL
380.1263(3) to both construction plans and site plans indicate
that the Legislature viewed site plans as meaning something
different from construction plans. Like the lead opinion, I
believe that a site plan essentially comprises “the plan for
everything on the property.” Ante at 6. As the lead opinion
acknowledges, a site plan reflects “what is to be undertaken
on the site,” ante at 7, and amounts to a proposal. This is
supported by the description of site plans given in MCL
125.286e(1):
As used in this section, “site plan” includes
6
the documents and drawings required by the zoning
ordinance to insure that a proposed land use or
activity is in compliance with local ordinances and
state and federal statutes. [Emphasis added.2]
Site plans thus can be reasonably understood as consisting of
written and illustrative documents that set forth the proposed
layout of a site and that are used to ensure compliance with
local zoning regulations.
Although I do not disagree with the lead opinion’s
general characterization of site plans, I disagree with its
conclusion that the superintendent’s authority over site plans
is “unaffected by any zoning or planning rules or ordinances
regarding what goes on within the site itself.” Ante at 10.
As the lead opinion recognizes, a “plan” is a proposal that is
tentative in nature and is not, by definition, a final
decision. Ante at 6. Recognizing this meaning, it is clear,
in my judgment, that the authority granted to the
superintendent in MCL 380.1263(3) relates only to the approval
of proposals for what might be built, or what the school
district would like to have built, on the school site, and is
not the equivalent of authority to undertake final zoning or
2
See also the township planning act, MCL 125.326(4):
After adoption of a plan under this section, a
site plan for a property located in the plan area
that is required to be submitted under section 16e
of the township zoning act [MCL 125.286e] shall
comply with the plan adopted under this act.
7
land-use decisions. The lead opinion, however, construes MCL
380.1263(3), as empowering the superintendent to effect final
zoning and land-use decisions regarding the placement of
buildings and facilities on school sites. In contrast, I
believe that the superintendent’s authority extends under the
statute only to the final review and approval of the proposed
layout—that is the “site plan”—for the school building. The
statute authorizes the superintendent to finally review and
approve the plan for the school site. However, local
authorities, consistently with MCL 125.286e(1), are authorized
to utilize the site plan as a means for ensuring that the
proposed land use by the superintendent complies with local
zoning ordinances.3
The superintendent’s authority over site plans is not the
equivalent of zoning or land-use authority, but it is an
authority in support of, an authority that informs, the
exercise of zoning authority by local officials. A site plan
is a tool that ensures compliance with zoning; it is not
merely substitute nomenclature for describing the zoning and
3
To illustrate this point, consider the situation of an
individual planning to build a new house. Although the
individual might have “sole and exclusive” authority to review
and approve a site plan for the house, as between the
individual and the builder and neighbors, this does not mean
that the site plan is exempt from applicable local zoning
ordinances. Local zoning authorities are still empowered to
examine the site plan in order to ensure that the proposed use
complies with local zoning requirements.
8
land-use processes.4
B. ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO ZONING
It is noteworthy that MCL 380.1263(3) is not a zoning or
land-use statute at all and nowhere does it refer to zoning or
land-use authority. Rather, this provision is located within
Part 16 of the Revised School Code, which concerns the general
powers and duties of boards of education. As discussed in the
preceding subsection, the statute grants the superintendent
sole and exclusive jurisdiction to review and approve site
plans for school buildings, but nowhere empowers the
superintendent to make final zoning or land-use decisions,
even as they relate to school site plans. This omission is
particularly significant in light of the level of specificity
with which the provision otherwise describes the
superintendent’s jurisdiction. Under MCL 380.1263(3), the
superintendent possesses jurisdiction over “plans” and
“specifications” for the “construction,” the “reconstruction,”
and the “remodeling” of schools, as well as for the “site
4
The lead opinion’s assertion that I view the township’s
authority under MCL 380.1263(3), as “not only concurrent with,
but also superior to” the superintendent’s authority, ante at
11, misapprehends this dissent. Rather, the respective
authorities of these entities are simply different. That the
President, for example, may veto legislation enacted by the
Congress does not make his veto authority either “concurrent”
with or “superior” to the legislative authority of the
Congress. It is simply a different authority whose exercise
may have an effect on the authority of the Congress.
9
plans,” of certain school buildings. However, nowhere in this
provision is there any mention of jurisdiction concerning
zoning or land-use planning, both of which are subject to
regulation under entirely separate statutes. This is hardly
surprising, considering that subsection 1263(3) is part of a
school code and not a part of a zoning or land-use statute.5
Despite the lack of any statutory reference to zoning or
land-use authority, the lead opinion construes subsection
1263(3) as replacing the authority of local officials in this
realm with that of the superintendent. It reaches this
conclusion with little substantive analysis, instead simply
assuming that the Legislature, by granting the superintendent
certain enumerated powers, intended to grant him unenumerated
powers as well.6 Yet, in my judgment, it is difficult to
conceive that the Legislature would have conferred zoning and
land-use authority upon the superintendent by implication, and
that it would have set forth with specificity an enumeration
5
Given its placement in Michigan statutory law, it is
quite likely that the legislative intention underlying MCL
380.1263(3) was merely to recognize the superintendent as the
final authority within the school system empowered to review
and approve construction plans and site plans for school
buildings.
6
This is reflected in part by the lead opinion’s
apparent conclusion that the state superintendent may preempt
some local zoning and land-use regulations, but not others.
Absent any reference to zoning or land-use authority in the
statute, it is hard to understand how the lead opinion draws
a distinction between zoning that is preempted and zoning that
is not preempted.
10
of lesser authorities and yet intended to grant a greater
authority despite failing to specify that greater authority.
Further, it is difficult to conceive that the Legislature
would have intended to deprive communities throughout the
state of one of their most fundamental powers, the power to
zone and regulate land use, through such indirection.7 In the
absence of any indication in MCL 380.1263(3), clear or
otherwise, that the superintendent is not required to comply
with local zoning and land-use regulations, I believe that
such compliance is required. There is nothing in that statute
that authorizes the superintendent to act in disregard of the
zoning and land-use decisions made by local communities
throughout this state.
C. TOWNSHIP ZONING ACT
The lead opinion’s interpretation of MCL 380.1263(3) is
further refuted by the Township Zoning Act, pursuant to which
township boards are authorized to regulate in a very broad
7
The Legislature has hardly shown itself incapable of,
or disinclined to, expressly use “zoning” when that was its
intention. A simple word check of the Michigan statutory law
indicates that the Legislature has used the term on at least
several hundred occasions when it wished to reference such
authority. Yet, in the view of the lead opinion, the
Legislature, through MCL 380.1263(3), conferred authority over
zoning upon an unelected state official, in derogation of the
authority possessed by the people of communities throughout
the state, in a realm (i.e., schooling) that likely would
effect every one of these communities, without happening to
mention “zoning.”
11
manner land uses and development within their boundaries,
including regulation of the location and size of buildings.8
Moreover, MCL 125.271 specifically allows townships “to
facilitate adequate and efficient provision for . . .
education . . . .” Similarly, MCL 125.273 provides:
The zoning ordinance shall be based upon a
plan designed to . . . facilitate adequate
8
With regard to land-use regulation by townships, MCL
125.271(1) states:
The township board of an organized township in
this state may provide by zoning ordinance for the
regulation of land development and the
establishment of districts . . . which regulate the
use of land and structures; to meet the needs of
the state's citizens for food, fiber, energy, and
other natural resources, places of residence,
recreation, industry, trade, service, and other
uses of land; to insure that use of the land shall
be situated in appropriate locations and
relationships; to limit the inappropriate
overcrowding of land and congestion of population,
transportation systems, and other public
facilities; to facilitate adequate and efficient
provision for transportation systems, sewage
disposal, water, energy, education, recreation, and
other public service and facility requirements; and
to promote public health, safety, and welfare
. . . . The township board of an organized township
may use this act to provide by ordinance for the
regulation of land development . . . . Ordinances
regulating land development may also be adopted
designating or limiting the location, the height,
number of stories, and size of dwellings,
buildings, and structures that may be erected or
altered . . . , and the specific uses for which
dwellings, buildings, and structures . . . , may be
erected or altered; the area of yards, courts, and
other open spaces, and the sanitary, safety, and
protective measures that shall be required for the
dwellings, buildings, and structures . . . .
12
provision for a system of transportation, sewage
disposal, safe and adequate water supply,
education, recreation, and other public
requirements . . . .
These provisions generally recognize the zoning and land-use
authority of townships, as well as the specific role of zoning
and land-use authority in promoting a system of education.
Because the Legislature has authorized township boards to
comprehensively regulate land use, and has specifically
authorized townships to enact zoning ordinances in order to
provide for the area’s education requirements, I do not
believe that the superintendent’s authority under MCL
380.1263(3) can reasonably be construed to displace all local
zoning and land-use ordinances that, in any way, “affect”
school site plans. The breadth of the Township Zoning Act is
inconsistent with the notion that the Legislature would have
compromised this authority through statutory silence and
indirection.
Given the integrated and coordinated nature of most
zoning and land-use plans, in which the whole is affected by
the part, the conferral of authority upon the superintendent
to disregard local regulations concerning school sites carries
with it a potential effect reaching far beyond these sites.
In communities throughout the state, the most carefully
considered and finely coordinated zoning and land-use plan
will now potentially be subject to the disruptiveness of a
13
contrary zoning or land-use decision made by the
superintendent. Moreover, such a decision will be one
undertaken by an unelected official who, almost certainly,
will possess less familiarity with the needs and circumstances
of these communities, and who will be less responsive to the
people of these communities, than their own local officials.
III. APPLICATION OF THE DEARDEN TEST
In Dearden, supra at 265, the statute at issue granted
the Department of Corrections “exclusive jurisdiction” over
penal institutions. The statute indicated that it was
intended to repeal other provisions of law that were
inconsistent with the department’s administration of the penal
system and indicated that the Michigan Corrections Commission
was to address “‘all matters relating to the unified
development of the penal institutions . . . of the state . .
. .’” Id. at 266 quoting MCL 791.202(1). The statute thus
evidenced a legislative intent to immunize the department
“from local zoning ordinances when establishing state penal
institutions.” Id. at 267.
In my judgment, the circumstances involved in Dearden
materially differ from the circumstances in this case.
Although, like the statute in Dearden, subsection 1263(3)
contains “exclusive jurisdiction” language, the exclusive
jurisdiction applies specifically to “the review and approval
14
of plans and specifications for the construction,
reconstruction, or remodeling of school buildings” and “site
plans for those school buildings.” This language, in my view,
reflects an intent to grant the state superintendent a more
limited authority that relates specifically to the oversight
of construction and site plans for particular school
buildings. Whereas the statutory scheme in Dearden reflected
a legislative intent to provide the Department of Corrections
with broad authority to oversee and develop a statewide system
of penal institutions, the relevant statute here reflects an
intent to empower the superintendent to oversee a much
narrower area relating to construction and site plans for
school buildings. This is not surprising in view of the fact
that principal authority over schools, unlike prisons, has
traditionally reposed with local communities.9
In regard to the application of the Dearden test, this
Court indicated in Burt Twp, supra at 666, that the party
claiming to be exempt must show “a clear legislative intent”
to exempt the particular activities from local zoning. The
9
Compare, also, the specificity and concreteness of MCL
46.11, considered in Pittsfield Charter Twp v Washtenaw Co,
468 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2003), which states that a county
board of commissioners may “[d]etermine the site of, remove,
or designate a new site for a county building,” MCL 46.11(b),
and “[e]rect the necessary buildings for jails, clerks'
offices, and other county buildings, and prescribe the time
and manner of erecting them,” MCL 46.11(d) (emphasis
supplied).
15
lead opinion effectively inverts this test, asserting that the
statutes pertaining to township zoning and planning do not
expressly require school districts to comply with local zoning
regulations. Ante at 9-10. However, given the broad land-use
authority that the Legislature has granted to townships, it
would hardly be expected that these statutes would also
affirmatively enumerate those entities obligated to comply
with their zoning requirements. To assume otherwise is to
suggest that, unless express compliance is mandated, then
compliance is not required. Following this reasoning to its
logical conclusion, one would have to assume that no entity
must comply with local zoning authority because no such
entities are listed. The lead opinion’s analysis improperly
shifts the burden to the township to demonstrate that its
generally applicable zoning and land-use regulations are
applicable to a particular entity.
In my judgment, the school district, the party claiming
exemption, has not met its burden. Rather, the relevant
statutory provisions do not evidence a “clear legislative
intent” to immunize local school districts from local zoning
ordinances.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MAJORITY HOLDING
The majority of the justices conclude that the
superintendent’s authority over “what goes on within the site
16
itself” is unaffected by local zoning, ante at 7, and that
local school districts are immune from township zoning
ordinances “as they affect the content of the site plan
itself.” Ante at 9. However, the lead opinion does not
otherwise explain how broad or how limited it perceives the
superintendent’s jurisdiction to be. This prompts the obvious
questions: precisely what, under the lead opinion, does the
superintendent have the authority to do; and precisely what do
local officials have the authority to do? By not offering
insight into how these questions should be answered, the
public is left only to speculate, ensuring that new litigation
will be the product. Which types of zoning and land-use
matters “affect” the content of the site plan itself?10 Do
sewage and drainage pipes that extend beyond the “site itself”
and into the surrounding community “affect” the site plan? Do
roads and paths, and means of ingress and egress that extend
beyond the “site itself” and into the surrounding community
“affect” the site plan? Do environmental regulations that
affect the community generally “affect” the site plan? Do
noise regulations that have a general effect on the community
10
Some sense of the breadth of the answer to this
question might be gleaned by reading the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111; 63 S Ct 82
87 L Ed 122 (1942), and its considerable line of progeny,
concerning what is meant by matters that “affect” interstate
commerce.
17
“affect” the site plan? Indeed, what generally applicable
zoning and land-use regulations might not be perceived, at
least under some circumstances, as “affecting” the site plan?11
Apart from what “affects” the site plan, and is thereby
within the exclusive determination of the superintendent, what
“affects” the community surrounding the school is also within
the exclusive determination of the superintendent. Persons
living within the surrounding neighborhood, and within the
surrounding community, will, as a result, have diminished
effective resort to their local representatives, none of whom
will any longer possess authority over matters relating to
school sites and the structures upon them.
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that MCL
380.1263(3), which grants the state superintendent “sole and
11
The lead opinion is tentative even in addressing
whether a community may determine the initial location of a
school, for example, by restricting it from being placed in a
recreationally, residentially, or commercially zoned area.
The lead opinion, while indicating that school districts are
exempt from zoning ordinances that “affect the content of a
school site plan,” ante at 12, does not clearly address the
question of who has the power to determine the location of the
school site in the first instance, and whether a community has
any involvement in this decision. Although the lead opinion
appears at one point to limit the superintendent’s exemption
to “the site plan itself,” ante at 9, it proceeds to suggest
that the superintendent possesses exclusive authority “over
design, construction, and siting requirements,” ante at 9
(emphasis added). Moreover, it is difficult to understand
what could more directly “affect” a school site plan than
where a school is sited in the first place.
18
exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval of plans
and specifications for the construction, reconstruction, or
remodeling of school buildings . . . and of site plans for
those school buildings,” indicates a “clear legislative
intent” to exempt the state school superintendent from local
zoning ordinances. First, the superintendent’s authority over
“site plans” is not the equivalent of zoning or land-use
authority, and such authority cannot reasonably be understood
to displace local zoning and land-use authority. Second,
subsection 1263(3) does not even refer to zoning. Its
specific grants of authority to the superintendent cannot
reasonably be construed to include the distinct, and greater,
authority over zoning and land-use matters. Third, the
relevant provisions of the Township Zoning Act confer upon
townships broad land-use authority and specifically recognize
the role of such authority in providing for a system of
education. Such breadth of authority is inconsistent with the
notion that the Legislature would have compromised this
authority through statutory silence and indirection.
I would therefore reverse the part of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals finding such an exemption for the
superintendent’s decisions, and remand for entry of summary
19
disposition on this issue in favor of the intervenors.12
Stephen J. Markman
12
I concur in part IV of the lead opinion, in which the
justices decline to address intervenors’ argument regarding
the improper delegation of authority.
20