Webster v. State

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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
17-MAR-2023
09:07 AM
Dkt. 23 MO

SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

TARVAL WEBSTER,
Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF HAWAII,
Respondent-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1CPN-XX-XXXXXXX)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Recktenwald, C.J., and Nakayama, J.,
Circuit Judge Park, in place of Wilson, J., recused,
Circuit Judge Browning, in place of Eddins, J., recused,
and McKenna, J., dissenting)

This case calls upon the court to address when a

defendant who is sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment

is entitled to presentence detention credit. As this court

previously established in State v. Tauiliili, 96 Hawaiʻi 195, 29

P.3d 914 (2001), Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 706-671 and

706-668.5 must be read together when a sentencing court imposes

consecutive sentences upon a defendant. In such cases,

HRS § 706-671 does not entitle a defendant to presentence
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detention credit for each sentence imposed. Rather, a defendant

is entitled to presentence credit only once against the

aggregate of his consecutive sentences. See Tauiliili, 96

Hawaiʻi at 200, 29 P.3d at 919.

Additionally, as this court held in State v. Vaden,

SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX (Haw. Mar. 15, 2023), the denial of presentence

credit for each sentence does not violate the double jeopardy

clause so long as the sum of the presentence detention and

sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum penalty.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 3, 1999, a jury convicted Webster for crimes

related to firing a semi-automatic weapon into an occupied

apartment on the night of July 1, 1997. In particular, the jury

convicted Webster of one count of attempted assault in the first

degree, in violation of HRS §§ 705-5001 and 707-710;2 one count

1 HRS § 705-500 (1993) provides in relevant part:

(1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime
if the person:

(a) Intentionally engages in conduct which would
constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances
were as the person believes them to be; or
(b) Intentionally engages in conduct which, under the
circumstances as the person believes them to be,
constitutes a substantial step in a course of
conduct intended to culminate in the person’s
commission of the crime.

2 HRS § 707-710 (1993) provides:

(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the first
degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes
serious bodily injury to another person.
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of carrying, using, or threatening to use a firearm in the

commission of a separate felony (assault in the second degree),

in violation of HRS §§ 134-6(a), (e)3 and 707-711(1)(a);4 one

(2) Assault in the first degree is a class B felony.

3 HRS § 134-6 (1993) provides in relevant part:

(a) It shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly carry
on the person or have within the person’s immediate control
or intentionally use or threaten to use a firearm while
engaged in the commission of a separate felony, whether the
firearm was loaded or not, and whether operable or not[.]

. . . .

(c) Except as provided in sections 134-5 and 134-9, all
firearms and ammunition shall be confined to the
possessor’s place of business, residence, or sojourn;
provided that it shall be lawful to carry unloaded firearms
or ammunition or both in an enclosed container from the
place of purchase to the purchaser’s place of business,
residence, or sojourn, or between these places upon change
of place of business, residence, or sojourn, or between
these places and the following: a place of repair; a target
range; a licensed dealer’s place of business; an organized,
scheduled firearms show or exhibit; a place of formal
hunter or firearm use training or instruction; or a police
station. . . .

. . . .

(e) Any person violating subsection (a) or (b) shall be
guilty of a class A felony. Any person violating this
section by carrying or possessing a loaded firearm or by
carrying or possessing a loaded or unloaded pistol or
revolver without a license issued as provided in section
134-9 shall be guilty of a class B felony. Any person
violating this section by carrying or possessing an
unloaded firearm, other than a pistol or revolver, shall be
guilty of a class C felony.

4 HRS § 707-711(1)(a) (1993) provides:

(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the
second degree if:

(a) The person intentionally or knowingly causes
substantial bodily injury to another[.]

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count of place to keep pistol or revolver, in violation of HRS

§ 134-6(c), (e); and three counts of reckless endangering in the

first degree, in violation of HRS §§ 706-660.1(3)5 and 707-713.6

The charges in this case are collectively referred to as the

assault counts.7

On September 22, 1999, Webster entered a plea

agreement in a separate case pertaining to the August 16, 1997

5 HRS § 706-660.1(3) (1993) provides in relevant part:

(3) A person convicted of a felony, where the person had
a semiautomatic firearm or automatic firearm in the
person’s possession or used or threatened its use while
engaged in the commission of the felony, whether the
semiautomatic firearm or automatic firearm was loaded or
not, and whether operable or not, shall in addition to the
indeterminate term of imprisonment provided for the grade
of offense be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment without possibility of parole or probation the
length of which shall be as follows:

. . . .

(b) For a class A felony—fifteen years;
(c) For a class B felony—ten years; and
(d) For a class C felony—five years.

6 HRS § 707-713 (1993) provides:

(1) A person commits the offense of reckless endangering
in the first degree if the person employs widely dangerous
means in a manner which recklessly places another person in
danger of death or serious bodily injury or intentionally
fires a firearm in a manner which recklessly places another
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Reckless endangering in the first degree is a class
C felony.

7 This court subsequently vacated Webster’s conviction and sentence for
carrying, using, or threatening to use a firearm in the commission of a
separate felony. State v. Webster, 94 Hawaiʻi 241, 243, 249, 11 P.3d 466,
468, 474 (2000). This court affirmed Webster’s convictions on all other
counts. Id.

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death of Chih Kai Pan. Under the terms of the agreement,

Webster pled guilty to one count of manslaughter, in violation

of HRS § 707-702;8 and one count of place to keep pistol or

revolver, in violation of HRS § 134-6(c), (e). The charges in

this case are collectively referred to as the homicide counts.9

Webster also agreed for his sentencing proceedings for

the assault and homicide counts to be heard by Judge Victoria

Marks (the sentencing court).

The sentencing court conducted Webster’s sentencing

hearing on November 18, 1999. The sentencing court sentenced

Webster for the assault counts as follows:

Attempted assault in the first 10 years with a 10-
degree year mandatory
minimum
Carrying, using, or 20 years
threatening to use a firearm
in the commission of a
separate felony
Place to keep pistol or 10 years
revolver

8 HRS § 707-702 (1993 & Supp. 1997) provides in relevant part:

(1) A person commits the offense of manslaughter if:

(a) He recklessly causes the death of another person; or
(b) He intentionally causes another person to commit
suicide.

. . . .

(3) Manslaughter is a class A felony.

9 In exchange for Webster’s guilty plea, the State agreed to reduce one
of the homicide counts from murder in the second degree to manslaughter and
to nolle prosequi charges in a third case.
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Reckless endangering in the 5 years with a 5-
first degree year mandatory
minimum
Reckless endangering in the 5 years with a 5-
first degree year mandatory
minimum
Reckless endangering in the 5 years with a 5-
first degree year mandatory
minimum

The sentencing court added that Webster’s “[t]erms of

incarceration imposed in this case shall run concurrently with

each other and with credit for time served. This sentence shall

be served CONSECUTIVE to the sentence imposed [for the homicide

counts] and [Webster] shall not receive ‘double’ credit for one

(1) period of time served.”10

The sentencing court sentenced Webster for the

homicide counts as follows:

Manslaughter 20 years with a 5-
year mandatory
minimum
Place to keep pistol or 10 years
revolver

As with the assault counts, the sentencing court explained that

Webster’s “[t]erms of [i]ncarceration imposed in this case shall

run concurrently with each other and with credit for time

10 Following this court’s vacatur of Webster’s conviction for carrying,
using, or threatening to use a firearm in the commission of a separate
felony, the sentencing court re-sentenced Webster to the same terms for the
affirmed assault counts. Webster v. State, 134 Hawaiʻi 306, *1, 339 P.3d 1107
(App. 2014).
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served. This sentence shall be served CONSECUTIVE to the

sentence imposed [for the assault counts] and [Webster] shall

not receive ‘double’ credit for one (1) period of time served.”

Webster filed the present Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal

Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 petition (Petition) on September 30,

2020.11 Webster contended that his sentence was unlawful for two

reasons. First, citing State v. Abihai, 146 Hawaiʻi 398, 463

P.3d 1055 (2020), Webster argued that HRS § 706-671(1)12 entitles

a defendant to presentence credit whenever five criteria are

met: “(1) The person is a defendant, (2) Sentenced to

imprisonment, (3) Who had previously been detained in a State

institution, (4) Following the person[’]s arrest, (5) For the

crime for which Sentence was imposed.” According to Webster,

Webster met the criteria in both proceedings for which he was

11 Webster has filed at least two other HRPP Rule 40 petitions.

12 HRS § 706-671(1) (1993) provides:

When a defendant who is sentenced to imprisonment has
previously been detained in any State or local
correctional or other institution following the
defendant's arrest for the crime for which sentence is
imposed, such period of detention following the
defendant's arrest shall be deducted from the minimum
and maximum terms of such sentence. The officer having
custody of the defendant shall furnish a certificate to
the court at the time of sentence, showing the length of
such detention of the defendant prior to sentence in any
State or local correctional or other institution, and
the certificate shall be annexed to the official records
of the defendant's commitment.

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sentenced, and therefore he was entitled to presentence credit

for each sentence.

Second, quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.

711, 717 (1969), Webster asserted that his sentence violated the

double jeopardy clause of both the Hawaiʻi and the United States

constitutions because “the guarantee against double jeopardy is

violated when imprisonment already exacted for an offense is not

fully credited.”

On August 23, 2021, the Circuit Court of the First

Circuit13 (circuit court) rejected Webster’s claims in its

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Dismissing and

Denying Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment or to

Release Petitioner from Custody (Order). The circuit court

“found and concluded that [Webster’s] claim for relief under

HRPP Rule 40 is (1) patently frivolous, (2) has already been

previously raised by [Webster] and ruled upon by the Court, and

(3) has no merit.” The circuit court accordingly dismissed and

denied Webster’s Petition pursuant to HRPP Rule 40(g)(2).14

13 The Honorable Kevin A. Souza presided.

14 Citing HRPP Rule 40(f), the circuit court noted in one instance that
Webster’s claim “is without trace support either in the record or from other
evidence submitted.” Insofar as the circuit court specified only HRPP Rule
40(g)(2) as the basis for the Order, this court does not consider whether the
circuit court could have dismissed Webster’s Petition pursuant to HRPP Rule
40(f).
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In particular, the circuit court rejected Webster’s

Abihai argument because “the Abihai Court was clear that HRS

706-671(1) properly applied presentence detention credit to both

of Abihai’s sentences primarily because they were being served

concurrently, not consecutively.” The circuit court added that

this court “has already heard and ruled on a similar claim being

put forward by [Webster]” in Tauiliili, 96 Hawaiʻi at 199, 29

P.3d at 918, where this court explained:

[W]hen concurrent sentences are imposed, presentence credit
is applied once. The credit applied once, in effect, is
applied against each concurrent sentence. This is done
because the longest term of the concurrent sentences
determines the total length of the imprisonment. However,
when consecutive sentences are imposed, credit for
presentence imprisonment is properly granted against only
the aggregate of the consecutive sentence terms.

(Emphasis in Order.) Thus, the circuit court concluded that

Webster’s claim that he was entitled to presentence credit for

each sentence was patently frivolous.

The circuit court did not address Webster’s double

jeopardy clause argument.

On September 21, 2021, Webster timely appealed the

circuit court’s Order to the Intermediate Court of Appeals

(ICA). On May 3, 2022, the same day Webster filed a reply brief

before the ICA, Webster timely filed an application for transfer

to this court.

On June 6, 2022, this court granted Webster’s

application for transfer.

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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Statutory Interpretation

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law

which this court reviews de novo. Keep the N. Shore Country v.

Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 150 Hawaiʻi 486, 503, 506 P.3d 150, 167

(2022) (citing State v. Ruggiero, 114 Hawai‘i 227, 231, 160 P.3d

703, 707 (2007)).

B. Constitutional Law

This court reviews questions of constitutional law de

novo under the right/wrong standard. State v. Yamashita, 151

Hawaiʻi 390, 397, 515 P.3d 207, 214 (2022).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Webster did not waive his illegal sentence claim.

As a preliminary matter, the State argues that

Webster’s Abihai claim is waived because “his sole claim

concerns application of credit for time spent in custody before

sentence.” The State asserts, without explanation, that this is

not a claim of illegal sentence and Webster therefore should

have raised the claim in prior proceedings.15

15 The State contends that “the Circuit Court properly found that Webster
waived the one claim in his Petition.” However, the circuit court did not
conclude that Webster waived his current claim. The circuit court determined
that Webster was not entitled to relief pursuant to HRPP Rule 40 because
Webster’s claim, inter alia, “has already been previously raised by
Petitioner and ruled upon by the Court.” Contra HRPP Rule 40(a)(3) (“[A]n
issue is waived if the petitioner knowingly and understandingly failed to
raise it”) (emphasis added).
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However, Webster could not have waived his Abihai

claim for two reasons. First, Webster could not have knowingly

and understandingly failed to raise a claim before the claim’s

underlying basis came into being. The text of HRPP Rule

40(a)(3) (2006) provides:

[A]n issue is waived if the petitioner knowingly and
understandingly failed to raise it and it could have been
raised before the trial, at the trial, on appeal, in a
habeas corpus proceeding or any other proceeding actually
conducted, or in a prior proceeding actually initiated
under this rule, and the petitioner is unable to prove the
existence of extraordinary circumstances to justify the
petitioner’s failure to raise the issue.

Webster presently relies upon this court’s holding in Abihai, to

assert that he is entitled to presentence credit for both of his

sentences under HRS § 706-671(1). Insofar as this court decided

Abihai after Webster’s trial, appeal, and prior Rule 40

petitions concluded, Webster could not have raised or waived the

claim during the previous proceedings. Cf. HRPP Rule 40(a)(3).

Second, Webster’s claim could not be waived because it

implicates the legality of his sentence. As the State

acknowledges, HRPP Rule 40(a)(3) includes an exception to its

definition of waived claims: “claim[s] of illegal sentence.” If

Webster is correct that HRS § 706-671(1) mandates that the

sentencing court apply his presentence credit to both sentences,

then the sentencing court’s failure to do so would mean that

Webster’s sentences were rendered in violation of HRS § 706-

671(1), and are illegal. See State v. Kahalewai, 71 Haw. 624,

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625, 801 P.2d 558, 560 (1990) (explaining an illegal sentence is

“a sentence which the court is not authorized to impose”).

B. The circuit court correctly determined that Webster’s
HRS § 706-671(1) claim lacked merit.

Turning to the merits of Webster’s claims, Webster

first argues that HRS § 706-671(1) obligates a sentencing court

to apply presentence detention credit to each of a defendant’s

sentences so long as the defendant satisfies five criteria.

Specifically, Webster quotes Abihai, 146 Hawaiʻi at 408, 463 P.3d

at 1065, for the proposition that “a person is entitled to

presentence detention credit if (1) the person is a defendant

(2) sentenced to imprisonment (3) who had previously been

detained in a State institution (4) following the person’s

arrest (5) for the crime for which sentence was imposed.”

However, Webster’s reliance on Abihai is misplaced.

In Abihai, defendant Allan H. Abihai challenged a circuit

court’s failure to apply presentence detention credits to a

later-imposed concurrent sentence. Id. at 400, 463 P.3d at

1057. Abihai’s explanation of when a person is entitled to

presentence detention credit under HRS § 706-671(1) consequently

did not contemplate what would occur when, as here, a defendant

is sentenced to consecutive sentences. See, e.g., id. at 410,

463 P.3d at 1067 (“Tauiliili held that a defendant is entitled

to presentence detention credit on each of the cases for which a

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defendant is sentenced to concurrent sentences.”) (citing

Tauiliili, 96 Hawaiʻi at 199, 29 P.3d at 918) (emphasis added).

In contrast, Tauiliili squarely addressed the issue of

whether a defendant is entitled to presentence detention credit

under HRS § 706-671(1) when the defendant is sentenced to

consecutive sentences. There, defendant Ropati Tauiliili

challenged a circuit court’s failure to apply a presentence

detention credit to a consecutive sentence. 96 Hawaiʻi at 197,

29 P.3d at 916. This court concluded that “when consecutive

sentences are imposed, credit for presentence imprisonment is

properly granted against only the aggregate of the consecutive

sentence terms.” Id. at 199, 29 P.3d at 918 (emphasis added).

The Tauiliili court explained:

The commentary to HRS § 706-671 states in relevant
part that “[t]his section provides for a result which the
Code deems fair” and “provides for some equalization . . .
between those defendants who obtain pre-sentence release
and those who do not.” Statutes giving credit for
presentence confinement were designed to ensure equal
treatment of all defendants whether or not they are
incarcerated prior to conviction. In re Atiles, 662 P.2d
910, 911 (Cal. 1983). [G]ranting presentence credit,
therefore, seeks to place an in-custody criminal defendant
who cannot afford to post bail in the same position as his
counterpart with bail money. Nissel v. Pearce, 764 P.2d
224, 226 (Or. 1988).
Once credit has been granted, no additional purpose
is served by granting a second or “double credit” against a
later consecutive sentence. State v. Cuen, 761 P.2d 160,
162 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).

Id. at 199, 29 P.3d at 918. The court further elaborated that

“allow[ing] multiple credit for consecutive sentences would

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defeat the legislative purpose underlying consecutive

sentences.” Id. Specifically,

HRS § 706-668.5 (1993) permits consecutive sentencing
if multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a criminal
defendant at the same time. The legislative purpose of the
statute is to give the sentencing court discretion to
sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment to run
either concurrently or consecutively. State v. Gaylord, 78
Hawaiʻi 127, 146, 890 P.2d 1167, 1186-1187 (1995).
Discretionary use of consecutive sentences is properly
imposed in order to deter future criminal behavior of the
defendant, to insure [sic] public safety, and to assure
just punishment for the crimes committed. Id.

Tauiliili, 96 Hawaiʻi at 199, 29 P.3d at 918 (footnote omitted).

Thus,

Tauiliili’s interpretation of HRS § 706-671 would undermine
the sentencing court’s decision to impose consecutive
imprisonment terms. We do not believe that the legislature
intended to allow a “double credit” for presentence
confinement without expressly saying so. Accordingly, we
hold that the circuit court correctly interpreted HRS
§ 706-671 by applying Tauiliili’s 853 days of presentence
credit only once against the aggregate of his consecutive
sentences.

Id. at 200, 29 P.3d at 919.

Although Tauiliili is squarely on point, Webster

insisted below that Tauiliili is inapplicable because

Tauiliili’s sentences arose from a single case, while Webster

“was sentenced in two seperate [sic] Criminal numbers, with two

seperate [sic] Grand Jury Indictments, and two seprate [sic]

settings of bail.”

This is a distinction without a difference. At the

time of Webster’s sentencing, HRS § 706-668.5(1) (1993) read:

If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a
defendant at the same time, or if a term of imprisonment is
imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an
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unexpired term of imprisonment, the terms may run
concurrently or consecutively. Multiple terms of
imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently
unless the court orders or the statute mandates that the
terms run consecutively. Multiple terms of imprisonment
imposed at different times run consecutively unless the
court orders that the terms run concurrently.[16]

The statute’s references to “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment

imposed at different times” indicate that the legislature’s

intent behind HRS § 706-668.5 applies regardless of whether the

sentences were imposed for charges arising from a single case or

from multiple cases.

Under these circumstances, the circuit court correctly

concluded that Tauiliili is controlling and Abihai is not

directly applicable. As in Tauiliili, the sentencing court

“correctly interpreted HRS § 706-661 [and HRS § 706-668.5] by

applying [Webster’s] presentence credit only once against the

aggregate of his consecutive sentences.” 96 Hawaiʻi at 200, 29

P.3d at 919. In turn, the circuit court did not err in

determining that Webster’s statutory claim is patently frivolous

and without merit.17

16 HRS § 706-668.5(1) (Supp. 2015) presently provides:

If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a
defendant, whether at the same time or at different times,
or if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who
is already subject to an unexpired term of imprisonment,
the terms may run concurrently or consecutively. Multiple
terms of imprisonment run concurrently unless the court
orders or the statute mandates that the terms run
consecutively.

17 Insofar as a circuit court may dismiss an HRPP Rule 40 petition “upon
finding the petition is patently frivolous, the issues have been previously
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C. Webster’s double jeopardy clause argument also lacks merit.

Citing North Carolina v. Pearce, Webster next argues

that “[t]he constitutional guarantee against multiple

punishments for the same offense absolutely requires that

punishment already exacted must be fully ‘credited.’” This

argument is unavailing.

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit has explained:

Courts, however, have only taken the teaching of
Pearce so far as to hold that a failure to credit violates
the guarantee against double jeopardy when the pre-sentence
time together with the sentence imposed is greater than the
statutory maximum penalty for the offense. Only in such a
situation is there “double punishment” for one offense.
Where the pre-sentence time and the sentence imposed
together are less than the statutory maximum penalty, no
grounds exist for finding “double punishment,” because the
total time of incarceration will fall within the single
maximum period of punishment set by the legislature.

Faye v. Gray, 541 F.2d 665, 667 (7th Cir. 1976) (citation

omitted); see also Vaden, SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX at 2 (“[W]hen

detention or prison time is accrued before sentencing . . . the

double jeopardy clause’s prohibition on multiple punishment is

not violated so long as the defendant’s total period of

detention and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum

term for the offenses at issue.”). Webster does not provide any

raised and ruled upon, or the issues were waived,” and may deny an HRPP Rule
40 petition “upon determining the allegations and arguments have no merit,”
we do not consider the merits of the circuit court’s finding that Webster’s
“claim for relief under HRPP Rule 40 has already been previously raised by
[Webster] and ruled upon by the Court.” HRPP Rule 40 (emphasis added).
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reason why we should deviate from the path trodden by other

courts.

Applying the test articulated in Faye, Webster’s

sentences do not run afoul of the double jeopardy clause. The

statutory maximum term of imprisonment the sentencing court

could impose based upon Webster’s convictions is 65 years.18

Webster’s current sentences total approximately thirty years.

Insofar as Webster’s total time of incarceration plus the

demanded 550 days of presentence detention credit is less than

the maximum period of punishment, “no grounds exist for finding

‘double punishment,’ because the total time of incarceration

. . . fall[s] within the single maximum period of punishment set

by the legislature.” Faye, 541 F.2d at 667.

18 The maximum sentences for the counts on which Webster is convicted are:

Count Term of
Imprisonment
Attempted Assault in the First 10 years
Degree
Place to Keep Pistol or Revolver 10 years
Reckless Endangering in the First 5 years
Degree
Reckless Endangering in the First 5 years
Degree
Reckless Endangering in the First 5 years
Degree
Manslaughter 20 years
Place to Keep Pistol or Revolver 10 years
Total 65 years

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IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the sentencing court

correctly did not apply presentence detention credit to

Webster’s latter, consecutive sentence. In turn, the circuit

court properly concluded that Webster’s Petition lacked merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s August 23,

2021 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Dismissing

and Denying Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment

or to Release Petitioner from Custody.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, March 17, 2023.

Tarval Webster, /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
Petitioner-Appellant Pro Se
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Brian R. Vincent for
Respondent-Appellee /s/ R. Mark Browning
State of Hawaiʻi
/s/ Shanlyn A.S. Park
Craig Y. Iha and
Lisa M. Itomura for
Respondent-Appellee
Department of Public
Safety

18