People v. Chavis - Case Law

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Chie f Justice Justices
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh

Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

FILED APRIL 8, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 120112

JACK CHAVIS,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________________________

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

WEAVER, J.

After waiving his right to a jury trial, defendant was

convicted in a bench trial of violating MCL 750.411a(1), which

makes it a crime to intentionally make “a false report of the

commission of a crime to a member of the Michigan state

police, a sheriff or deputy sheriff, a police officer of a

city or village, or any other peace officer of this state

knowing the report is false . . . .”1 The issue presented is

whether defendant may be convicted of filing a false report

pursuant to this statute, where defendant provided false

details concerning the crime. We hold that defendant may be

convicted pursuant to the statute, and, therefore, we reverse

the Court of Appeals reversal of defendant’s conviction.

FACTS

On April 14, 1998, defendant called 911 and reported that

he had been carjacked. Officer Robert Sanchez responded to

the call. He testified that he and his partner met defendant

at South Fort and Francis streets in the city of Detroit and

that defendant informed them that he had been carjacked by

four unknown black males. Defendant informed Officer Sanchez

that he was carjacked in the area of South Fort and Outer

Drive and that the carjackers kicked him out of the car at

South Fort and Francis. Defendant indicated to the officer

that one of the men had put a gun to defendant’s head and two

of the other men had jumped into the car with baseball bats

and that he had been beaten with a baseball bat. He informed

the officer that the men had stolen his wallet, a gold

necklace, and a gold ring. Officer Sanchez and his partner

made a report of the carjacking. Defendant’s car, a Honda

Civic CRS, was found about an hour later being driven by

1
Defendant was sentenced to thirty days in jail and the

remainder of one year on probation.

William Bonner. After a brief chase, Mr. Bonner crashed the

car into a tree and was arrested.

Officer Sanchez testified that he informed defendant that

he did not believe that defendant was actually carjacked. He

explained that his assessment was based on defendant’s

demeanor, which he described as defensive and hostile, and the

fact that defendant did not live in the area and gave no

explanation for why he was in the area. Officer Sanchez also

testified that he did not observe any physical injury to

defendant and that defendant did not request any kind of

medical attention.

Detective Sergeant Randell Schnotala testified that at

the time of the incident, he was assigned to the carjacking

task force working out of Detroit Police headquarters. He was

assigned to investigate the reported carjacking. After

speaking with Mr. Bonner, Detective Schnotala became

suspicious of the truthfulness of the report filed by

defendant and made several attempts to contact defendant to

discuss the incident. A few days later, defendant telephoned

Detective Schnotala and agreed to meet the detective at police

headquarters.

Detective Schnotala testified that he immediately

informed defendant that defendant was not under arrest, that

defendant did not have to speak with him, and that defendant

could leave at any time. Detective Schnotala explained that

he had some questions and concerns about the report that had

been filed. He testified that defendant then told him that

the report was not true “beginning with the location.”

Detective Schnotala stated that defendant informed him that

defendant was a crack cocaine user and that he had given a

false location because he did not want the police to know why

he was in the area. Detective Schnotala testified that

[a]t that time I told him we could reduce this to

writing, take care of matters, get him on his way.

He could go about the business of getting his car

back, but that he would be charged with filing a

false police report. At this time he became very

agitated with me and refused to talk any more about

the incident and stormed out of my office.

Detective Schnotala explained that he informed defendant that

he would be charged with filing a false police report because

defendant said that the report he had filed was not true.

Defendant testified that he was in southwest Detroit on

April 14, 1998, to purchase crack cocaine. He spotted the

supplier from whom he had purchased crack cocaine earlier in

the day and let the supplier get into defendant’s car.

Defendant informed the supplier that he wanted $20 worth of

crack cocaine, and they drove to a house.2 The supplier went

into the house to get the crack cocaine. Defendant stated

that when the supplier left the house, the supplier returned

to the car. As the supplier was again sitting in the

2
On cross-examination, defendant stated that he did not

drive the supplier to the house—they were already there.

passenger seat showing defendant the crack cocaine, defendant

heard the hatchback of his car open. Two men entered the car.

Defendant testified that the supplier pulled the keys out of

the ignition and that one of the men in the back pointed a gun

at defendant, demanding that defendant give them everything

defendant had. Defendant stated that he told them that the

gunman would have to kill defendant because defendant “had a

lot of gold on.”

Defendant testified that the gunman then put down the gun

and began choking him from behind until he passed out and that

the supplier was hitting defendant. When defendant “came to

[he] was half in [his] car and half out.” Defendant further

explained that when he “came to,” his jewelry, his watch, his

necklace, his rings, and his wallet had been taken. He stated

that he observed four men walking down the road and ran after

them. He testified that the men surrounded him and began

attacking him, one of them beating him with a pool cue and

another hitting him in the jaw.3 He stated that he received

a cut on his head and felt like he had broken his hand during

the attack after being hit with the pool cue. Defendant

testified that when he asked them to give him his keys so that

he could go home, they told him to move away from his car.

Two or three of the men jumped into his car and drove off.

3
Defendant denied that he had stated that one of the men

had a baseball bat.

Defendant testified that he then ran to Fort Street,

entered a restaurant, and called the police. He stated that

he told police that he was at the gas station and that he had

just left his sister’s house when he was carjacked and made to

drive to the gas station. Defendant stated that he had lied

about the location because he did not want anyone to know that

he was buying crack cocaine. He stated that he showed the

cut to the officer and indicated that his hand felt like it

might be broken. However, when the officers asked if he

wanted an ambulance, he declined. Defendant acknowledged that

when he spoke with Detective Schnotala, he did not give the

detective any specific details or provide any written

statement about what had actually occurred.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found

defendant guilty of the charge. The trial court stated:

This is somewhat of an interesting case in the

sense that he’s charged with filing a false report

of a felony.

And without going into a lot of detail as far

as fact finding goes, I do believe from all the

evidence and the testimony that the defendant, Mr.

Chavis, was carjacked. I believe that his car was

taken from him with the use of force, and that he

didn’t voluntarily turn it over or surrender it.

And that’s essentially what happened.

However, in this case, because of, and I

believe some of the defendant’s testimony, too. I

believe his testimony about using crack. I believe

his testimony about going around looking for crack

and having contact with various incendiary people

in terms of seeking out some crack cocaine.

And I do also believe and find that the

defendant did tell, did lie to the police about how

it happened, where it happened, and some other

miscellaneous details.

So on the one hand I believe that the

defendant did make some false statements and give

some false facts [sic] about the crime itself. And

I do believe that in essence the defendant was the

victim of a carjacking.

And when the defendant told the police officer

those false facts, he knew that they were false and

deliberately made those false statements.

And for that reason, I’m going to find the

defendant guilty of the charge.

I find that the elements of the offense have

been made out.

Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the

conviction. 246 Mich App 741; 635 NW2d 67 (2001). The Court

of Appeals explained:

Here, the statute proscribes the intentional

making of “a false report of the commission of a

crime.” MCL 750.411a(1) (emphasis added). The

plain language of the statute provides that those

who make police reports falsely claiming that a

crime has been committed are guilty of making a

report of a false crime. See, e.g., People v Lay,

336 Mich 77; 57 NW2d 453 (1953) (the defendant was

convicted, under the predecessor of § 411a, of

making a “fictitious report of the commission of

any crime” after falsely telling the police that he

had put poison in a bottle of home-delivered milk).1

To construe the statute to encompass false

information concerning the details of an actual

crime would be a significant departure from the

plain language of the statute. Because the false

information reported by defendant in the present

case did not pertain to whether a crime occurred,

the conviction for filing a false report of the

commission of a crime cannot be sustained.2

Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s conviction and

sentence.

___________________________________________________
1
Our research has unveiled no Michigan cases

where a defendant was convicted of the crime of

making a false report of the commission of a crime

for lying about details other than whether a crime

had actually been committed. Our research of

federal and foreign states’ case law has not

unveiled any cases where a defendant was convicted

of this type of crime for lying about details other

than whether a crime had actually been committed.

See, e.g., Smith v Arkansas, 1999 WL 200671

[unpublished opinion] (Ark App, 1999) (false report

that husband broke into home); People v Trimble,

181 Ill App 3d 355; 537 NE2d 363 (1989) (defendant

falsely told police his car was stolen); State v

Matilla, 339 NW2d 54, 55 (Minn, 1983) (defendant

falsely reported being burglarized); State v

Kachanis, 119 RI 439, 440; 379 A2d 915 (1977)

(defendant falsely reported his car stolen).

2
The trial court’s finding that a carjacking

actually occurred is unchallenged on appeal.

___________________________________________________

[246 Mich App 743-744.]

On April 30, 2002, this Court granted the prosecutor’s

application for leave to appeal. 466 Mich 860 (2002).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case concerns an issue of statutory interpretation.

Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.

People v Thousand, 465 Mich 149, 156; 631 NW2d 694 (2001).

ANALYSIS

MCL 750.411a(1) provides:

Except as provided in subsection (2), a person

who intentionally makes a false report of the

commission of a crime to a member of the Michigan

state police, a sheriff or deputy sheriff, a police

officer of a city or village, or any other peace

officer of this state knowing the report is false

is guilty of a crime as follows:

(a) If the report is a false report of a

misdemeanor, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor

punishable by imprisonment for not more than 93

days or a fine of not more than $100.00, or both.

(b) If the report is a false report of a

felony, the person is guilty of a felony punishable

by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine

of not more than $2,000.00, or both. [Emphasis

added.]

When interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain and

give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v

Koonce, 466 Mich 515, 518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002). We begin by

reviewing the plain language of the statute. If the language

is clear and unambiguous, no further construction is

necessary, and the statute is enforced as written. Id.;

Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d

686 (2001).

The issue in the present case centers on whether lying

about details concerning a crime constitutes “a false report

of the commission of a crime . . . .”4 MCL 750.411a(1). The

Court of Appeals and the dissent construed this language to

mean that only “those who make police reports falsely claiming

that a crime has been committed are guilty of making a report

of a false crime.” 246 Mich App 743. We disagree with this

4
Defendant admitted to the police officer that he had

lied. Accordingly, there is no dispute about whether

defendant’s statements were made intentionally and knowingly.

interpretation and find it inconsistent with the plain

language of the statute.

As placed in the statute, the word “false” modifies the

word “report,” not the word “crime,” as the Court of Appeals

and the dissent’s interpretations suggest. The word “false”

is defined as

1. Not true or correct; erroneous; wrong: a false

statement. 2. Uttering or declaring what is

untrue; lying: a false witness. 3. Not faithful

or loyal; treacherous; hypocritical: a false

friend. 4. Tending to deceive or mislead;

deceptive: a false impression. 5. Not genuine;

counterfeit . . . . [Random House Webster’s College

Dictionary (1997).]

The word “report” is defined as “1. A detailed account of an

event, situation, etc. usu. based on observation or inquiry.

2. A statement or announcement. . . .” Id. It is not

disputed that defendant made untrue and misleading statements

when he provided his original account of events to the

officers.5 First, defendant clearly acknowledged that he had

lied about where the carjacking occurred and what he was doing

at the time the carjacking occurred. Second, he informed

police that he did not know any of the perpetrators when, in

fact, he knew one of them from his previous purchase of crack

cocaine. Third, although defendant stated that he had been

5
While the false statements in the present case occurred

in defendant’s initial communications with the police, we note

that the definition of “report” does not require that the

statements always be made at the outset of an investigation.

The definition could cover subsequent communications as well.

beaten with a pool cue or baseball bat, resulting in a cut to

his head and an injury to his hand, the officer stated that he

observed no physical injuries on defendant and that defendant

did not request any medical attention. Thus, in describing

what had occurred, defendant made a false report.

Our inquiry does not end there, however. Following the

phrase “false report” in the statute are the words “of the

commission of a crime.” Defendant’s false report must be “of

the commission of a crime.” “Commission” is defined as “the

act of committing or perpetrating a crime . . . .” Id.

Replacing the word “commission” with its definition, the

statute prohibits making a false report of “the act of

committing or perpetrating” a crime. One who provides false

details about the crime has made a false report of “the act of

committing or perpetrating” a crime. Thus, the plain language

of the statute is not limited to only those situations where

no crime has been committed; it also applies where one reports

false details about the crime.6 Because defendant reported

6
The dissent criticizes our opinion as failing to

provide guidance to the bench and bar and suggests that it

will inhibit victims from reporting crimes for fear they will

be convicted for insignificant misstatements. We would remind

the dissent that the statute requires a person to

intentionally make a false report of the commission of a

crime. This intent requirement should obviate many of the

“problems” that the dissent asserts our opinion will create.

The dissent also criticizes our opinion as allowing the

prosecutor “unfettered discretion,” post at 7, in determining

when to bring charges under the statute. It is invariably the

(continued...)

false details about the crime, he can be convicted under the

statute.7

For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court

of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s conviction.

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Michael F. Cavanagh

Clifford W. Taylor

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

6
(...continued)

case that the prosecutor always has great discretion in

deciding whether to file charges. Such executive branch power

is an established part of our constitutional structure. Any

apprehension that the prosecutor may abuse this power should

be tempered, in part, by the knowledge that there are

significant systemic protections afforded defendants,

including the defendant’s right to a preliminary examination

and right to a jury trial. Moreover, there are other

protections against the misuse of power that spring from

daily scrutiny by the media as well as from periodic

elections, which call all office holders to account to their

constituents.

7
Our interpretation and application of the statute is

consistent with one of the purposes of the statute, which is

to avoid distracting the police and misusing police resources.

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 120112

JACK CHAVIS,

Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________________

KELLY, J. (dissenting).

The majority stretches the statutory phrase "false report

of the commission of a crime" in MCL 750.411a(1) to mean a

report of false details concerning the commission of a crime.

This interpretation goes beyond the plain meaning of the words

the Legislature used.

I agree with the Court of Appeals that "[b]ecause the

false information reported by defendant in the present case

did not pertain to whether a crime occurred, the conviction

for filing a false police report cannot be sustained." 246

Mich App 741, 743; 635 NW2d 67 (2000). To the extent that

this statute is ambiguous, traditional judicial construction

favors my interpretation. Parenthetically, the majority

ignores the inherent question that it raises: how significant

must a falsehood be to trigger criminal liability under the

statute?

The majority holds that "the plain language of the

statute is not limited to only those situations where no crime

has been committed; it also applies where one reports false

details about the crime." Ante at 12. It arrives at this

conclusion by defining the words "report" and "commission."

These words, it concludes, refer to a "detailed account" of

"the act of committing a crime."

The majority's interpretation does not accurately

construe the plain meaning of the statute's words because it

glosses over the meaning of "the commission of a crime." The

only facts that establish "the act of committing a crime" are

those that satisfy the elements of a criminal statute. It

follows then that one violates the statute only in falsely

alleging facts that comprise the elements of a criminal

statute. Extraneous details do not pertain to whether a crime

has been committed.

An example clarifies the point. MCL 750.72 makes it a

crime to burn a dwelling house. The facts establishing the

commission of that crime are limited to those showing (1)

wilful or malicious (2) burning (3) of a dwelling house, its

contents, or any building within its curtilage. A false

report that the perpetrator wore black clothes while setting

the fire when, in fact, he wore white does not constitute the

report of a false crime, i.e., a false report of the

commission of a crime. Rather, it constitutes facts not

essential to the crime.

The majority's interpretation of MCL 750.411a(1) would

render criminal the report of black clothes in my example. It

effectively reads the limiting phrase "of the commission"

right out of the statute. Doing so ignores the well

established canon of avoiding an interpretation that renders

part of a statute nugatory or mere surplusage. Koontz v

Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34

(2002).

For the reasons stated, I interpret MCL 750.411a to

prohibit only the reporting of a false crime, meaning the

false reporting of facts that establish the commission of a

crime. Unlike the majority's analysis, this interpretation

comports with the plain language of the statute and the "fair

import" of the words used. MCL 750.2.

This Court made a proper statutory interpretation in

People v Lay, 336 Mich 77; 57 NW2d 453 (1953). There, it

construed the statute from which MCL 750.411a(1) was drawn.

It affirmed the defendant's conviction after he falsely

reported to the police that he had poisoned a bottle of home

delivered milk. The Court held that the defendant's

conviction was proper because he alleged a crime that had not

been committed. He alleged facts that were false and that

satisfied the statutory elements of the crime.

Here, unlike in Lay, the state charged defendant for

falsely reporting where in Detroit the carjacking crime

occurred and why he was in that area. The carjacking statute,

MCL 750.529a, requires a showing that a person, (1) by force

or threat of force, (2) took a motor vehicle (3) in the

presence of the lawful possessor of it. Defendant did not

falsely report any of the facts establishing the elements of

the carjacking. In the words of the trial court, "Mr. Chavis

[] was carjacked. [H]is car was taken from him with the use of

force, and . . . he didn't voluntarily turn it over or

surrender it."

Because defendant truthfully reported these, the

essential aspects of the crime, he should not be chargeable

under MCL 750.411a. The false statements he made were

immaterial to the commission of the crime of carjacking.

Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals reversal of

defendant's conviction.

When reasonable but differing interpretations of a

statute exist, the statute is ambiguous. In re MCI, 460 Mich

396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). Hence, because the majority's

reading of the statute is arguably reasonable, as is mine, the

incompatibility of our interpretations renders this statute

ambiguous. After judicial construction, however, the

ambiguity is resolved in a manner that favors my

interpretation.

MCL 750.411a(1) is the part of the statute under

consideration here. It reads "a person who intentionally

makes a false report of the commission of a crime to a member

of the Michigan state police . . . or any other peace officer

of this state knowing the report is false is guilty of a crime

. . . ." The two subsections under subsection 1 clarify its

meaning.1 Subsection (1)(a) makes a false report of a

misdemeanor itself a misdemeanor and lists the penalty.

Subsection (1)(b) makes a false report of a felony itself a

felony and lists a far greater penalty than does subsection

(1)(a).

If the majority's interpretation of subsection 1 were

correct, a report falsifying nonessential details of a crime

would draw a much greater penalty if the crime were a felony

than if it were a misdemeanor. However, the details might be

the same for each crime, e.g., the perpetrator wore black. It

1
2A Singer, Statutes & Statutory Construction (6 ed,

2000), § 47:06, pp 226-227 ("[I]t is an elementary rule of

construction that all sections of an act relating to the same

subject matter should be considered together unless to do so

would be plainly contrary to the legislative intent.").

is not readily apparent why the Legislature would have

distinguished in terms of criminal severity and penalty

between a report of false details of a felony and a report of

the same false details of a misdemeanor.

It is obvious, however, why the Legislature would have

distinguished in terms of criminal severity and penalty

between a report of a false misdemeanor and a report of a

false felony. There, the reports would be different. One of

the crimes would be more serious, hence a false report of it

would deserve a more severe penalty.

Therefore, any ambiguity in "false report of the

commission of a crime" is best resolved to mean that the

report to be criminalized is the report of a false crime.

III

I note that the majority fails to deliver any guidance to

the bench and bar about how to apply its interpretation of

this statute. Specifically, it fails to address how material

a falsified detail must be in order to trigger criminal

liability under the statute. Did the Legislature intend to

criminalize the intentional falsification of even the most

insignificant detail of a reported crime? This would be

permitted under the majority's interpretation. If some false

details should be made crimes and others not, where does one

draw the line? Without guidance on this issue, the bringing

of charges under this statute becomes a matter of the

prosecutor's unfettered discretion, raising other legal

problems.2

The interpretation of the statute that I propose, by

contrast with the majority's, limits this offense to the

falsification of certain identifiable information. My

interpretation not only comports with the Legislature's

intent, it establishes clear boundaries of which

falsifications are criminal, thus providing comprehensible

guidance to our courts and our citizens.

Additionally, my interpretation avoids another problem

that looms in the majority's broad reading of the statute:

that it may inhibit victims from reporting crimes for fear

that they may be convicted themselves for an insignificant

misstatement of fact to law enforcement officers.

2
The majority takes issue with my reference to the

dangers of the prosecution exercising unfettered discretion.

The United States Supreme Court expressed the concern I raise

when it made its decision in the case of United States v

Armstrong, 517 US 456, 464; 116 S Ct 1480; 134 L Ed 2d 687

(1996), quoting Oyler v Boles, 368 US 448, 456; 82 S Ct 501;

7 L Ed 2d 446 (1962). There, it found that unfettered

discretion in the prosecution can result in a violation of the

constitutional right to due process of law. More to the point

in this case, my concern is that the majority's expansive

interpretation of MCL 750.411a allows too easily for the

statute's selective enforcement. It thereby increases the

possibility that the statute will be used as a coercive tool

in violation of the constitutional constraints that govern

prosecutors. While the majority enumerates current

protections from prosecutorial abuse, I am unconvinced that

the existence of these protections excuses this Court's

failure to provide the guidance that could afford more

immediate and certain protection.

III

Accordingly, I would affirm the conclusion reached by the

Court of Appeals. This Court should interpret MCL 750.411a(1)

to criminalize only the false reporting of facts that

establish the commission of a crime. As defendant made no

such false statement, the Court of Appeals reached the correct

conclusion in reversing his conviction.

Marilyn Kelly