PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J.
LEE COUNTY
v. Record No. 012543 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
September 13, 2002
TOWN OF ST. CHARLES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY
Ford C. Quillen, Judge
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred
in ruling that a board member of a water and sewer authority
must reside within the authority's service area to be qualified
to hold that office.
In 1967, Lee County (the County) and the Town of St.
Charles (the Town) entered into a joint resolution to create the
St. Charles Water and Sewer Authority (the Authority) to provide
water and sewer services to the residents of a designated
service area. In the joint resolution, the County and the Town
appointed five members to the Authority's Board of Directors
(the Board). However, the joint resolution and the Authority's
articles of incorporation and by-laws were silent concerning
qualification requirements for future Board members.
In 1992, the Town filed a declaratory judgment action
against the County to determine the respective rights of the two
entities to appoint members to the Board. In 1997, the trial
court entered an order declaring that the Town and the County
each have the right to appoint two members to the Board and that
the fifth board member shall be appointed jointly by the Town
and the County. The court did not address the issue whether
members of the Board must reside within the Authority's service
area. 1
The present litigation began after Nell Stewart, who was
serving as the joint appointee on the Board, moved her residence
from St. Charles to Pennington Gap. Although Stewart's new
residence is located within the County, that residence is
outside the Authority's service area.
The Town Council voted to remove Stewart from the Board and
to appoint a new member as her replacement. The Town requested
that the County also act to remove Stewart from the Board and to
designate its choice for a joint appointee to replace her. The
County, by vote of its board of supervisors, refused the Town's
request.
The Town filed the present declaratory judgment action
against the County, asking that the trial court determine, among
other things, the qualification requirements for membership on
the Board. After hearing argument of counsel, the court held
that all Board members must be residents of the Authority's
service area. In explaining its decision, the court stated:
1
These rulings were made by the Honorable James C.
Roberson.
2
This [residency] requirement makes sense in that a
member of [the Authority], in effect, represents all
the people within the service area of the Authority.
Therefore, to properly represent the citizens of the
service area, that member should be a resident of the
defined service area of the Authority. Without this
requirement, a person could live in another area of
the county (or even in another county or state) served
by a different water and sewer authority and yet make
decisions which directly affect the lives of the
citizens served by [the Authority].
The trial court disqualified Stewart from membership on the
Board and directed the Town and the County to appoint jointly a
replacement member who met this residency requirement. The
County appeals from this judgment.
The County argues that the trial court erred in imposing a
service area residency requirement for Board membership and
notes that Code § 15.2-5113(A), which addresses the selection of
board members of a water and sewer authority, does not specify
such a requirement. The County observes that numerous other
statutes impose a residency requirement for appointment to
various offices, boards, and commissions in the Commonwealth.
Therefore, the County argues, had the General Assembly intended
that all board members of a water and sewer authority be
residents of that authority's service area, the General Assembly
would have expressly stated such a requirement. The County also
notes that the joint resolution establishing the Authority, as
3
well as its articles of incorporation and by-laws, do not
contain a residency requirement for all Board members.
In response, the Town argues that Code § 15.2-5113(A) does
not prohibit the imposition of a residency requirement, and that
a residency requirement can be inferred from the fact that the
joint resolution establishing the Authority named as Board
members individuals who were all residents of the Authority's
service area. The Town also notes that from the date the
Authority was created until the date Stewart moved to Pennington
Gap, all Board members had been residents of the Authority’s
service area. Finally, the Town argues that the trial court’s
1997 order implicitly established a residency requirement for
the fifth Board member by requiring that this member be
appointed jointly by the County and the Town. We disagree with
the Town’s arguments.
In our review of the trial court’s judgment, we first
observe that the trial court’s legal conclusions are not binding
on this Court, and we are accorded the same opportunity as the
trial court to consider the issue of law presented. See Eure v.
Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631, 561
S.E.2d 663, 667 (2002); Craig v. Dye, 259 Va. 533, 537, 526
S.E.2d 9, 11 (2000). This issue of law is resolved by our
examination of Code § 15.2-5113(A).
4
Under basic principles of statutory construction, we
consider all relevant provisions of a statute and do not isolate
particular words or phrases. Industrial Dev. Auth. v. Board of
Supervisors, 263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2002);
Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001).
When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we are
bound by the plain meaning of that statutory language.
Industrial Dev. Auth., 263 Va. at 353, 559 S.E.2d at 623; Shelor
Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 479, 544 S.E.2d 345, 348
(2001). Thus, when the General Assembly has used words that
have a plain meaning, courts cannot give those words a
construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly
meant something other than that which it actually expressed.
Vaughn, Inc. v. Beck, 262 Va. 673, 677, 554 S.E.2d 88, 90
(2001); Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 262 Va. 91,
100, 546 S.E.2d 696, 702 (2001).
Code § 15.2-5113(A) provides, in relevant part:
The powers of each authority created by the governing
bodies of two or more localities shall be exercised by
the number of authority board members specified in its
articles of incorporation, which shall be not less
than one member from each participating locality and
not less than a total of five members. The board
members of an authority shall be selected in the
manner and for the terms provided by the agreement
. . . or concurrent ordinances or resolutions creating
the authority.
5
We conclude that this statutory language is plain and
unambiguous. That language provides for the selection of board
members of a water and sewer authority and requires that at
least one person from each participating locality be included
among the appointees to such an authority board. However,
compliance with this requirement is not an issue here because
the Town does not argue, and the record does not show, that Nell
Stewart was the sole resident from the Town serving on the
Board.
The above requirement is the sole restriction contained in
Code § 15.2-5113(A) concerning the residence of water and sewer
authority board members. Moreover, contrary to the trial
court's interpretation, the statute does not require that each
person appointed by a locality to a water and sewer authority
board reside within that authority's service area. When the
General Assembly has intended to impose a residency requirement
for service on boards, authorities, and commissions in the
Commonwealth, it has done so explicitly. See, e.g., Code
§ 15.2-4203(B) (establishing residency requirement for certain
members of planning district commissions); Code § 15.2-4904(C)
(mandating residency requirement for directors of industrial
development authorities); Code § 15.2-5204 (providing that
members of hospital or health center commissions be residents of
political subdivisions they represent); Code § 15.2-6403(A)
6
(requiring that board members of regional industrial facilities
authorities be residents of appointing member locality).
Finally, we note that the 1997 order entered by Judge
Roberson did not address the issue of a residency requirement
for Board members. Nor did the provision in that order for the
joint appointment of one Board member implicitly impose any
residency requirement for that member, because the record does
not show that the Town's appointment power is restricted to the
selection of residents from the Authority's service area. Thus,
we hold that the trial court erred in imposing a service area
residency requirement for all appointments to the Board and in
concluding that Nell Stewart is disqualified from serving on the
Board because she resides outside the Authority's service area. 2
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's
judgment and enter final judgment declaring that there is no
requirement that every Board member be a resident of the
Authority's service area and, thus, that Nell Stewart is not
disqualified from serving on the Board based on her place of
residence and she is entitled to remain in office for the
duration of her present term.
2
We need not address the issue whether the County and the
Town had the power to impose a residency requirement for the
appointment of all Board members. The joint resolution
establishing the Authority, the Authority's articles of
incorporation, and its by-laws do not provide such a
requirement.
7
Reversed and final judgment.
8