[J-30-2020]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WESTERN DISTRICT
SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 32 WAP 2019
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the Superior
: Court entered 1/18/19 at No. 1354 WDA
: 2017, affirming the judgment of
v. : Sentence of the Court of Common
: Pleas of Allegheny County entered
: 8/25/17 at No. CP-02-CR-0011118-
CHARLES F. NEVELS, III, : 2015
:
Appellant : SUBMITTED: April 16, 2020
OPINION
CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: AUGUST 18, 2020
In this appeal by allowance, we consider whether the statute criminalizing
retaliation against witnesses applies only to witnesses in civil litigation.
When originally enacted in 1980, Section 4953 of the Crimes Code stated:
(a) Offense defined. A person commits an offense if he harms another
by any unlawful act in retaliation for anything lawfully done in the capacity
of witness or victim.
18 Pa.C.S. §4953(a) (superseded). The provision was amended in 2000 to read as
follows:
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if he harms another
by any unlawful act or engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly
commits acts which threaten another in retaliation for anything lawfully
done in the capacity of witness, victim or a party in a civil matter.
18 Pa.C.S. §4953(a) (emphasis added). See Act of Dec. 20, 2000, P.L. 837, No. 117,
§1. This appeal centers on whether the new phrase, “or a party in a civil matter,” affects
the scope of the prior statutory terms “witness” and “victim” – so that they, too, are
limited to the civil context.
In March 2014, Husband and Wife witnessed a fatal shooting outside their
home.1 In their grand jury testimony concerning the incident, they implicated Theodore
Smedley. In June 2015, shortly before Smedley’s trial was scheduled to begin, an
arson fire occurred at the couple’s house, where they and their daughter were sleeping.
Although the flames engulfed the home, all three occupants escaped, albeit with
injuries. Appellant – Smedley’s cousin – was eventually arrested in connection with the
fire and charged with multiple counts of retaliation against a witness, attempted
homicide, and aggravated arson. A jury convicted Appellant on all counts, and he was
sentenced to a lengthy prison term.
On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his conviction for retaliation against a witness.
In his advocacy on this point, Appellant noted that Section 4953(a) requires the
retaliation to have been committed against a “witness, victim or a party in a civil matter.”
18 Pa.C.S. §4953(a). He maintained that such language excluded Husband and Wife
because they provided testimony in a criminal matter.
A divided, three-judge panel of the Superior Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment
of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Nevels, 203 A.3d 229 (Pa. Super. 2019). The
majority concluded that the civil-matter qualifier modifies only the immediately preceding
word, “party.” See id. at 243. The dissent opined that the statute was ambiguous and,
1 Their names are not included in this opinion in an abundance of caution, as they have
already been the victims of crimes of violence based on their eyewitness testimony.
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as such, should be read in Appellant’s favor pursuant to the rule of lenity. See id. at
249-50 (Shogan, J., dissenting).
This Court granted further review limited to the following issue as framed by
Appellant:
Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to the charges of
Retaliation Against Witnesses or Victim (18 Pa.C.S. § 4953(a)), where the
evidence demonstrated that if [Appellant] had retaliated against anyone,
no such person had been party in a civil matter, but rather had testified or
was about to testify in a criminal matter.
Commonwealth v. Nevels, ___ Pa. ___, 216 A.3d 1042 (2019) (per curiam).
Although the above facially sets forth a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, in
seeking review Appellant stressed that the crux of his argument related to the
purportedly limited scope of the statute as encompassing witnesses (and victims) in civil
matters only, see, e.g., Petition for Allowance of Appeal in Commonwealth v. Nevels,
No. 49 WAL 2019 (Pa.), at 22, and that is the basis on which this Court issued its limited
grant. As such, the sole issue for our present resolution pertains to the proper
interpretation of the statute, which is an issue of law as to which our review is plenary
and de novo. See Commonwealth v. Cullen-Doyle, 640 Pa. 783, 786, 164 A.3d 1239,
1241 (2017).
Highlighting that statutory words and phrases should “be construed according to
rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage,” 1 Pa.C.S.
§1903, Appellant asserts that the most natural reading of Section 4953(a) suggests it
only protects individuals from retaliation for their role in civil proceedings. Appellant
posits that an interpretation whereby the statute protects parties in civil proceedings
only, while also protecting witnesses and victims in criminal proceedings, would lead to
an absurd result, contrary to Section 1922(1) of the Statutory Construction Act. See 1
Pa.C.S. §1922(1) (reflecting a presumption that the General Assembly does not intend
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a result that is “absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable”). He maintains, in
this regard, that it would be unreasonable not to protect witnesses in civil matters from
retaliation. See Brief for Appellant at 26. Finally, Appellant agrees with the Superior
Court dissent that, to the degree the statute is ambiguous, it must be read strictly
against the government under the rule of lenity. See id. at 27-30 (citing, inter alia, 1
Pa.C.S. §1928 (providing that penal statutes are subject to a strict construction)).
Section 4953 appears in Part II, Article E, Subchapter 49(B) of the Crimes Code.2
Subchapter 49(B) provides an express definition for the terms “victim” and “witness,” as
follows:
The following words and phrases when used in this subchapter shall have,
unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the meanings given to them
in this section.
“Victim.” Any person against whom any crime as defined under the laws
of this State or of any other state or of the United States is being or has
been perpetrated or attempted.
“Witness.” Any person having knowledge of the existence or
nonexistence of facts or information relating to any crime, including but not
limited to those who have reported facts or information to any law
enforcement officer, prosecuting official, attorney representing a criminal
defendant or judge, those who have been served with a subpoena issued
under the authority of this State or any other state or of the United States,
and those who have given written or oral testimony in any criminal matter;
or who would be believed by any reasonable person to be an individual
described in this definition.
18 Pa.C.S. §4951.
As can be seen from the above, for purposes of Subchapter 49(B), the terms
“victim” and “witness” are to be understood within the context of criminal proceedings,
“unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the
2Part II relates to the definitions of specific offenses, Article E to offenses against public
administration, and Chapter 49(B) to victim and witness intimidation.
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question becomes whether the present statutory context clearly indicates otherwise. In
this respect, and as noted, Appellant suggests that it does due to the inclusion, in 2000,
of parties in civil matters. However, there is little indication that that addition to the list of
persons protected under Section 4953 was intended to affirmatively remove protections
that already existed for victims and witnesses in criminal matters.
Nor does a grammatical analysis of the statutory text lead to such a result.
Appellant’s reading assumes that the words witness and victim are essentially in a
series with party, so that all three are subject to the “civil matter” qualifier appearing at
the end of the sentence. But the Legislature’s use of the indefinite article “a” in the
middle of the series undermines that reading. If the nouns in Section 4953(a) were
intended to be placed in a series, traditional English grammar would suggest usage of a
parallel structure. The Legislature instead used a parallel structure for victim and
witness, and then it interrupted that parallelism by placing “or a” before “party in a civil
matter.” It is therefore questionable at best to read “in a civil matter” as limiting anything
other than “party.” Accord Brief for Commonwealth at 26 (“Giving ‘or’ its normal
disjunctive effect in §4953, ‘a party in a civil matter’ is correctly read as an alternative to
witnesses and victims[.]”).3 Even to the degree an argument in favor of Appellant’s
understanding may be capable of articulation, the point here is that the statutory context
does not clearly indicate that that would be the preferred reading, as is required under
Section 4951.
Our conclusion is also consistent with the common sense understanding of the
limited nature of the 2000 statutory amendment as simply adding protections for parties
3 The Commonwealth also posits that limiting “party” in this way is sensible because in
criminal matters the only two parties are the Commonwealth and the defendant, and the
prosecuting attorney is independently protected from retaliation. See Brief for
Commonwealth at 28 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. §4953.1).
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in civil matters. As demonstrated by the present case, witnesses in criminal matters are
sometimes themselves victimized by persons unhappy with their cooperation with the
authorities, and the statute in the pre-2000 timeframe protected those individuals from
retaliation. It is counterintuitive to think the Legislature would have sought to eliminate
such safeguards by adding text to the statute which protects civil parties. Accord Brief
for Commonwealth at 28 (“It is illogical to interpret the addition of ‘or a party in a civil
matter’ as signifying the [L]egislature’s intent to decriminalize retaliation against
witnesses and victims in criminal matters.”).
Additionally, we disagree with Appellant to the degree he suggests that the
failure to protect witnesses in civil matters renders our present interpretation
unreasonable. As noted, the statute originally protected only witnesses and victims in
criminal matters, and it was later revised to add protections for parties in civil matters.
While the legislative body may, at some future time, see fit to extend protections to
witnesses and victims in civil matters, it need not have done so as part of the 2000
revision. To the contrary, the Legislature is free to address social problems of statewide
dimension incrementally. See Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 574 Pa. 121, 140-41, 828
A.2d 1079, 1090-91 (2003) (citing Maurer v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 27, 7 A.2d 466, 473
(1939)).
Finally, Appellant cannot prevail by appealing to the rule of lenity. As explained,
the definitions appearing in Section 4951 are to be applied throughout Subchapter 49(B)
absent a clear contextual indication to the contrary, which does not exist here. That
being the case, when Sections 4951 and 4953 are read together, there is insufficient
ambiguity in the substantive statute criminalizing victim or witness retaliation to implicate
strict construction against the government. In all events, the rule of lenity has its limits,
as it “does not require that the words of a penal statute be given their narrowest
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possible meaning or that legislative intent be disregarded.” Commonwealth v. Packer,
568 Pa. 481, 489, 798 A.2d 192, 196 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
Justices Baer, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht and Mundy join the opinion.
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